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I am compelled to go my own way, often a roundabout way, and that I 
cannot make any use of ideas that are suggested to me when I am not 
ready for them.1  
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‘Everything would be all right were it not for this and that and t’other’ (Freud in 
Jones, 1957: 496). 
 
 
Acknowledgements are funny things somebody or something always gets left out.  
And given that this is a thesis engaged with psychoanalysis and therefore the 
unconscious, one wonders if the leaving out is deliberate. 
 
The journey of this thesis has been rather long and somewhat arduous. Less dream 
journey and royal road and more nightmare and deserted thoroughfare, in the sense 
that thoroughfare gives as a ‘rite’ of passage.  And while Freud’s dream journey and 
his theory in general seems to be stopped by a ‘burning bush’ and the biblical 
reference to Moses is deliberate, my travails have been held up by life.  But as Freud 
puts it ‘we must live in the world after all’ (SE 20: 203).   
 
As I said, a long journey with few open spaces and quite a lot of falls, metaphoric as 
well as literal. This has been a journey accompanied by two little boys, born at the 
onset and ready to see this ‘thing’ depart.  But they have had a ‘good enough mother’ 
who turned away from her thesis to mother them and then back again when she could. 
Add two ‘sometime’ daughters, grown now and left the nest and perhaps an 
understanding towards the length and winding road of this thesis becomes clearer. 
 
But it also had its own problems, less a metamorphosis and more a mutation.  I began 
this thesis with Dr. Victoria Grace, who at the end of this thesis is now a Professor. 
Initially a different thesis entirely but she realised my heart wasn’t in it and told me to 
go away and write what it was I wanted to think and write about.  Even at this early 
stage she stressed the journey of a thesis and the need then to write about something 
that you were passionate about.  I came back with something so different to my initial 
inquiry Victoria had to ‘depart’.  So it was that I was looking for another supervisor.  
Here then Associate Professor Rosemary du Plessis stepped in.  Warmed by her 
encouragement I wrote a proposal and handed it in as my sons reached their six-
month mark.  My supervisor taking a good look at me, declared I needed to be kind to 
myself, to not imitate superwoman and go home, be a mother as she sensed that was 
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what I wanted to be.  And it was, and for a time I enjoyed that role, adding in teaching 
at the University and time went on.  But always those scratches in my mind, the 
wayward thoughts, the ‘what ifs’. … So I began again and as I started to write I 
realised that where I thought I wanted to go was not where I wanted to go at all.  
Telling me that talking to me was like having Julia Kristeva and I on one side of the 
room, a compliment as I saw it, and her on the other, Rosemary also had to leave. 
Psychoanalysis was not an interest for her, maybe the mother but definitely not 
psychoanalysis.  I was told several times by several people that the thesis I wanted to 
undertake was unpopular – the mother – and unfashionable – psychoanalysis.  And 
then Dr. Nabila Jaber stepped in. I had taught in her classes for several years and had 
a rapport with her – my academic mother I sometimes called her.  And she has been 
with me ever since.  I’m not sure that I can express the gratitude of having someone 
who just wanted me to finish and believed that I could. Victoria came back briefly and 
I thank her also, because on her return she bought with her a new, well perhaps 
enlarged, interest in psychoanalysis.  It was lovely to have someone at last that I could 
talk to about the theory of psychoanalysis even if she was a Lacanian and I a Freudian 
(a bigger difference than you can imagine).  We also parted but I think of that time 
fondly (mostly) because it was here, in conversation with Victoria that I began to get a 
sense of what this project could mean.  
 
But I can go no further without thinking back to that brief period of a group of us, a 
coven really, a solid group of four that opened up to others as they passed through the 
corridors.  For a small amount of time we worked and ‘lived’ together on the fourth 
floor of the History building.  Allowed to develop undisturbed we shared crisis, 
crunch-times and ideas.  But more than that, we had a sense, as four PhD’s of 
companionship and of a knowledge of what doing a PhD entailed.  The University 
broke us up, restructuring they called it and ‘our’ floor was given over to another 
department and we were spread far and wide.  Sharon and Tanja have finished now 
with only Sally and I, almost in conjunction, to complete our theses.  To all three I 
owe gratitude; on the ‘Kant’ floor we learnt the strength of each other and the 
knowledge that we would all get there in the end. 
 
Freud once said that the Interpretation of Dreams was written in ‘splendid isolation’.  
And I could say the same with this thesis, but without the splendid, mostly the 
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isolation.  Because it is to be isolated to be doing something that has no department or 
school or people that you can discuss ideas with or to wonder where the ideas are 
going and what do they mean. And the people around me…well, ‘Freud is just that 
man that talked about sex wasn’t he’? And the mother, well she is such a loaded term, 
concretised and ephemeral at once, how could we ever untangle or even think such a 
concept. To quote Freud once again, ‘we must live in the world after all’ (SE 20: 
203).  And as a mother, however the term is loaded, however the world of theory and 
also the lived world, the everyday world judges you, you just keep going.   
 
My biggest companion throughout this thesis has been Freud himself.  I saw a 
commonality between us from the start.  Perhaps small commonalities, but then 
psychoanalysis is about the small, the insignificant, the forgotten.  His migraines, his 
fear of poverty, his abhorrence of authority – he has ‘a learnt expression to it’ he says.  
Freud told Fliess that regarding poverty, he had a ‘constant fear of it’, having known 
‘it’ and compared poverty to the ‘certain nervousness’ that one has for life. I 
understand then when Freud says that his state of mind depends on his earnings – ‘a 
certain prosperous livelihood improves his style!’ But for some reason, one of those 
unknown quantities in life, Freud reminds me of my mother.  Reading Freud I hear 
my mother.  Now I would not be so bold to confess that a small amount of Jewish 
blood may offer an inherited tendency towards some kind of knowing, an 
understanding perhaps.  But I would ask, how big is small?  And how strong are 
inherited, perhaps archaic knowledges? 
 
On the closing of these acknowledgements (of this thesis really) I thank my family 
who wondered ‘why’ more than once I am sure. To Brent, who hasn’t been here for a 
lot of it but who has the ability to make me smile, to make me laugh. To my funny 
little boys, with their quirky senses of humour and there often direct, more often that 
not complex way of looking at the world. They were born at the onset of this thesis 
and it was their growth that let me see the stages Freud wrote of, from the ‘bundle of 
id’ upwards.  Of course Freud’s writing ‘out’ of the mother will be addressed in the 
following thesis but I still remember the little boy who wanted to find something 
similar about us (he’d tired of seeing if I had a penis), who finally said, with great 





And finally, in the context of last but not least, my mother.  This thesis would never 
have been written without my mother, in the sense as Freud wrote it that we owe a 
depth of gratitude to the mother, after all she bought us into the world.  But also my 
way of thinking, my ways of being really, mirror my mother a great deal. 
Acknowledgments are in some ways a place to reflect on how this project got to 
where it was and who helped to get it there.  And when I say whom, I wonder about 
the possibility of the other, perhaps archaic voices that exist in the unconscious.  And 
why I say this, is that when I was reading over, and editing my thesis, I was struck by 
the date I used in Chapter Two to explain the temporal locator, here enacted in a ‘fall’. 
The date I used, ‘I/We fell pregnant on the 6 August 1907’ is my maternal 
grandmother’s birth date.  A grandmother I have never known but who I have been 
compared to throughout my life; I look like her, I have her eyes I am told.  It is 
reiterated tirelessly and sometimes my looking like her is offered as a ‘fright’. As in, I 
have become the walking dead it seems (at my Uncle’s funeral I gave my Aunty, 
whose name I carry, as a second name but my favourite name, a fright.  She thought 
her mother was standing there in front of her; her mother who had been dead for over 
50 years). Freud showed us, that these uncanny and seemingly unremarkable 
coincidences mean something.  It could be said, they ‘make’ us to a degree. It seems 
such an unremarkable fact that I was supposed to be born on this day, the 6th of 
August so many years later, but because I obviously liked my first ‘home’ too much I 
wasn’t (and I was induced!).    
 
To end then, I thank my ‘mum’, and my dad, my sisters and brother, ‘my’ Brent, my 
children (and here wee Lacy I remember you with my cups of tea, my salvation) my 






It was for the longest time that the mother in Freud troubled me.  Unlike some 
feminist psychoanalysts such as Julia Kristeva who argue that the mother/maternity in 
Freud is finally to be thought of as a ‘massive nothing’ (Kristeva, 1987: 255), I knew 
that the mother was there/da, but it was how she was there that concerned me and 
forms the basis of this thesis. Freud shows us the mother in his work when he argues 
that the child’s first love object in its truest sense is the mother, ‘and all of his sexual 
instincts with their demand for satisfaction have been united upon this object’ (SE 18: 
111). I highlight the ‘his’ because Freud’s focus on this first love object is primarily 
male.  And although Freud does not differentiate between the little girl and little boy 
at this early stage, thereafter the girls relationship to the mother, argues Freud, ends in 
‘hate’. She cannot be forgiven for not giving the little girl a penis. But the mother as a 
primordial ‘object’ not only becomes lost (and thereafter we are all involved in a 
search to ‘refind ‘it’/‘her’) but she seems also to be, uniformly Mater/matter to be 
overlooked. To use a rather explosive analogy, it is as if the mother and Freud are 
together yet separated in a double-barreled shotgun, with the misfiring of one barrel 
obscuring (obliterating) the other.  Freud in fact used a similar analogy in an 
explanation for anxiety. Here the rifle is pointed at the ‘wild beast’ a description that 
Freud uses to describe the unruly forces of the libido in the unconscious. A fitting 
parallel then because the mother has a relation to anxiety and the unconscious that 
might best be described as central.  
 
Thus Freud writes and the mother is ‘shaded’.  Again an apt analogy one that Freud 
himself uses to describe the Odyssean like shades that invade the unconscious as 
ghosts and taste blood.  If the mother is indeed the dark-continent, a simile for the 
unconscious, or at least her sexuality, which after all is what is important in Freud’s 
Oedipal theory, then the question might be asked, ‘is the mother a ghost that haunts 
our living lives’? Of course a living mother is not a ghost, but then a literal 
explanation neglects the repression that accompanies the developing ego, an ego no 
less that is subject to childhood amnesia during the middle years of childhood. 
 
The Prologue introduces us to Freud the man.  It seemed to me at the onset of this 
thesis that the mother is both universalised but also personalised.  If Freud did not 
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mourn his mother, why might this be so? And how is Freud himself mourned, 
remembered, outside his work?  Chapter One is an introduction to Freud’s work, 
asking where the mother might be, and even why she may or may not be recognised 
in areas that seem peculiar to a space that mothers might occupy.  Chapter Two looks 
at feminist psychoanalysts and asks how they engage with both Freud the man, and 
Freudian psychoanalysis and thereafter the later schools of psychoanalysis.  Chapter 
Three engages with Freud and Freudian theory, offering an in-depth engagement with 
particular psychoanalytic concepts and places where the mother might be, or should 
be, but for some reason is not.  Chapter Four explores the concept of anxiety, itself 
singled out as somehow having an integral relationship to the mother but again, Freud 
by a less than careful sleight of hand writes the mother out.  And yet this is not a 
direct writing out, because Freud circulates around the point, the navel as it were, 
offering a kind of adverse reckoning, the mother is there but also, she is not. Chapter 
Five concludes this thesis by looking at several different theories, including 
Christopher Bollas’s ‘clowning mother’, and asks how might they offer alternative 
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A Note on the usage of the word Mother 
Throughout this text I use mother instead of the current popular usage of ‘primary 
care-giver’.  It will be seen in Chapter Two that I am quite critical of this renaming of 
the mother in such a ‘politically correct’ manner.  It denies the mother of a position 
that is itself always already undermined.  Given that in most cases mothers raise 
infants and children it becomes an unnecessary and clumsy appellation, which also 
undermines the very meaning of mother.  Of course, the meaning of ‘mother’ is itself 
under scrutiny, and I think that this is a good thing.  Mother in all her guises, most 
often heavily loaded ones that determine her position as some kind of all-giving and 
all-forgiving everything needs to be ‘unpacked’.  That being said, ‘The Mother’ in its 
abstract form and mother in her visceral grounded shape have a history, longer in 
some cultures, shorter in others that combines all the obvious and hidden things, even 
things as yet unknown, that by changing her title, ‘mother’, we lose. And really, who 
is going to introduce their mother as, ‘this is my primary care-giver?’  While I am, of 
course an advocate of mothers being people first I want to stress the importance of 
what seems to be an unknown quality attached to the idea (perhaps even the lived 
experience) of mothers, of mothering.  If we lose the title then we lose the tangled, 
sweaty, unwieldy somethings that are caught up in the very filaments, the very bones 
perhaps, of the word mother.  It would be a shame to lose this and I would ask how 
can you build onto something when its foundations, however unstable, even as 




Prologue: ‘Prelude for the Reader’ 
‘…my good old lady’.2  
 
‘Let me speak, then, and find relief’ 
(Job, 32:20).3 
 
Freud famously said that he did not grieve when his mother died.  And perhaps more 
famously with the death of his father, psychoanalysis was born.  A lot is being said in 
these two sentences.  They point to an importance given the father and a lack thereof 
afforded the mother.  And yet neither of these statements is quite true.  In a letter to 
Sándor Ferenczi on the eve of his mother’s death, he states her death ‘has affected me 
in a peculiar way, this great event.  No pain, no grief, which probably can be 
explained by the special circumstances—her great age, my pity for her helplessness 
toward the end; at the same time a feeling of liberation, of release, which I think I also 
understand.  I was not free to die as long as she was alive, and now I am.  The values 
of life will somehow have changed noticeably in the deeper layers’ (in E. Freud, 
1930: 400). With my mother’s death says Freud I am ‘free’, to live but also ‘free to 
die’.  This ‘great event’ is something that ‘I’ think ‘I’ understand writes Freud to 
Ferenczi.  And yet in the ‘deepest layers’ life has changed.  With the suspicion of the 
worst, when first diagnosed with oral cancer, Freud asked his doctor ‘for help to 
“disappear from this world with decency”’ (Kramer ed., 1996: 13).  But then he 
remembered his mother.  Referring to her as the ‘old lady’, an expression of fondness 
he also used for his nurse and an elderly patient, Freud says, ‘It would not be easy to 
do that to the old lady’ (Kramer ed., 1996: 13). Inexplicably says Kramer, there is 
                                                 
2 Freud in a letter to William Fliess (in Bonaparte, A.Freud, Kris ed., 1954: 334). This 
‘good old lady’ had just died, but had been a patient of Freud’s for several years and 
is the old lady whose medicine/eye-drops he ‘bungles’ in The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (SE 6). In this ‘bungled action, Freud drops morphine into the eyes of 
his ‘good old lady’ who is a ‘medical patient’ that he visits twice a day, instead of the 
collyrium he is supposed to use. As he had performed the task so often he completed 
it automatically but on this morning, ‘the automaton had worked wrong’ (SE 6: 177).  
His feeling of fright he thinks must have some other source as a few drops of 
morphine will not harm the eye.  In fact he links it to the dream of a young man, a 
patient who he cures, and who offers him the Oedipus myth, which later becomes 
Freud’s Oedipus Complex.  The young man dreams he has sex with his mother, a 
phantasy Freud suggests that ‘fluctuates’ between two periods the infantile as the 
return of the repressed and the ‘right now’. 
3 Also quoted by Yosef Yerushalmi (1991: 81). 
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always something, ‘“an inseparable bond for Freud between the words “my mother” 
and “my death”’ (Kramer ed., 1996: 13). 
 
In contrast the death of Freud’s father, Jacob has been cited as the point from which 
psychoanalysis grew. Freud told Jones it ‘revolutionised my soul’ (Jones, 1957: 21).  
What has been called Freud’s seminal work The Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4-5) is 
intertwined with stories of fathers, absurd fathers, stern fathers, strong and weak 
fathers, forbidding and forbidden fathers. In a letter to Fliess three days after the death 
of his father he says his father ‘bore himself bravely up to the end, like the remarkable 
man he was’ (in Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris ed. 1954: 169-170).  Further Freud 
writes, ‘By one of the obscure routes behind the official consciousness, the old man's 
death affected me deeply. I valued him highly, understood him very well indeed, and 
with his peculiar mixture of deep wisdom and imaginative light-heartedness he meant 
a great deal in my life. By the time he died his life had long been over, but at a death 
the whole past stirs within one.  I feel now as if I had been turned up by the roots’ 
(Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris ed. 1954:170-171).  This ‘remarkable man’ Freud 
described as being rather Micawber-like ‘always hopefully expecting something to 
turn up’ (Jones, 1953: 3). And yet, Freud writing to Ernest Jones states that he has no 
time for ‘the exaggerations on the occasion of death’ which he found, ‘particularly 
distasteful’ and was ‘careful to avoid them’ although he could truthfully say on Karl 
Abraham’s death, ‘Integer vitae scelerisque purus’ (‘He whose life is blameless and 
free of guilt’) (in E. Freud ed., 1925: 363). In fact, even on the death of Jones’s first 
son Freud wrote and suggested ‘a piece of Shakespearean research in the hope of 
distracting me’ states Jones.  When Jones reproaches Freud for his lack of 
‘consolatory wisdom’ Freud replies ‘When I did not write to you what you had 
expected I had good reasons for it.  I know of only two consolations in such a case.  
The one is bad, since it robs life of all its value, and for young ones like you and your 
poor wife.  What this second is you may easily guess. … As an unbelieving fatalist I 
can only let my arms sink before the terrors of death’ (in Jones, 1957: 149).  
 
‘I am uprooted’ with the death of my father says Freud, and yet I feel ‘the whole past 
stir within me’.  In the ‘deeper layers’ I feel the death of my mother, but now I am 
free to live, and free to die says Freud.  His mother, he writes to Max Eitingon on the 
death of Eitingon’s mother, ‘bars my way to the longed-for rest, to eternal 
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nothingness’ and comments, ‘The loss of a mother must be something very strange, 
unlike anything else, and must arouse emotions that are hard to grasp’ (in E.Freud, 
1960: 392). When Freud is honoured with a plaque on the house in which he was 
born, he writes to the Mayor of Přibor-Freiberg thanking him.  He states that he left 
his birth place at the age of three and returned only once, when he was sixteen but 
‘one thing is certain’, ‘deep within me, although overlaid, there continues to live the 
happy child from Freiberg, the first-born son of a youthful mother, the boy who 
received from this air, from this soil, the first indelible impressions’ (in E. Freud, 
1960: 407-408).  ‘Deep within me, although overlaid’ lives the happy child, the first-
born son of a youthful mother’.  Freud states in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
‘that in being in love with one’s own mother one is never concerned with her as she is 
in the present but with her youthful mnemic image carried over from one’s childhood’ 
(SE 6: 178).  For Freud, his mother is no Jocasta ‘mistakenly’ undertaking an 
incestuous relationship with her son.  She is a representation of the Madonna, ‘a 
charming, sympathetic nursemaid, not from the celestial world but from ours’ as he 
writes in a letter to Martha Freud (E. Freud, 1960: 82). Jim Swan argues that Freud 
cleaves his mother in two, mater and nannie (Swan, 1974). And yet the two will 
inevitably become one: ‘If during a child’s prehistoric epoch, his nurse has been 
dismissed, and if soon afterward his mother has died, the two events are superimposed 
on each other in a single series in his memory as revealed in analysis’ (SE 4: 255).  
Freud’s mother did not die, although we could argue that this youthful mother saw a 
lot of death, felt a lot of grief.  Freud’s eleven-month younger brother Julius dies of an 
intestinal problem around eight months old. A few months before Julius’s birth 
Amalie’s4 (Freud’s mother) brother dies.  This then is a house of grieving.  It could be 
                                                 
4 Ernest Jones and Ernst Freud spell Freud’s mother’s name, Amalie, although I have 
seen it spelt Amalié and perhaps more commonly by authors writing on Freud, 
including Peter Gay (1988), Amalia.  I will follow Jones and Ernst Freud in their 
spelling because Ernst is the grandson and editor of an edition of letters written by 
Freud and one would think he would know the spelling of his grandmother’s name. 
And Jones was familiar with the Freud family as a whole and I expect he would, 
given the three-tiered biography on Freud, spell her name correctly. It seems a little 
thing to note but after all, Freud following Goethe pointed out that a ‘man’s name’ is 
important to him. Freud states ‘Goethe, I recalled, had remarked somewhere upon 
people’s sensitiveness about their names: how we seem to have grown into them like 
our skin (SE 4: 207). Freud had preceded his comment on Goethe’s name by stating 
that ‘‘Freud’ is the German word for ‘joy’’ (SE 4: 207 n 2) and that his ‘playing about 
with names’ which has ‘a kind of childish naughtiness’ to it, is a reaction to all the 
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said that Freud’s Spaltung, between mater and nannie has as much to do with a 
mother in mourning, to a Catholic nurse that tells him of ‘Heaven’ and ‘Hell’ and the 
fulfillment of the wish of a jealous infant, ‘dethroned, despoiled, prejudiced’ against 
his usurper, his baby brother.  
 
Perhaps it is not as simple as this and if Freud taught us anything he taught us to look 
beyond the obvious.  When Freud’s mother died he had experienced several deaths of 
people close to him. His daughter Sophie, the mother of little Ernst of the famous 
psychoanalytic game the fort/da (the Sunday child Breger calls Sophie in light of her 
beauty (Breger, 2000)), and then Sophie’s son, (Ernst’s younger brother) Heinrele, of 
who Freud declared he had never loved another human being so much. This 
‘enchanting little fellow’ was always sickly ‘a bag of skin and bones’ (Jones, 1957: 
96). Freud states that Heinrele was one of those children whose mental development 
out grew his physical growth. To Kata and Lajos Levy Freud wrote, ‘I don’t think I 
have ever experienced such grief’ (E. Freud, 1960: 343-344). And Jones argues it was 
                                                                                                                                            
‘feeble witticisms’ that his own name had encountered on numerous occasions (SE 4: 
207). To this point it is interesting that Freud wrote in a letter to Martha, (during the 
early days of their courtship), and trying to impress on her (and himself) the 
importance of her family history, ‘The Jew is made for joy and joy for the Jew’ (E. 
Freud, 1960: 21). Freud has a teacher in this, an ‘Old Jew’ who he refers to as a 
‘Nathan the Wise’ (after Lessing’s character in a play of the same name, who pleads 
for religious tolerance).  Freud tells Martha that ‘when I took my leave I was more 
deeply moved than the Old Jew could possibly guess’ (E. Freud, 1960: 21).  Freud 
had used a pseudonym, a Dr. Wahle, a friend and former admirer of Martha, and a 
different destination, Prague instead of Vienna to order monogrammed paper from 
this ‘Old Jew’. Freud tells Martha that while the ‘joy’ that the ‘Old Jew’ speaks of 
with such reverence in relation to the ‘Holy Days’, is not for them, ‘no longer offers 
us any shelter, something of the core, of the essence of his meaningful and life-
affirming Judaism will not be absent from our home’ (in E. Freud, 1960: 22).  Thus, 
Freud who is often depicted as a ‘joyless Jew’ (he has a ‘cheerful pessimism’ he tells 
Jones), in fact shows that the ‘joyful’ teachings of his ‘Old Master’ had some 
meaning, incorporated some element that related in some way to the meanings he had 
attributed to his own name, even if here, Freud (although I do not know why – no 
reason is given. I suppose he was trying to keep the paper a secret from Martha. 
Perhaps making some sort of point to Martha?), is using the name of another.  Freud 
then, if we are to employ our own ‘playing about with names’, which means ‘joy’, 
seems to suggest something about his relationship to Judaism, to his own sense of 
being a Jew, to some sort of ‘core’, an ‘essence’ of/to Freud, ‘many dark emotional 
powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words’ (E. Freud, 1960: 
367) that is in fact, carried throughout Freud’s work.  
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‘the only occasion in his life when Freud was known to shed tears’ (1957: 96).5 To 
Jones he said, that the loss of Heinrele ‘killed something in him for good’ (Jones, 
                                                 
5 Peter Rudnytsky in his book, Rescuing Psychoanalysis from Freud and Other 
Essays in Re-Vision (2011) has Freud ‘bursting’ in on William Stekel and his 
Viennese colleagues, who sought to oust Carl Jung from the position of Freud’s ‘true 
son and heir’, with ‘tears streaming down his cheeks’ (in Rudnytsky, 2011: 37).  This 
is an account given by Stekel, who Rudnytsky will whole-heartedly believe, even 
engaging an account by Ferenczi of Freud, who received an honorary doctorate from 
Clark University ‘almost with tears in his eyes’ (in Rudnytsky, 2011: 37) as 
confirmation of Stekel’s story.  Rudnytsky takes sides, and in this book (the only book 
of his I have read) he sides with Stekel of whom Freud called ‘worse than swine’.  In 
fact, Rudnytsky, who Brett Kahr states in the foreword, ‘loves Freud’ seems to be 
involved in the worst kind of gossiping, that which would strip the last shred of 
dignity from the bones of the dead (which is interesting as Freud in a letter to Fritz 
Wittels (of who Rudnytsky quotes in support of Stekel) states that when one knows as 
little about the subject of their biography as Wittels does of Freud, they should wait 
‘till the person is dead, when he cannot do anything about it and fortunately no longer 
cares’ (E.Freud, 1960: 350)). Far be it for me to suggest that the dead should get to 
rest easily, but Rudnytsky’s scholarship, in this book at least, builds on very tenuous 
associations, those of the supposed Minna Bernays/Freud affair, here taking Jung’s 
account as a truth, rather than addressing the fact that Jung had several affairs, and 
perhaps was deflecting from these.  And why would Minna Bernays, Freud’s sister-in-
law, tell Jung on their first meeting that she was having an affair with Freud.  It makes 
no sense.  And even if there were an element of truth to it, why would you build an 
argument around something so tenuous, and ultimately non-consequential? Perhaps if 
there was ‘good’, that is to say ‘adequate’, as in, verification from the man himself 
evidence for an affair we could suppose that it might have had some bearing on 
Freud’s work. Although admittedly I am not sure why, or even how much impact it 
would have. Rudnytsky will say, ‘In today’s world, Freud’s authority is no longer 
exercised through his personal charisma but solely through the enduring power of his 
texts’ (2011: 39). Which is slightly disingenuous as Rudnytsky himself argued ‘all 
Freud’s psychoanalytic writings may be read as fragments of his interminable self-
analysis’ (2011: 34).  Thus Freud the man it would seem is Freud the text. I was 
disquieted by Rudnytsky’s empathic account of Winnicott’s affair, which is in direct 
contrast to the gossip like nastiness that he attributed to Freud’s apparent affair. And 
what is it, but hearsay, because it cannot be proven. And the ‘proof’ that Rudnytsky 
believed that he had is tenuous at best, at worst, it is just ‘horrid’ (as Winnicott says of 
himself) and ultimately it goes nowhere.  To this Rudnytsky wants us to know that 
Freud ‘wet his pants’ when he and Jung and Ferenczi were in America.  For what 
purpose do we need to know this I ask?  How does this aid Freudian scholarship? And 
again, it came from Jung, so why are we to believe Jung, Ferenczi and Stekel over 
Freud? The letter to Wittels that I quoted above is twice cited by Rudnytsky to 
support his argument that Freud was ‘unkind’ and ‘unfair’ to Stekel but he neglects to 
say that Freud here is expressing disappointment that Wittels ignored the information 
Freud had given him about his relationship to Stekel and the reasons for the break 
(from his point of view) in a previous letter (pgs 345-347 in E.Freud, 1960). To 
engage with Freud, whether we believe his theories are right or wrong does not need 
to involve stripping him of both his ‘clothes’ or his ‘dignity’ for that matter: ‘they 
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1957: 97).  Jones suggests that perhaps Heinrele stood in some way for ‘little Julius’, 
something ‘deep in his heart’ (Jones, 1957: 97).  Freud was ailing and at 72 was 
nearing the end of his own life (although admittedly he lived for another decade). But 
Freud thought he was destined to die young, partly influenced by Fliess’s ‘period 
theory’ Freud had in fact lived past both the ages he thought he would die, 51 and 62.   
His farewell to friends was apparently, ‘Good-bye, this might be the last time you see 
me’ or a variation of this.   
 
It could be said that the death of his father occurred at a turning point in his life.  The 
loss of a father, as Freud describes it is ‘the most important event, the most poignant 
loss, of a man’s life’ (SE 4: xxvi). This was a ‘liminal’ period for Freud, as Jung 
referred to it, where one looks back at his/her achievements, or lack thereof and 
forward to the possibilities of doing something in/with ones life.  Freud was 
potentially at a crossroads, involved in self-analysis and therefore deeply reflective. 
His father’s death would have affected him more than his mother’s for these reasons 
alone.  And yet Freud lived in fear that he would die before his mother, knowing that 
she would not cope with news of his death. To Eitingon he wrote, ‘I somehow could 
not forgive myself if I were to die before her’ (in E. Freud, 1960: 392). To note, Jones 
follows his account (which is remarkably brief) of Amalie’s death with a recollection 
of Eva Rosenfeld’s concerning her anxiety with Freud’s own illness (his recurring 
operations for cancer of the mouth and upper jaw). In analysis with Freud she could 
not help showing her tension, and upon telling Freud her ‘unhappy secret’ he said, 
‘We have only one aim and only one loyalty, to psycho-analysis.  If you break this 
rule you injure something much more important than any consideration you owe me’ 
(in Jones, 1957: 163).  A strange example to follow Freud’s portrayal of his emotions 
following the death of his mother: psychoanalysis is all are the words Jones puts in 
Freud’s mouth (‘Psychoanalysis is Freud’ writes Jones, which begs the question 
                                                                                                                                            
begrudge the coat I am wearing’ (Freud quoted by Rudnytsky, 2011: 37). Or as Freud 
writes to Wittels in the earlier letter referring to Stekel’s ‘treachery and ugly 
dishonesty’: ‘all the buttons of [even my] trousers of patience snapped off’ (E. Freud, 
1960: 346).  I agree with Rudnytsky (although not in the context he offers) when he 
states that we should both escape the ‘Scylla of Freud-bashing and the Charybdis of 
Freudolatry’ (Rudnytsky, 2011: 39). An entirely appropriate metaphor with its 
mythological Odyssean element, (which I will engage with in Chapter Three) but I 
would also argue that this would involve a fairer trial than the one that Rudnytsky 
offers Freud, at least in this account. 
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argues Phillips, ‘Who, then, is Jones’ (Phillips, 1994: 110)). But who will “fish” these 
words out? Who will reach into the ‘yawning’, and one might say, as Kramer does, 
the prosthetic ‘hole’ of Freud’s mouth?  Anxiety, cancer/the ‘monster’ (Freud’s name 
for this prosthetic), death, psychoanalysis and the mother, all hang together ‘in’ the 
mouth of Freud.  And we know the mouth has a symbolic equivalence to the 
mother/vagina/womb. Here then, like the Māori legend of Māui, who standing on the 
South Island of New Zealand, fishes up the North Island with the jawbone of his 
grandmother, I ‘fish’ out the words from Freud’s mouth, acknowledging the slippage 
between the terms mother, death, psychoanalysis, all spoken that is from the symbolic 
equivalence of the vagina/womb, here perhaps more readily acknowledged because of 
the prosthetic monster, which replaces Freud’s jaw. 
 
Freud will argue that we all desire to return to the womb, but he seems to forget, not a 
proper forgetting though, that the womb is, importantly in the mother. Freud stressed 
that the importance of the infantile experience was overlooked and yet he would 
ignore the person who is most loved by the infant in its early years – its mother.  He 
would state that the mother was vitally important to the mental wellbeing of the child 
and then ‘gloss’ this over with his Oedipal paradigm.  The mother becomes a 
necessary piece of the puzzle and yet a seemingly unimportant prop. Madelon 
Sprengnether will argue that all the mothers in Freud disappear into footnotes, or 
asides: ‘be it Dora’s madly cleaning mother, Little Han’s beautiful, seductive mother, 
or the Rat Man’s absentee mother, they all appear as silhouettes against the rich 
background of other relationships, other entanglements’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 42 n 3). 
And yet Freud sought to give women a voice.  He listened to ‘female hysterics’, and 
by doing so, whatever we may conclude regarding the interpretations (and I will 
discuss the Little Hans case-study in Chapter Three) he let ‘them’ speak. And this in a 
time when medicine/science thought women’s mental and physical being was simply 
tied to biological life-cycles/events.  Freud will tell the ‘Impartial Listener’ in The 
Question of Lay Analysis (SE 20) that medicine conceived of ‘women’s problems’ as 
something that ‘nature or time will finally take care of it’: ‘With women there is first 
menstruation, then marriage, and later on the menopause. Finally death is a real help’ 
(SE 20: 232).  In his ‘chimney sweeping’ or ‘talking cure’ as Anna O. (Bertha 





But what of Freud’s own relationship to his mother.  He refers to himself as the first-
born son of a youthful mother, but we might ask, where does Amalie Freud go to after 
that?  Robert Kramer asks, ‘Who, exactly was this powerful and fearsome mother to 
whose Imago Freud seems to have been chained, eternally, in his unconscious?’ 
(Kramer ed., 1996: 44 n 4).  He continues by stating that we know almost nothing 
about Freud’s mother except for a few scattered memories.  The mother who referred 
to her son as ‘mein goldener Sigmund’ (‘my golden Sigi’) has all but been forgotten.  
This is the mother that Freud visited every Sunday for lunch, all his adult life, up until 
her death and yet, argues Kramer, Nichts (nothing). Of Freud’s colleagues continues 
Kramer, not even Otto Rank with his belief that the mother was ‘All’ seemed to 
question Freud’s relationship to his mother. Except one, later in his life Sándor 
Ferenczi did so, but only in the privacy of his diary.  A year before his death Ferenczi 
considers Freud’s motives for abandoning the seduction theory for his Oedipal theory 
(I will explain these theories in Chapter Three).  In Ferenczi’s own work he had been 
increasingly drawn back to the so-called seduction theory and argued that the ‘sexual 
abuse’ of children ‘was far more common than Freud admitted’ (in Kramer ed., 1996: 
45 n 4).  Ferenczi wondered at the ease with which Freud ‘sacrifices the interests of 
women in favour of male patients’ and considers that this might have something to do 
with his relationship to his mother.  Ferenczi suggests that Freud ‘recoiled’ from a 
‘sexually demanding mother’ and that her passionate nature may have repelled him. 
In italics Ferenczi writes,  
 
Castration of the father, the potent one, as a reaction to the humiliation he 
experienced, led to the construction of a theory in which the father castrates the 
son and, moreover, is then revered by the son as a god. In his conduct Fr[eud] 
plays only the role of the castrating god, he wants to ignore the traumatic 
moment of his own castration in childhood; he is the only one who does not 
have to be analysed’ (Kramer ed., 1996: 45 n 4).  
 
Ferenczi’s depiction of Freud’s relationship with his mother is at odds with Jones’s 
biographical account.  Jones states that it is from Amalie that Freud gets his ‘passion’, 
his temperament.  From his father, Freud ‘inherited his sense of humour’, ‘his 
scepticism about the uncertain vicissitudes of life’, his custom of quoting a Jewish 
anecdote to emphasise a moral, ‘his liberalism and free-thinking, and perhaps his 
uxoriousness’ (Jones, 1953: 4).  His intellect, argues Jones was his own.  Freud offers 
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a lovely little vignette, a recollection of his father’s to illustrate in what high regard 
his parents held Freud’s intellect, his genius.  One day, Jacob Freud comes upon a 
friend and his son arguing in the street.  Freud senior ‘laughingly’ reproves the son, 
with the expression, ‘(w)hat, are you contradicting your father? My Sigmund’s little 
toe is cleverer than my head, but he would never dare to contradict me!’ (Freud cited 
by Jones, 1953: 21). 
 
Reflections on Freud 
But in looking to understand where the mother is for Freud, in his work, given that 
this might be the only place we can locate the mother of/for Freud we need to 
understand Freud the man.  Freud referred to himself as a ‘conquistador’ an 
archeologist and also an architect of the psyche. In a letter to James Putnam he says, ‘I 
have always been dissatisfied with my intellectual endowment…[and] if I were ever 
to meet the Almighty, I would ask Him why He hadn’t endowed me with a better 
intellectual equipment’ (E. Freud, 1960: 307-308). Freud might have been ‘one of 
those people that disturbed the sleep of mankind’ but in doing so he made a place in 
our ‘psyches/soul’ that is impossible to resist.  Peter Gay will state that ‘Freud is 
inescapable’ and ‘it may be a commonplace by now that we all speak Freud whether 
we know it or not, but the commonplace remains both true and important’ (Gay, 1989: 
xi). Even if you believe that Freud’s theories are essentially wrong-minded argues 
Gay, you cannot escape from talking about your unconscious or your friend who you 
think is incredibly narcissistic or even catching yourself or others in a ‘Freudian slip’ 
– a slip of the tongue, where your unconscious reveals something that you were not 
expecting to say.  
 
Georg Groddeck argues that Freudian discoveries, of the unconscious, of resistance 
and transference are comparable to Copernicus. ‘…Freud did something that can only 
be compared to the work of the founders of religion’ (Groddeck, 1977: 5-6). Adam 
Phillips argues ‘Freud is the writer for people who want to find out what words may 
have done to them, and may still be doing’ (Phillips, 2006: vii).  Freud he states 
changes our reading habits.  Even if you don’t like Freud argues Phillips, ‘you can’t 
stop reading him’ (Phillips, 2006: viii).  Jonathan Lear quotes Thomas Mann (who 
exchanged correspondence with Freud): ‘Has the world ever been changed by 
anything save by thought and its magic vehicle the Word?’ (in Lear, 1990).  Lear 
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continues calling Freud a ‘revolutionary’ (Lear, 1990: 1) and argues that the psyche 
Freud was attempting to ‘speak’ is also to be called the soul.  Bruno Bettelheim finds 
the translation of Freud’s Seele into psyche contemptible. The soul included the whole 
person argues Bettelheim, psyche/soul and body.  In a similar vein Diana Jonte-Pace 
argues that ‘Freud referred to his project as an investigation of the unconscious in the 
Seelenleben. Although Strachey translates the term as “mental life” a better translation 
for Seelenleben is “psychic life” or “the life of the soul” (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 14). Again 
Jonte-Pace quotes Harold Bloom as calling Freud the ‘dominant mythologist of our 
time’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 24).  And Kristeva called Freud ‘The Galileo of the 
unconscious’ (Kristeva, 1995: 180). Helene Deutsch stated that Freud was the 
‘greatest revolutionary of the century’ (in Kristeva, 1995: 191).   
 
In a lovely wee book, called Freud off the record… an informal conversation the 
author exclaims, ‘Freud faced his own demons, fearlessly, and wished us to face ours’  
(D.M Thomas, 2010: 9).  Rank states that the ‘unspoken insight is Freud’s great 
accomplishment, for he himself is a myth creator in the grandest style, in Plato’s sense 
a real philosopher’ (Rank in Kramer ed., 1996: 229). Ernest Jones argues quoting 
Leopold Bellak, ‘Sigmund Freud had no Newton before him.  If the theory of 
relativity is said to be the greatest feat the human intellect has achieved, it is difficult 
to find words for the attainment of Freud’ (Jones, 1956: 39). And finally, in Stanley 
Messer’s and Nancy McWilliams commentary on Freud they argue, ‘not since Jesus 
has there been a master of the use of the parable’ (Messer and McWilliams, 2003:75). 
This is my favourite description of Freud: the ‘Godless Jew’ has become the Jesus of 
our time! 
 
But these are affectations, of which Freud was disinclined.  When Princess Bonaparte 
wrote that he ‘combined the powers of Einstein and Pasteur’ Freud replied, ‘Do you 
really think so?’ ‘I’m very flattered.  But I can’t share your opinion.  Not that I’m 
modest, no.  I have a high opinion of what I have discovered, not of myself.  The great 
discoverers are not necessarily great minds.  Who has changed the world more than 
Christopher Columbus? Now who was he? An adventurer’ (in Edmundson, 2007:76). 
But Freud could laugh at himself, at his theories even.  On discussing a young 
scientist with Jones, who Freud thought might be advantageous to the future of 
psychoanalysis Freud bemoans, ‘But I can’t regard it as normal, you know, that he 
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married a woman old enough to be his mother!’ (in Jones, 1955: 452).  Freud the 
discoverer of the Oedipus complex was both amused and ‘seriously disappointed’ 
states Jones.  Robert Graves amusingly observed that Freud could have, following 
Plutarch rather than Sophocles called his infantile sexual theory the hippo complex 
because Plutarch believed that the hippopotamus was ‘unique in the animal kingdom 
for murdering its father and impregnating its mother’ (in Kelly, 2005: 47). 
 
But as Freud states himself, ‘The fellow is actually somewhat more complicated’ (in 
E. Freud, 1960: 402). This is a man who included with his scientific treatises to Fliess, 
affectionate accounts of his growing children, ‘my worms’ as he referred to them (in 
Masson, 1985: 244). Freud tells Fliess his children’s dreams, recounts the day to day 
instances, includes Martin’s (his eldest son of the ‘My son, the Myops’ dream (in 
Chapters Three and Five)) poetry – which Freud felt was very good – and describes 
the laughter of his first born baby girl as ‘the most beautiful thing that could happen to 
us’ (Masson, 1985: 21). He tells this laughing baby girl when she has grown and asks 
for his advice, that ‘I am not going to offer you any illusions’ and ‘I should very much 
like to talk to you for once’ (E. Freud, 1960: 271).  Mathilde of the ‘Hella’ dream,6 
who Freud argues, ‘I have guessed for a long time that in spite of all your common 
sense you fret because you think you are not good-looking enough and therefore 
might not attract a man’.  And he tells her, with the words of a father, ‘I have watched 
this with a smile, first of all because you seem quite attractive enough to me’ and 
‘(y)our mirror will inform you that there is nothing common or repellent in your 
features’. Reassuring Mathilde that in any event, beauty by itself is not enough, a girl 
needs a ‘whole personality’ and this she has in abundance (in E. Freud, 1960: 272).  
                                                 
6 The Hella dream where Freud tells Fliess he dreamt of having ‘overaffectionate 
feelings for Mathilde, only she was called Hella’ (Masson, 1985: 249). Freud’s 
summation of this dream is brief: Hella is the name of an American niece whose 
picture they had just received and correspondingly at this time Mathilde had shown an 
interest in mythology and had wept over the Greek defeats. Swan (1974) argues that 
Freud’s interpretation of this dream is very tame particularly when he states himself, 
that the ‘dream of course shows the fulfillment of my wish to catch a Pater as the 
originator of neurosis and thus [the dream] put an end to my ever-recurring doubts’ 
(in Masson, 1985: 249). Whatever ‘our’ interpretations of this dream maybe, it is only 
four months later that Freud gives up his seduction theory for his infantile sexual 
theory.  The father had caught the Pater by the ‘tail’ we might say, and then 
frightened, shocked, disturbed maybe, he turned away as he did at the idea that his 




And while Freud’s mother may be neglected in his letters and theory, he wrote 
faithfully to Martha Freud, and according to Jeffrey Masson the only dream that Freud 
ever fully interpreted, the so called ‘Martha dream’ was never published (and is 
presumed lost or destroyed) because Fliess indicated to Freud that it was too intimate 
to be made public (Masson, 1985: 10).  He refers to her later in life as ‘Beloved Old 
Dear’ (E. Freud, 1960: 281) and in Martin Freud’s memoirs he remembers his fathers 
preference for alpine flowers, in particular the Kohlroserl (Nigritella nigra).  When 
Freud returned with a bunch of these flowers for Martha she told a story, one that 
Martin says is not a ‘dramatic story’, or even an ‘important one’ (M. Freud, 1957: 85).  
This is a recollection of a time before children, when the Freud’s are newly married.  
Martha spotted a clump of this flower on a ‘steep, grassy slope’ and Freud braved this 
slope and its potential dangerousness to gather some flowers for her.  The sight and 
smell of these deeply fragrant flowers took Martha back to that happy time when it 





If I look around for something with which to compare the final form 
assumed by a dream as it appears after normal thought has made its 
contribution, I can only think of nothing better than the enigmatic 
inscriptions with which Fliegende Blätter has for so long entertained its 
readers.  They are intended to make the reader believe that a certain 
sentence—for the sake of contrast, a sentence in dialect and as scurrilous 
as possible—is a Latin inscription.  For this purpose the letters contained 
in the words are torn out of their combinations into syllables and arranged 
in a new order.  Here and there a genuine Latin word appears; at other 
points we seem to see abbreviations of Latin words before us; and at still 
other points in the inscription we may allow ourselves to be deceived into 
overlooking the senselessness of isolated letters by parts of the inscription 
seeming to be defaced or showing lacunae.  If we are to avoid being taken 
in by the joke, we must disregard everything that makes it seem like an 
inscription, look firmly at the letters, pay no attention to their ostensible 
arrangement, and so combine them into words belonging to our own 
mother tongue’ (SE 5: 500-501).7 
 
                                                 
7 Lacan suggests that ‘To interpret the unconscious as Freud did, one would have to 
be as he was, an encyclopedia of the arts and muses, as well as an assiduous reader of 
the Fliegende Blätter.  And the task is made no easier by the fact that we are at the 




The Fliegende Blätter argues Freud uses Latin inscription to fool us, a little joke.  
Freud in contrast as we will see in the following chapters employs Latin when 
something appears too close, makes him uncomfortable, thus his mother is always 
‘Matrem, nudam’ and ghosts are revenants. Here then might be a good place to 
understand ‘what and why’ Freud does with to/the mother.  By rendering her position 
as too uncomfortably close in Latin is Freud trying to cover over lacunae? And if so, 
what specific lacuna is most troubling to him? Is most in need of concealment? We 
might also ask ‘whether and why’ Freud might be trying to fool us? This thesis will 
follow Freud’s imperative and ignore the ‘enigmatic inscriptions’ that Freud offers in 
relation to ‘the mother’ and instead try and find ‘our own mother’ here rendered as the  
‘mother tongue’. Itself inclusive of the all-important oral stage, and thereafter our 
access to the Symbolic through the acquisition of language, importantly that of the 
mothers tongues.8  
 
And finally… 
Jones states, ‘There comes to my mind here a remark the philosopher Ludwig Klages 
once made in my presence.  Someone had asked him whose writings one had best 
read to get a grasp of Freud’s doctrines.  He answered unhesitatingly: “His own’” 
(Jones, 1956: 132). For that reason I have relied on Freud’s own material as first and 
foremost the ‘foundation’ of this thesis. Like Yosef Yerushalmi, while I am ‘bereft of 
professional training and experience in psychoanalysis’ I ‘have some contribution to 
make in various areas of applied psychoanalysis’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: xvi).  It is from 
Yerushalmi that I have borrowed the words ‘Prelude for the ‘Reader’’ although here 
Yerushalmi writes ‘Listener’.  Because while this work will open with an engagement 
between Freud, Freudian theory and ‘the mother’ ‘it must introduce itself along the 
way’, raking over old ground and introducing the new in response to my own feminist 
engagement, previous feminist engagement and an overall engagement with, and 
appreciation of the Freudian oeuvre.  I find myself in agreement with Michael Billig 
                                                 
8 And here I include all meanings that ‘speaking in tongues’ might suggest. The 
obvious biblical (read Holy) meaning but also the nonsensical dialogue of early 
childhood, although the child/ren know (but don’t know) what they are saying 
themselves. ‘A’psychoanalysis is after all, about acquiring meaning from the lowering 
of resistances so that the repressed unconscious has a chance to speak.  That the ‘free 
association’ (the talk of the unconscious) does not make sense, or is at least, not often 
very clear is shown by Freud in both his case-studies and his dream analysis. 
xxi 
 
who argues ‘I have never been able to grow out of the pleasure of reading Freud. …I 
found myself entranced by the beauty of Freud’s writing and the monument of his 
intellect.  But I am not a ‘silent’, passive reader: I want to argue back’ (Billig, 1999: 
3). Hugh Haughton states that Freud ‘puts childhood and the legacy of childhood 
fantasy and experience at the centre of mental life’ (PE, 2003: xiv) and yet the mother 
seems to be but a neglected and marginalized figure in Freudian theory. To this point 
Freud’s rather exasperated, ‘What does woman want?’ to Princess Marie Bonaparte is 
echoed in my own exasperated, ‘Where is the/your Mother?’  
 
And just one more thing… 
Samuel Weber concludes his preface to The Legend of Freud by explaining that his 
‘return’ to Freud, which involves a going back to Freud’s German is written in 
juxtaposition to James Strachey’s Standard Edition, which positions itself argues 
Weber as the ‘original’ text. A startling suggestion but the Standard Edition presumes 
to ‘know what it is talking about’ states Weber (Weber, 1982: xvii). Presumes that is, 
to know Freud better than Freud himself.  In Yerushalmi’s splendid book, Freud’s 
Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (1991) that I came to rather late but 
which I have enjoyed thoroughly, he writes that ‘Strachey’s devotion and 
achievement are not to be minimized’ but that a return to ‘Freud’s original German’ 
will lead us to discover ‘how misleading Strachey’s translations can sometimes be’ 
(Yerushalmi, 1991: xxiii). While I find the Standard Edition of Freud an invaluable 
resource I would like to experience the ‘privileged theater’ (sic) of Freud’s work in 
his ‘Mother Tongue’.  My figure of Freud according to Weber is disfigured.  But 
more than this, it has become familiar in a way that loses the uncanny and less 
comforting visions of Freud argues Weber. This thesis begins then, not only with the 
uncanny and disfigured ‘body’ of the mother but equivalently if I am to follow 
Weber’s precept the uncanny and disfigured figure of Freud himself. 
 
The following thesis then, although only having Freud’s words in English to guide me 
attempts to make the unknown figure of the mother, whom we have ‘known’ all the 
time to quote Weber, ‘but of which we think less and less’ visible in Freud’s texts 
(Weber, 1982: xvii). Not visible as in a sum of parts put together to make a whole, 
although this is after all what some feminists involved in psychoanalysis have 
attempted (most often) to do.  But as a presence, uncanny perhaps, a ‘Witch’ maybe, a 
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Fate even, well as Freud was fond of repeating states Jones, ‘…it is no use quarreling 
with fate’ (Jones, 1957: 154). After all, it is too the three Fates, as a Lear-like figure 
that Freud finally and importunately ‘holds up his arms’: the Goddess of Death, 
Mother Earth, who receives him once more: ‘But it is in vain that an old man yearns 
for the love of woman as he had it first from his mother; the third of the Fates alone, 













Freud and the Mother 
 
The following thesis seeks to explore, understand, make sense of the figure of the 
‘Mother’ in Freudian psychoanalysis. The mother has been variously denoted as 
‘missing’, sidelined, forgotten, negated, neglected, as pre-Oedipal, spectre, phantom 
and shadow by feminist psychoanalysts (and other theorists) writing on Freud but 
there is something in Freud’s description of the mother, an importance that does not 
seem to get realised that is relevant and important to the Freudian oeuvre as a whole. 
 
To achieve this I need to ‘know’ Freud, not only theoretically but also biographically.  
If we do indeed drag our ‘epistemological baggage’ throughout our writing as Elspeth 
Probyn would have it, or as Ruth Blier declared ‘we don’t leave our life histories at 
the door’ then Freud’s would appear to be tainted/coloured with the figure of his 
mother.9 This immediate relationship of Freud and his mother is not what I will be 
looking at directly, after all how does one get privileged access to this relationship?  
But there is something in Freud’s writing that seems to take us - on a royal road 
maybe - back to the Mother.  One of the complexities of writing on or about the 
mother is whether to universalise her ‘the mother’, or to give her the singularity that 
she may well deserve.  Also complicating this is the concept of the ‘other’ itself 
caught up in the guise of the ‘big Other’ hence the capital ‘O’ or the ‘other’ as 
representative of something outside ourselves although seemingly having a direct 
                                                 
9 This is not surprising, as Jung argues, ‘I know well enough that every word I utter 
carries with it something of myself—of my special and unique self with its particular 
history and its own particular world. Even when I deal with empirical data, I am 
necessarily speaking about myself.  But it is only by accepting this as inevitable that I 
can serve the cause of man’s knowledge of man—the cause which Freud also wished 




connection with/to us.  Lacan utilises these differences in his work, and I will touch 
on some of Lacan’s theories throughout this work.  But Lacan, the self-proclaimed 
heir of Freud is not really of interest here.  I want to know Freud, in the old 
philosophical sense, if knowledge is indeed the path to some truth as Heraclitis or 
Plato would have it, then the truth I am looking for is caught up in Freud’s writing and 
Freud himself.  For a person interested in Freud, there is a wealth of information.  We 
have access to his personal correspondence and Freud was a prolific letter writer, even 
keeping a ledger of letters sent and received. Within these letters we get a sense of the 
‘personal’ Freud, not that his work does not offer this also. As the Father of 
psychoanalysis, Freud’s personal thoughts, dreams and struggles were on display. 
Reading Freud’s letters alongside his theory of psychoanalysis offers us a deeper 
understanding of Freud’s thinking. Although admittedly as both Freud and Jung point 
out, one is never able to give a true representation of their unconscious because of 
their own inhibitions, resistance and repression.  Early on in their correspondence 
Jung was able to say to Freud in response to the analysis of his own dream, ‘The 
analysis and use of one’s own dreams is a ticklish business at best; one succumbs 
again and again to the inhibitions emanating from the dream no matter how objective 
one believes oneself to be’  (in McGuire, 1974: 15).  Freud was of the opinion that 
anyone who is a good dreamer and not too abnormal could analyse their dreams (SE 
14: 20).  In the Fliess correspondence Freud argues, ‘Genuine self-analysis is 
impossible; otherwise there would be no [neurotic] illness’ and towards the end of his 
life, he wrote, ‘In self-analysis the danger of incompleteness is particularly great.  One 
is too soon satisfied with a part explanation, behind which resistance may easily be 
keeping back something that is more important perhaps’ (SE 14: 21 n. 2).    
 
This ‘more important’ is suggestive.  Why might a resistance to something be too 
great to analyse?  And could this ‘more important’ be somehow tied into Freud’s 
deferral of a greater exploration into femininity?  Femininity for Freud was a ‘riddle’, 
something mankind have knocked their heads against for eons.  And correspondingly, 
female sexuality is a ‘dark continent’ (SE 20: 212).  For Freud the original 
relationship to the mother ‘seemed to me so difficult to grasp in analysis – so grey 
with age and shadowy and almost impossible to revivify – that it was as if it had 
succumbed to an especially inexorable repression’ (SE 21: 226).  Freud said in An 
Outline of Psychoanalysis (SE 23) that the child brings to the world, before any 
3 
 
experiences an “archaic heritage” (167 and 240-241)). The ‘before’ that attaches 
itself to the infant would seem to have an immediate relationship to the mother – she 
is after all the womb that carries ‘it’.  She is also the child’s first ‘seducer’ and first 
‘love-object’.  It is the mother that gives to the child his/her first experiences.  By 
designating the mother as a ‘before’ she becomes ‘grey with age and shadowy’, 
something unknown and possibly unknowable. It is the object of this thesis to try and 
understand Freud’s positioning of the mother as a ‘before’, and yet at the same time as 
a figure who is ‘without parallel’ and as ‘the prototype of all later love-relations – for 
both sexes’ (SE 23: 188). 
 
Psychoanalysis was, to a greater degree, Freud’s brain-child, but as such, it was 
dependent on his relationships with others.  That is, his letters to Fliess offered him a 
means of discussing the ideas he was formulating in his dream work and his analysis 
of hysteria.  I think that Freud’s own example of the amoeba is useful here.  After all 
he utilises the amoeba to explain the libidinal transfer in narcissism and he explains 
that while the body of the amoeba is the ‘ego’ the protrusions, the pseudopodia are the 
‘substance of the body’, the libido if you like.  His idea that the psychical apparatus is 
much like a prehistoric organism that sends out sentinels to find sustenance is a highly 
appropriate metaphor for the processes involved in the creation of the understanding 
of ‘something’.  Thus Freud is the amoeba/ego itself, that sends out 
protrusions/pseudopodia that latch onto other protrusions/libido, amoeba/egos 
creating a chain of transference, a form of prehistoric feeding.  After all, if narcissism 
is ‘the universal and original state of things’ (SE 16: 416), then it has an integral 
relationship to the oral stage, which is of course about the appeasement of one’s own 
needs (even if we, as a infant, do not really realise it as such), and this relationship we 
know is also explicitly about our first and originary relationship, that is the 
relationship to an ‘other’, our mother.  Freud indicates this in his paper on narcissism 
stating ‘The development of the ego consists in a departure [Entfernung] from 
primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state’ (SE 14: 
100).  The formulation of a pre-ego by Hans Loewald (1980) helps expound this 
primary narcissistic relationship with the mother, which can be seen in the struggle 
the psyche seems to endure when pressured to give her up.  This will be engaged with 




Throughout Freud’s work the mother as our first love object, as the womb we desire 
to return to, as the symbol of death, explicated in the Māori myth of Māui, who crawls 
into Hine-nui-te-pō’s vagina in a return to the womb that will cheat death (the womb 
being variously connoted as the place of birth and therefore death) and give Māui 
immortality, is bought to the fore only to be subsumed under the imago of the Father 
in what might be called the vanguard of psychoanalysis, the Oedipal complex.10  I 
will not go into any depth about any of this here but rather continue with the question 
‘Why Freud?’ and importantly, ‘Why Freud and the Mother?’ 
 
I have long held an interest in Freud, and perhaps a longer interest in this ‘thing’ that 
we call a Mother.  I don’t use ‘thing’ here in a derogatory sense, but in the sense that 
Freud used it, the thing is the object and the object is also subject if we are discussing 
the narcissistic self caught up as it is in the self-preservation instincts.  As a younger 
academic I came to Freud through feminist engagements with psychoanalysis in the 
context of feminist theory.  Given that Freud is not usually depicted in a kindly 
manner within feminist psychoanalysis – although there are some feminist authors 
who are sympathetic, Juliet Mitchell is one example – my initial response to Freud 
was to see him as somewhat misogynistic and yet I understood even then that this was 
probably a skewed picture of Freud and psychoanalysis, and so my journey into the 
realms of this depth-psychology began. 
 
To take a step back, I have long held an interest in ‘the mother’.  Whether this is 
because I am a ‘mother’ or more simply that I have been, am continually mothered is 
perhaps less clear, and I question whether this distinction really matters.  I have been 
perplexed at the feminist agenda of writing the story of mothers and daughters, this in 
itself a reaction to the historical significance of the mother/son relationship a 
relationship privileged by Freud, as the most conflict-free of all relationships and 
perhaps of secondary importance only to the father/son relationship, which is after all 
                                                 
10 In Māori mythology, Hine-nui-te-pō is the goddess of death and Māui is a demi-god 
seeking immortality.  Māui’s attempt to kill Hine-nui-te-pō, by climbing into her 
vagina and exiting out her mouth is thwarted by the cry/laughter of the moho pererū 
(banded rail) who awoke Hine-nui-te-pō, who closed her legs so tightly together she 
crushed Māui to death. In some versions of this legend it is a tīwaiwaka (fantail) that 
alerts Hine-nui-te-pō of Māui’s ploy, the tīwaiwaka being viewed in Māori mythology 
as a harbinger of death. 
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the dominant story of psychoanalysis. But it was the story, or stories behind Laius and 
Oedipus, the story of the mother, Jocasta that held my interest.  Not in the sense that I 
wanted to privilege Jocasta’s story over that of Oedipus but more that Jocasta, at least 
in Freud, figures only as the body/mother who Oedipus fathers children with and who 
kills herself in discovering that Oedipus is in fact her son.  Popular films will often 
have long-lost children and mothers being reunited and here I am thinking of a movie 
theme, which has a mother and son reunited after a significant period of time and 
there is no sexual reunification, no element of it at all.  Which is not to say that I am 
disagreeing with Freud’s Oedipal theory, in fact I find elements of it entirely 
convincing, more that I have often wondered why Jocasta at least did not sense a 
familiarity with Oedipus, a sense of having known him from somewhere.  Perhaps she 
does, and this is one aspect of the story we are not told.  The myth in several of its 
guises seems to suggest, at least to me, a sense of disquiet felt by Jocasta and Oedipus 
whose retelling of the prophecy gives him sense to pause.  Again, perhaps popular 
film as well as myself romanticise the mother-child bond in such a way that we 
imagine that even given a period of time so long that the child is itself now a parent 
the mother will always recognise her own.   
 
This is kind of the blood-lust of old that I recognised in Freud’s Das Unheimliche (SE 
17).  This has long been a favourite text of mine, a text that I return to repetitiously.  
For there is something in this text that ‘unveils’ the mother in Freud’s work that is 
significant, and yet always we are presented with the turns, the travails, the riddles 
that encompass Freud’s writing.  In The Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4-5) Freud tells 
us that there is always a part of the dream that is ‘unplumbable’, a ‘navel’ if you like. 
This is a part of the dream that is impossible to untangle, it is a spot that ‘reaches 
down into the unknown’ (SE 5: 525).  Like Diane Jonte-Pace, I see the ‘dream navel’ 
as having a direct correlation to the human navel, our first bodily link to an (m)Other, 
which marks the bodily transposition from our mother’s body to the outside world. 
Forty years after The Interpretation of Dreams the Medusa’s Head (SE 18) is 
published posthumously.  Seemingly an uncomplicated account of castration anxiety 
as the source of the myth of Medusa along the lines of the Oedipal masterplot (Jonte-
Pace, 2001) it becomes much more than this because once again we are presented 
with a ‘turning away’ from a tangle, from something too frightening to be known.  
This of course is the mother’s genitals, that Freud suggests the young boy catches 
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sight of, surrounded by hair and turns away in horror (SE 18: 273).  In fact Freud adds 
a footnote to his paper on Infantile Genital Organization (SE 19) with the words, ‘I 
should like to add that what is indicated in the myth is the mother’s genitals.  Athene, 
who carries Medusa’s head on her armour, becomes in consequence, the 
unapproachable woman, the sight of whom extinguishes all thought of a sexual 
approach’ (SE 19: 144 n 3).  Thus the mother, or at least the mother’s genitals, the 
entrance to our ‘uncanny home’ is unapproachable because she is too frightening, fills 
us with horror – at least for boys – and so he/we turn away.  Madelon Sprengnether 
recognises this in Freud’s writing arguing that ‘the pre-oedipal mother, like medusa, 
cannot be looked at directly’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 6).  And further she suggests that 
the mother seems to exercise a kind of fatal attraction for Freud, but one that sees 
Freud create a “multitude of defensive strategies” to cope with her (Sprengnether, 
1990: 6).  
 
What fascinates me so with Freud is his turning away from the absolute significance 
he attributes to the mother but which he seems to find impossible to write, assigning 
her a position, in most cases, to the footnotes, or turning away, as he suggests Faust 
does, when offered the key that unlocks the ‘Mothers’.   I want to interrogate this 
turning away. If the female genitals both frighten us, are unheimlich and yet draw us 
in, are our first heim, a phantasy that Freud depicts as filling us with ‘a certain lustful 
pleasure’ (SE 17: 244), if the mother is our first love object, to whom we compare all 
other love objects, then why is she not given the importance she appears to demand?  
An importance that Freud himself recognises although cannot seem to grasp in his 
own self-analysis (SE 14: 21 n 2). The alternating presence and absence, the haunting 
quality of the mother in Freud’s writing positions her at the forefront of 
developmental stages but equally appears to minimise her role in this development.  
Sprengnether argues that these fluctuations can be seen in object-relations theory as 
an ‘original maternal presence from which, infant subjectivity must differentiate 
itself’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 6).  But also in Lacan’s ‘Imaginary’, a term invented 
contends Sprengnether as an over-arching concept for the pre-oedipal11 period that 
makes of the mother an ‘abstract necessity’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 6).   
                                                 
11 Andre Green points out that for Lacan there is no ‘pre-Oedipal’ as a child comes 
into the world with always already Oedipalised parents, thus by association the child 




Our ego as Loewald argues is constituted with the loss of our mother. Comparatively 
our sense of having a doppelgänger is linked by Freud to the original – one might say 
primordial - split, the Spaltung, which Freud has incur in front of a mirror (as does 
Lacan) and in a game, the fort-da. When Leonardo da Vinci gazed at the world of 
nature with wonder, Freud held the wonder to correspond to the ‘tender, kindly 
mother who had nursed him’ (PE, 2003: 93 and SE 11: 122).  While the female 
genitals, the womb may be the ‘uncanny home’ (SE 17) heaven as Freud depicts it in 
The Future of an Illusion (SE 21) is the ‘home of the uncanny’.  Again, these 
important propositions, that allude to the cornerstones of Freudian psychoanalysis, are 
underwritten it seems with reference to the mother.  Jonte-Pace calls these ‘hesitant 
non-Oedipal speculations’ in Freud a counter-thesis, it may well be, but it does not 
quite grasp this sense in Freud of something ungraspable, and it is this something 
ungraspable that I aim to explore. 
 
I have trawled through feminist psychoanalytic texts over the years finding aspects of 
particular writers thought provoking.  Some of their theories still resonate and I can 
recall them with ease.  Luce Irigaray’s question, ‘Is language a replacement for the 
womb?’ still gives me a moments pause.  Maybe it is.  Maybe our turning away from 
the unplumbable navel, from the unknown and unknowable is because once we get to 
the ‘womb’ (the hole, the gap, the void) we can go no further, in fact, we cannot 
return.  Our only out – and Lacan suggests this, although not in this language – is to 
acquire language, to access the Symbolic, to learn the Mother Tongue.  Our turning 
away from the mother then, which occurs with the constitution of the ego, in the 
frame of mirroring, is in part about saving ourselves.  If we do not turn away, look 
awry, we will become psychotic – too much closeness suffocates.  My question then 
is, did the young Sigmund turn away from his mother because she was too close and 
is this what occurs for all of us, although in different ways at an individual level since 
we are all individually mothered?  And is this turning around in his text, when it 
comes to directly engaging with the figure of the mother a response to this?  And how 
can we know? Who gets to write about mothers?  If feminist psychoanalysts – not 
forsaking the Kleinians, who may or may not identify as feminist – rewrite the 
psychoanalytic classic of father and son as a story of mothers and daughters what gets 
lost in the rewriting?  What – or who – gets written out? Forgotten? These questions 
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are not dissimilar to the questions asked by Jacqueline Rose in her essay, Of 
Knowledge and Mothers: On the Work of Christopher Bollas (2004).  Rose asks, 
‘What does thinking about mothers do to thinking?’ and further, ‘Can we think about 
mothers and keep an open mind?’ (Rose, 2004: 151). Utilising Christopher Bollas’s 
‘most famous formula – the ‘unthought known’12 Rose asks through Bollas, if the 
‘unthought known’ is the place ‘where the mother, the imprint of her care on the 
being of the subject, is once and for all to be found?’ (Rose, 2004:151). This raises the 
question, in the (re)finding of the mother have we moved beyond thinking?  If the 
mother represents both birth and death to us, and here we are closely following Freud, 
does she return us to some kind of truth?  Given that psychoanalysis ousted the idea of 
one truth early on in its development, having a figure that returns us to ‘the status of 
only truth or rather the only place’ (Rose, 2004:151) as the mother appears to do, is 
too troubling, to unthinkable.  And so the mother as the place of truth gets relegated to 
the ‘dark continent’ – out of sight, yet not out of mind.  
 
And yet the call to the mother, and this is how a reminiscence of her is often depicted, 
appeals to her as a place of truth.  The Wolf Man famously said, ‘Life makes me so 
unhappy! I must get back into the womb’ (SE 17: 100), and Tolstoy wrote at the end 
of his life,  
 
Felt dull and sad all day.  Toward evening the mood changed into a desire for 
caresses, for tenderness.  I wanted, as when I was a child, to nestle against some 
tender and compassionate being and weep with love and be consoled … become 
a tiny boy, close to my mother, the way I imagine her.  Yes, yes, my Maman, 
whom I was never able to call that because I did not know how to talk when she 
                                                 
12 Nancy Chodrow argues that Bollas takes Freud’s ‘most famous formula’ (one of 
them I would say), ‘the shadow of the object falls on the ego’ and argues that ‘the 
shadow’ is an ‘unthought known’ that influences and structures the self but is [itself] 
unavailable to consciousness’ (in Chodorow, 1999: 252).  Working from the idea of 
Winnicott’s ‘true self’ as opposed to the ‘false self’ the ‘unthought known’ is the 
‘human subject’s recording of his early experiences of the object or the mental 
representation of the mother’s logic of intersubjectivity’ (Chodorow, 1999: 252). 
Robert Kramer argues that throughout the ‘Standard Edition of Freud’ the powerful or 
‘bad’ mother is Freud’s ‘unthought known’. This ‘unthought known’ is a ‘ghostly 
phantom, invisible and unthinkable but ever present between the sheets of the text’ 
(Kramer ed., 1996: 38).  Kramer explains Bollas’s conception as ‘anything that we 





died.  She is my highest image of love – not cold, divine love, but warm, earthly 
love, maternal.  … Maman, hold me, baby me! … All that is madness, but it is 
true (in Troyat, 1967: 14).  
 
The ‘hallmark’13 mother, ironically fantasised through the act of writing is the 
accepted image of the mother: a fantasised portrayal of the mother, as the all-giving, 
all-encompassing Mother Nature.  Freud suggests in his Autobiographical Study (SE 
20) that this image of ‘the mother’ with its limitlessness was the reason he choose 
medicine over law.  Hearing Goethe’s14 ‘beautiful essay on Nature’ coupled with 
Darwin’s revolutionary views ‘strongly attracted him’ (Freud, 1989: 4).  Peter Gay 
argues in, A Godless Jew (1987) that the Nature that Freud responds to, and that the 
essay describes is one of beneficence, describing a ‘nourishing, never exhausted, and 
never denying mother—a sensual and maternal deity wholly different from the cruel, 
heedless, destructive Nature he would delineate in his late writings’ (Gay, 1987: 59).  
Could our difficulty in writing about the mother be because our closest relationship 
with her is before words, beyond words even?  Freud argued that, ‘Writing was in its 
origin the voice of an absent person; and the dwelling-house was a substitute for the 
mother’s womb, the first lodging, for which in all likelihood he still longs, and in 
which he was safe and felt at ease’ (SE 21: 91).  Klein argued that the mother’s body 
was understood by the child’s unconscious as representing a ‘treasure-house of 
everything desirable’ and that to have access to the knowledge that ‘she’ offered the 
mother’s body must be kept well and unharmed (Klein, 1948: 259).  This seems to 
beg the question, if writing and reading have some relation to the mother’s body but 
also the unconscious, and perhaps more importantly her unconscious, then whose 
voice do we speak with when we speak from the unconscious?  
 
This is something children are aware of according to Anna Freud (1970) and Dorothy 
Burlingham.15 Burlingham argues that children are naturally responsive to the 
mother’s unconscious and their perception of this can be seen in the empathetic 
                                                 
13 The ‘hallmark’ mother refers to the ‘universal’ brand of cards that depicts mothers 
as omnipresent and eternally loving. 
14 Peter Gay comments that the author of this essay was not Goethe but G. C. Tobler 
and that Goethe later mistakenly included this emotional hymn to nature among his 
own writings (in Freud, 1989: 4 n 2). 
15 Anna Freud’s companion, friend and associate.  Burlingham did extensive research 




relationship that mother and infant develop (or fail to). Thus when my six-year old 
son asked me – and it is important to note that he would be on the threshold of 
Oedipalisation – ‘If you eat my soul, does that mean you have my voice?’ he was 
responding to what may well be perceived as a threat to his ego/psyche/unconscious 
by my own. This is nothing new, Freud said as much in his paper on The Unconscious 
(SE 14) ‘It is a remarkable thing that the Ucs of one human being can react upon that 
of another, without passing through the Cs’ (SE 14: 194).  Rose suggests that we are 
close here to telepathy, which like femininity remains an undercurrent to Freud’s 
work, not as a ‘“wild fringe” but something whose links with the discoveries of 
psychoanalysis are unavoidable but difficult because in each case they push it over its 
own theoretical edge’ (Rose, 2004: 156). Thus while the mother in Freud is relegated 
to the sidelines, to the footnotes, as the arbiter of death according to Jonte-Pace, as 
pre-Oedipal and haunting according to Sprengnether, she nevertheless says 
something, something too difficult to decipher because it is not in the language of the 
Symbolic perhaps?   
 
There is something circuitous to these questions, which echo Freud’s own work.  I 
have time and time again come back to Freud’s suggestion that there is ‘something 
else besides…’ (SE 15: 153).  The ‘something else besides’ here stands in for the 
primal act, the primal scene, given significance by Freud but later left to languish by 
psychoanalysis as too troublesome.  But the ‘something else besides’ which Freud 
used as an expression of the unknown, as an exemplar of the riddle has become a kind 
of springboard from which I approach (and understand) the mother in Freud.  My 
sense is that the mother is a ghost of types that haunts Freud’s writing, that guides his 
hand.  But not in the sense that she is just a spectre as in the explanation that one is 
just a mother, but in the Loewaldian sense that she is bloody and vengeful, that she 
‘tastes blood’.  So while the mother may indeed be relegated to the unconscious, after 
all, she is the ‘dark continent’, she haunts the individual in a ‘flesh- like’ way – as a 
genuine ghost as Girard might say (Girard, 1987: 14). When Freud writes on the 
tailor’s dream in The Interpretation of Dreams (SE 5) he notes a similarity between 
them, one that he comments on by drawing on the tailor’s statement that ‘I have for 
many years dragged around with me, like a ghost from which I could not set myself 
free, the shadow of a tailor’s life’ (SE 5: 473). My sense is that the shadow as ghost is 
in fact the mother, something we all ‘drag’ around with us, and the shadow after all, 
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for Jung at least is part of the complex designated as female, as primordial. Jung is 
important when aligned against Freud because he offers the mother up, literally 
almost, although as the mother of myth and archetypes.  The need to elaborate the role 
of the mother, as progenitor of libido among other things was articulated throughout 
Jung’s letters to Freud.  Jung asked Freud the question: ‘Where does the libido 
detached from the mother go?’ to which Freud answers, ‘…to autoerotism’ (in 
McGuire, 1974: 65). And in a much later letter Jung still trying to follow Freud’s 
reasoning argues, ‘In certain circumstances, indeed as a general rule, the fantasy 
object is called “mother”’ (Jung quoting Rank, in McGuire, 1974: 512).  
 
Jonte-Pace suggests that ‘“Woman” has come to be a metaphor for otherness, for 
marginality, for writing, for the demise of the autonomous subject, for the 
unconscious, for God, and for the unrepresentable’ (Jonte-Pace, 1992: 1).  Kristeva 
emphasises this by stating that ‘woman’ is ‘something that is not said, something 
above and beyond nomenclature and ideologies’ (in Jonte-Pace, 1992: 2).  Jonte-Pace 
states that contemporary understandings of ‘woman’ are different to those of early 
psychoanalysis.  Freud she argues may despair over ‘what women want’ but he had 
knowledge of what ‘woman’ means, as mother and as daughter within the Oedipal 
framework.  Also, and as Gilman makes explicit the fixed categories of ‘empowered 
male’ to weak and ‘powerless woman’ were changing at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  This of course did not alleviate the stereotype of woman as a conceptual 
category one that ‘straddled’ two sides of the proverbial coin.  Woman was either 
whore or Madonna, and as Gilman argues the conceptual categories of ‘woman’ were 
inherently collated in the image of a ‘bad’ Other to the image of the ‘good’ (m)Other 
(Gilman, 1993: 8-9). How these images are understood by Freud, even though at 
times he may use them ‘unconsciously’ will be engaged with in the following 
chapters. 
 
To return to the relationship between Freud and Jung, Jung saw an analogy between 
psychic phenomena and the unconscious while Freud doubted the existence of the 
supernatural, ghosts, God(s) and magic and yet he could attribute magic to words.  He 
argues that ‘Words were originally magic and to this day words have retained much of 
their ancient magical power’ (SE 15: 17).  And further ‘…for the words which we use 
in our everyday language are nothing other than watered-down magic’ (SE 7: 283).  
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The infant as polymorphous and perverse was (is) also magically omnipotent; 
repression is enacted as magical intent and the undoing of repression is a kind of 
‘negative magic’ (SE 20: 119).  The ‘symbolic action…[is] more correctly, a magic 
action’ (SE 17: 152); and of course magic is linked inextricably to das unheimliche – 
‘the uncanny’.  For human beings in what Freud referred to as ‘the stage’ called 
‘animism’ magic was a weapon, ‘the earliest fore-runner of the technology of to-day’ 
(SE 22: 165).  The magic attributed to words was later to be taken over with the word 
of God, but residues remain such as the infants belief in its own magical omnipotence: 
a belief that persists into the world of the adult and which manifests according to 
Freud in the infantile need for religion. Freud argues that after infancy ‘man’ ‘cannot 
conceive of a world without parents and makes for himself a just God and a kindly 
nature, the two worst anthropomorphic falsifications he could have imagined’ (in 
McGuire, 1974: 283-284).  Freud tells Jung that this persistence arises from the self-
preservation instincts and not the sexual instincts.  This would suggest that the 
infant’s need for a ‘protector’ develops in response to the ‘loss’ of the mother.   The 
mother may well be surmounted by the father but the self-preservation instincts of 
hunger, love and fear are squarely placed in the realm of the mother and say 
something about the mother’s relationship to the later need of human beings for a big 
Other/object.  Jung’s earlier response to what he called Freud’s ‘alarming positivism’ 
seems to have resonance in Freud’s framing of the expression of these ‘infantile 
needs’ as ‘self-preservation instincts’. These ideas will be developed in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five, suffice to say, the perseverance, and this is indeed the right 
word, of psychic phenomena (magic) with its relation to God and salvation has an 
originary relationship with the mother and it might be said, the unconscious and that 
Jung recognised this.  
 
In a long letter to Fliess, dated December 6, 1896 (SE 1: 233-239), Freud is giving 
Fliess an update on where his theory is leading, and in the last paragraph gives a brief 
explanation of the hysteric’s action as a means to reproduce the pleasure associated 
with the repressed ‘trauma’.  What is interesting here, and which I am going to use for 
my own pleasure and purpose is that the hysteric according to Freud, repeats – after 
all her/their attack is aimed at another person. Freud puts it like this, ‘Attacks of 
giddiness and fits of weeping—all these are aimed at another person—but mostly at 
the prehistoric, unforgettable other person who is never equalled by any one later’ (SE 
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1: 239).  I am not sure whether Freud means the father or the mother here, as at this 
stage he was still developing his seduction theory and the father for Freud held an 
importance that he did not assign the mother—well not directly.  But my sense is that 
perhaps it is the mother, after all Freud uses the world prehistoric to explain the 
infantile bond to the mother elsewhere and calls her our first love object.  In this same 
passage he gives the example of one of his patients who ‘still whimpers in his sleep as 
he used to do—to be taken into bed by his mother, who died when he was 22 months 
old’ (SE 1: 239). Loewald suggests that these earliest forms of experience are part of 
the original, primal unity we have with the mother which allowed no differentiation 
between inside and outside, self and other, actuality and fantasy, past and present 
(Mitchell, 1998: 826).  In fact he states that these dichotomies that we come to think 
of as givens are complex constructions built up over our early years and which 
operate as an overlay between ourself and an Other, our mother.   
 
Loewald’s analysis is compelling and he takes Freud to task for differentiating so 
strongly between inside and outside, between self and other arguing instead that they 
are not as strongly differentiated as Freud perhaps posits.  After all, our first sense of 
being ‘inside’, inutero is as parasite to the mother’s body as host.16 We cling on 
literally to the walls of our first heim as Freud so poetically puts it, we in fact cling on 
for dear life, because any good host will try and get rid of the parasite that lingers and 
makes her feel ill.  This is why Lacan’s Hommelette (lamella) is so interesting. Lacan 
suggests that we imagine, as in a story, a fable if you like, that at birth, when the 
amniotic egg sac breaks and the baby is pushed out, that something else other than the 
afterbirth comes out with the baby.  This something else, which is intimately bound to 
the egg and therefore the infant, is immortal and to it Lacan gives the name 
‘Hommelette’ – a pun on l’homme, French for man, and omelette – ‘You can’t make 
an Hommelette without breaking eggs’ (Clement, 1983: 97). This Hommelette is what 
Freud called the ‘libido’ which in itself means a kind of ‘hunger’.  A hunger then that 
attaches itself to the infant, covers it like a liquid vampire that ‘begins slowly and 
                                                 
16 Of course our sense, if indeed we can call it a sense of being a parasite or of being 
continuous with the mother’s body is itself contentious and how could we ever know 
what the embryo/ foetus feels.  Certainly different studies have indicated that the 
foetus responds to noise, stress, fear and Rank held that anxiety was first felt inutero.  
For the sake of this argument I follow the theorists, medical or otherwise that suggest 
the foetus and the mother share more than just a womb.   
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calmly to eat away at the newborn babe’ (Clement, 1983: 97).  I find this interesting 
given that initially one could refer to the growing foetus, the embryo as a parasitical 
vampire, ‘sucking’ the mother dry, taking all that it can get from its host body.  
Interesting because the battle begins here: the baby takes from the mother, but at birth, 
with the breaking of their egg the mother gets the baby back.  She lets the something 
else, a hunger, escape with the baby.  She lets ‘it’ pervade the baby.  In fact, given 
that the Hommelette/libido comes out of the mother’s body with the baby, she literally 
then coats the baby with herself – the ‘hunger’ is the hunger of herself for the self that 
is her infant.  Perhaps the infant realises this.  It looks away from the mother when she 
looks too closely, too deeply (something that Winnicott, Bowlby, Klein, and Horney 
all discuss).  Perhaps it knows that she wants to eat it up.  Perhaps this is the battle the 
infant experiences for the rest of its life: a need to escape/separate from the mother 
with an unconscious, perhaps uncomfortable knowledge that ‘it’ can never 
escape/separate.  In this sense the mother is ‘All’ because she encases/encapsulates 
the baby’s body with herself and in Zwinger’s words, ‘How are we going to get out 
alive’ (Zwinger, 1992: 83). 
 
The Hommelette/lamella as Lacan’s fable shows it, is therefore resolutely linked to 
the self-preservation instincts and thereafter to primary narcissism.  And is this not 
what Lacan is implying in his comparison with the Hommelette to the amoeba?  It is 
primitive – primordial? – and it moves about everywhere.  Lacan’s Hommelette is 
immortal and has some relation to the soul.  Freud’s amoeba is ‘prehistoric’, sends out 
sentinels, everywhere to find sustenance, to feed.  To reiterate, it is not difficult to see 
why Jung wanted to use the word ‘hunger’, with all its implications, instead of libido, 
which came to mean the psychic transfer of sexual energy.  In point of fact, and as 
Jung suggested, they coalesce psychologically.  Freud uses the prehistoric feeding 
apparatus of the amoeba to describe how the libido operates in narcissism but for 
Freud the amoeba stood in for the ego.  Of course I am not suggesting that Freud, 
Jung or Lacan cannot use the same terminology to describe different things but that 
Freud and Lacan use the amoeba to explain some early – prehistoric, relationship. 
That Freud figures this amoebic mechanism as the ego and its libido and Lacan 
describes it as covering the body at birth but with an inbuilt ability to move about 
everywhere seems a fitting description for Freud’s later illustration of the ego as first 
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and foremost a bodily ego.17  But more than that, these descriptions appear to signal 
something that occurs of which we have little or no knowledge.  While all three may 
agree that narcissism is the ‘universal and original state of things’, and for Jung this 
had to do with the archetypal mother, a melting pot of psychoanalytic tenets is formed 
(as a gap maybe).  It is both what goes into this melting pot and to whom it may be 
attached that is interesting.  A haphazard guess would position both squarely in/on the 
body of the mother, given that the act of birth, the development of the ego, the 
constitution of the ‘I’, primary narcissism, the idea of the ‘object(s)’, and love all have 
some primary relation to this ‘originary state of things’.  I will develop this in later 
chapters, suffice to say, what gets left out in Freud’s and Lacan’s descriptions, and 
rather rigidly apportioned into archetypes in Jung’s explanations, is the literal body of 
the mother.  
 
This thesis then finds in Freudian theory, including in the later schools of object-
relation theory and Lacanian theory, something so vitally important concerning the 
mother that for some reason or another it keeps getting written out of the main story. 
How it gets written out or even why it gets written out might bring us to something 
that was too difficult, to obscure perhaps for Freud to articulate.  Sprengnether 
suggests this with her designation of the mother as spectre.  And again, Benjamin 
illuminates it with the question, ‘what prevents the representation of the mother is 
thus linked to the problem of omnipotence’ (Benjamin, 1995: 85). This omnipotence 
seems to have some relation to the ‘melting pot’ of psychoanalytic tenets I referred to 
above and I will discuss what Benjamin means by this in Chapter Two of this thesis 
because this appears to be a crucial statement, one that I have considered myself.  If 
the mother is always already everywhere, in a postmodernist sense at least she ends 
up nowhere, with no place to call her own and therein may lie the worm/womb.  As I 
stated at the start of this paper the concept of mother is, and possibly always was, a 
universal, a universal that begins as a singularity given that she is caught in a 
fragment of a mirror that only we have eyes for.  Kristeva has argued that the maternal 
body cannot be neatly divided into subject and object (something she argues Freud 
suggests in his discussion on instincts and narcissism), it is an identity ‘that splits, 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that Lacan is not positing something prior and primordial in 
any ontological sense – this ‘Thing’ in Lacan’s terms is fantasmatic – is an effect of 
the Symbolic, its meaning and its power is formulated retrospectively. 
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turns in on itself and changes without becoming other’ (in Oliver, 1993: 4).  Notice 
this is the other, not the Other, a position the mother always already has according to 
Kristeva.  Kristeva will argue that ‘maternity is the bridge between nature and culture, 
the drives and the Symbolic’ (in Oliver, 1993: 5).  Further, she states that the 
‘mother’s body guarantees the continuation of the species and yet her questionable 
identity threatens the Symbolic unity’ (in Oliver, 1993: 5).  And finally it is her view 
that the ‘maternal is the ambivalent principle that is bound to the species, on the one 
hand, and on the other stems from an identity catastrophe that causes the Name to 
topple over into the unnameable that one imagines as femininity, nonlanguage, or 
body’ (in Oliver, 1992: 5). I quite agree with Kristeva, but there is something else 
happening here. And Freud, and to a lesser degree Lacan, remembering that Lacan 
was initially a Freudian, are two theorists who recognise this within their writing.  
Perhaps this recognition then is because they are not trying, not even thinking of 
ceding importance to the mother. I am not even sure that it is as obvious as this.  
There is ‘something else besides’ that is present in Freudian theory, which feminist 
theorists as diverse as Sprengnether, Kristeva, Chodorow (later Chodorow, after she 
became a practising psychoanalyst) and Irigaray identify, but differently from the way 
I view it.  There are of course linkages, there always are but in their need to name they 
actually in fact leave the mother in the unnameable, which Kristeva associates with 
femininity, the presymbolic and the body. 
 
Finally I conclude this ‘Introduction’ thinking of a children’s movie I have seen 
recently.  Coraline (2009) is an animated movie about a small girl, who, bored with 
her world, finds entrance to a parallel world through an appendage that takes her 
through one small door to another.  Interestingly there is only one key to both these 
worlds and this key is initially held by Coraline’s ‘real’ mother.  The appendage 
which looks remarkably like a cervix takes Coraline to a world where her ‘mother’ is 
represented as a better version of the ‘real’ mother, the only major difference being 
that this mother has button eyes as do all the people in this world.  Coraline loves 
these parents to begin with as they want to spend time with her and feed her nice food, 
but she realises something is amiss when the mother with the button eyes tries to 
enforce her to stay by offering to replace her eyes with buttons.  Coraline rejects this 
idea and the button-eyed mother throws her into a cell of types, which is kind of like 
the liquid mirror we imagine in ‘Alice Through the Looking Glass’.  Coraline meets 
17 
 
three other children in this ‘cell’, three ghost children with button eyes.  They tell her 
that they are stuck here in this world because the taking of their eyes means that their 
souls can’t go to heaven.  They beg for Coraline’s help and suggest she play a game 
with the button-eyed mother who we find out is an Evil Witch.  Actually the children 
refer to her as the Beldame, which initially meant ‘grandmother’, but has come to 
mean ‘hag’, ‘old woman’, ‘witch’.18  Coraline is saved from the ‘cell’ by a boy she 
has befriended in the real world and who in the button-eyed universe has button-eyes 
and cannot speak – he is an improved version of the too talkative boy according to the 
Witch.  She is aided in the game to save the children by the cat that can move through 
both worlds without being changed. Coraline finds the eyes of the children, which are 
hidden in children’s toys as the button-eyed world collapses around her.  What she 
took for better is actually only a caricature of the ‘real’ world and the button-eyed 
mother is a spindly spider like old woman who needs the eyes of the children – their 
souls – to stay alive, to exist.  Coraline is also presented the task of saving her parents 
who are trapped in a snow globe.  She manages to outsmart the Evil Witch mother, 
escaping as the parallel world collapses around her only to find that the spider-like 
metal hand of the Witch has managed to get through to the ‘real’ world and can act 
independently from the Witch.  Trying to escape the hand she remembers the closed-
up well, which magically reflects the tunnel in which she had initially moved from 
world to world.  With the help of ‘Why were you Born’ (Wyborn – the too talkative 
boy) she swaddles the hand and throws it down, deep into the well.  And finally the 
garden blooms at the ‘Pink Palaces’ and everyone appears to have a modicum of 
happiness. 
 
I finish with this because I was struck by the Freudian elements that kept appearing 
and which I will engage throughout my thesis.  The little girl wishing for a better 
family (Family Romances, PE, 2003), the castration complex, which looms large, in 
fact could be the mainstay of the film.  The children’s souls cannot escape without 
their eyes, and their eyes have been taken by a mean Witch Mummy.  One must play 
a game, a game of discovery and chance to escape, the fort-da and the Mirror Stage 
otherwise one is forever trapped within the world of the ‘psychotic’ Witch, the 
                                                 
18 Hélène Cixous argues that in fairy tales ‘there are great men but no great women: 
there are Grand-Mothers instead. And grandmothers are always wicked…’ (Cixous, 
2000: 233).  
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mother.  Even the differentiation between Real and real is here. The ‘key’ that unlocks 
the mystery of the mothers, the number three, the overabundance of food, Freudian 
elements all. To see them presented in such a recent movie made me think that the 
universality that Freud ascribed to and which has been ridiculed throughout these long 
years is indeed still contemporary after all this time – even if we don’t always see it. 
 
Freud argued with reference to Charcot, that one needs ‘to look at the same things 
again and again until they themselves begin to speak’ (SE 14: 22). By looking at the 
mother in Freud ‘again and again’ alongside other theorists who talk about the mother 
in Freud, perhaps we can get the mother to ‘speak’. To speak then, would suggest that 
the mother is given more space, no longer relegated to the sidelines, as phantom or 
ghost, but embodied.  In a sense then, the mother needs to be put back together.  If she 
is not haunting from the periphery, she is cut up in bits and pieces as she is for the 
object-relations theorists, but she is never whole.  I question whether this is the 
problem with depictions of the mother, she is always already a hole of types and being 
so is too readily equated with the gap, the space, the void.  But she is also, although 
maybe inadvertently equated to the theory of drives or instincts.19  Freud said of the 
                                                 
19 ‘Drive’ which is the English translation (by “superficial resemblance” according to 
Strachey (SE 1: xxv) of the German word Trieb is translated as ‘instinct’ in the 
Standard Edition.  This has been universally renounced because of the association of 
instinct with ethological and biological theories. And indeed, because Lacan who 
modelled himself as somewhat the Freudian expert par excellence, and with his 
emphasis on language, argued that Strachey…got it wrong. I predominantly use 
instinct in this thesis, partly because instinct was approved by Anna Freud (who it 
might be said, especially in the later years, was closest to Freud) and also because I 
imagine that if Freud had first of all requested Strachey to translate a paper (after two 
weeks in a psychoanalysis with him) then I imagine he had faith in Strachey’s ability.  
That being said, Freud was notoriously unconcerned regarding the translation (and 
even copyright at times) of his work. This is of course the problem with reading 
translations of original works – something gets lost. John Reddick in the translator’s 
notes for the Adam Phillips Penguin edition of ‘On an Introduction to Narcissism’ 
argues that Strachey’s translation of Freud seems to be saying that Freud’s writing ‘is 
not to be presented as a hot and sweaty struggle with intractable and often crazily 
daring ideas, but as a cut-and-dried corpus of unchallengeable dogma’ (in Phillips ed. 
2006). Reddick is quite vituperative of Strachey’s translations calling them 
“systematically flawed” and naming him a “bowlderizer” of Freud’s work. Jean 
Laplanche would agree, arguing that not only is trieb mistranslated it is also then used 
willy nilly, one might say, by the subsequent schools of psychoanalysis and here he 
cites the Klenian school, the object-relations school and the ego psychology school (it 
is interesting that he makes a distinction between Klein and the object-relations school 
– I would have thought they were one and the same. Unless the distinction is between 
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theory of instincts that it was the one, which had the longest and hardest labour, and 
yet of course, it was the one most ‘indispensable to the whole structure’ (SE 21: 117).  
Without ‘its’ birth, the part would not become ‘whole’.  In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (SE 18) he argued that the instincts were ‘at once the most important and 
the most obscure element of psychological research’ (SE 18: 34).  And further, 
‘(h)unger and love are what moves the world.  Hunger could be taken to represent the 
instincts, which aim at preserving the individual; while love strives after objects, and 
its chief function, favoured in every way by nature, is the preservation of the species’ 
(SE 21: 117).20 If ‘hunger and love meet at the woman’s (mother’s) breast’ (SE 4: 
                                                                                                                                            
the Kleinian and British object-relations school (the so-called ‘Middle-School’) that 
grew out of the Kleinian school). As a consequence of this, says Laplanche these 
schools hold onto the idea of a biological basis to infantile sexuality, which 
correspondingly expresses itself through developmental stages.  Laplanche will 
emphasise that thus ‘the whole of Freud’s discovery is forgotten’ adding although 
‘Freud sometimes forgets it too, in fact’ (interview with John Fletcher and Peter 
Osborne, 1999 (online)). And yet, like Andrè Green I am troubled by the neglect, in 
fact, the denial of Freud’s biologism.  The trieb, drive, instinct debate seems to 
highlight this.  But this disregards Freud’s own belief and ironically in the paper cited 
above, On Narcissism: An Introduction (SE 14) Freud will say of the ego-instincts 
and sexual-instincts – the libido theory, that it ‘derives its principal support from 
biology’ (SE 14: 79).  That being said, just because the instincts/drives divine their 
support from biology of course does not mean that they are biological in aim and 
Freud’s argument suggests this also.  Jung also supports Freud’s distinction here 
stating in his book, Psychology of the Unconscious (1919) ‘The incest prohibition 
places an end to the childish longing for the food-giving mother, and compels the 
libido, gradually becoming sexual, into the path of the biological aim’ (254). Again, 
to quote from the Narcissism paper, Freud said, ‘we must recollect that all our 
provisional ideas in psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic 
structure’ (SE 14: 78).  Lastly, as an English reader of Freud and a writer on Freud, I 
have only had the English translations to rely on.  That being said, I have read the 
Collected Papers, Standard Editions, Penguin Editions and various miscellaneous 
translations, including Peter Gay.  I return to Strachey’s preface to the Standard 
Edition and note that not always have the German editions of Freud’s works been 
trustworthy either.  It might be said then, that a “bowdlerization” of Freud has taken 
place, but that it might not be what we think.  The wholesale neglect of Freud’s 
Anlehnung ‘leaning on’ of biology is taken as a truism. In the following work then, 
and mindful of arguments circulating against the use of instinct, I will, following 
Strachey’s translation, and the discussion given above, predominantly use instinct and 
on occasion I will use drive.  In doing so, I do not necessarily see a problem in 
transposing one for the other.  I simply use instinct when it appears right to do so, vis-
à-vis drive. Whether this is either correct or right ultimately relies on ones own 
interpretation. 
20 Jung who left Freud because he felt the sexual theory was too constricting, argued 
that the words ‘food’, ‘hunger’ and ‘eating’ were equivalent to the importance 
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205), if the mother as the three Fates is associated with life, love and death; if the 
mother is by definition the primarily narcissistic object and also the being from whom 
the self-preservation instincts originate, then why is she so neglected – forgotten – in 
the Freudian story of ego-development? 
 
Freud argued that ‘repression is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis’ and that in the first 
attachment to the mother this repression is especially inexorable (SE 21: 226). Being 
so, he continued it was ‘difficult to grasp’, ‘shadowy’, ‘and archaic’.  But what this 
ungraspable seems to point to, as I have argued above, is the mother.  What this thesis 
will ask is, if the mother is subject to both an ‘inexorable repression’, if she is only, or 
mostly designated a place in the unconscious then how can we uncover/recover her?  
She is locatable though, and this thesis will explore and engage with the areas in 
which she is ‘seen’; as anxiety, the construction of the ego, Eros/love and hate 
(ambivalence), castration and Oedipal complexes, death and religion (God), phantasy 
and magic.  It seems to me, at the onset of this thesis, that the primary narcissistic 
relationship to the mother is paramount to an understanding of the mother in 
psychoanalysis.  If the ego must be developed, if it is not present at birth, then what 
part does the mother play in this construction?  In Freud’s second topographical 
system of id-ego-superego, the id, which is correlative to the unconscious, is also 
understood to have an innate part; something archaic while the ego is seen as having a 
part (and Freud thought that it was a reasonably big part) that is unconscious.  Freud 
insisted that the id-ego separation should not be taken too rigidly and the concept of 
narcissism was introduced to bring together the sexual and ego drives which were 
seen as the id and ego representatives.  Since the drives are ‘our mythology’ they are 
unknowable and unconscious.  But they are also ‘insufficiently understood’ and 
involve said Freud a ‘groping in the dark’ (SE 18: 51).  More than this, Harold Bloom 
                                                                                                                                            
accorded to ‘sex’ in Freud’s theory. Jung suggested that ‘food’, ‘hunger’, and ‘eating’ 
denoted a primordial instinct with sex which was deeply rooted in the unconscious 
and which played a role in the formation of the archetypal images depicted in myth 
and religion. Thus he would argue that they represent the spiritual side of instinct and 
also that instinct and image combine to form the same archetype. While I find Jung’s 
archetypes confusing there is something in his depiction of instinct and image that 
resonates.  His example of the old mythological or archetypal idea of impregnation by 
eating is clearly evident in young children’s belief that their ‘stools’ are babies, 
although Freud suggested this also.  But Jung’s argument seems to highlight the 
‘womb envy’ that some feminist psychoanalysts have suggested has been subsumed 
under the Freudian ‘penis envy’.  
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argues that for Freud, as for the archaic Greeks, the drive was also a god, just as the 
daemonic was also a drive (Bloom, 1995: 115 (‘daemonic’ and ‘uncanny’ 
(unheimlich) have the same meaning in Arabic and Hebrew (SE 17: 221)). That 
narcissism was the concept that both prefigured the reconfiguration of the drives and 
stands as a locution of these drives would seem to suggest that the mother should be 
pivotal in an analysis that brings all these disparate strands together. 
 
‘We need our mothers’ argues Maggie Mackellar in When it Rains (2010) because 
they stand as witnesses to our lives.21  There is a question in Mackellar’s analysis, a 
question that suggests, without a mother the ‘myriad of instances’ that make up our 
lives are not recorded and in being so lost, does this make our existence less? 
(Mackellar, 2010: 159).  Chapter Four looks at anxiety as one of the places we might 
locate this ‘lost’ mother.  It tells a story of the Holocaust where the idea of the witness 
is important in the definition of the ‘I’.  Here the mother as witness to the boy’s life is 
lost even though she is still living.  As a death camp survivor she is unrecognisable 
and the little boy who has remained resolute throughout her incarceration by praying 
to her photograph, ‘falls apart’ when mother and son are reunified (Laub, 1995). For 
the young boy without a tangible mother or even a phantasy mother as witness to his 
life he begins to have nightmares that trouble him for the rest of his life. In this way it 
might be said that anxiety was the concept that most troubled Freud.  It was both the 
‘reproduction of an old event’ and linked to the self-preservation instincts (SE 22: 85).  
It was a nodal point, central to the psychology of the neuroses and the stuff of 
nightmares (SE 16).  In Freud’s earliest exposition on anxiety he suggests that the act 
of birth is our first experience of anxiety and also the source and prototype of the 
affect of anxiety (SE 5: 400-411). He concludes Das Unheimliche (SE 17) by saying 
that infantile anxiety, aroused by solitude, silence and darkness remains with us 
throughout our lives, it is ‘something that most of us never wholly overcome’ (PE, 
2003: 159).  Anxiety then, is infantile at bottom and in being so has a relationship to 
the mother that Freud points to but never fully elaborates. It may well be that Freud’s 
anxiety surrounding the figure of the mother merged with his engagement on anxiety 
and it is this that troubles the concept of anxiety so much. 
 
                                                 
21 Weber argues that ‘the role of witness is, in Western societies at least, generally 
(but not always) assigned to the mother’ (Weber, 1991: 119). 
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To suggest then that there appears to be ambivalence to the mother and the mother’s 
body in Freudian psychoanalysis and perhaps in psychoanalysis in general would 
seem to be the proverbial understatement. Chapter Three will engage with Freud’s 
work, his personal letters, his theory and biography.  In this way I hope to offer a way 
of viewing the mother in Freud that unlike Sprengnether’s mother is less haunting and 
more ‘solid’.  Chapter Two looks at Feminist engagements with Freudian and post-
Freudian analyses.  Finding in some of their work both a nod to the mother and a 
turning away from her.  This might be as I suggested through Rose above, that to 
speak about the mother in Freud one needs to find a place from which one can speak.  
If this place is unconscious, then we need to ask whose voice is speaking?  Perhaps 
even, if the place of the mother is the unconscious how does one have a voice of one’s 
own?  Chapter Four will try and locate the mother in the areas I have highlighted – 
anxiety, castration and repression which, in turn emphasises the Oedipal complex, 
self-preservation and narcissistic drives.  Lacan’s mirror stage and his object a are 
discussed alongside Winnicott’s transitional object/phenomena and Ferenczi’s 
magical omnipotent stages.  What is it about the mother that while she may inform all 
of these ‘complexes’ she does so without recognition and only from the sidelines? 
Chapter Five looks to theorists like Bollas who offer an alternate view of the mother 
in psychoanalysis, one that may well hark back to Freud’s own work.  This thesis 
then, will attempt to explore and engage with Freudian texts where possible and 
uncover the meanings inherent to the mother who is both heimlich and unheimlich, 





Feminism and Freud 
 
While this thesis is about the mother in Freud’s writing it perhaps took its initial foray 
into this field by reading feminist (and sometimes not feminist) authors who had 
engaged in psychoanalysis or possibly were psychoanalysts. In particular feminist 
authors involved in psychoanalytic discussion around the mother.  One of the things I 
took from these authors is that in fact they rarely said anything that Freud had not 
already said.  Freud of course had suggested a pre-Oedipal stage he had just not 
allocated it the importance that most feminist authors involved in psychoanalysis did.  
Nor would he have, when by definition the pre-Oedipal suggests the Oedipal 
structure.  André Green, arguing through Lacan puts this well, ‘when the child arrives 
in the world, he is already structured by the Oedipal conflict of his parents’ (Green in 
Kohon ed., 1999: 47).  And further, ‘So before even the child experiences the first 
smile the mother has already a complete programme of fantasies, and the father too; 
there is a relationship between the three players in the drama … even before the baby 
was born’ (Green in Kohon ed., 1999: 47).  The importance then given the pre-
Oedipal which was an importance ceded to the mother, and was possibly articulated 
most forcibly by Melanie Klein and the subsequent Kleinian school of which objects-
relation-theory emerged, became a symbiotic enclosure extant from the Oedipus 
complex and the importance that ‘orthodox’ psychoanalysis gave the Father.  One of 
the problems that arose from what Kristeva has called the semiotic, the place of 
mother and baby before the Symbolic or the Oedipus complex is that this space has 
been glorified as something strictly maternal and outside the phallogocentric systems 
of patriarchy. Thus the semiotic then is ‘before’ language, which raises the question 
of just what sort of voice the mother and infant might have in this non-differentiated 
space.  Given that feminism has argued for the right or even the need for women to be 
heard and importantly seen, articulating a maternal space before language could be 
viewed as problematic.  This of course does not suggest that it does not exist (and as I 
stated in Chapter One Freud suggested that the baby brought to the world a ‘before’, – 
‘before any experiences an “archaic heritage”’ (SE 23: 167 and 240-241)), but that 
the theories resting on a kind of fusion between mother and infant may need rather to 
be seen as an impasse between a desire to elevate the mother to a similar level as the 
father or as seems to be the case bury her in a space where her relationship with the 
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‘baby’ is seen as a before,22 before language, society, culture. Again, I do not want to 
suggest that the importance given to the mother-infant engagement was, or is, 
problematic per se but that how this ‘bond’, this space has been enunciated, has been 
carted through arguments with out recourse to its initial intent is problematic. The 
following chapter will endeavour to outline some of the authors who articulate this 
before, in particular, it will focus on Nancy Chodorow, Luce Irigaray, Jessica 
Benjamin, Julia Kristeva and Melanie Klein.  It might be noted that this chapter on 
Freud and Feminism looks only to ‘feminist’ psychoanalysts and their engagement 
with Freudian concepts.  
 
Much has been said on motherhood by a wealth of respected academics from various 
schools of thought.  Sarah Blaffer Hrdy in her hefty tome Mother Nature: A History of 
Mothers, Infants, and Natural Selection (1999) offers a compelling read on 
motherhood that spans the fields of anthropology, primatology and evolutionary 
theory, among other disciplines.  She refers to the analysis of motherhood as the 
proverbial minefield without a map, or let us say ‘royal road’ from which we might 
get direction.  That her own motherhood is weaved throughout her account that spans 
ages, species, cultures renders it a personal and relatable read (for those of us that are 
mothers and academics and also for those of us that are not).  She was an important 
source for my early ‘academic’ understanding of motherhood.  While her account 
does engage with Bowlby’s ‘Attachment’ theory she has little to say on Freud or 
Freudian psychoanalysis.  Rather unflatteringly and wrongly she compares Freudian 
psychoanalysis to the Behaviourist school suggesting that Freud like B. F. Skinner 
and J. B. Watson believed in the ‘cupboard love’ theory.  In fact, Blaffer Hrdy 
suggests that Bowlby argues this about Freud.  Perhaps my reading of Bowlby is not 
as extensive as it could be but I do not remember seeing Bowlby refer to a Freudian 
expression around mother love as ‘cupboard love’.  Unless Blaffer Hrdy is referring to 
Bowlby’s discussion of Freud’s well-known ‘screen memory’ in which, his older half-
brother pretends his mother is locked in the cupboard only to open it and she is not 
there.  This engages a long and reasonably complicated remembering of his mother 
and his nurse, which were both ‘Kasten’, that is ‘boxed’ up/locked up – his nurse for 
                                                 
22 This before is interesting as Jean Starobinski quoting La Rochefoucauld suggests 
‘There are people who would never have been in love if they had never heard tell of 
love’ (Starobinski, 1966: 82). 
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stealing from him, and his mother ‘confined’ – pregnant (Freud’s mother had only 
recently given birth.  The infant Freud resenting this intrusion was preoccupied with 
his mother’s insides, he says.  Also his nurse that he was quite fond of had been sent 
away (put away) for the theft (SE 6: 49-51)). Of course this ‘reminiscence’ does not 
quite convey what Blaffer Hrdy is saying here.  But I would argue that Freud was 
definitely not a Behaviourist, even if Skinner himself suggested that he had just 
simplified Freud’s typography – made it accessible for people.   In fact, Freud referred 
to Behaviourism as ‘naïve’ and an abuse of psychoanalysis in his An 
Autobiographical Study (Freud, 1989: 33). And while Freud coined the idea of the 
baby as the ‘bundle of id’ and somehow kept writing the mother out of the main story, 
she is always there, in the background, sometimes even fore grounded, as haunting, as 
spectre as first love object.   
 
I cannot begin this chapter without reference to Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born 
(1977).  She has little to say on Freud and what she does say is not necessarily 
negative but not often has such an honest and almost visceral account, of mothering, 
her own mothering been written.  Her journal accounts, that alternate between a 
passionate love for her infant sons coupled with a burning rage and hatred show 
clearly the ambivalence that Freud pointed to and Klein attempted to make clear.  I 
am not sure that either of them has ever conveyed quite as well the ambivalence that 
the mother feels when faced with ‘the bundle of id’.  Freud’s terminology here says it 
all, after all how can one survive when confronted with ‘chaos, the seething cauldron 
that is the id?’ And yet mothers do and have done so through out the centuries.  Why 
work like Rich’s and Blaffer Hrdy’s are important is that they make the task of 
mothering both explicit and explicitly human. The following chapter then while 
acknowledging the importance of this type of engagement with mothering looks 
instead to feminist authors involved in psychoanalysis, in particular Freudian 
psychoanalysis to understand where the Freudian mother might be in their work, 
where she might even be for Freud. 
 
Chodorow 
In a thesis on the mother it seems impossible not to look at Nancy Chodorow’s 
popular work of the late 1970’s, early 80’s, The Reproduction of 
Mothering:Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978).  I confess a dislike 
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for this book, finding it tedious on the few occasions I made an attempt to read it.  But 
read it I did, and found Chodorow’s question, ‘Why are mothers women?’ 
(Chodorow, 1978: 11), possibly an epitaph for the entire work.  It rests on a social 
constructionist analysis of the mother, so that the question of ‘Why are mothers 
women?’ suggests that fathers can be mothers too. This is a rather simplistic approach 
to the complexity of women as/becoming mothers and Chodorow’s later work 
including The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and 
Culture (1999) states something similar in relation to her earlier work.  She suggests 
that in The Reproduction of Mothering ‘I describe empirically discovered, not 
theoretically deduced, connections’ (Chodorow, 1999: 110). And that her goal was, 
‘to explain prevalent observed gender differences in psychological life and personality 
without relying on biology, without centering on genital difference, and without 
assuming that women are failed men’ (Chodorow, 1999: 111).  But as the authors of 
From Klein to Kristeva: Psychoanalytic Feminism and the Search for the “Good 
Enough” Mother (1992) state, ‘It would be hard to exaggerate the centrality of Nancy 
Chodorow’s Reproduction of Mothering and the extent of its influence on American 
contemporary thought’ (Doane and Hodges, 1992: 33). In particular they cite feminist 
authors, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Jane Flax, Robin West, Evelyn Fox Keller, 
Judith Kegan Gardiner, Marianne Hirsch and Claire Kahane, as being exponents of 
Chodorow’s thesis, albeit in diverse ways but who all, finally, ‘hope to define an 
authentic female voice’ (Doane and Hodges, 1992: 33).  Doane and Hodges argue that 
in fact Chodorow is more complex than these authors disseminate and acknowledge 
that Chodorow’s own analysis of her work suggests that it is grounded in object-
relations theory, in particular using the work of D.W. Winnicott, Michael and Enid 
Balint, W.R.D. Fairbairn, Margaret Mahler, Harry Guntrip and others (33).  
Chodorow in Powers of Feeling argues that she is influenced by Klein, British 
Independent object-relations theory, Hans Loewald and Erik Erikson, among others, 
and that she is not concerned that these authors are often viewed as incompatible with 
each other (Chodorow, 1999: 3).  Doane and Hodges argue that Chodorow’s stance 
that it does not matter which school of psychoanalysis or in this case object-relations 
theory she utilises founders on the principle it seeks to change – that is the patriarchal 
bias of the socio-cultural system that we inhabit.  This because the heavy influence of 
Winnicott in The Reproduction of Mothering belies Chodorow’s insistence that 
object-relations theory can be made into a feminist theory simply by exchanging the 
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boy into a girl. Winnicott himself articulates the need for a ‘good enough’ mother 
above all else.  That this mother is in fact almost always, and most possibly needs to 
be a woman, is overlooked by Chodorow in her transposition of one system for 
another.  What Chodorow does, Doane and Hodges argue is conflate Freud and Klein 
(although she distances herself from both), ‘orthodox’ psychoanalysis and object-
relations theory. These are not the same thing and while they may indeed overlap the 
underlying tenets of each ‘school’ are quite different. Which they argue in fact 
problematises the dichotomy that Chodorow wished to subvert, nature verses culture.   
 
While I am not quite as critical of Chodorow’s endeavour as Doane and Hodges, 
seeing in their own work a misreading of Winnicott (Catherine Clement who they 
discuss writes on an overlap between Lacan and Winnicott something Doane and 
Hodges neglect.  They also use Winnicott’s texts specifically written for a lay 
audience, mothers, which are quite different in content to the texts written for a 
psychoanalytic/psychiatric audience), they return to the question, ‘Why are women 
mothers?’ as an example of something Chodorow gets right, whereas I view it as 
something rather obvious that needs no social prescription to enforce it and through a 
different looking glass would argue that it is something Chodorow gets wrong.  I will 
return to this question shortly but Chodorow’s analysis finally falls into the classic 
feminist (and repetitious) story of mothers and daughters.  This story then gets picked 
up by other feminist authors who glorify the story of mothers and daughters creating a 
utopian field where ‘within the mother’s embrace all feminists can identify with each 
other’ (Doane and Hodges, 1992: 45). 
 
Chodorow’s analysis in The Reproduction of Mothering has become a ‘truth’ for some 
schools of American feminism and perpetuated from feminist authors as diverse as 
Ann Kaplan to Jane Gallop.  Gallop, who identifies with the Lacanian school writes, 
‘…as becomes clear in object-relations theory and particularly Chodorow, the mother 
is the site of something which is both other and not quite other, of the other as self and 
the self as other’ (in Doane and Hodges, 1992: 45).  Gallop attempts to marry object-
relations theory to Lacan and Chodorow that in the words of Doane and Hodges 
works against itself to produce ‘a single, unified story of motherhood’ (1992: 46). 
Sprengnether agrees with Doane and Hodges critique of Chodorow, writing that 
‘scores of her readers… have fastened on her account of femininity as quasi utopian’ 
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and ‘unwittingly’ Sprengnether states, ‘they’, ‘recuperate the very categories which 
serve to inhibit women’s progress in the social sphere’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 146). 
 
One of the overriding concerns that Doane and Hodges express in regard to 
Chodorow’s treatment of the mother is her desire to make of the mother an origin, an 
origin that is ‘key to her own oppression (the sexual division of labour)’(1992: 38).  
This positioning of mother as origin is burdensome to women according to Doane and 
Hodges but it is only so because the origin given to mothers in Chodorow’s account at 
least is amended from a socio-cultural perspective in which a psychological 
prescription comes with an unconscious as descriptive as it is fixed.   
 
Diana Tietjens Meyers (1994) says something similar in regard to Chodorow’s 
endeavour that she attempts, in Chodorow’s own words, ‘to get psychoanalytic theory 
right’ (in Tietjens Meyers, 1994: 78).  In fact, argues Tietjens Meyers, Chodorow 
‘calls our attention to the activity of mothering, not the status of motherhood’ (78) and 
by doing this, suggests Tietjens Meyers, she erodes the passivity that Freud and others 
apply to the mother and the mother’s procreative role.  Tietjens Meyers is certainly 
not the first author to confuse Freud’s definitions of masculine and feminine.  In fact, 
applying passivity to the role of mothering is not something Freud does, or indeed has 
written on.23 Freud noted that the mother breastfeeding the baby is actively 
breastfeeding the baby and part of the Freudian thesis is that we are born with a 
bisexual disposition, socio-cultural mores and language (among other things) position 
us as masculine or feminine (although quoting Napoleon, Freud also argued that 
‘Anatomy is Destiny’).  Freud queried our corporeal representations by imagining the 
ability to divest ourselves from them: ‘If we could divest ourselves of our corporeal 
existence, and could view the things of this earth with a fresh eye as purely thinking 
beings, from another planet for instance, nothing perhaps would strike our attention 
more forcibly than the fact of the existence of two sexes among human beings, who, 
                                                 
23 Although as Jessica Benjamin rightly points out, Freud’s writings frequently rely on 
references to maternal activity and feminine passivity, a paradox, as I have stated, he 
seemed to be aware of.  The equations, masculine=active, feminine=passive, is 
alternately expounded and criticized and perhaps represents, according to Benjamin 
the ‘defensive reversal of complementarity, whereby the boy says to the mother, “You 
are now the helpless baby, which I no longer am.” The vulnerable dependency of the 
baby is projected onto the mother, who must accordingly hold the position of both 
feminine passivity and maternal activity’ (Benjamin, 1995: 101). 
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though so much alike in other respects, yet mark the difference between them with 
such obvious external signs’ (SE 9: 211-212). Tietjens Meyers states that Chodorow 
privileges the pre-Oedipal where mother and child exist in a symbiotic space.  As I 
noted in the introduction of this chapter, there has been a privileging of this ‘space’ by 
particular feminists.  Irigaray, Kristeva and Klein point to a pre-Oedipal period with 
the mother that they argue Freud neglects and further that this pre-Oedipal period of 
mother and child is vitally important to the psychical health of the growing child.  
This thesis will argue that the pre-Oedipal – this somewhat undifferentiated space – is 
obviously important to the mental health of the child, indeed Freud said as much. But 
what surprises me is that so many feminist authors, and indeed ones who should know 
better (and here I am pointing to the practising psychoanalysts that would (should) 
have read Freud’s work) argue that Freud neglects this ‘wholesale’.  Freud did 
privilege the Oedipal, but I am hesitant in suggesting that he did so at the expense, 
well at least without acknowledging the pre-Oedipal. While he does not assign the 
pre-Oedipal the significance that he offers the Oedipal the pre-Oedipal haunts as 
Sprengnether might say, his oeuvre. And while he did not elevate the mother to the 
same position as the father he constantly reinstates her importance as first love-object, 
as integral to the mental life of a child, as having a major role in the castration 
complex and so on.  Obviously this thesis will explore the positions Freud both 
allocates to the mother and which he also, perhaps by a less than careful sleight of 
hand, neglects.   It might also be noted that for Freud the phallic mother was both pre-
Oedipal and whole, i.e., the child believes his/her mother has a penis. And as Jane 
Gallop argues much of the feminist argument for the recognition of the pre-Oedipal 
may be a desire to keep the mother as whole rather than ‘hole’, which by comparison 
represents lack.   
 
Freud said in a discussion of a patient’s obsessional neurosis, that the act of putting 
his feet into his socks disturbed him so much because ‘he must pull apart the stiches 
in the knitting, i.e. the holes, and to him every hole was a symbol of the female genital 
aperture’ (SE 14: 200).  Freud questioned the diagnosis of obsessional neurosis 
instead suggesting that ‘something different must be going on here’, linking the 
‘whole’ schizophrenic symptomatology too the castration complex (SE 14: 200), and 
in turn aligning this to another patients obsessional squeezing of blackheads.  Here 
Freud argues, ‘As far as the thing goes, there is only a very slight similarity between 
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squeezing out a blackhead and an emission from the penis, and still less similarity 
between the innumerable shallow pores of the skin and the vagina; but in the former 
case there is, in both instances, a ‘spurting out’, while in the latter the cynical saying, 
‘a hole is a hole’, is true verbally’ (SE 14: 200-201).  For Freud, what dictates the 
similarity here is not that the ‘thing’ is the same but that the expression, the words, 
used to describe it are. Gallop’s argument for a feminist privileging of the pre-Oedipal 
then is a resistance to the position of ‘hole’ at the expense of the ‘whole’.  This thesis 
will engage with this distinction throughout the following chapters noting as J. B. 
Pontalis argues that what psychoanalysis has got wrong is ‘to mistake the part for the 
whole’ (Pontalis, 1998: 86). Pontalis’s point was directed at the school of object-
relations theory where the part/breast proliferates as somehow representative of the 
whole/mother – albeit, for object-relations theory, (in most cases) a phantasy mother.  
Freud’s argument in contrast is an argument concerned with explaining the 
unconscious.  The unconscious is not a language as such and it is only when the thing 
is made conscious and has a word attached to it – a word that belongs to it – that the 
unconscious is made conscious.  Freud does use the expression a ‘hole is a hole’ 
elsewhere and yet he will argue ‘sometimes a cigar is just a cigar’.24  Surely this 
                                                 
24 There is a lot of discussion on whether Freud actually said this.  And yet I am sure I 
have read it somewhere, attributing it to a footnote in the Standard Edition or 
alternatively to Peter Gay (in fact Peter Gay in A Godless Jew (1987) argues that this 
– sometimes a cigar is just a cigar – ‘seems to have been wished on him by some 
anonymous phrasemaker.  But he might well have said it.  Sometimes a cigar was just 
a cigar, even for Freud’ (Gay, 1987: 18)), or in Ernest Jones trilogy on Freud’s life.  
Regardless, the emphasis in this argument is concerned with the placement of women, 
the mother in the oral stage, which infantilises her and corresponding the attribution 
of ‘word’ to ‘thing’. That this association can be read explicitly in Kipling’s poem, 
‘The Betrothed’ illustrates well Freud’s meaning.  Here Kipling is a young man 
musing on the benefits of marrying his Maggie, or staying true to his ‘brides,’ cigars.  
The line, ‘And a woman is only a woman, but a good Cigar is a Smoke’ makes clear 
his decision. Also in an introduction to Otto Rank’s ‘American Lectures’ Robert 
Kramer suggests that Freud’s “almost sexual craving” for cigars was something Freud 
was both unwilling and unable to master.  His brief exegesis on masturbation could 
have been explored further but Kramer argues that Freud was his own obstacle, 
writing in a letter to Fliess, ‘The role played by [masturbation] in hysteria is enormous 
and it is perhaps there that my major, still outstanding obstacle is to be found, wholly 
or in part’ (Kramer ed., 1996: 13).  In a letter to Ferenczi, Freud wrote that being 
without a cigar ‘“was an act of self-mutilation as the fox performs in a snare when it 
bites off its own leg.  I am not very happy, but rather feeling noticeably 
depersonalized”’ (in Gilman, 1993: 177). Sander Gilman writes that without his cigars 
Freud’s sense of self was challenged, including his self-control and his ability to 
work.  Without smoking Freud felt that – ‘he ceased being completely human’ 
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would beg the question then, that if a cigar can be just a cigar then why can’t a hole 
just be a hole and not a vagina – not the entranceway to the womb?  Given that Freud 
had made the sucking of the breast analogous to the sucking of the penis thus 
effectively assigning them, and therefore the body that was both sucked and according 
to Freud, sucked (women in fellatio (SE 10: 7 also SE 7: 52) to the oral stage, it is 
interesting that the phallic shaped cigar that is also ‘sucked’ is excluded. More 
important to this argument is the knowledge that the thing may be different but the 
words we use to describe it are similar, have the same root.  Freud explores this 
throughout his work but most explicitly in The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words 
(SE 11) and The Uncanny (SE 17).  I have included an appendix that describes all the 
words that ‘mother’ is both associated with and has an etymological relationship to.  It 
should be no surprise then that mother and mud have the same meaning 
etymologically and therefore the same connection verbally. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(Gilman, 1993: 177). To Stefan Zweig he wrote, ‘I ascribe to the cigar the greatest 
share of my self-control and tenacity in work’ (in E.Freud, 1960: 403).  In this his 
father was his role model, who was a “heavy smoker” and remained so all his life.  
Gilman suggests that Freud’s cigar smoking was more complicated than it seemed.  
Initially cancer of any type was seen as part of the pantheon of “Jewish” diseases. But 
by Freud’s generation cancer of the palate was viewed as “rich man’s cancer” because 
of the cost associated with the cigars. Freud adhered to the belief that cancer of the 
mouth was due to smoking but his need to smoke was caught up in his need to work 
and his relationship with his father.  Gilman is surprised at Freud’s positive 
association of smoking with his father given the negative internalised representations 
he offers of his father, including his fathers perceived weakness and his lack of 
economic sense. That these characteristics have an “oral” overlay, usually associated 
with the mother but here represented in the fantasy of the father as a role model who 
gives/gifts him his ability to “live and keep on living” through the oral satisfaction of 
the cigar is staggering.  Once again Freud elides the figure of the mother for that of 
the father. Here the oral pleasures of the pre-Oedipal are transposed onto the Oedipal.  
Freud’s need to masculinize the male Jew, which is Gilman’s thesis is seen here in his 
transposition of the mother for the father, and his emphasis on smoking as the cause 
of cancer. In a conversation with the writer Thornton Wilder, Freud is supposed to 
have said, ‘“it might some day be shown that cancer is allied to the ‘presence of hate 
in the subconscious’”’ (in Gilman, 1993: 178).  Ignoring the exchange of unconscious 
for subconscious here (Wilding was American where the use of subconscious was 
more readily used), and acknowledging the “oral” with smoking, then the “hate” 
buried in the unconscious would surely have some connection with the repressed 
ambivalence that the baby and young child has to the mother?  This is in line with 
Freud’s own argument that “proper” repression attributed to the oral stage is a result 




To return to Chodorow, she claims argues Tietjens Meyers that children are originally 
matrisexual rather than, as Freud would have it bisexual because their love fastens on 
the person who cares for them.  Thus to illuminate one of Chodorow’s most enduring 
arguments, the ‘caretaker’ of babies could just as easily be male as female.  Of course 
this somewhat negates her pre-Oedipal which is about the importance of the mother in 
what she terms as a primordial fusion with the mother (Tietjens Meyers, 1994: 123).  
Perhaps finally what is important in The Reproduction of Mothering is that Chodorow 
tries to initiate motherhood as an enduring human good, but not without showing that 
too much mothering is detrimental to the psychical health of the child.  By utilising 
Winnicott’s standard of the ‘good-enough’ mother she attempts to illustrate that 
mothering is something (most) women want to do and most mothers do it well 
enough.  Where she differs from Winnicott is to suggest that men could mother just as 
well as women, anatomy is not destiny, and her argument that the self-sacrificing 
mother is just as harmful as the neglectful mother, from a socio-cultural perspective 
that is, rather than the psychoanalytic perspective she utilises.   
 
Later Chodorow 
Chodorow’s later thesis, in The Psychodynamics of the Family (2000) and The Power 
of Feelings (1999) offers a more complicated argument than The Reproduction of 
Mothering.  In particular these later works do adopt a broader psychoanalytic 
approach, still concentrating on object-relations theory, but with the emphasis on 
analysis of the roles people, in particular mothers might play in the psyche of children 
and adults.  In The Psychodynamics of Family she argues that ‘(m)others experience 
daughters as one with themselves; their relationships to daughters are ‘narcissistic’, 
while those with their sons are more ‘anaclitic’ (Chodorow, 2000: 112). While I don’t 
necessarily agree with how Chodorow is using the concept of narcissism here, in a 
Freudian sense this primary narcissism would be experienced similarly regardless of 
sex, the argument that she builds from this statement has a lot more psychoanalytic 
engagement with the mother and motherhood than in her previous work.  Thus she 
will argue, not unlike Kristeva, that the mother-child relationship completes a 
relational triangle for the mother, not with the father but with the mother’s mother.  
And that the act of coitus cannot return the mother to her mother as straightforwardly 
as it can for men but that through pregnancy a symbolic return can occur through 
identification with the child in her womb.  Chodorow quotes Helene Deutsch as 
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confirmation of this theory stating, ‘Ferenczi’s “maternal regression” is realized for 
the woman in equating coitus with the situation of sucking.  The last act of this 
regression (return into the uterus) which the man accomplishes by the act of 
introjection in coitus, is realized by the woman in pregnancy in the complete 
identification between mother and child’ (Chodorow citing Deutsch, 2000: 117). 
Chodorow argues that because of this psychological identification it is logical that 
women turn their marriages into families and to be more involved in their children’s 
rearing than men.  In some way then the woman/mother as ‘the mother’ has returned 
to her first love-object, which importantly has now become herself.  It is this return, 
reasonably neglected by feminist psychoanalysts and psychoanalysis itself (although 
Kristeva and Irigaray, albeit quite differently, certainly engage with this) that troubles 
the self/other dichotomy that persists in object-relation theories, socio-
constructionalist theories and perhaps even psychoanalysis itself.  
 
Irigaray 
While I may have out grown Luce Irigaray finding in her work, a battle that she has 
unsuccessfully sought to subvert, her own corps-a-corps with Freud and Lacan, her 
earlier work on mothers and mothering most evident in Sexes and Genealogies 
(1993a) has been important to my approach in questioning the position of the mother 
in psychoanalysis. In this work Irigaray states that ‘the relation to the mother is a mad 
desire, because it is the “dark continent” par excellence.  It remains in the shadow of 
our culture, it is night and day’ (1993a: 10). Irigaray argues that the woman-mother, 
and she conflates them intentionally arguing that the only position in culture and 
society for women is as mothers and that this is no position at all given that mothers 
have had their ‘power’ stripped from them by the patriarchal ‘invasion’ of mothering, 
is relegated to the dimension of need.  She points to the political questions of 
contraception and abortion as illustrating how the maternal function underlies the 
social order.  Turning Freud’s Oedipal theory on its head she argues that everyday 
events in our culture and society operate on the basis of ‘an original matricide’ 
(1993a: 11).  This matricide is of Clytemnestra by her son Orestes.  Like the story of 
Oedipus this matricide is decreed by the Oracle and in Greek mythology prophecies 
must be fulfilled. But Clytemnestra is murdered by her son for killing Agamemnon 
who in turn sacrificed their daughter Iphigenia to secure his position as a military 
ruler.  For this murder Orestes is driven mad by the Erinnyes who haunt Orestes ‘like 
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the ghosts of his mother’ (1993a: 12).  Orestes is saved by Athena, the faithful 
daughter of the patriarchy according to Irigaray, born as she is from the head of Zeus 
(but only because Zeus swallowed her mother).  Thus patriarchy argues Irigaray is 
founded on the death of a mother at the hands of a son who is saved by a daughter of 
the patriarchy (a daughter denied her mother no less). In the meanwhile Orestes’ sister 
Electra is left to her madness in the wilderness, she is not saved with an Oracle, in fact 
she seems to be forgotten.  With the Erinnyes though she continues to haunt as both 
ghost and as hysterical revolutionaries, this original matricide.25   
 
Freud’s revision of the Oedipus myth, argues Irigaray, reactualises the madness of 
Orestes.  When faced with the mother whom he has married and with whom he has 
borne children, he goes mad and blinds himself – the proverbial maxim of, if I cannot 
see it then it cannot be real (Freud’s derealisation – an accurate term because 
derealisation suggests that a piece of reality is strange to ‘him’.  Although Freud does 
argue that derealisation’s and there counterpart depersonalisations are ‘remarkable 
phenomena of which little is understood’. They are also defence mechanisms invoked 
by the ego in response to an ‘intrusion’. For Freud, it is not the existence of the ‘real’ 
thing you doubt, it is whether the ‘real’ thing exists outside of one’s imagination (in 
SE 22: 244-245)).  The ambivalence that Oedipus feels towards his father, from which 
all theory and practice in psychoanalysis is derived, according to Irigaray, seems to 
forget or to negate his relationship with his mother.  Of course by now Jocasta has 
committed suicide but she does so in part because her own horror in the act is 
reflected back to her twofold, she is doubly guilty because she takes on Oedipus’ guilt 
as well as her own.  Oedipus seeing this guilt reflected back to him blinds himself as 
if by blinding himself he no longer participates in the incest.   
                                                 
25 In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993b) Irigaray suggests love among women is a 
matter of rivalry ‘practiced through substitution’.  Irigaray’s ‘one plus one’ is here 
substituted for ‘either the one woman or the other’.  Freud’s perfect relationship, that 
of mother and son is elaborated by Irigaray as the foundation on which ‘man’ builds 
his world: ‘If we are to be desired and loved by men, we must abandon our mothers, 
substitute for them, eliminate them…’ (Irigaray, 1993b: 102).  Man’s relation to the 
maternal, a relation that is equally denigrated and held sacred accords a position of the 
unique one, a position unachievable for ‘real’ women.  Thus the place rendered as 
‘Holy’ in both a biblical and adjectival (holey) sense can neither be occupied or filled: 
‘Since the mother has a unique place, to become a mother would supposedly be to 
occupy that place, without having any relationship to the mother in that place’ 




Maria Torok, Barbro Sylwan and Adèle Covello (1998) argue that Freud is 
‘famously’ silent about the father’s silence in the Oedipal myth.  Believing a prophecy 
that foretells his death at the hand of his son Laius ‘pins’ Oedipus’ ankles together 
and orders Jocasta to ‘expose’ him to the wilderness. But Freud is also silent about 
Jocasta’s compliance with this order.  The mother willingly or not, hands her baby 
Oedipus to the shepherd to dispose of.  In hearing the story repeated by a drunk, 
although thinking that Polybus is his father, Oedipus leaves and begins his journey 
towards the fulfilment of the prophecy.  He kills Laius at the crossroad with three 
paths and answering the riddle set by the Sphinx frees the people of Thebes and 
becomes their King.  In doing so he marries his mother and in time completes the 
prophecy.  Thus, while Laius and Polybus merge quietly in the background and 
Oedipus is fore grounded he is only so by dent of his marriage to his mother.  It is the 
act of incest in the story that cements the murder.  What Freud plays on and 
recognises in this story argue Torok, Sylwan and Covello, are the universal, 
instinctual and unconscious themes that permeate his works (1998: 61).  The acts of 
the fathers and the mothers in this story remain silent. And they do so because of what 
Torok calls the ‘phantoms’ that reside in Freud’s unconscious (an unconscious they 
identify in Freud’s written work because obviously there has been no psychoanalysis 
with him!).  Utilising Nicolas Abraham’s definition of the phantom, ‘a formation of 
the unconscious that has never been conscious’ (in Torok, Sylwan and Covello, 1998: 
53), which is different to dynamic repression, Torok suggests that Freud’s phantoms, 
passed through the parental unconscious into the child’s and have a function not 
unlike the secret.  Different to the symptom formation that arises with the return of the 
repressed this is the ventriloquist’s dummy, speaking for us without our knowledge.  
The phantom is a fascinating idea and yet, maybe not so different to what Freud had 
called our ‘personal complexes’ in a passage on the forgetting of proper names (SE 6: 
a note on the word ‘complexes’, while it is in ready use today Freud praises Jung for 
his ‘indispensable’ word, ‘complexes’ in 1910 in the paper, The Future Prospects of 
Psychoanalytic Therapy, CP 2: 288 see my comment on page 39 of this chapter 
regarding the changing meaning of terms).  Freud argues that the forgetting of proper 
names, or for that matter first names, can be motivated by repression (SE 6: 7-8 n 2).  
While we can forget because of tiredness, drunkenness or general illness the 
repression is familial at bottom states Freud.  In suggesting this Freud uses the same 
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language he used to describe the uncanny, ‘long and familiar’ (SE 6: 24).  He 
continues, that to get to this forgotten name, one must take associative pathways 
where words, sound, smell even, has some archaic personal reference.  He argues that 
this is not conscious but a ‘continuous current of personal reference of which 
generally I have no inkling but which betrays itself by such instances of my forgetting 
names’ (SE 6: 24).  Further he suggests that this comparison to oneself with others 
must be a general means of understanding something other than ourselves (SE 6: 24-
25).  It may well be that I am doing Abraham’s ‘phantom’ an injustice, after-all this is 
something that Abraham suggests, ‘returns to haunt [and] bears witness to the 
existence of the dead buried within the other’ (cited by Torok et al, 1998: 53-54 
(italics in the original)). While Torok’s engagement here is not to foreground mothers, 
she makes the point that Freud’s death instinct bears all the hallmarks of ‘phantoms’: 
‘it has no energy of its own; it cannot be ‘abreacted’, merely designated’ and ‘it 
pursues its work of disarray in silence’ (Torok et al, 1998: 54).  Torok argues that 
‘phantoms’ elude rationalization and give rise to endless repetitions (54).  Again, I 
may be misunderstanding Abraham’s ‘phantom’ but it resonates with Freud’s ‘unlaid 
ghost’ something Freud himself linked back, to our earliest memories of the mother.  
Coupled with this, Abraham’s ‘phantom’ also sounds a lot like Rank’s/Freud’s 
doppelgänger: ‘For the ‘double’ was originally an insurance against the destruction of 
the ego, an ‘energetic denial of the power of death’, as Rank says; and probably the 
‘immortal’ soul was the first ‘double’ of the body’ (SE 17: 235). Whether we call ‘it’ 
ghost, phantom or double there is something in these passages, in the myth of Oedipus 
that suggests the mother rather than the ‘traditional’ story of the son.  If we look at the 
Oedipus myth again and again the incest complex is vanguarded, given that it is the 
mother’s body through which the act of incest occurs.  Typically in psychoanalysis 
the mother’s body conveys death.  And the mother is variously denoted as spectre, as 
counter-thesis, as the body through which our immortal soul escapes according to 
Lacan’s Hommolette/lamella, thereafter attaching itself to us. It is the purpose of this 
thesis to foreground the mother through an engagement with each of these ideas. The 
mother ‘appears’ it seems but only through her ‘disappearance’, in the shape of 
phantoms, spectres, ghosts, doppelgängers and perhaps finally, even the eternal soul! 
 
According to Irigaray this matricide set the contemporary scene and the ambivalence 
we feel towards the mother is a retroactive projection of the ambivalence that should 
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be directed towards the father.  Irigaray argues that while it may be true that analysis 
may tell us something about the drives and there relation to the mother’s body, it is a 
body cut up into bits and pieces and handed back to the child so that he might grow: 
‘The partial drives, in fact, seem to refer especially to the body that brought us whole 
into the world’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 13).  These whole, partial and part metaphors 
proliferate in Irigaray’s writing.  Irigaray argues for the recognition of the whole child 
being held and nourished in a whole and originary womb.  This she states proceeds all 
associations of the mother’s body cut up into bits and pieces for the gratification of 
the child.  The whole child exists after all only through the mediation of her blood, 
her body.  This may be, in part, what becomes problematic in Irigaray that she argues 
for a whole child in a whole mother, which is always already mediated by a part 
object if the umbilicus can indeed be thought of as such.  Irigaray would have the 
phallic erection – her words – occur at the place where the umbilical cord once was, 
which would indeed be some erection, as a form of honour to the mother’s power.  
Without sounding facetious it is difficult to see how a ‘phallic erection’ could 
reinstate or honour the mother’s power and I would argue that Irigaray does not seem 
to realise that by implication she in fact restores Oedipus to the mother, something she 
is desperate to undo.26 
 
Irigaray asks an important question, albeit in different words, is language a 
replacement for the womb?  The proper name, be it the family name or a first name 
replaces the irreducible mark of us all, the scar of the naval.  Again, we have these 
‘echo’s’ to use an appropriate analogy given that in the Narcissus myth, it is Echo that 
fades away when confronted with Narcissus’ self-love/indifference. I argued above 
that Freud understood ‘personal complexes’ as having some relation to the familial 
and finally when the argument was unpicked, to the maternal.  Freud may use 
‘personal complexes’ and Abraham ‘phantoms’ but both ideas seem to have an ‘echo’ 
of the maternal firmly planted within.  Both ideas ‘haunt’, bear witness in someway to 
what Irigaray will call the ‘irreducible mark’ of the navel.  Irigaray’s argument that 
our first home accompanies our every step echoes Freud’s discovery that in most 
                                                 
26 Rank wrote in a footnote on his analysis of birth trauma that ‘In dreams at the end 
of the analytic cure I found the phallus often used as a “symbol” of the umbilical 
cord’ (Rank, 1929: 20). 
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neurotics and some psychotics,27 there was an accompanying desire to return to their 
first home, that is, the womb: ‘To some people the idea of being buried alive by 
mistake is the most uncanny thing of all.  And yet psycho-analysis has taught us that 
this terrifying phantasy is only a transformation of another phantasy which had 
originally nothing terrifying about it at all, but was qualified by a certain 
lasciviousness—the phantasy, I mean, of intra-uterine existence’ (SE 17: 244). In fact 
Freud’s analysis in Das Unheimliche (SE 17) continues in what he calls ‘a beautiful 
confirmation of our theory’, he states that ‘neurotic men often declare that they feel 
there is something uncanny about the female genital organs.  This unheimlich place, 
however, is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the place 
where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning’ (SE 17: 245).  
These images argues Jonte-Pace, ‘inscribe a powerful circularity’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 
68).  Freud links the uncanny with birth and death; the terror of death through 
premature burial is thus diminished or transformed into pleasure by locating its source 
in the fantasy of returning to the womb.  What seems uncanny is actually canny, 
comforting, pleasant or cosy (SE 17: 222 n 2).  Irigaray argues that although our first 
home, our originary or primordial relationship to the mother accompanies our every 
step it is undermined by the symbols and language of male culture that drive a stake 
through the navel into the very place where we once lived in complete bliss, marking 
out the boundaries of patriarchal traditions.  Again what becomes difficult in 
Irigaray’s argument is the assumption that life in the womb is blissful and fulfilling 
when in many cases it is not. Irigaray of course is not alone in the fantasy of a 
paradisical ‘before’, this ‘unio mystica, the being at one with the All’ (Rank cited by 
Kramer ed., 1996: 7).  Rank argues that the ‘child weeps’ to leave its ‘blissful 
paradise’. The visitation of the Angel of Life, states the Talumudical sages, to the 
infans inutero tells the child that it will be born, as it was conceived, against its Will 
(Rank cited by Kramer ed., 1996: 7). The inutero, which Irigaray romanticises is, I 
would imagine, a projection of the phantasy of the omnipotent mother. This returns us 
to Benjamin’s suggestion that ‘what prevents the representation of the mother is thus 
linked to the problem of omnipotence’ (Benjamin, 1995: 85). This goes back, 
according to Benjamin to Karen Horney’s classic essay, ‘The Dread of Woman’ 
                                                 
27 Cognisant of the fact that Freud didn’t really work with psychotics as he wrote in a 




which begins with Schiller’s poem ‘The Diver’ ‘whose search for a woman doomed 
him to the perils of the engulfing deep.  Horney suggests that man’s longing for 
women is always coupled with ‘the dread that through her he might die and be 
undone’ (Benjamin, 1995: 81).  The early ambivalence that the infant feels with the 
mother endlessly repeats itself.  This then is an originary feeling whose origin is in the 
mother, and relates to the mystification of motherhood (Horney in Benjamin, 1995: 
81). Benjamin suggests that although ‘modern disenchantment’ has worked to 
diminish the mystique enveloping motherhood and procreation it has not alleviated 
the dread of maternal power, this she argues has been banished to the unconscious 
where even divers may fear to swim. 
 
She continues by noting that Horney’s argument parallels Freud’s in Civilization and 
Its Discontents (SE 21), although Freud’s argument is on the origins of religious 
feeling he discusses the ‘oceanic feeling’, which he claims to have little experience of.  
Again Schiller’s diver, ‘I am moved to exclaim, in the words of Schiller’s diver: “He 
may rejoice, who breathes in the roseate light’” (Freud cited by Benjamin, 1995: 82).  
Benjamin suggests that if we read between the lines another meaning surfaces.  While 
Freud offers the Father as the saviour of infantile helplessness it is a rescue from the 
fear of being engulfed in the maternal depths.  The ‘oceanic oneness’ suffocates, or to 
keep to the theme, drowns as much as it offers life.  This ‘oceanic oneness’ according 
to Benjamin, the infant’s helpless dependency on its mother from whom s/he must 
separate or be forever caught in the mesh of a neurosis or more probably a psychosis, 
‘has guided psychoanalytic thinking ever since Freud’s formulations… and has led to 
the proposition that men had to denigrate or dominate women to compensate for their 
dependency upon and envy of the mother, who can give birth and nurture the young’ 
(Benjamin, 1995: 82).  Male dominance then can be viewed as a need to keep their 
distance, claiming their independence as separate from their mother, something 
Irigaray also argues.  Benjamin continues claiming that Freud’s cloacal theory, that 
the vagina is unknown to young children is challenged by Chasseguet-Smirgel who 
argues instead that the young boy conscious of the little girl’s lack of a penis is 
repressing an image of the mother as all-powerful and overwhelming (Benjamin, 
1995: 83).  The original threat is not castration by the father but suffocation by the 
mother. Irigaray argues the original threat is incorrect anyway given that when the 
child is threatened with castration this covers up the first cut of the umbilical cord, our 
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separation from our mother’s body. While Irigaray would have it, that we erect veils 
to cover up, cover over this first debt to the mother, Chasseguet-Smirgel according to 
Benjamin contends that if ‘children know consciously only of the penis, this stance is 
actually an effort to repair a narcissistic wound, the sense of helplessness and 
dependency on the omnipotent mother, whose vagina is too large’ (Benjamin, 1995: 
83).  The horror of the female genitals and the eventual scorn by men is an ‘effect of 
the transfer of power to the father, which at once conceals and assuages fear of the 
mother’ (83).  Irigaray states, ‘(j)ust as the scar of the navel is forgotten, so, 
correspondingly, a hole appears in the texture of the language’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 16).  
A hole, gap, void that continues to be filled with things so as to suppress the image of 
the ‘all-powerful-mother’ behind the veil according to Irigaray.  In Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4-5) he argues that there is a spot in every dream, ‘a 
“navel” as it were’ that is unplumbable.  It is a point that reaches down into the 
unknown and cannot be unravelled (SE 5: 525). Thus for Freud we could say that the 
navel, far from being a ‘hole’ or even a scar, unconsciously represents something 
obscure, a ‘something’ that we turn away from, as we turn away from the mother 
when she gets too close.  For Jonte-Pace this turning away both illustrates the limits of 
Freud’s Oedipal paradigm and also an ‘uncanny’ journey in/to the mother that Freud 
was unwilling, unable to take (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 30-32). 
 
To return to Chodorow briefly, her argument that men could mother just as well as 
women is extended by Dorothy Dinnerstein who suggests that the cultural largesse 
than we are experiencing is in fact because of this paternal rescue which results in the 
negation of the mother.  Dinnerstein argues that there is no antidote for this but that 
men should shoulder some of the ‘envy, greed, dread, and rage’ tied to mothers by 
mothering themselves (Benjamin, 1995: 84).  Chodorow differs from Dinnerstein 
because she argues for a sociocultural projection of the mother, i.e., the mother is still 
a subject to the child not only an object.  This according to Chodorow will 
counterbalance the omnipotent mother, but the question needs to be, if this is the case, 
if even young children recognise their differentiation from the mother, then why does 
the mother constantly lose out?  Why is she not given the political and social 
importance that this recognition should offer? Chodorow does not answer this, her 
argument is a prescription for good-enough mothering not a revolution, which in any 
case may end up being the same thing, but Irigaray considers these issues in more 
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depth. Irigaray’s argument that the polis was founded on an original matricide, 
suggests in opposition to Freud that the primeval horde has already feasted on the 
body of the mother by the time it gets to the father.  The mother according to Irigaray 
has been turned into a devouring monster to assuage the child/man’s guilt for the 
blind consumption she is forced to submit to (Irigaray, 1993a: 15).  This inverted 
effect according to Benjamin creates ‘the inability to symbolically represent that first 
relation and the separation from it, that makes of woman a dangerous hole into which 
the individual may disappear.  The question of where, precisely, this inversion occurs 
and what prevents the representation of the mother is thus linked to the problem of 
omnipotence’ (Benjamin, 1995: 85). 
 
Benjamin 
Staying with Benjamin, she elucidates the either/or of ‘orthodox’ psychoanalysis as 
being rather ‘She is…’ following Horney’s suggestion that man contains a ‘dread of 
woman: “It is not”, He says, “that I dread her; it is that she herself is malignant, 
capable of any crime, a beast of prey, a vampire, a witch, insatiable in her desires. She 
is the very personification of what is sinister”’ (Horney cited by Benjamin, 1995: 86).  
The She is, is the key to the duality that positions the mother as both omnipotent and 
another subject, the split signifying a collapse between fantasy and reality.  She is 
illustrates the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating within a psychic circularity 
where self and objects mingle, are omnipotent and yet can symbolically represent real 
others on an intersubjective register.  Infancy theorists, and here Benjamin cites Stern, 
Beebe and Lachmann (not Winnicott or Bowlby) argue ‘that even at four months an 
attuned mother is not undifferentiated, does not create the illusion of perfect oneness’ 
(Benjamin, 1995: 87). Stern, Beebe and Lachmann according to Benjamin suggest 
that the infant enjoys otherness, new faces, new places.  This is contrary to Freud’s 
argument that ‘A child is frightened of a strange face because he is adjusted to the 
sight of a familiar and beloved figure—ultimately of his mother’ (SE 16: 407).  What 
Benjamin raises here is the suggestion that the oceanic symbiosis that Freud questions 
and which is perpetuated by object-relation theory is perhaps an oversimplified and 
idealised version of the infants ‘real’ experiences. In fact the Freudian idea of 
Nachträglichkeit or deferred action, a reworking of early experience is at work here (I 
will explain the concept of Nachträglichkeit more fully in Chapter Three).  Benjamin 
puts it well, ‘(i)t is a reading backward through the lens of loss, the encounter with 
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which generates the wish for omnipotence and the projection of the longing for 
symbiotic oneness upon the mother’ (Benjamin, 1995: 87).  Again, this is not to 
negate the early mother-baby bond but rather to question the universal omnipotence 
ceded to it.  Benjamin asks, ‘(h)ow did the trope of oneness come to inform the whole 
theory of infancy? If men and women both project the dangerous longing for a return 
to amniotic life onto the mother, is this not itself a symptom of a breakdown in 
tension between fantasy and reality?’ (Benjamin, 1995: 87-88).  Changes in the socio-
political arena as a result of new scientific developments create change in the 
ideologies that underpin motherhood and the status of mothers/women.  We may, 
suggests Benjamin want to create a distance from a paradigm that cedes the mother so 
much responsibility with minimal concern ‘for the conditions of her own subjectivity’ 
(Benjamin, 1995:88).  Further Benjamin posits that man’s infantile fear of 
dependency on the mother is not accounted for in the fantasy of the omnipotent 
mother but is rather to be seen in particular theoretical assumptions around 
dependency which further encode the ‘lost mother as a dangerous object’ (Benjamin, 
1995: 88).  The child’s (re)positioning of the mother as She is, is facilitated in part 
through the mother’s own desire for independence from the infant, an infant that 
disappoints because s/he is not the perfect fantasy child that the mother initially 
idealised.  Thus the mother’s and baby’s disappointments collude and articulate a 
response within the psyche. Whether as repression or as displacement would be 
inclusive of the situation and the child’s and mothers response to each other.  
Benjamin’s argument here is not unlike Bowlby’s, who was castigated by second-
wave feminists for his Attachment Theory.  What a baby needs is its own mother 
argued Bowlby.  In fact Bowlby went as far to suggest that society needed to change 
and be more attune to mother’s: ‘Let us hope that as time goes on our society, still 
largely organised to suit men and fathers, will adjust itself to the needs of women and 
mothers, and that social traditions will be evolved which will guide individuals into a 
wise course of action’ (Bowlby, 1979: 9). 
 
Benjamin’s argument that ‘it is a reading backward through the lens of loss, the 
encounter with which generates the wish for omnipotence and the projection of the 
longing for symbiotic oneness upon the mother’ (1995: 87) needs further engagement.  
This longing to return to an idealised symbiotic oneness with the mother results in a 
breakdown between the tension of fantasy and reality according to Benjamin (87-88).  
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And further, as with Freud, the breakdown of this tension could – would – create an 
accompanying anxiety.  The privileging of a space between fantasy and reality, a 
space where the trope of oneness appears to proliferate has a strangely Lacanian feel 
to it but Benjamin’s concern is first and finally it seems with the ‘real’ mother; the 
mother living in the socio-political arena.  This ‘space’ (loosely connoted as a third 
term) resonates with the loss of ‘something’ but this something itself appears to be 
unknown.  An unknown though that takes on the yearning associated with the original 
(in the medical sense), rather than poetic meaning of the word nostalgia.  I make 
mention of this here because nostalgia, like ambivalence and melancholy, even 
schizophrenia have mutated to a point that is quite removed from Freud’s usage of 
these terms.  Jean Starobinski argued fifty years ago that these terms, among others, 
have been absorbed into everyday language, thus loosing their original meaning.  
Starobinski maintained that the deprivation associated with nostalgia was one of ‘loss 
of childhood, of ‘oral satisfactions,’ of motherly coaxing’ (Starobinski, 1966: 87). 
And further that ‘the nostalgic did not stop eating his heart out; the wound did not 
heal!’ (94). Thus to read Freud one must consider the difference a century makes to 
our understanding of language and of things, and therefore perhaps, our unconscious.  
This does not mean, I think, that the ‘universals’ Freud discovered are not applicable 
today, or that we have exhausted the possibilities that they represent.  ‘Mother’ in any 
language is a universal, irrespective of the fact that we are all individually mothered. 
And within the context of mothering Freudian ideas, the unconscious transference of 
material, of love and hate – ambivalence, the family romance, of castration and 
Oedipus complexes, anxiety and mourning, pleasure and unpleasure abound.  
Zygmunt Bauman is an academic that that I have long enjoyed but I disagree with his 
comment that ‘Freud’s theory of the mind belongs to its own times’ (in Billig, 1999: 
256).  The world and indeed the language we use to describe the world change, but 
the mind, the afflictions that affect it and the typography that Freud used to 
‘shorthand’ it, the id, ego and superego remain basically unchanged.   
 
The dyad of mother-child must be broken to ensure the child is not s-mothered.  This 
is what psychoanalysis suggests.  In contrast Sprengnether argues that this might in 
fact cause a redirection of anger and loss onto the figure of a rival-father.  The 
omnipotence once attributed to the mother is displaced onto the rescuing fantasy 
father – as in Freud’s analysis of the oceanic in religion (Benjamin, 1995: 97).  Thus 
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the mother is split, she is unattainable, belongs to the father but is also the omnipotent 
figure of the child’s fantasy.  The mother according to Kristeva is then located in a 
‘lost territory’, as oedipalised and idealised she cannot then obtain any form of 
subjectivity (Kristeva cited by Benjamin, 1995: 97).  Benjamin argues that 
Sprengnether makes a compelling case for the way in which Freud’s own maternal 
idealisation, his difficulty in acknowledging loss in relation to his mother, and his 
reiterated belief in a mother’s unambivalent love of the firstborn son contributed to 
his formulation of the Oedipus complex.  That may well be, but the Oedipus complex 
has its roots in his early work with neurotic patients.   
 
In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6) Freud illustrates a series of events 
that began with a bungled action concerning eyes, a forgetting of the proper medicine 
and culminating in a remembering of the dream of a young man who dreamt he had 
sex with his mother.  Freud aligns this dream to the Oedipal myth and suggests that 
the young man’s dream is a return of the repressed. Freud argues, ‘that in being in 
love with one’s own mother one is never concerned with her as she is in the present 
but with her youthful mnemic image carried over from one’s childhood’ (SE 6: 178).  
While we know that Freud’s dream theory colluded with the death and therefore loss 
of his father, Sprengnether suggests that this loss, which Freud could not idealise was 
instead turned outwards as an aggression towards the father, as Oedipus does with 
Laius. Sprengnether argues that this does not happen with the first love-object, indeed 
it cannot happen because of the infant’s dependency on the mother, for his/her all 
consuming greed and love for her. The loss that the infant subsequently and 
sequentially feels leads to a series of displacements that become internalised as anger 
and anxiety at the unfaithful mother (in Benjamin, 1995: 97).  Who it seemed 
according to Freud never gave us enough milk (SE 22: 122).   
 
A counter-thesis 
Sprengnether’s earlier argument in The Spectral Mother: Freud, Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis (1990), suggests that the pre-Oedipal mother haunts Freud’s writing.  
In some ways this is not dissimilar from the argument that Diana Jonte-Pace offers.  
Both Sprengnether and Jonte-Pace are involved with dead mothers of sorts. Jonte-
Pace recommends her work as a counter-thesis to Freud, illuminating the ‘dead’ 
mother, ‘below the surface of the Oedipal masterplot’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 1).  Jonte-
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Pace contends that the counter-thesis is not pre-Oedipal, this cause has been taken up 
by the object-relation theorists like Winnicott.  It is also not anti-Oedipal like the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 2).  The counterthesis then haunts in 
a different way to Sprengnether’s pre-Oedipal because it challenges the dominance of 
the Oedipal paradigm rather than trailing after it offering alternatives.  Jonte-Pace 
suggests that the counterthesis can be seen most clearly in the ‘images and metaphors 
which, although intended as support for the Oedipal masterplot, actually decenter it’ 
(Jonte-Pace, 2001: 2).  I have little argument with Jonte-Pace’s text, she offers a 
compelling and thoughtful ‘counterthesis’ to Freud’s theories, in particular the four 
major ‘cultural texts’, Totem and Taboo, The Future of an Illusion, Civilisation and 
its Discontents, and Moses and Monotheism (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 2).  Included in what 
she terms the smaller (although not lesser) texts, she offers a subversive reading of 
Das Unheimlich, Medusa’s Head and The Theme of the Three Caskets. Jonte-Pace 
trawls through The Interpretation of Dreams offering discontinuities in Freud’s 
Oedipal argument, pointing out that Freud was aware of these limitations calling them 
‘umplumbable’.  In his religious texts suggests Jonte-Pace, Freud shows himself as a 
‘successful mourner of religion in transition’ but throughout his texts he appears to be 
‘an unsuccessful or “melancholic” mourner of the lost mother’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 5).  
Jonte-Pace argues that in fact ‘Freud’s inability to mourn the mother is far from 
idiosyncratic, however, for we are all melancholy mourners of maternal loss’ (Jonte-
Pace, 2001: 5).  Jonte-Pace suggests that dangerous and deadly mothers proliferate 
both in Freud’s oeuvre and in contemporary society but that they are unspeakable.  
Part of her counterthesis then is to speak the unspeakable in Freud’s work.  My only 
quibble with this interesting and compelling work is that I do not like the term 
counterthesis.  Jonte-Pace offers a reasoned argument as to why she uses the term 
counterthesis, my sense of the word though is as an inversion of something, to counter 
something is to oppose it, and Jonte-Pace is not opposing Freud’s initial thesis, not 
even really offering an alternative reading, but illuminating the interstices in Freud’s 
work that account according to Jonte-Pace as a ‘shadowy presence of this non-







Staying with Freud, Diana Fuss in Identification Papers (1995) suggests that Freud’s 
work on identification offers a reading ‘where the psychical/social distinction 
becomes impossibly confused and finally untenable’ (Fuss, 1995: 10). In Group 
Psychology (SE 18) Freud examines the process of the group through the concept of 
identification. This thesis as I have made clear is not about the group per se although 
our identification with the Mother is of singular importance in the construction of a 
self (which will be addressed throughout this thesis).  And the self is first and 
foremost a construction formulated from a relationship with an other/Other in much 
the same way as a self relates to a larger group in later development, through 
kindergarten, school, work and so on. Freud will argue that ‘identification is known to 
psycho-analysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person,’ 
that is to the father (SE 18: 105). The relationship to the mother develops alongside 
the one to the father as a ‘true object-cathexis’ states Freud with an Anlehnung –
literally ‘leaning on’- component (the sexual instincts (aim) lean up against the self-
preservative instincts).  The relationship to the mother is straightforward argues Freud 
because its aim is sexual.28 But identification is ambivalent from the start Freud 
suggests because it acts like a derivative of the oral stage of libidinal constitution ‘in 
which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way 
annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained at this standpoint; he has 
a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he is fond’ 
(SE 18: 105). The identification is one of being or having the father. Correlatively of 
whether ‘the tie attaches to the subject or to the object of the ego’ (SE 18: 106).  This 
is where Freud’s concept of identification becomes confusing (contradictory) because 
he will argue that the tie to the father as one of being, therefore identifying with him 
                                                 
28 A note on the word sexual.  In Freud’s later writings what he designated as sexual 
was grouped together under the concept, Eros.  But perhaps a fitting explanation for 
the enlarged understanding of sexual is to be found in the ‘American’ lectures: ‘You 
will now perhaps make the objection: “But all that is not sexuality.” I have used the 
word in a very much wider sense than you are accustomed to understand it. This I 
willingly concede. But it is a question whether you do not rather use the word in much 
too narrow a sense when you restrict it to the realm of procreation. You sacrifice by 
that the understanding of perversions; of the connection between perversion, neurosis 
and normal sexual life; and have no means of recognizing, in its true significance, the 
easily observable beginning of the somatic and mental sexual life of the child. But 
however you decide about the use of the word, remember that the psychoanalyst 
understands sexuality in that full sense to which he is led by the evaluation of infantile 




as a subject is possible before ‘any sexual object-choice has been made’ (SE 18: 106). 
But the ‘sexual object-choice’ caught up in the self-preservative instincts, which 
Freud has already told us is linked to the mother as a ‘true type’ is constitutive of the 
oral phase, which is itself explicitly about the mother and is before, in the sense that it 
is the ‘first’ relationship that the infant experiences when s/he comes into the world. 
Adam Phillips argues in On Kindness that ‘The most fundamental tie – one that could 
easily be taken to be the source if not the blueprint for all human bonds – is the one 
between mother and child’ (Phillips and Taylor, 2009: 80). This is a historical 
argument one that claims British and American psychoanalysis changed in response 
to two world wars, privileging the idea of a mother-child bond that had been relegated 
to the sidelines (and those that advocated for something like it, for example Rank, 
with it) in orthodox psychoanalysis.  But before this ‘wholesale’ belief in the 
mother/baby bond Freud finds himself in a ‘tangle’ with identification because he 
reiterates ‘identification is the earliest and original form of an emotional tie’ and then 
tells us that where repression breaks through, i.e., the formation of a symptom, for 
instance a cough – Freud’s example – ‘You wanted to be your mother, and now you 
are—anyhow so far as your sufferings are concerned’ – that object-choice has turned 
back into identification.  ‘The ego’, says Freud ‘assumes the characteristics of the 
object’ (SE 18: 106-107).  Freud attempts to save the concept of identification by 
suggesting that what happens in the process of identification is that the ego splits, has 
‘fallen’ into two pieces, ‘one of which rages against the second’ (SE 18: 109). The 
second piece of the ego contains the ‘lost object’ argues Freud and is an example of 
his famous dictum ‘The shadow of the object has fallen upon the ego’. This second 
piece of the ego seems to be in a protective mode shielding the ‘lost object’ from the 
wrath of the first part of the ego (later to be ‘identified’ as the super-ego). Freud does 
say in a footnote that he has not exhausted all the possibilities of identification and 
links this back to the primal horde and the feasting together, a feasting that Irigaray 
has shown above forgets its matricidal origins! Again, in Freud’s attempt to keep his 
Oedipal theory intact, he neglects what is obvious that our first identifications must be 
with the mother and in a rather convoluted manner tries to make the father the 
‘earliest emotional tie’.  And even if we accepted the divisions Freud makes between 
a true object-cathexis which is different to identification but runs alongside 
identification the fact that Freud compares identification to a derivative of the first 
oral phase of libidinal development comparable to his argument in Negation (SE 19) 
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‘I take you in and I spit you out’ would suggest that identification is first and foremost 
to do with the mother. 
 
Diana Fuss makes the point that in fact in Freud’s writings on homosexuality in 
women, identification and desire/libido intertwine and thus undermine a central tenet 
of psychoanalysis which holds ‘that desire and identification are structurally 
independent of one another, the possibility of one always presupposing the repression 
of the other’ (Fuss, 1995: 67).  The homosexual woman as identified by Freud marks 
not only the woman’s return to the mother but the subject’s turn as mother (Fuss, 
1995: 67).  There is something in Fuss’s argument that resonates with this project as a 
whole and will be explored in brief below. 
 
‘falling’ 
Fuss (1995) argues through Helene Deutsch that the girl’s homosexual pre-Oedipal 
attachment to the mother might also be viewed as a post-Oedipal29 regression in that 
the earlier fixation on the mother as first love object becomes a return (Fuss, 1995: 
63-64).  In fact Fuss suggests that Otto Fenichel offers a ‘blunt’ analysis of this return 
by stating that for the homosexual pre-subject, ‘every “pre” contains the spectre of a 
“re”: female homosexuality is posited as regressive and reactive, primitive and primal, 
undeveloped and archaic’ (Fuss, 1995: 64).  Fuss’s focus is on the female homosexual 
a troubled figure in psychoanalysis, in particular Freudian psychoanalysis, according 
to Fuss, and yet if we were to answer the following question, ‘where is female 
                                                 
29 Post-Oedipal encounters similar issues as pre-Oedipal.  All relationships are 
formulated within pre-existing Oedipal structures.  We are, as I stated at the beginning 
of this chapter always already Oedipalised, which does not mean that some form of 
undifferentiated space ‘before’ language is not available to us.  As this chapter 
illustrates Kristeva identifies this ‘before’ as the semiotic chora, a space where 
primary narcissism is invoked to cover up/over something.  To assign this ‘space’ a 
name seems particularly pressing for most feminist psychoanalysts, perhaps 
psychoanalysis in general.  Whether it is an intermediary space filled with angels as it 
is for Irigaray; a counter-thesis as it is for Jonte-Pace; or pre-Oedipal as it is for 
Sprengnether, Klein and others, it is a ‘space’ where we know the mother seems to 
have some position of power, of importance – even Freud allocated it as such.  Thus, 
pre-Oedipal while not the ‘best’ term is certainly descriptive of something that 
remains unknown.  Post-Oedipal in contrast seems to be an unnecessary term.  If we 
follow Freud’s reasoning, once we are Oedipalised what else is there?  We return, but 
the return is to this undifferentiated space of the pre-Oedipal. Which as I argued 
earlier, is according to Green, always already Oedipalised. 
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homosexuality to be found in psychoanalysis?’  Fuss replies, ‘in psychoanalysis’s 
very foundations’ (Fuss, 1995: 58). Importantly this troubling female figure gets 
displaced.  Fuss offers an historical treatise that runs through Freud’s case-studies of 
inversion in women, to Lacan’s dissertation on paranoid psychosis in women 
(‘attributed by Lacan to their presymbolic, prelinguistic, preseparation relation to the 
mother’ (Fuss, 1995: 59)), to Kristeva’s lack of interest in female homosexuality 
positing it as a ‘fall back’ to the ‘ambiguous space of the precultural’ (Fuss, 1995: 59) 
rather than accession to the position of subject.  What I will take from Fuss’s 
explanation and exploration of this ‘return’ is how this return gets reconfigured as a 
‘fall’.  And how this in turn, has some immediate relationship to the mother. Because 
the idea of a/The Fall is beset with the omniscient fall of the biblical story of Adam 
and Eve.  But also because there is something in Freud’s quoting of Grabbe’s 
Hannibal that ‘We will not fall out of this world’ that resonates with this thesis and 
importantly the mother as a whole.  After all, to finish Freud’s expression, ‘we will 
not fall out of this world’ but only because the ego, through a painful surrender of its 
boundaries, does not allow it (Freud in a letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé 1960: 310 and 
SE 18: 65). 
 
Fuss argues that for Freud, a woman’s return to the mother enacts a fall—‘not a 
prelapsarian fall which was, after all, a fall into heterosexuality, but a postlapsarian 
fall into homosexuality’ (Fuss, 1995: 65).  She suggests that Freud’s own play on the 
word ‘fall’ which in German means ‘both “to fall” and “to be delivered of a child”’ is 
important here.  In English the construction ‘to fall’ can also be construed as meaning 
to ‘fall pregnant’ and is commonly used as a temporal locator, i.e., ‘I/We fell pregnant 
on the 6 August 1907’, or ‘I/We fell pregnant in Spain, Paris, London, New York…’ 
or ‘I/We fell pregnant in the month of …’ and so on.  Fuss argues that ‘the girl’s fall 
back into a homosexual desire for the mother actually constitutes a particular kind of 
maternity in Freud’s reading—a fall equivalent to a deliverance’ (Fuss, 1995: 65). 
Fuss offers her own return, read through Cathy Caruth, that recounts an early memory 
of Freud’s of an accident which ‘befell’ him between the ages of two and three years 
old.  This is the childhood memory that Freud added to the Interpretation of Dreams 





I had climbed up on to a stool in the store-closet to get something nice 
that was lying on a cupboard or table.  The stool had tipped over and 
its corner had struck me behind my lower jaw; I might easily, I 
reflected, have knocked out all my teeth (Fuss, 1995: 65). 
 
Fuss points out that Freud presents this ‘screen memory’ through the lens of the oral-
cannibalistic stage.  The cupboard we know is also represented by Freud as the womb, 
importantly his mother’s womb in another recollection of his childhood which 
involved a teasing, laughing and one could say menacing older brother and a crying, 
frightened Freud (SE 6).  Freud was attempting to reach in for something nice from 
his mother’s cupboard only to have the stool fall over and knock him in his jaw. This 
could have resulted in the loss of his teeth he notes, the symbol of his entry into 
Oedipality.  Freud then offers ‘falling’ as ‘representations of childbirth’, fear of being 
a ‘fallen woman’ ‘of giving birth’.  Freud suggests Fuss, sums it up ‘nicely’ when he 
states that ‘when a girl falls she falls on her back’ (Fuss, 1995: 66).  This has some 
resonance with Freud’s contention that a ‘hole is a hole’ but Fuss’s argument here is 
enveloped in the question of why do Freud’s writings on female homosexuals 
inevitably end up in maternity?  In fact she writes ‘it cannot be a matter of 
indifference to feminist readers of Freud that “A Case of Homosexuality in a 
Woman”30 begins with the word “homosexuality” and concludes with the word 
“motherhood” …’ (Fuss, 1995: 66 and SE 18: 145-172).  She states that ‘Freud could 
be suggesting that homosexuality represents a regressive return to the mother—a 
desire to have the mother by figuratively becoming the mother—a return achieved 
through a literal fall enacting a symbolic delivery’ (Fuss, 1995: 67).  This would 
trouble Freud’s analysis of identification because it suggests that the son’s 
identification with the father does not in fact, precede the child’s identification with 
the mother.  A mother who is not hallucinatory, or part, but whole and who is 
                                                 
30 It is important to note that Freud did not think that the girl was in any way ill ‘she 
did not suffer from anything in herself, nor did she complain of her condition’ (Freud 
cited by Gilman, 1993: 136).  Freud concluded that the parents were the problem, 
fixated as they were on the daughter’s sexual orientation.  Gilman explores the change 
in Freud’s attitude where early in the 20th Century the origins of psychopathology and 
homosexuality were linked and later in a letter in the year 1935 he came to ‘see 
homosexuality, as having “no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, 
no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it a variation of the 
sexual function”’ (in Gilman, 1993: 136 (the letter is titled ‘anonymous’ and was 
written in English. It was written by a mother concerned that her son was homosexual 
although Freud is impressed that she never uses the term homosexual to describe her 
son (in E. Freud, 1960: 423)). 
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representative of something/somebody that not only do we wish to have but we also 
wish to be.  
 
Fuss’s explanation of ‘falling’ in Freud, in a history of psychoanalysis offers the 
rudiments of a more detailed account of ‘falling’. After all, Freud suggested that 
‘Childish ‘romping’ [‘Hetzen’], if I may use a word which commonly describes all 
such activities, is what is being repeated in dreams of flying, falling, giddiness and so 
on; while the pleasurable feelings attached to these experiences are transformed into 
anxiety.  But often enough, as every mother knows, romping among children actually 
ends in squabbling and tears’ (SE 4: 272). Lacan makes this link in his paper Anxiety 
(1962-63) suggesting that it is precisely the fall of the subject in an orgasm 
(precipitated by anxiety) – in ejaculation, that anxiety occurs. There appears to be a 
link between a psychoanalytic understanding of ‘falling’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘love’, which 
seem to have some relation to the mother. Jeffery J. Anderson in his paper, The Motif 
of Falling: Falling and the Loss of the Mother (1963) argues that ‘falling is a symbol 
of maternal loss’ (417) but more than this, falling converges with myths, tropes and 
biblical imagery to emphasise the mourning of this loss.  Sprengnether says 
something similar in her paper, (M)other Eve: Some Revisions of the Fall in Fiction 
by Contemporary Women Writers (1989), ‘and the Fall is portrayed in terms of the 
loss of the mother’ (299). After all Freud argues in On Narcissism (SE 14): ‘A strong 
egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in 
order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we 
are unable to love’ (SE 14: 85).  If psychoanalysis is the cure through love, as Freud 
once famously wrote to Jung, and this love is a protection against falling ill then our 
ability to love, to be healthy, normal as Freud might write it, seems firstly, or 
originally, to have its ‘roots’ in our relationship to our mothers.   
 
Kristeva 
In Tales of Love (1987) Julia Kristeva also engages with Freud’s theory of 
identification, but she outlines how narcissism is implicated in identification.  It is 
interesting given the analysis of the mother as omnipotent that Kristeva suggests 
Freud ‘imposes an omnipresence of narcissism which permeates the other realms to 
the point that one finds it again in the object (where it is reflected)—if we assume that 
an object can be designated, in other words symbolized and loved as such, outside of 
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chaos, rejection, and destruction’ (Kristeva, 1987: 22). Narcissism is far from 
originary though suggests Kristeva, it is a ‘supplement’, added or attached to the 
autoerotic drives and therefore might be called intrasymbolic.  Kristeva adds that one 
problem that arises is that narcissism would appear to be dependent on a third term 
‘but within a disposition that chronologically and logically precedes that of the 
Oedipal Ego’ (Kristeva, 1987: 22).  This returns us to Benjamin’s analysis which 
questions whether the father as third term breaks up the mother-child dyad, or if 
indeed the third term is not the father, laws etcetera but ‘an effect generated by the 
symbolic space within a social, differentiated maternal dyad’ (Benjamin, 1995: 96). In 
fact Benjamin’s argument suggests that if the third term is integral to the mother-child 
dyad then its collapse would foreclose the negotiation of recognition with the mother, 
transferring her omnipotence instead of relegating it to a different – psychic, social, 
political – sphere (Benjamin, 1995: 96).  Thus the father would take on, attract 
somehow, because of his differentiated space maybe, the Oedipal omnipotence of the 
mother therefore her power as we might understand it in Freudian and Lacanian 
ideologies, would become the father’s.  This would leave the mother then in some 
kind of hinterland without Oedipal power and therefore without Oedipal or Symbolic 
subjectivity.  This Spaltung which splits the mother places her as Kristeva says in ‘the 
fantasy of a “lost territory”. This fantasy is, in effect, less about the maternal 
relationship than about “the idealization of primary narcissism”’(Kristeva cited by 
Benjamin, 1995: 97).  Kristeva then offers a whole host of questions, which are worth 
repeating here: ‘What is this narcissitic “identity”? How stable are its borders, its 
relation to the other?  Does the “mirror stage” emerge out of nowhere? What are the 
conditions of its emergence?’ (Kristeva, 1987: 22-23).  Kristeva argues that the 
ternary structuration of narcissism is different from the Ego-object-Other triangle, 
which is articulated in the shadow of the Oedipus complex. It has been suggested 
therefore by some theorists because of the ubiquity of Freudian narcissism that 
narcissism is in fact a Freudian fantasy constructed out of a mimetic relationship that 
exists primarily between mother and child. Kristeva argues, ‘(n)evertheless, it is still a 
fact that narcissism, caught in a play of rebounds within the Freudian text, in a first 
stage seem to be a mimetic play that would establish psychic identities (Ego/object), 
until that play finally, and in the dizziness of rebounds, reveals itself as a screen over 
emptiness’ (Kristeva, 1987: 23).  Kristeva calls this emptiness, ‘the root of the human 
psyche’ which is not unveiled on the psychoanalytic couch but located (if indeed it 
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can be located) in front of the Saussurian bar (an emptiness brought about by the 
arbitrariness of the Saussurian sign) ‘that constitutes the referent/signified/signifier 
relationship, of which Lacan has merely taken up the “visible” aspect in the gaping 
hole of the mirror stage’ (Kristeva, 1987: 23).  Kristeva suggests that from the 
standpoint of representation Lacan’s gaping hole and Saussure’s arbitrariness of the 
sign perhaps illuminate the ubiquity, the uneasiness and inconsistency of Freud’s 
narcissism (Kristeva, 1987: 23-24).  She asks, that if emptiness is there at the 
beginning of the symbolic function, between the not yet Ego and the not yet object 
‘might narcissism be a means for protecting that emptiness?’ (Kristeva, 1987: 24).  
But what might narcissism be protecting the emptiness from?  Kristeva suggests that 
narcissism is protecting the emptiness from chaos, from indistinct borders that 
threaten and confuse the limits of the body, words, the real and the symbolic. ‘The 
child, with all due respect to Lacan, not only needs the real and the symbolic—it 
signifies itself as child, in other words as the subject that it is, and neither as a 
psychotic nor as an adult, precisely in that zone where emptiness and narcissism, the 
one upholding the other, constitute the zero degree of imagination’ (Kristeva, 1987: 
24). This returns us to the notion of ‘identification’ according to Kristeva.  
Identification as it is explained above, takes us back to the Ego ideal (the split ego – 
later the super-ego) where identification is not really with the object but with the 
object as ideal.  For Freud we know that this primary process of identification was 
with the Father, although there is slippage for Freud, between ‘father’ and ‘both 
parents’.  Identification is only tenable if one conceives of it as always already within 
the symbolic orbit, under the sway of language but we know empirically, counters 
Kristeva, that the mother is the object of the first affections, first vocalizations and 
first imitations (Kristeva, 1987: 27). Again this troubling of Identification and a 
recognition of it as an ‘emotional tie’ first and foremost with the mother. 
 
Kristeva’s mother, or maternal space is not like Irigaray’s caught up as it is in the 
mother-daughter duality, a duality that endorses the rather arbitrary – for Irigaray – 
position between you and me.  Kristeva in contrast is much more the Freudian or 
Lacanian daughter, arguing that women need the Symbolic to avoid the lack of 
distinction from the mother and thereafter psychosis.  In Stabat Mater (1987) which 




If it is not possible to say of a woman what she is (without running the 
risk of abolishing her difference), would it perhaps be different 
concerning the mother, since that is the only function of the “other 
sex” to which we can definitely attribute existence?  And yet, there too, 
we are caught in a paradox. First, we live in a civilisation where the 
consecrated (religious or secular) representation of femininity is 
absorbed by motherhood.  If, however, one looks at it more closely, 
this motherhood is the fantasy that is nurtured by the adult, man or 
woman, of a lost territory; what is more, it involves less an idealized 
archaic mother that the idealization of the relationship that binds us to 
her, one that cannot be localized—an idealization of primary 
narcissism (Kristeva, 1987: 234). 
 
This mother is the site of the primary identification and Kristeva’s premise is that the 
mother’s body is necessary for the continuation of the species and because of this ‘her 
questionable identity threatens the Symbolic unity’ (in Oliver, 1993: 5).  If the mother 
loves an Other it is her own mother but this love is narcissistic as the love for the 
mother is also love for herself as mother. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholy 
(1989) Kristeva argues that the subject by not being able to give up the ‘archaic’ 
mother, which is understood psychically as the lost object, develops ‘asymbolia’, an 
inability to use language (Kristeva, 1989: 9).  Language, suggests Kristeva, as 
symbolic function is constituted only at the expense of repressing ‘instinctual drives’ 
and thus an uninterrupted relation to the mother (Kristeva, 1980: 136).  Language 
begins with a negation – a negation inset with loss and mourning – of the mother 
argues Kristeva.  By recognising her loss as a speaking being, then she is not lost but 
can be recovered states Kristeva, in the proliferation of signs (in Beardsworth: 2004: 
104). Poetic language contends Kristeva is the only way of getting back to the mother, 
because it unsettles and reactivates this repressed, instinctual, maternal element 
(Kristeva, 1980: 136).  Following Kristeva, Ewa Ziarek points out that it is maternity 
not poetry, that is the most powerful model of alterity-within because it exists at the 
heart of the social and the species (Ziarek, 1993: 4).   
 
To return to the argument above Kristeva’s pre-Oedipal, which draws on Lacan’s 
Imaginary, rewrites the Imaginary according to Lisa Lowe and does so to privilege the 
infant’s identification with the mother not its specular image stressed by Lacan 
(Lowe, 1993: 154).  Kristeva’s archaic relationship to the mother is reinstated in the 
child’s relation to the ‘father of prehistory’, the ‘imaginary father’ who exists before 
the Oedipal father and whose existence may be hallucinatory but who offers the child 
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the ability to sublimate as might be seen in the reading of Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci 
(in Kristeva, 1995: 121). In this way, continues Kristeva it becomes a love that cannot 
be represented. 
 
Doane and Hodges suggest that Kristeva is not only influenced by Lacan (and Freud) 
as many feminist writers have theorised but is in fact indebted to André Green. Green 
according to Doane and Hodges argues that Freud, Lacan and Lacanians are too 
concerned with the ‘dead father’, centralising castration and sidelining or 
‘castrasizing’ other anxieties (in Doane and Hodges, 1992: 57).  Green both argues 
that the ‘Lacanian emphasis on language precludes significant analysis of the situation 
of psychotics and borderline patients whose problems seem to be linked to a space 
before language where the vicissitudes of the passions are inscribed’ (in Doane and 
Hodges, 1992: 57) and further that ‘descriptions of the mother-infant relationship 
have not been taken far enough’ (57).  Unsurprisingly Doane and Hodges recognise 
Green’s argument in Kristeva’s work.  Green contends, as does Kristeva albeit 
without reference to Green state Doane and Hodges, that Kleinian psychoanalysis 
elevates the maternal part objects in particular the breast, and the anxieties relating to 
its loss, that is depressive anxieties (in Doane and Hodges, 1992: 57).  Freud’s mother 
was mostly good, although nobody, particularly boys, wanted to look at her genitalia. 
Klein’s mother in contrast is usually pretty frightening, although this is not the actual 
mother but the infant’s phantasised projection of her.  It would be left to Winnicott 
and I would add Bowlby with his Attachment theory, to theorise the ‘real’ mother.  
Green though, argue Doane and Hodges gives credence to the actual ‘bad’ mother in 
contrast to the ‘good’ mother of Winnicott (we will return to an engagement with 
Winnicott in Chapter Four).  Kristeva’s analysis of the mother as lost object for the 
child/adult is premised on our ability to enter the Symbolic. Preceding the Symbolic 
though is Kristeva’s semiotic which I introduced above.  Jacqueline Rose suggests 
that discussion around Kristeva’s work has been ‘notably around the concept of the 
semiotic which has acquired something of an existence of its own, outside the realm 
of meaning without which, strictly, it does not make sense’ (Rose, 1993b: 48).  
Feminist readers of Kristeva have both accepted and at times rejected Kristeva’s 
semiotic, to which Kristeva has variously ascribed femininity, colour, music, body 
and affect.  The problem according to Rose is that the semiotic is entangled with the 
repressed, its attraction is that it rests outside symbolic norms (Rose, 1993b: 48). Rose 
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also points too Kristeva’s reliance on Green’s work, in particular his concept of 
‘affect’ again suggesting that Kristeva, like Green, was responding to the primacy of 
representation and the linguistic sign which ignored and thereafter absorbed the 
irreducible, drive, affect (Rose, 1993b: 49).  While Kristeva argues that the semiotic is 
not origin Rose begs to differ. After all, according to Rose, Kristeva variously defines 
the semiotic as ‘genetically detected in the first echolalia’s of infants’ and 
heterogeneity as the ‘archaisms of the semiotic body’ which are ‘logically and 
chronologically prior to the institution of the symbolic’ (in Rose, 1993b: 49).  Further 
what becomes problematic in the concept of the semiotic is Kristeva’s linking of the 
term chora with the semiotic.  Why this might be problematic is twofold. On the one 
hand the term chora which in Greek means, ‘enclosed space, womb’, comes from 
Plato’s The Timaeus, ‘where it stands for the mediating instance in which the copies 
of the eternal model receive their shape’ (Rose, 1993b: 50). Plato suggested that the 
chora was ‘a matrix like space that is nourishing, unnameable, prior to the One and to 
God, and that thus defies metaphysics’ (Plato cited by Kristeva, 1995: 204).  Both the 
problem with, and perhaps the revolutionary capacity of, the chora are that it 
represents the ‘flux’ of ‘maternal’ space. There is a contradiction here though, 
because the chora while allocated a name (although seemingly unnameable), is 
according to Plato ‘incomprehensible’ (in Moi, 1985: 161).  But it also partakes of the 
‘intelligible’ (Plato in Moi, 1985: 161). This sounds remarkably like Freud’s A Note 
Upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad (SE 19), which contains the shape and form of the 
words – language – that had been written on it but not the actual words themselves.  
Or alternatively, in the first of his three papers on the psychology of love Freud in a 
surprising turn of phrase comments that the imprint of the mother’s cervix on the 
shape of the infant’s head is noticeable when the labour is protracted.  Here Freud’s 
analogy is of libido that has remained attached to the mother (SE 11). And yet this is 
what the chora is according to Kristeva, a primitive ‘before’ if you like, something 
that connects and orients the body to the mother. An undefinable space that is before 
the One and God says Plato – a space yet that ‘must needs be in some place and 
occupy some room’ (cited by Kristeva, 1995: 236 n 3). Rose comments that Kristeva 
writes Plato’s chora through Freud’s statement, ‘this rhythmic space without thesis or 
position, the process where significance comes to be, Plato indicates as much when he 
designates this receptacle nursing, maternal’ (in Rose, 1993b: 50).  It should be 
considered though that for Plato, if we substitute the receptacle for the chora 
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(acknowledging the meaning inherent to both words), that the womb, receptacle, 
chora, was an empty vessel waiting only to be filled up with the unborn child. And 
that in the act of procreation the mother played no part, after all for Plato, she had no 
soul.  Of course, consideration of this point may illustrate why the ‘chora’ has proved 
to be problematic for some feminist readers of Kristeva.  To offer the mother a space, 
an important space, before language and the Name of the Father, would seem to 
fortify her importance in the development of the ego in the infant.  But by following 
Freud and Plato and positioning this space as ‘maternal’ appears to relegate it once 
more to some dark hinterland – the unconscious.  It might be remembered though that 
Freud argued that the nursing mother was both active in the act of feeding and passive 
and that he therefore offers Plato’s ‘chora’ a significance that Plato does not offer it 
himself.  And more explicitly Kristeva’s semiotic-chora ‘centrally’ concerns the 
mother’s body with both the recognition that this is no presymbolic body and 
correspondingly, that this is a body that is mediator of the symbolic (in Beardsworth, 
2004: 44).  To write then of the semiotic-chora, of a space before, and it might be 
said, beyond the Symbolic, rather than limiting the maternal, may instead offer the 
mother a space to be a mother. Plato makes the chora a ‘womb’ because in his 
reasoning it needs a room, but if it is before ‘the One and God’ then this womb-room 
has an importance beyond that traditionally – historically – appointed the mother.  If 
in Plato’s reasoning, God is the ‘crafter of uncreated matter’ then how do we 
understand the mother, bearer of the womb-room and crafter of ‘matter’ in the shape 
of a baby?  These are questions that neither Freud nor Plato asked, or indeed I 
imagine even considered.  Kristeva with her redefinition of Plato’s term seems to be 
moving towards these types of questions but she limits herself by limiting the concept.  
This might be because of her adherence to Lacan’s ‘system’ of the real, imaginary and 
symbolic.  In fact the ‘thetic’, the ‘chora’, and the ‘semiotic’, appear to be simply 
grafted onto this system at times.  At other times the insurgency of these terms 
appears to ‘rock’ the very foundations on which Lacan and Freud developed their 
psychoanalysis.    Kristeva’s reframing of Freud’s famous dictum, ‘What does a 
woman want?’ to ‘What does a mother want?’ (in Beardsworth, 2004: 70), is left to 
languish when one considers the potential of the chora because she does not ‘push’ it 
far enough.  There is ‘revolution’ in Kristevian psychoanalysis but her adherence to 
Freud and Lacan’s methods (for want of a better word) means she remains the dutiful 
daughter: although it might be said erring on the side of the Erinnyes.  Kristeva’s 
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position might be understandable.  She is a follower of Freud and Lacan, not 
necessary a faithful follower, but a follower never the less.  She is not ‘crafter’, in the 
sense that the chora might offer, and that her work Stabat Mater (1987) might suggest 
but a ‘crafter’ working from the boundaries of a more orthodox psychoanalysis. As a 
feminist psychoanalyst and academic this might make her position more tenable 
rather than the corps-a-corps of Irigaray or the écriture féminine of Hélène Cixous.  
Both these positions seem to the take their authors to some hinterland that is neither 
(un)conscious or for that matter especially coherent.  Kristeva it might be said, more 
than Klein, and certainly I think more than Cixous or Irigaray attempts to approach 
the mother, as a mother we could say, but a mother that is always just out of reach.  
This is both the tantalising aspect of her work and also its limitation.  Then again, how 
does one reach the mother when she is positioned within psychoanalysis, on the 
periphery, the margin, as spectre, and as pre-Oedipal?  It is as if the mother is the 
space between the fingertips as Michelangelo’s depicts it, of God and Adam reaching 
out to each other – almost there but not quite.  Between a man and his God then there 
is space.  It might well be, if we took the revolutionary aspect of the chora, that this 
space is female, is the mother.  
 
Klein 
It may seem strange to end with Melanie Klein given the pre-eminence of her object-
relations theory in the work cited above but like many people coming to Klein it is 
difficult to imagine where she might be best placed.  While Lacan maybe the self-
proclaimed heir to Freud, Klein in contrast argued that nobody had taken Freud 
further than her – she argued that she took him beyond his climax! (in Stonebridge, 
1998: 192-193). In fact she suggests that Freud regressed in his work on anxiety and 
that his daughter Anna Freud was part of the problem, she ‘held him back’ (in 
Stonebridge, 1998: 193).  It is not easy to imagine anyone holding Freud back let 
alone, ‘my daughter, the child analyst’, as Freud referred to Anna and yet, Klein saw 
herself as the ‘true’ Freudian heir. She was both follower of Freud and conquistador 
of a new field of psychoanalysis, object-relations theory.  Klein takes the mother, a 
neglected and negated object in Freudian psychoanalysis according to her model and 
places her at centre stage.  But Klein’s mother doesn’t really do anything.  She is cut 
up into bits and pieces by the infant, now good breast, now bad breast and is the body 
on which the infant’s paranoid, sadistic and depressive phantasies are projected and 
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thereafter the adult’s paranoid, sadistic and depressive phantasies or positions are 
played out.  Doane and Hodges will argue that Klein takes the burden of mother-
blaming off actual mothers but I am not entirely convinced.   
 
Stonebridge and Phillips call the interest in Klein, mid 1990’s on, as stemming from 
the impetus of feminist theorists and the decision by the publishing house Virago, to 
publish her work in the late 1980’s.  Be that as it may, many feminist theorists have 
steered clear of Klein repelled as Stonebridge and Phillips suggest by the 
‘uncomfortable proximity between mother-love and matricide’ in Klein’s work and 
her unhesitant, incessant heterosexism (Stonebridge and Phillips ed., 1998: 3).  
Stonebridge and Phillips suggest that Klein has been ignored largely because Lacan’s 
adaptation of Saussure’s structural linguistics, which he grafted onto Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams opened up ground breaking possibilities of thought across 
fields as diverse as science to the humanities and in so doing created a ‘large’ and 
sympathetic audience (in Stonebridge and Phillips, 1998: 5).  Klein’s disturbing view 
of infant and adult relations was generally ignored as both too difficult and going too 
far.  But, suggests Stonebridge and Phillips, Klein’s formulations enable us to see that 
Lacan’s ‘linguistic a priori’ is both less satisfying and leaves (us) little room to 
manoeuvre.  Klein’s infantile development would seem to trouble all paradigms and 
its negativity, its adherence to what Klein calls the depressive position push us to the 
very borders of the unacceptable, the unimaginable: the un perhaps here being the 
token of repression as it was for Freud (SE 17). 
 
Juliet Mitchell argues that what Klein did was new, but it is important to realise that 
the innovation sprang directly from a reading of Freud.  Klein’s work was primarily 
with children and she stressed that the treatment of children and adults could use the 
same psychoanalytic tools. Klein introduced a new psychoanalytic tool into the 
analytic situation, the ‘play technique’ and argued, ‘Play, like dream-thoughts, can be 
a manifest expression with a latent unconscious content’ (in Mitchell, 1998: 20). Here 
Klein was following Freud, after all Freud had argued that, ‘(b)efore there is such a 
thing as a joke, there is something that we may describe as “play” or as “a jest”’ (SE 
8: 128).  And further, ‘(d)uring the period in which a child is learning how to handle 
the vocabulary of his mother-tongue, it gives him obvious pleasure to ‘experiment 
with it in play’ (SE 8: 125).  Freud did argue that had dream theory or research into 
60 
 
the neuroses not led him to the royal road of the unconscious then a revision of jokes 
most surely would have.  The joke, which is infantile at bottom, grows out of child 
play and both play with words and with the mother are, little by little, repressed until 
most play is relegated to the ancient dwelling place of the unconscious to use Freud’s 
expression. Child’s play then is the predecessor of the free associations of the 
traditional analytic situation and Klein realised this.  She saw the introduction of toys 
in her children’s sessions as a way to bridge the gap between an external object and 
the inner world: ‘Toys represent the object of phantasy and of object relations’ 
(Mitchell, 1998: 23). But this could be limiting because the ‘toy’ might represent 
something ‘unconscious’ that may well then be un-representable.  This of course was 
Klein’s purpose, to get to a ‘before’; a ‘before’ that is, prior to the division of the 
unconscious/conscious bought about by repression (Pontalis, 1998: 89).  In that way 
Klein believed she would go back in time – through the child’s phantasies as it were – 
and arrive at the ‘birth’ of the unconscious (Pontalis, 1998: 89). Winnicott understood 
this knowledge of the child’s unconscious was limited – if not impossible to recognise 
- so he created, or identified a space that he termed ‘transitional’ and compatibly the 
‘transitional object’.  He thus blurred the boundaries, as it were, and effectively 
handed ‘play’ back to the child, something Klein failed to do.   
 
One of the issues highlighted in Klein’s case-studies is that the child has symbolism 
slammed onto him with complete brutality (Lacan in Evans ed., 1996: 96). Klein 
speaks for little Dick (the pun is noted) but also, and perhaps tellingly she offers 
prohibitions.  In her analysis of her own children ‘Felix/Hans’ and ‘Fritz/Eric’  (Felix 
and Fritz are the pseudonyms), Klein writes herself as if she were the neighbour next 
door. Klein as the mother analysing her own children seemed to believe that she 
‘should’ have access, or at least a more intimate knowledge of their unconscious – 
even acknowledging her role-playing.  But as Pontalis makes clear, the unconscious 
by the very fact that it is unconscious is devilishly hard to understand or for that 
matter locate.31  Pontalis states, ‘But any knowledge of the unconscious can only be 
                                                 
31 Joan Riviere in a paper written to celebrate the centenary of Freud’s birth, ‘A 
Character Trait of Freud’s’ (1958) offers a tacit understanding of the unconscious that 
Freud gave during her analysis with him.  Freud made an interpretation of something 
Riviere says and she immediately objects.  Freud simply said, ‘It is un-conscious’. 
Riviere states she was ‘overwhelmed’ and repeats, ‘I knew nothing about it’.  In that 
instant then states Riviere, ‘he had created in me his discovery of the powerful 
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effectively established if it stands the test of what contradicts it from another place…’ 
(Pontalis, 1998: 89).  Tellingly, Klein ‘stumbles’ as Pontalis notes when ‘Fritz’ 
expresses his desire for sexual knowledge, but importantly sexual knowledge about 
his parents.  Seemingly embarrassed she replies to his ‘sexual researches’, that ‘every 
man has only one wife’; when he is big she will be old; the white stuff that Papa 
makes out of his wiwi, he makes like doing ‘wiwi’ although not so much (Pontalis, 
1998: 87).  Pontalis calls this, the mother’s prohibition and adds that the further Klein 
pushed ‘Fritz’ for answers the further he strayed from her prescription of a 
psychoanalysis.   In Klein’s Contributions to Psychoanalysis (1921-45) she asks, 
“What holds the child back?” (Pontalis, 1998: 82).  Pontalis argues that in her effort to 
find the child’s primary unconscious before any intervention, Klein failed to see that 
she was the intervention, it was ‘she’ then who held the child back.  She also failed to 
take the Master at his word.  Freud argued that, ‘After such enlightenment children 
know something they did not know before but they make no use of the new 
knowledge that has been presented to them … They behave like the primitive races 
who have had Christianity thrust upon them and who continue to worship their idols 
in secret’ (Freud cited by Pontalis, 1998: 84).  In Klein’s analysis of ‘Fritz’, the little 
boy who gave us the good and bad mother (in Torok, Sylwan and Covello, 1998: 71), 
while he could be convinced to give up God he would neither let go of the mother as 
witch or indeed as Freud suggests above, was he prepared to believe ‘her’ stories of 
enlightenment.  Little ‘Fritz’ became increasingly attached to a phrase that he knew to 
be untrue.  To all inquiries he responded with, ‘go to your stomach’ or some variation 
with stomach as the key word because he believed, although given evidence to the 
contrary that babies grew in the mother’s stomach, as it were asexually.  It might also 
be argued that given the stomach/womb as a symbol of the mother, that ‘Fritz’ was 
attempting to hold onto his mother, identify with his mother rather that the neighbour 
‘Mrs Klein’.  This was a household that allowed no God, no Father Christmas, no 
Angels or Devils.  If the child insisted that they existed the unequivocal ‘No’ was 
always supplied.  And yet just as he held onto his ‘stomach’ (because as Pontalis 
argues he couldn’t stomach what he was being told) he also held onto the division of 
                                                                                                                                            
unconscious in our minds that we know nothing of, and that yet is impelling and 
directing us.  I have never forgotten this reminder from him of what unconscious 
means’ (Riviere in Sutherland ed. 1958: 149).  What Riviere reminds us, is that the 




mother’s as witches and queens. The witch according to Klein is merely the negative 
side of the mother-imago taken up by Fritz/Eric to maintain some kind of order inside 
the chaotic phantasies of mother with a penis, dead mother, powerful mother and so 
on. Using Karl Abraham’s concept of ‘cannibalistic incorporation’, Klein argues that 
the child wishes to cut the/his mother into bits and pieces and swallow her whole.  
 
Mitchell argues that Klein develops a model based on the polar pair love and hate that 
Klein will argue, the neonate brings into the world.  Klein moved away from orthodox 
psychoanalysis here by dwelling on the conflict between mother and baby rather than 
the triangular discord adhered to by earlier psychoanalysis. Following Freud, although 
not adopting a Freudian methodology, Klein states that love is the manifestation of the 
life drive/Eros, and hate, the death drive/Thanatos.  These two drives are in eternal 
conflict with each other and the infant needs to learn how to deal with these conflicts 
within the dyad of mother and baby. For Klein, Freud neglected ‘his’ aggressive 
instinct and did so because he didn’t pay enough attention to the ‘phantasy’32object, 
the mother. The phantasy mother is not strictly the biological mother but they 
intercept argues Klein: 
  
My hypothesis is that the infant has an innate unconscious awareness 
of the existence of the mother.  We know that young animals at once 
turn to the mother and find their food from her.  The human animal is 
not different in that respect, and this instinctual knowledge is the basis 
for the infant’s primal relation to the mother… (Klein cited by 
Mitchell, 1998: 23).  
 
                                                 
32 Of note here, while for Freud phantasy can, or does mean imagination – 
‘Phantasiebildung’ – ‘imaginative formation’ (SE 5: 491 n 1), for Klein phantasy 
seems to encompass an ‘All’ that we are never really made aware of.  Thus, phantasy 
for Klein becomes omnipotent, a weapon states Riviere that cuts both ways (in Rose, 
1993: 164). Mitchell points out that the ‘ph’ spelling is to indicate that the process is 
unconscious which is important to an understanding of phantasy in Klein (Mitchell, 
1998: 22). To note, the ‘ph’ as opposed to the ‘f’ spelling of ph/fantasy is also a 
matter of translation.  In German ‘fantasy’ is spelt with a ‘ph.’ In the Standard 
Editions of Freud most often the ‘ph’ spelling is left intact which refers to something 
intangible that the ‘f’ spelling does not seem to convey. Although there is slippage 
here and both spellings of ‘fantasy’ are used.  Following the English translation of 
Freud, the Standard Edition, I will most often use the ‘ph’ spelling of fantasy although 
if the translation has used the ‘f’ then I will follow suit. Whenever I refer to Klein’s 
use of ‘phantasy’ I will use the ‘ph’ spelling as indicative of the unconscious. 
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For Mitchell it is finally the development of the ego that interests Klein, in particular 
how the ego struggles to preserve itself against a relentless death drive.  Whereas for 
Freud the ego precedes the super-ego and has a complex relation to it for Klein the 
ego takes its shape in relation to internal representations of the mother and the super-
ego begins in the earliest relation to the mother not in the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex as it does for Freud. Klein argued that object-relation’s initial starting point 
emerged from a passage in Freud’s The Ego and the Id (SE 19 (in fact as Eli Zaretsky 
shows, Klein believed that had Freud followed up his insight in this paper then he 
would have become a Kleinian not a Freudian!)): ‘the superego is to a large extent 
due to the sadism projected on to the parents who are thus established in the superego 
as frightening and persecuting figures.  That is, however not just one point, it is the 
point on which my conception of internalised objects has developed’ (Freud and Klein 
quoted by Zaretsky, 1998:38).   
 
Later Klein 
The death of her son while mountain climbing led Klein to develop a new idea of the 
ego, something quite distinct from Freud’s. This new ego took mourning as its 
starting point suggesting that in mourning we identify with lost objects and thus an 
inner object world is built up.  Klein introduced the concept of a ‘position’ to clarify 
and conceptualise the specific anxieties and defences integral to this inner world of 
object relations.  There are two positions, the paranoid-schizoid position and the 
depressive position. For Klein the whole of life happens in the shift between the two 
positions.  In its earliest phase, the psyche is in the ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ this 
position is defined as experiences, which are especially fragmentary and 
discontinuous where thoughts and feelings happen to the subject but persecutory 
anxiety predominates.  ‘The human accomplishment lies in achieving the “depressive 
position” although persecutory anxiety is never fully supplanted’ (Zaretsky, 1998: 
39). The mother becomes for the infant an internal object which according to Klein 
suggests the recognition by the infant that the mother is separate to the infant, not 
caught in some kind of fusion and importantly constitutes the beginnings of the 
infant’s own subjectivity, a subjectivity that involves mourning, sadness and object 
loss, which Klein has also called the ‘pining’ position (Zaretsky, 1998: 39). For Klein 
at the ‘heart of the depressive position is the realisation that security can only be 
achieved through responsibility’ (Zaretsky, 1998: 39).  That is, if you hurt an object 
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on which you depend you need to make reparation. As Klein notes, when the naughty 
child who has rent a hole in the ‘fabric of the world’ in Ravel’s Opera (‘The Magic 
Word’), whispers ‘Mama’ everything is restored to order once more (in Klein, 1929: 
436-437). The guilt and anxiety that the infant feels in this depressive position is for 
the damage it has done to the mother in phantasy. Klein is important argues Zaretsky 
because she argues for a subjective position that is conceived of as being separate to 
the mother, the phantasy mother, while also being integral to the ‘real’ mother.  
Kleinian theory then is understood as mother-centred and perhaps it is although I say 
this with reservation. The primary relationship the infant has is to the figure of the 
mother but as part object (good breast/bad breast).  The relationship has the quality of 
being atemporal and the Kleinian ‘positions’ are supposed to illustrate this.  After all, 
a ‘position’ happens in a mental space, which intermingles past, present and future 
and importantly the psychical phenomena, unconscious, conscious and preconscious.  
Mitchell contends that for Klein the ego is like the contemporary idea of ‘self’ always 
and already everywhere and correspondingly nowhere if one takes a postmodernist 
stance whereas Freud’s ego, while never definitive, did not become a psychology of 
the ego – at least, not by Freud.   
 
A Way Forward 
Kristeva’s concern regarding narcissism has some similarity to Klein’s emphasis on 
ambivalence.  Ambivalence as we know from Freud is the movement between the 
drives eros and thanatos but also between love and hate from the infant towards the 
mother and the father.  For Klein this ambivalent fluctuation centred in part, a good 
(and bad) part, on the breast.  But there is something more in Klein’s conception of 
ambivalence because the relationship to the breast is at bottom a relationship to the 
mother, the infant loves the mother with the good breast and hates the mother with the 
bad breast (and the representation of these positions is not as simple as I am depicting 
them) because as Klein sees it, the infant both loves and hates the mother because she 
saves him/her from the internalised emptiness, an emptiness that Kristeva argues, 
Lacan saw as taken up by the visible aspect of the ‘gaping hole’ of the mirror stage 
and to which Kristeva attributed primary narcissism.  Winnicott might more readily 
see it as outside the mirror caught up in objects, transferred probably to the ‘safety’ of 
transitional phenomena, the transitional object – this then keeps emptiness at bay. For 
Klein ambivalence occurs in Ferenczi’s magical omnipotent stages (which I will 
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engage with in Chapter Four), but in shorthand are the stages where the infant 
believes it controls its world as if by magic (this is Freud’s developing ‘Majesty the 
Ego’).  Of course the infant in Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position is not at all like the 
infant in Ferenzci’s magical omnipotent stages. Ferenczi’s child is developing in a 
more sequential way and appears to be a happier child for it.  Klein’s infant caught in 
the ‘vicious circle’ as Riviere describes the circularity of ambivalence the child has 
for its mother, never seems to be ‘happy’.  This could be that Ferenczi’s stages are 
magically omnipotent and he writes them as if the child has some control over them.  
Klein’s position in contrast is one of omnipotence of phantasy, the child never seems 
to know whether it (or for that matter its mother) will get out alive (Rose, 1993a: 163-
164).  To return to Kristeva, narcissism is the screen for the emptiness left over in the 
development of the individual ego, this is the ego separated from the mother using 
which, ever psychoanalytic ‘fable’ you like (the mirror, the mother’s face as mirror, 
the paranoid-schizoid position etcetera).  Perhaps, then the intensity of the Kleinian 
ambivalence must be felt more substantially in the covering up, covering over of a 
part of the child’s ego with the mother’s own ego – after all isn’t this is what primary 
narcissism is about?   
 
For Klein, love comes from the mother’s demand: if ‘I’ smile and coo engagingly 
‘thinks’ the infant then my mother will love me. Thus the infant in response to her 
(and this could just as easily be She is as Horney offers, see above, pages 38-39), 
pleasure ‘seeks out her desires and her words’. It attempts, argues Rose, ‘to fetch the 
sounds out’ of its mother’s mouth’ (Rose, 1993a: 165).  What is unsettling in Klein is 
we are never sure which mother is at play in the demands of her infant.  This may 
seem unremarkable, what matter which mother we could ask, but the very 
omnipotence of Klein’s phantasy mother seems to make the real mother redundant. 
Pontalis and Jean Laplanche argue that this points to a potential reductionism in 
Kleinian object-relations theory (in Rose, 1993a: 159). In contrast, Doane and Hodges 
argue that early Klein does point out to her readers that the presence of a ‘real mother 
is important’: ‘The presence of the real, loving mother diminishes the dread of the 
terrifying mother, whose image is introjected into the child’s mind’ (Doane and 
Hodges, 1998: 17).  But one has the sense, when reading Klein that this mother is an 
avatar of sorts, and that the phantasy mother takes over her three-dimensional 
capacity. In a very early essay by Klein on ‘Weaning’, Klein acknowledges the actual 
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mothering invested in being a mother.  Klein suggests that if the mother can she 
should breastfed to establish a strong bond between herself and her baby and thus to 
develop an insight into the baby’s personality:  
 
The baby can enjoy his mother’s presence in so many ways.  He will often 
have a little play with her breast after feeding, he will take pleasure in her 
looking at him, smiling at him, playing with him and talking to him long 
before he understands the meaning of words.  He will get to know and to like 
her voice, and her singing to him may remain a pleasurable and stimulating 
memory in his unconscious.  Soothing him in this way, how often she can 
avert tension and avoid an unhappy state of mind, and thus put him to sleep 
instead of letting him fall asleep exhausted with crying! (Klein in Rickman ed. 
1936: 49). 
 
For early Klein the subject was created at the moment of weaning.  The difficulty here 
argues Green is that if one believes that weaning is the crucial moment in the 
constitution of subjectivity then subsequently all separations are founded on this 
initial loss of the breast (or bottle).  Klein does analyse how this loss might be 
managed in this early paper but her later work attends to the anxieties created because 
of the loss rather than how the mother might manage or even figure in this loss.  Thus 
Klein finally it seems both undercuts the mother while letting her child analysands cut 
her up into bits and pieces or perhaps more accurately, ‘tear her apart’.  
 
‘Black Holes’ 
Paula Heimann asks in relation to Kleinian theory, ‘When exactly does the ego, the 
differentiation from the amorphous id begin?’ (in Rose, 1993a: 171).  Rose compares 
Heimann’s enquiry to Stephen Hawking’s questions on time and space in his best-
selling book, A Brief History of Time (1988).  Hawking’s thesis which is to uncover 
‘black holes’ and to understand the creation of the universe through the Big Bang 
Theory has him ask, ‘What really happens during the very early . . . stages of the 
universe? . . . Does the universe in fact have a beginning? . . . What were the 
“boundary conditions” at the beginning of time?’ (in Rose, 1993a: 171 and Hawking, 
1988: 115, 122).  Rose argues that Hawking’s theory of the black hole resonates with 
the very negativity of Klein’s ‘destructive instinct’.  Since for Hawking no-one can 
know what happens in a black hole because a black hole absorbs everything that 
enters it (as Rose points out, Hawking amends this to ‘Black Holes Ain’t So Black’ in 
a later chapter in the same book), and for Klein, ‘how can negativity – be thought?’ 
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(Rose, 1993a: 172).  The black hole as an allegorical representation of the 
unconscious is a perfect compliment suggests Rose for Klein’s ‘theory of negativity’: 
‘too close, it devours you; safely outside, you don’t know what’s going on’ (in Rose, 
1993a: 172).   
 
Utilising Sir Roger Penrose’s equation, ‘God abhors a naked singularity’ (in Dawkins 
ed., 2008: 344 (which Rose mistakenly attributes to Hawking)), ‘God’ as the 
‘watchman’ here covers up the nakedness of the singularity/ies. Thus you can fall into 
a black hole, and if you are lucky you might fall out again by falling through a worm-
hole but the probability of this is unlikely: unlike Alice, you don’t get to step back 
through the looking glass, you don’t get to return.  A singularity is thought to be at the 
centre of a black hole, would defy ‘the laws of science’, and could be understood 
comparatively as a ‘big bang’ at the end of time as opposed to the hypothesis of the 
‘big bang’ at the beginning of time. Time it could be said effectively comes to a 
standstill. This is what Freud seemed to imply in his ‘amoebic equation’. Here the 
‘discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs.,’ (Perception-
Consciousness), which is itself pervious and passes the perceptions received from the 
cathetic innervations, whose ‘feeler like protrusions’ (either initiated from the 
unconscious or from the ego, Freud is not certain (perhaps from the unconscious part 
of the ego?)), sample the external world in rapid succession, ‘on to the unconscious 
mnemic systems’ (SE 19: 231). Freud considered that this process might lie ‘at the 
bottom of the origin of the concept of time’ (SE 19: 231). This raises the earlier 
question that Rose posed, ‘how is the mother implicated in thought?’ If she herself is 
thought to be ‘unconscious’ or at least relegated to the ‘dark continent?’ A black hole, 
like the unconscious, both theoretical propositions I might add, are ‘timeless’ and can 
only be known through their effects/affects. Like the unconscious though, the black 
hole is censored. An arbitrary watchman (God?), who both censors, what enters and 
also what leaves the ‘hole’. Rose aligns Hawking’s hypothesis with Klein’s, but what 
Klein lacks I would argue is the censorship/watchman that Hawking argues governs 
the hypothesis of the black-hole, because in this case, with Hawking’s play on the old 
philosophical treatise, ‘Nature abhors a naked singularity’ we come closer to Freud.  
 
Rose’s argument, that aligns Klein’s destructive principle to Hawking’s black holes is 
convincing but I want to push this comparison a little bit further. I want to make of the 
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black hole a mother – and here I am still in the Rosarian/Kleinian realm – but I also 
want to make ‘God’ our personal God, the mother as well.  Here I step outside the 
Rosarian/Kleinian black hole.  I would argue that this might be where the 
contradiction, or the contradictory threads of the Freudian tale come apart, or at least 
find it difficult to stay together, because of Freud’s neglect of the mother. And 
perhaps it is this that Klein saw and sought to express, albeit in different and not 
altogether convincing language.  Because if ‘God abhors a naked singularity’ and it is 
this singularity – at the centre of the black hole – the black hole that I want to call the 
mother (she who covers up – creates? – our own ‘unconscious-ego’, can be rather 
‘crushing’) then why can’t the mother as God abhor what she is capable of – the 
destruction of her infant?  Klein does not answer this.  She has the infant ‘breaking 
ruthlessly through into the mother to take out of her everything that is felt there to be 
good’ (in Winnicott, 1958: 24), but she does not really have the mother respond in 
kind.  
 
Pushing Hawking’s theory outside its own hypothetical realm for a moment, and 
instead aligning it to Freud’s Oedipal complex – God as the Father (and God as the 
Father is an infinitely different proposition), steps in to prevent the suffocation of the 
infant by the mother.  But this is too easy, to simplistic.  Might it not rather be, that 
the infant seduced by the mother, absorbed by her, attempts to free itself by turning 
away? After all, who wants to be ‘crushed’ by a black hole? The mother, if she is a 
Go(o)d mother lets this happen.  If she is not a Go(o)d mother then the baby never 
really develops an ego that is wholly differentiated from hers: s/he never really 
escapes.  In Hawking’s terminology, there is no light here at the end of this tunnel – 
there is no beyond to ‘her’ event horizon. This might be the inherent contradiction.  
We cannot think outside the need to break-up the mother-baby dyad so we create a 
third term – Father, God, Law, Language and so on.  But these are just supplements to 
cover up/cover over the (black) hole left because of this separation.33 Here Kleinian 
ambivalence, or more appropriately, the depressive position, and Kristevian primary 
                                                 
33 ‘The trauma of birth’ Rank once confided to a friend, “is really a great vision of the 
idea of separation governing the universe”…not just the idea of separation from one’s 
mother or from mental representations of significant others. “And when Freud in his 
[Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties] accepted the idea of separation he did not know 
what he really was accepting because he only thought in terms of individual mother 
fixation”. …Difference equals pain’ (Rank quoted by Kramer ed., 1996: 46 n 5). 
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narcissism as a way to think of ourselves outside this void, this emptiness, are helpful.  
What Klein perhaps, more explicitly than Kristeva, does is illustrate the anxieties and 
complexities, the ‘repressions’ that this ‘escape’ costs us.  This might be why Klein is 
so unpalatable (to use a good oral metaphor), because just as ‘God abhors a naked 
singularity’, “we”, a universal “we” abhor the loss – even the acknowledgement of the 
loss – of our mother: it is not ‘she’ who is the black hole we might finally discover, it 
is ourselves.  
 
Hawking argues, why this universe and not another? (‘Why this mother and not 
another?’), and replies by way of the ‘anthropic principle’, ‘If it had been different we 
would not have been here’ (in Rose, 1993a: 173).  Thus, ‘it is only through fantasy of 
our being-in-the-world that we can theorize the fact that the world comes to be’ 
(Rose, 1993a: 173). This is what cosmologists call the ‘Goldilocks Problem’: ‘Why is 
the universe so favourable to life?’ (in Dawkins, 2008: 362). In this case, to extend 
my own analogy, the universe could be said to be the Mother giving birth to other 
universes in black holes apparently, and so it goes on (and I hesitate to remark that 
here I reiterate Freud’s proposition that a ‘hole is a hole’). But as Rose makes explicit 
arguing through Klein, ‘fantasies are always in on the … act’ (Rose, 1993a: 174).  
Paradoxically this act doesn’t really have a beginning, or for that matter does it have 
an end – this is the principle (if we can call it that) of ‘phantasy’.  But it is the idea of 
this that pushes us off the proverbial edge and, which makes Klein hard to swallow 
(again, the oral metaphor). Kant was right, ‘time and space are ‘necessary forms of 
thought’’ (SE 18: 28), but time only has meaning “in a sensible world” and “infinite” 
space is ‘that mere vague empty nothing in which nevertheless all things are’ (Plato in 
Ritchie, 1902: 137-141). Thus we can ‘think the mother’ but only if the thinking of 
her is within the limits prescribed by positioning her within the boundaries described 
by these limits: spectre, haunting, phantom, aside, periphery, abyss, hole. Maybe this 
is the ‘crux’ of Klein, a kind of enantiomorphism: tweedledum and tweedledee, 
mirrored but trying to go in opposite directions and always arriving at the same 
‘space/hole’. The enantiomorphic being an entirely appropriate metaphor given that 
Freud used the example of a broken crystal, cracked but always already 
predetermined to describe the psyche of a mental patient: the ‘insane’ patient has 
‘turned away from external reality, but for that very reason they know more about 
internal, psychical reality and can reveal a number of things to us that would 
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otherwise be inaccessible to us’ (SE 22: 59). The insane patient like Alice then, has 
journeyed through the ‘hole’/unconscious, returning with information on the 
“unknown” (‘God’s secret’). The only problem being that in Kleinian reasoning, in 
her desire to get to the before of the unconscious as I argued above, she creates more 
boundaries than she collapses.  Her ‘black hole’ is so effectively shored up that it 
appears to consume everything in its path (which is after all what a ‘good’ black hole 
will do). Thus we have no way of by-passing the censor, through which we might 
otherwise set ourselves free. 
 
The extension of Hawking’s ‘cosmic censorship’ of the hypothesis of the black hole is 
as extensive as space and time itself.  That the singularity obliterates both of these 
raises so many, and (im)probable ways of looking at Hawking’s hypothesis, as would 
appear to be endless (I restrict myself from saying infinite). In fact, Dawkins states in 
response to the unceasing inquiry of cosmologists (and sounding much like Freud), 
‘The power of the dream is undeniable’ (Dawkins, 2008: 363). A black hole is a point 
in space where space and time are ‘infinitely’ compressed, where a complex function 
is undefined but also fixed.  This should reassure us that we do in fact have 
boundaries – that we are effectively boxed in (although this is in opposition to 
Hawking’s new proposal states Rose that there is ‘no boundaries’ (Rose, 1993a: 
175)).  This argument revolves because the box is a symbol according to Freud both 
of the heart and of the womb (‘The box was of course the womb’ (SE 10: 70 n 1)).  
The ‘point’ then of this singularity (perhaps just its etymology), if we are to consider 
Rose’s engagement with Hawking’s hypothesis, is the mother, here enacted in a 
return, because according to Freud, love and hunger meet at the mother’s breast.  This 
is what Klein neglects.  In her proliferation of good and bad breasts she loses the 
mother in a black hole of her own making.  But if we look at the crossroad of 
argument between Hawking and Rose, we find that Freud might be right after all – 
although this in itself is not as simple as it sounds. God is indeed the Father here, 
because ‘He’, in whatever guise ‘He’ might be, breaks up the singularity of mother 
and baby.  Leaving the singularity of a black hole aside for the moment, the question 
might be why does God abhor a naked singularity in the first place? If in fact what is 
contentious about a ‘naked singularity’ is that here, where time and space cease to 
exist, God might be found! What matter that mater collapses in on itself?  What does 
God think ‘He’ is missing out on?  Or to put it slightly differently, why is God the 
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Father frightened of being left out in the dark? And correspondingly, why does Freud 
the Father ‘box’ the mother in, the cupboard, the womb, the unconscious, when faced 
with the ‘apocalyptic’ force of the mother? I asked in Chapter One why Freud turned 
away from the mother when she seemed so close.  Chapter Three will attempt to 
answer this, asking why it is she gets pushed to the periphery (effectively boxed in) 
just when she makes an appearance, a proper appearance that is, in Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Why does Freud assign the mother a position in the unconscious, the 
black hole it might be said of the psyche? 
 
While the preceding chapter engaged with feminist understandings, explorations and 
even new inroads into realising the mother in Freudian psychoanalysis it also 
illustrated that femininity is continually effaced and even engulfed by maternity.  And 
yet correspondingly this maternity is somehow lost in a narcissistic emptiness 
according to Kristeva.  Or it becomes the story of mothers and daughters as it does for 
Irigaray.  Gallop asks, ‘Is it that Freud/man/theory can assimilate the otherness of 
woman into Mother (the complement to man’s primary narcissism) thanks to a 
structural weakness in the distinction between a girl and her mother?’ (Gallop, 1982: 
114).  Certainly Freud advocated for a weaker Oedipal complex and correspondingly 
a weaker superego in women. Which would suggest as feminist psychoanalysts are at 
pains to point out that ‘woman’ has a ‘primary’ relationship to the mother because the 
distinction between the ‘stages’ pre-Oedipal and Oedipal are less severe than they are 
for the little boy.  Sprengnether calls the pre-Oedipal/Oedipal split at the heart of 
object-relations theory a hierarchy that feminists psychoanalysts engaged in object-
relations theory fail to problematise (Sprengnether, 2000: 144). And further, ‘A 
beneficial conjunction between feminism and psychoanalysis must take account of the 
fact (as Lacanianism and post-structuralism fail to do) that a woman’s body is the 
carnal origin of every human subject without desubjectifying the mother herself (as 
object-relations theory tends to do) (Sprengnether, 1990: 9).  
 
The following chapter looks to Freud, his letters, his theory, and also biography on 
Freud to try and locate the mother in his writing. And to ask why, if the mother is not 
there – which we can reasonably assume she is not – why is she not?  Why did Freud 
privilege the father/son relationship in the Oedipal complex but regard religion as 
infantile?  And yet what is the story of God and his son if not Oedipal?  The mother in 
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this biblical story effectively disappears through an act of sexual procreation that is 
not.  The mother-son story is privileged here in much the same way that Freud will 
privilege it by arguing that it is the most perfect and conflict free of all relationships.  
The Father, the son and the Holy Ghost are the story of three men.  There are no 
mothers (t)here.  As Sprengnether rightly points out, the mother is ‘spectre,’ an aside, 
a footnote even.  And yet this is not quite right either because Freud argued that the 
mother was first love-object; that the fort/da is explicitly about the mother and a need 
to manage her loss; the uncanny and the unplumbable navel all concerned with an 
unknown – a lost mother – a mother of depths.  And there, in The Theme of the Three 
Caskets (SE 12) Freud names the mothers, as Goddesses, of Fate – man’s fate it might 
be noted.  But in this short essay Freud is at pains to illustrate that the fairest of the 
Fates is not only Death, but the Goddess of Love.  And he concludes this brief article 
by stressing the mothers that men love, ‘the mother herself, the beloved…and finally 
the Mother Earth who receives him once more’ (SE 12: 301).  It is to Freud’s mother, 
or the mother in Freud – and one questions how differentiated these mothers are for 







‘Psychoanalysis is like a woman who wants to be seduced but knows she will be 
underrated unless she offers resistance’ (Freud, 1938).34 
 
The following chapter looks at Freud’s letters and his theories to understand where 
the mother might be in his work. We know the mother is locatable, at times directly, 
more often than not, indirectly in Freud’s writing.  What is difficult in Freudian 
‘speculation’35 is where the mother is glaringly obvious and yet Freud will by-pass 
her to keep his Oedipal theory intact.  As other authors have shown this can lead to an 
argument that may sound unconvincing.  Of course Freud’s natural penmanship will 
keep us engaged and his ability to write the Oedipal complex as a ‘bulwark… Against 
the black tide of mud’ (Jung, 1963: 147-148) becomes its own dogma.  This was said 
to Jung in 1910, three years before they parted company because of Jung’s inability to 
accept Freud’s sexual theory.  Jung recalls this incident in his memoirs (1963).  But 
Jung’s recounting of it is vivid and conveys his astonishment at Freud’s emotional 
tone.  Here Freud guards his unpalatable ‘child’ with the ‘tone of a father’ says Jung 
against the ‘black tide of mud’ (Jung, 1963: 147-148).36 An interesting use of 
                                                 
34 In a letter to Stefan Zweig, in E. Freud, Letters of Sigmund Freud (1960). 
35 Freud argued in ‘On Narcissism’ that the difference between a speculative theory 
and their own, based on empirical evidence, is that the speculative theory wants ‘neat 
and tidy foundations.’ Whereas psychoanalysis is content to do with ‘nebulously 
evanescent, scarcely conceivable basic ideas, hoping to grasp them more clearly as 
they develop, and willing if need be to exchange them for others’ (Freud in Phillips 
ed., 2006: 361-362). I am not comparing psychoanalysis to a ‘speculative theory’ 
although I would say, and in line with Freud’s own analysis here, that the mother is 
quite often ‘speculative’ for Freud.  For all the horror her Medusa-like genitals 
provoke she is packed away ‘tidily’ for Freud particularly in his analysis of the son-
mother relationship as being ‘perfect’ and conflict free. Abstract thought, such as 
shown in his metapsychological texts was different according to Freud, from 
philosophical speculation (in Jones, 1957: 32). 
36 In fact Jung continues his ‘speculation’ on Freud’s ‘sexual theory’ stating that the 
neurotic (which is one of the charges Jung leveled against Freud in his ‘final’ letter 
(the letter that caused the break between Freud and Jung, 18 December, 1912 in 
McGuire, 1974: 534-535)), which he admitted following Freud, we all were to a 
degree, found it difficult to ‘climb up out of the mud of the commonplace’ (in Jung, 
1963: 161).  Jung continues comparing the mud that the ‘neurotic’ ‘wallows in’ as the 
earlier repressed.  This can only mean the mother as the earlier repressed (in the/as the 
unconscious) is solely placed in the realm, whether fantasy or real, of the mother.  
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terminology given that the word ‘mud’ and the word ‘mother’ have the same meaning 
etymologically and therefore the same connection verbally as I argued in Chapter 
Two.  By itself, this argument would be rather weak in its suggestion that 
‘unconsciously’ Freud privileges the Father over the Mother.  As we will see in the 
following chapter, this is not always unconscious at all.  Freud in his own analogy 
regarding paths, roads and journeys took the ‘royal’ road of dreaming to find the 
‘unconscious activities of the mind’ (SE 5: 608).  This is consciously taken argues 
Jonte-Pace, because the royal roads in ancient times were direct routes free from 
dangers and obstacles (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 24-25).  The suggestion being that only a 
‘fool’ would take the uncharted road/path.  Jonte-Pace states that the tension inherent 
in Freud’s depiction of a ‘Christian’ royal road travelled by a ‘godless Jew’ is 
extended in the competing/complimentary metaphor of the ‘narrow defile’ – the path 
– through which ‘we’ might emerge on-route to our destination.  Freud will tell Fliess 
that the structure of the dream book is that of a ‘fantasised journey through the 
wilderness’ – a pilgrimage (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 24).  Metaphorically though this 
journey that leads us away from the royal road highlights Freud’s own argument that 
landscapes and pathways are representative of the female body – a female body that 
he later depicts as unknown and a riddle.  
 
In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (SE 15) Freud shows that pubic hair 
‘is depicted in dreams as woods and bushes’, mindful of the fact that Freud had also 
argued that the pubic hair surrounding the mother’s genitals is a ‘Medusa’s head’ one 
that we turn away from in fear and horror (SE 18).  Stanley Hyman argues that ‘(a)ll 
of these dark woods, narrow defiles, high grounds, and deep penetrations are 
unconscious sexual imagery and we are exploring a woman’s body – that of Freud’s 
mother’ (Hyman cited by Jonte-Pace, 2001: 24 n 3).  While I am hesitant about 
retrospectively attributing unconscious motives to Freud regarding his theories, in 
particular the Oedipal theory – Freud’s ‘bulwark’, Hyman’s analysis is compelling in 
light of Freud’s own engagement.  And as we will see, Freud felt no such 
compunction when addressing Leonardo da Vinci’s ‘Oedipal’ relationship to his 
mother. And if these types of speculations are arrived at because of unconscious 
memories of a time before the Oedipus complex – mindful of Green’s statement that a 
                                                                                                                                            
Thus Jung explicitly, although without further reference compares the mother (the 
repressed/unconscious) to ‘mud’. 
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baby is born into an Oedipalised world – then it is psychoanalysis’s endeavour to 
uncover them.  Lyotard makes this explicit, questioning, what he terms, Freud’s 
‘deferral’ of the mother.  Lyotard argues that a ‘baby must see its MOTHER’s face as 
a landscape’ (Lyotard, 1991:189 (his emphasis)).  But not because the baby feels with 
its mouth, its face and hands, or even because it ‘sees’ the mother, but because it is the 
‘first act in the ‘deferred action’ that Freud tried to elaborate. But he was too much of 
a psychologist.  This mother is a mother who is a timbre ‘before’ it sounds, who is 
there ‘before’ the coordinates of sound, before destiny’ (Lyotard, 1991: 189). I have 
addressed this ‘before’, in Chapters One and Two. Freud said in An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis (SE 23) that the child brings to the world, before any experiences an 
“archaic heritage” (167 and 240-241). But it could be said that this ‘before’ becomes 
tricky for Freud if we consider that Freud’s conceptualisation of anxiety and even the 
unconscious betray a certain amount of mutability, in light of the fact that he wanted 
his sexual theory to be a ‘bulwark’.   
 
This chapter will offer an engagement with Freud, interacting between his personal 
correspondence and his theory.  The Oedipus complex will be highlighted because 
within it and because of it, Freud’s infantile sexual theory as opposed to his seduction 
theory reigned supreme.  Briefly, Freud initially believed that children were seduced 
(sexually abused) by their parents or close (male) relatives and he included his own 
father as one of these ‘perverts’ (Masson, 1985: 264 – the important letter of 21st 
September, 1897).  James Strachey the editor and primary translator of the Standard 
Edition of Freud in English argues that the Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(hereafter referred to as ‘The Project’) haunts all of Freud’s work (SE 1: 290).  The 
‘trauma’ theory or as it is more often referred to as the ‘seduction’ theory also 
worries, perhaps haunts if we are to keep to this analogy, his theory of infantile sexual 
phantasy.  After all, trauma in Greek means ‘wound’ but it also has a PIE37 root 
meaning to rub, or to turn.  Freud constantly referred to the gaps, holes, voids, 
‘wounds’ we might say, in his theory, which he argued needed filling in badly (SE 1: 
195).  He also never denied that children were not abused but that it was not as 
common as he first thought: ‘You must not suppose, however, that sexual abuse of a 
child by its nearest male relatives belongs entirely to the realm of phantasy.  Most 
                                                 
37 Proto-Indo-European (PIE). Descendent/remnant languages represented in the 
Romance languages of which English, German, Greek and Latin belong. 
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analysts will have treated cases in which such events were real and could be 
unimpeachably established’ (SE 16: 370).   
 
Much has been written about Freud’s ‘abandonment’ of the seduction theory.  Freud 
himself said it was ‘untenable’ and a ‘mistaken idea’ (SE 14: 17).  But also, he felt a 
‘helpless bewilderment’ and the ‘firm ground of reality was gone’ (SE 14: 17).  This 
becomes poignant if one considers that Freud saw his neurotica (the seduction theory) 
as offering him the ‘expectation of eternal fame’ and ‘wealth’, which was principally 
about supporting his children as the dream ‘My son the Myops’ explains (SE 4).  
‘“Rebecca, take off your gown; you are no longer a bride”’(Masson, 1985: 266), a 
particular Jewish joke, suggests Masson, where Rebecca has forsaken her wedding 
vows before the wedding.  Masson in apparent agreement with Anna Freud also 
understands Freud’s use of this joke as personalising how Freud conceived of this 
loss: ‘Freud, with his theory of the neuroses, had believed himself privileged and 
happy as a bride.  Those days were now over and he had to return to his earlier 
ordinary status; he had made no discovery’ (in Masson, 1985: 267 n 3).  Further Anna 
Freud argues, ‘keeping up the seduction theory would mean to abandon the Oedipus 
Complex, and with it the whole importance of phantasy life, conscious or unconscious 
phantasy. In fact, I think there would have been no psychoanalysis afterwards’ 
(Brunner, 1995: 36).  Sprengnether argues that in Freud’s abandonment of the 
seduction theory he relegated the importance of the mother as the first seducer, as can 
be seen in the Little Hans case-study below, and ignored the ‘key that would have 
opened the ‘doors to The Mothers’ [an allusion to Goethe’s Faust]’, something he 
condemns Breuer for doing no less (Sprengnether, 1990: 39 n 1).  But by Freud’s 
assignment of ‘the mother’ to a kind of pre-Oedipal never-land, as Laplanche and 
Pontalis will argue ‘fantasy’ operates as a kind of ‘regressive tendency towards the 
origin’ (Laplanche and Pontalis: 1986: 15).  
 
Freud set up a series of theoretical alternatives subject-object, constitution-event, 
internal-external, imaginary-real, where he stressed the ‘first terms of these pairs of 
opposites’ state Laplanche and Pontalis (1986: 14-15).  But as Freud has shown in 
Das Unheimliche (SE 17) the linguistic meaning of one word tends to meld into its 
opposite, thus what was unfamiliar (uncanny/unhomely) becomes familiar 
(canny/homely).  This can be seen in Freud’s positioning of the Oedipus complex as a 
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‘bulwark’ which is constantly undermined by the pre-Oedipal (if we understand the 
pre-Oedipal as a place before language and the rules/laws associated with the Oedipal 
theory). Freud’s sets of opposites ooze into each other so that where Freud is 
determined to upheld one against the other, the proverbial banana skin makes an 
appearance and Freud, or at least his Oedipal theory and its component parts, end up 
slipping and sliding all over the place.  
 
This chapter then will highlight the ‘slipping and sliding’ including the areas of 
castration anxiety, repression and the infantile sexual theory (Oedipus complex) 
because these appear to be the places where the mother is most prominent and where 
Freud repeatedly turns away.  Given that these areas are the ‘cornerstones of 
psychoanalysis’, his turning away raises several questions, not least, why he turns 
away?  In Chapter Two this turning away was offered as a response to the child’s 
sighting of the mother’s genitals. Here Freud emphasised the little boy’s horror when 
seeing the ‘wound’ left by castration – obviously not a literal castration but the child’s 
psyche does not understand this argues Freud.  Before this, as part of Freud’s cloacal 
theory all children imagine the mother has a penis.  It is only with the resolution of the 
Oedipus complex and the advent of puberty and the return of the sexual instinct – in 
any case a return in content of the manifest desire for the first love object, the mother 
– that a fuller understanding of the vagina as an ‘asylum’ for the penis is uncovered.    
 
Nachträglichkeit: return to the ‘before’ 
Lyotard’s use of the term ‘deferred action’ which is most often left untranslated, 
Nachträglichkeit  (Laplanche calls Nachträglichkeit part of Freud’s ‘paraconceptual’ 
apparatus (Laplanche, 1976: 25 n 1), confirms an expression of a ‘before’ in Freud’s 
work. Laplanche and Pontalis argue that Nachträglichkeit which they translate as 
‘afterwardness’ would seem to undermine time itself.  Controversially then, Freud 
after consideration of Nachträglichkeit – first mentioned in ‘The Project’ in relation to 
the notion of defence and the seduction theory, preposes something he will call, 
‘primal phantasies’.  Laplanche and Pontalis suggest that Freud’s ‘primal phantasies’ 
made up as they are from the primal scene (parental coitus), castration anxiety, 
seduction and ‘others’ as Freud puts it, were a counter argument to what Freud saw as 
limiting in Jung’s similar concept of ‘retrospective phantasies’.  The “primal 
phantasy” ‘transcends the individual lived experiences and his imaginings’ and is a 
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foundation on which the primal scene, castration, seduction etcetera, emerge 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 114).  Sounding rather Lamarckian, and Freud was not 
adverse to Lamarck’s idea of inherited tendencies being passed down generationally 
(now called ‘soft inheritance’), Nachträglichkeit was neglected by subsequent 
psychoanalysts (excluding Lacan) as perhaps too difficult to ‘reify’/ ‘rectify’. That 
being said, something without linear time that arises, if you will, from a ‘substrate’ 
suggests as Lyotard argues, a before that is intimately concerned with the mother; a 
mother before time itself it seems. Freud’s favoured example for the expression of 
Nachträglichkeit was the story of the young man ‘who was a lover of feminine beauty 
and reminisces about the good-looking wet-nurse who suckled him when he was a 
baby. ‘I’m only sorry that I didn’t make better use of my opportunity’, he says (SE 4: 
204).   
 
It might be remembered, that Freud said of the relationship to the mother that it was 
‘so grey with age and shadowy and almost impossible to revivify – that it was as if it 
had succumbed to an especially inexorable repression’ (SE 21: 226).  Simply put then, 
the mother, and our relationship to her, is too difficult to understand and belongs 
somewhere in the ‘dark continent’ – a term Freud applied to both the unconscious and 
female sexuality.  But there is more to this, because in the ‘The Project’ Freud will 
say ‘If a trauma (an experience of pain) occurs for the first time when there is already 
an ego in existence—the very first traumas of all escape the ego entirely—there is a 
release of unpleasure; but the ego is simultaneously at work creating lateral cathexes’ 
(in A. Freud, Bonaparte, Kris ed., 1954: 416).  Thus the ‘deferred action’ surfacing – 
and this is the right word if one thinks of Freud’s depiction of the ego as first and 
foremost a bodily-ego; ‘it is not merely a surface entity, but it is itself the projection 
of a surface’ (SE 19: 26 and Freud, 1989: 636-637) – as it does from a psychical 
substrate, is without coherent time or for that matter, it seems, an especially coherent 
ego.   
 
A pre-ego 
I want to stay with this ‘ego’ that is not an ego but a pre-ego according to Loewald. 
This ego is integral to Freud’s understanding of the ‘oceanic’, of revenants/ghosts. 
Freud comments throughout the Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4-5) that he is 
‘haunted’ surrounded by ‘revenants’.  He argues that we call upon revenants as a 
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means to bring back what we have lost, friends and enemies, even his own children. 
Named after deceased friends, dead heroes or figures from mythology, Freud argues 
that ‘(t)heir names made the children into revenants’ (SE 5: 485-486), and reasons 
that children are ‘our only path to immortality’ and are made revenant regardless of 
their names (SE 5: 485-486).  The word ‘revenant’ is interesting.  When discussing 
his mother, in particular his mother naked or in a state of undress Freud resorts to 
Latin as in matrem and nudam. When Freud talks of ghosts he uses the Latin term 
revenant, which means ‘returning’. Thus when faced with something that for Freud is 
too close, he turns away, resorting to Latin, the language of Rome and not his mother-
tongue. Gilman will argue that when Freud discusses seeing his mother, nudam on the 
train journey from Leipzig to Vienna he expresses anxiety but it is an anxiety that 
reveals the ‘innate difference between the self and the Other’ (Gilman, 1993: 126). 
Thus the ‘marginal Jewish self’ is displaced onto the body of the Other, his mother, 
who in this instance at least becomes the container for his well known travel anxiety.  
But as Gilman points out Freud follows the comments on matrem nudam with the 
death wishes he held against his eleven-month younger baby brother.  Thus the 
displacement of his anxiety onto his mother’s naked body is compounded by the guilt 
he feels around the realisation of his wish, his brother died.  The time-line is wrong 
here though. Operating on something of a ‘deferred action’ (Nachträglichkeit) 
himself, Freud shaves two years off his age, he is four when he makes the train 
journey with matrem nudam, not two or two and a half as he writes in the letter to 
Fliess (Bonaparte, A. Freud, Kris ed., 1954: 219).  Here then, we could say, is a 
rudimentary Oedipal Complex ‘before’ it is named.  But importantly, the jealously is 
not directed towards the father, or as it is understood an unfaithful mother but to a 
now dead brother.  Thus matrem nudam is interweaved with the dead body of his 
brother Julius, a revenant we could say.   
Freud writes in Moses and Monothesism (SE 23) that ‘the periods between the ages of 
two and four seem to be the most important’ (74), and further that the experiences in 
this period are usually forgotten, the remaining ‘mnemic’ residues becoming ‘screen 
memories’.  These screen memories have, as a rule, ‘injured’ the budding/pre-ego 
(“narcissistic moritfications”), and are predominantly, argues Freud, of a ‘sexual-
aggressive nature’ (young children making no ‘sharp distinction between sexual and 
aggressive acts, as they do later’ (SE 23: 74)). The “traumas” suggests Freud ‘are 
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either experiences on the subject’s own body or sense perceptions, mostly of 
something seen and heard—that is, experiences or impressions’ coming back to 
memory only through the process of analysis (because of subsequent traumas (SE 23: 
74)). Perhaps evocatively, Freud argues that the onset of infantile amnesia, coinciding 
with the onset of this early period of sexuality, could be thought of ‘as a vestige—a 
‘survival’—of primeval times like certain portions of our bodily anatomy’ (SE 23: 
75). Thus, just as wisdom teeth (a perfectly ‘oral’ symbol), the appendix and even 
muscles behind the ear are vestigial so too, argues Freud is the traumas of early 
childhood (and it might be remembered that Freud suggested that anxiety itself was an 
“archaic heritage”). The aggressive wish on the one hand, the death of the ‘usurper’, 
and on the other hand, of an awakening sexuality, seem to be combined in Freud’s 
early ‘screen memories’ although it might be said, (mis)recognised by Freud, as if 
‘through a glass, darkly’ (1 Corianthians 13:12): a mis-recognition, and obscuration 
that Freud not only frequents upon the mother/his mother, but which he assigns as 
vestigial, as a ‘before’.  
Matrem nudem, anxiety and the journey 
In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (SE 7) in Freud’s discussion on 
childhood trauma and the subsequent “infantile amnesia” Freud remarks that it is 
surprising how often young boys show an inordinate amount of interest in the 
workings of trains. Little Hans thinks that the steam from trains has something to do 
with the trains penis and Freud as a young child thought the steam came up from Hell, 
a Hell made real to him by his old Catholic nursemaid. Freud states that when the 
train left Freiberg, the place of ‘happy childhood memories’ for Leipzig, and stopped 
in Breslau, the gas jets aflame made him think of ‘souls burning in hell’ (Breger, 
2000: 16. Jones, 1953: 14. Masson, 1985: 285).  
Freud suggests that journeys, in particular train journeys, are often associated with 
anxiety and this can be seen in the repression of the sexual element associated with 
the movement of the train. The repressed aspect of the ‘rocking and rolling’ quite 
often turns into its opposite, argues Freud, so that an adult will respond to the 
‘rocking’ with nausea, exhaustion or anxiety.  This same person will ‘protect 
themselves against a repetition of the painful experience by a dread of railway-travel’ 
(Freud, 1989: 276). Freud is saying then, that a child with a strong sexual disposition, 
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who enjoys the ‘passive movement’ of the ‘rocking’ and ‘swinging’ of the railway 
carriages, will later, because of repression ‘turn away’ from what was originally felt 
as pleasurable.  Of course, not all children with a fascination for trains will follow this 
particular path, but it might be said, that the young Freud, viewing a naked mother 
and carrying the guilt of a brother’s death, developed a well-known train neurosis and 
therefore may have been such a child.  For Gilman Freud’s train anxiety is articulated 
in the face of his own difference – the circumcised/castrated Jew, which he displaced 
onto his mother or onto ‘the “castrated” body of the woman’ (Gilman, 1993: 126). For 
Jones, Freud’s train anxiety is also connected with his mother, but Jones saw it as 
‘connected with the fear of losing his home’ and therefore ‘ultimately his mother’s 
breast’ (Jones, 1953: 14). As I argued above, Freud said that the most significant 
traumas were those ‘laid down’ in the unconscious in the first three years of childhood 
and Freud was three when his family left Freiberg. 
Freud’s ‘journeys’ 
Robert Kramer argues that for Fliess’s benefit Freud ‘maps’ out the itinerary for the 
‘conquistador’s descent into Virgil’s Infernal Regions, (a reference to Freud’s epitaph 
for The Interpretation of Dreams – ‘If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will move 
the Infernal Regions’) revealing that “the whole” was far more important than the 
parts’ (Kramer ed., 1993: 39).  Thus Kramer concludes, ‘The Interpretation of 
Dreams is at once a maternal return and an open refusal of the whole’ (Kramer ed., 
1993: 39). Freud will instead inscribe his own Oedipal journey here of another road 
and an unheroic father – his unheroic father.  When faced with an anti-Semite who 
knocks his new fur cap onto the road with the taunt ‘Jew, get off the pavement!’ 
Freud’s father responds to his young sons question, ‘And what did you do?’ with the 
answer, ‘I went into the street and picked up the cap’ (SE 4: 197).  In a move 
reminiscent of the ‘family romance’ Freud turns to Hannibal, the Jewish General of 
antiquity, identifying instead with his noble deeds. He replaces the weak father with a 
more worthy one.  In contrast Martin Freud in his memoirs offers a story of Freud 
who defending his sons Martin and Oliver marched through a crowd ‘swinging his 
stick’ and hurling abuse at them. Freud will call this the ‘Thumsee’ incident in a letter 
to Fliess (although Martin Freud said, ‘there is no evidence that father was affected in 
the least.  He never recalled the incident at home, and I am not aware that he ever 
mentioned it in any of his letters to our family or friends’ (M. Freud, 1957: 71).  
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Martin remembers this as the only time his father spoke in an angry tone to him, 
telling him to stay in the boat while he ‘charged the hostile crowd’.  And the crowd, 
frightened by the man running at them dispersed and let him through.  For Martin 
Freud, this incident made a deep impression on him and 55 years on in his memoirs, 
he can still recall the ‘racial hatred’ expressed on the faces of the ‘mob’.  For him, 
they were ‘fiendishly ugly’.  For Freud, the memory of his father and the gentile still 
expresses its power in ‘all these emotions and dreams’ he says (SE 4:197).38 
 
Freud declaration that ‘All paths lead to Rome’ is a significant statement when one 
considers his short essay A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis (SE 22).  When 
Freud stood on the Acropolis he felt that he had surpassed his father and therefore he 
had done something forbidden (SE 22: 247).  His memory of his father is tied 
to/bound with his own longing to see the Eternal City, to walk in the footsteps of 
Hannibal. This memory is interweaved with his boyhood dream of journeying to 
Rome in light of his father’s condemnation of him – ignoring propriety he urinates in 
front of his parents when he is seven – ‘The boy will come to nothing’ his father says 
(SE 4: 216). Thus, Rome becomes the culmination of Freud’s sense of achievement.  
Freud says that his wish to go to Rome was, on the one hand, an acknowledgement of 
the ‘tenacity of Jewry’ against the powerful organization of the ‘Catholic church’. On 
                                                 
38 In Martin Freud’s memories, one memory in particular stands out.  The flooding 
that occurred in Aussee, the place of their summer holidays. On this occasion the 
flooding caused bridges and roads, houses and shops to be washed away.  As the 
larder emptied Freud put on a knapsack and decided to brave the elements and see 
whether he could find a village not affected by flooding.  To the Freud children it was 
decided their father was ‘the most efficient, the wisest and most knowledgeable hero 
in the world’ (M. Freud, 1957: 62).  Freud returned with the knapsack fill to ‘bursting-
point’ and while Martin Freud could not recall the contents he did remember clearly 
‘that one important item was an enormous salami’ (M. Freud, 1957: 62).  Not only 
Martin though, his sister Mathilde who also recalls the day ‘agrees about the big 
sausage’ (M. Freud, 1957: 63).  She could not remember any other details but that her 
father returned with a ‘big sausage’. ‘Lord Penis’ might be right then, although 
offered in a different context (to Fliess in relation to Witch’s and a consideration of 
their association to the Hysteric’s psychoses/neuroses, in Masson, 1985: 227) because 
as ‘the Hero’ Freud in his ‘caul covered cap’ (see pg 92 of this chapter) pushed 
through the weather related tangle and saved the day. At what unconscious level does 
an understanding of ‘uncastrated’ become whole?  And how could, ‘woman’ as 
‘hole’, i.e., castrated ever think to acquire this position?  Again, Geller’s and Gilman’s 
arguments that Freud displaced the feminine application of the male Jew onto the 




the other hand, ‘the wish to go to Rome had become in my dream-life a cloak and a 
symbol for a number of other passionate wishes’ (SE 4: 196-197). Freud’s use of ‘a 
cloak and a symbol’ here are a reference to the ‘weak spot’ in a dream which Freud 
likened to something that might be undone like the embroidered mark on Siegfried’s 
cloak where Kriemhild embroidered a small cross so that Hagen could stab him there 
(SE 5: 515 n 2).   
 
Which/Witch Way39 
It is pertinent to point out that with all these paths, roads and journeys Freud neglects 
to tell us which way we – or he – should turn.  He tells Fliess he is planning the dream 
book on an imaginary journey - through the annals of the mother’s body as it were – 
and when ‘we’ come out into the open, ‘the prospect and the question: “Which way 
do you want to go?”’ (Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris, 1954: 290).  A significant 
question and one that Freud himself alludes to in his citing of Stekel’s40 analysis of 
the ‘right’ or ‘wrong/left’ way:  Right and left, according to Stekel, offer in an ethical 
sense the kind of path or journey we undertake: ‘The right-hand path always means 
the path of righteousness and the left one that of crime. Thus ‘left’ may represent 
homosexuality, incest or perversion, and ‘right’ may represent marriage, intercourse 
with a prostitute and so on, always looked at from the individual’s moral standpoint 
(SE 5: 357-358). Not surprisingly a lean towards right means the path of 
righteousness, towards left, to something forbidden, wrong, a path of crime (SE 5: 
357). Freud tellingly cites the biblical story of Moses here, who using his ‘left’ hand 
in which, he held a rod (that could turn into a snake), struck water from a rock for the 
thirsting Israelites (SE 5: 380). But this forbidden action, like the eating of the apple 
                                                 
39 This is reminiscent of the childhood board games, ‘Hey, Hey, Witch Way’ and 
‘Which Witch’ both of which operated on a journey or a path, to a house, or through a 
house (the Witch in the womb we might say). We will meet this/se Witch(s) shortly, 
in Freud’s ‘Witch metapsychology’. And these games offer an entirely appropriate 
comparison between Freud’s Witch metapsychology and the ‘Witch’ in Faust who 
Freud calls on to help as Mephistopheles tells Faust after addressing the ‘Witch’: 
‘Note which way, with what or which/One deals with a witch’ (Part One, Scene eight 
(see reference below)). 
40 Freud suggests that Stekel offers a few ‘good’ ideas (SE 5: 357 and SE 14: 19) and 
that while he did some creditable work initially “afterwards went totally astray”. In a 
letter to Jung he states that when he thinks of Stekel ‘the old litany comes to mind: 
“Me piget, pudet, poenitet, taedet, atque miseret” (“I feel disgust, shame, regret, 
weariness, and pity”) (in McGuire, 1974: 458). 
84 
 
at the bidding of another snake had repercussions for Moses.  Moses was allowed to 
see the Promised Land but he was not allowed to enter it (SE 5: 380-381). Freud said 
that the story of Moses tormented him like an ‘unlaid ghost’ (SE 23: 103). Similarly, 
in his case-study of Little Hans Freud argues that in an analysis ‘a thing which has not 
been understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost, it cannot rest until the 
mystery has been solved and the spell broken’ (SE 10: 122). What is it that Freud 
does not understand?  He will argue that female sexuality is the ‘dark continent’ and 
that castration and circumcision are possibly the deepest motives for anti-Semitism 
and yet he is spell-bound; by what? What is the ‘thing’ that Freud misunderstands but 
will reappear like an ‘unlaid ghost?’ The collusion of Moses and Eve (the primordial 
mother Sprengnether calls her) is deliberate because they point to a connection 
between woman/mother and Jewish male. As we saw in Chapter Two Sprengnether 
argues that the mother haunts Freud, although it is not a haunting that Freud will 
acknowledge or for that matter see.  But there are elements of the Jewish 
male/mother/ghost nexus throughout Freud’s writing, creating what Jonte-Pace will 
call a ‘counter-thesis’.  As I have argued, I am unsure of the term ‘counterthesis’ that 
Jonte-Pace uses.  It seems such a clumsy term for ‘the hesitant non-Oedipal 
speculations in which Freud analyses death and the fantasy of immortality in 
association with the mother’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 2).  
 
Ghosts, Ancestors, ‘archaic heritages’ 
These points of intersection, navels as it were, suggest something so much more 
visceral, bloody even.  Loewald argues for a distinction between these ghosts and 
ancestors, which accompany us throughout our lives but importantly how they 
accompany us argues Loewald depends on what type of mother, or mothering we 
have had.  If they attend us as ghosts states Loewald then they ‘haunt the present 
generation with their shadow life’ (Loewald in Mitchell, 1998: 850).  Rather 
vampirish, these ghosts of the unconscious feed on the ‘patients’ defences and 
symptoms, they quite shockingly as Loewald writes it, ‘taste blood’ (Loewald in 
Mitchell, 1998: 850).  In analysis these ghosts are laid to rest states Loewald and in 
being so are transformed into ancestors who serve in the continuity between past and 
present life, between fantasy and reality, between object and subject. If we accept this 
division between ghosts and ancestors, which itself relies on a dualism, something 
Loewald takes Freud to task for, then a complication arises in Freud’s own account.  
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He is tormented by ‘unlaid ghosts’, but also in the dream of the ‘tailor’s life’ on 
Freud’s own admission, he felt a familiarity with this dream and the tailor’s statement 
that ‘I have for many years dragged around with me, like a ghost from which I could 
not set myself free, the shadow of a …life’ (SE 5: 473). I referred to Freud’s 
comparison to the tailor in Chapter One but there is more here because if Freud will 
have it that the child is born with an “archaic heritage” what exactly is it? (SE 23: 
167).  Freud argues in Analysis Terminable and Interminable (SE 23) that the ‘archaic 
heritage’ children bring with them at birth is a combination of ‘inherited and acquired 
characteristics’, which we should not divide too dramatically. Comparatively making 
the relationship between the ‘id’ and the ego antithetical is not quite right either states 
Freud.  The id may well be what is oldest in us but the id and ego were originally one; 
the ego grew out of, developed as it were from the id.  To speak, more clearly then of 
an archaic heritage is too include both of these ideas and to add to them, ‘the lines of 
development, trends and reactions which it [the ego] will later exhibit’, and which 
‘are already laid down for it’ (SE 23: 240).  Indeed, Freud argues, symbolism as well 
as ‘equally specialized precipitates’ from other fields of research impute to ‘us’ the 
importance of assigning a specific ‘hereditary inheritance’ (SE 23: 240-242). We can 
see this in the Wolf Man case-study where Freud suggests that it does not matter 
whether primal phantasies are really experienced or are a phylogenetic experience, 
issuing as they do from the archaic heritage, what matters is what is done with the 
experience.  If the child’s own experience fails him then he fills in ‘the gaps in 
individual truth with prehistoric truth; he replaces occurrences in his own life by 
occurrences in the life of his ancestors’ (SE 17: 97).41  
 
In Moses and Monotheism (SE 23) under the chapter titled ‘Difficulties’ Freud writes 
that the archaic heritage is constitutional, peculiar to the individual but that it has a 
                                                 
41 In a letter to Else Voigtländer Freud explains this clearly: ‘We find in 
psychoanalysis that we are dealing not with one disposition but with an infinite 
number of dispositions which are developed and fixed by accidental fate.  The 
disposition is so to speak polymorphous.  We also believe that this is again a case in 
which scientifically thinking people distort a cooperation into an antithesis. The 
question as to which is of greater significance, constitution or experience, which of 
the two elements decides character, can in my opinion only be answered by saying 
that …[fate and chance] and not one or the other are decisive.  Why should there be 
an antithesis, since constitution after all is nothing but the sediment of experiences 
from a long line of ancestors; and why should the individual experience not be 
granted a share alongside the experience of ancestors? (in E. Freud, 1960: 284).  
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universal application in particular with regard to ‘symbolism’, which is accessible to 
us in the form of myth, legend and fairy-tale: in the very language, thought, speech 
that ‘we’ use irrespective of our ‘mother tongue’: ‘A number of symbols are as old as 
language itself…’ (SE 5: 352).  But more than this, the ‘model of a phylogenetic 
event’ is the very early and what might be called, generic ‘traumas’ (SE 23: 98-99). 
Thus the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety are an archaic heritage given that 
both have an immediate relation to the totemic murder of the father (SE 23: 101).  
Freud makes it clear that the archaic heritage of ‘the human animal … corresponds to 
the instincts of animals even though it is different in its compass and contents’ (SE 
23: 100).42 Freud asks, ‘under what conditions does a memory of this kind enter the 
archaic heritage?’ And, ‘in what circumstances can it become active—that is, can it 
advance to consciousness from its unconscious state in the id…?’ (SE 23: 101).   In 
both cases, the repetition of some ‘important’, that is to say ‘traumatic’ event would 
give rise to the entrance of the archaic heritage, the individual component is less 
easily answered.43In Moses and Monotheism Freud’s argument is concerned with the 
cross-cultural phylogenetic inheritance that applies the murder of Moses and of Christ 
to the Jews and to the Jews alone.44 
 
If Loewald sees a discord between ghosts and ancestors then, it is not so certain that 
Freud does.  After all, an archaic heritage suggests ancestral knowledge.  In The 
Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4) Freud writes that the discarded, buried and repressed 
wishes, ‘which we have to attribute some sort of continued existence only because of 
their re-emergence in a dream’, are not dead, like persons who have died, in the sense 
that we know death but are rather like the shades in the Odyssey who awaken to a 
                                                 
42 An unpopular argument in Freud’s day, and possibly more so now.   
43 One form of repetition is what Freud called ‘affectionate abuse’, where the father, 
or in Bollas’s example of the clowning mother, will use such phases as, ‘I’ll eat you 
up’ and so on.  One phrase I remember quite vividly from my childhood is being told 
that if I misbehaved my mother would ‘Boil my blood for breakfast’. Another one, 
less memorable but possibly more transferable, was ‘I will skin you alive if you do 
that again’. For some reason I equated this to the childhood rhyme of ‘hang your 
britches on a chair’ but instead of pants I pictured my skinned body, and only the 
flesh, that is without the blood now boiling in the pot, hanging over the chair.  I have 
never been able to rid myself of this equation of images. 
44 Martin Freud asks, ‘I sometimes wonder whether or not this traditional hatred of 
Jews, nourished as it is by legend and fairy-tales throughout the centuries, will die 
out: witches are not burnt any longer in civilized countries’ (in M. Freud, 1957: 186). 
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certain degree of life as soon as they have drunk blood (SE 4: 249). Whereas for 
Freud these ghosts are ancestors, remnants of discarded and forgotten wishes of 
which the affect remains the same only the ideational content has changed.  For 
Loewald there is separation between the ghosts of the past who are linked to passion, 
trauma and loss and the ancestors who are ‘there’ to assist ‘us’ with living.45  Freud 
follows his example of the Odyssean shades with the dream of a ‘pregnant’ woman 
who in the course of analysis came to understand that the rejection of the child in her 
womb was itself a ‘reminiscence’ of herself as a foetus in her mother’s womb. That is 
to say, she remembered or had heard that her mother fell into a deep depression when 
she was pregnant with her. She followed her mothers example says Freud, the dream 
of her daughter now fifteen and dead in a case illustrative of the fact that the 
Odyssean shades of blood, buried and repressed are also resurrected, albeit not often 
in such a complimentary way.46 What might be called the ‘doppelgänger effect’, 
which Freud in The Uncanny (SE 17) links to a belief in the soul and an afterlife, is 
here returned to the body of a woman, importantly a pregnant woman who represents 
the nexus of birth/life and death. When Freud evokes the Odyssean shades, ghosts 
who reside in an underworld he ‘forgets’ that the womb, the place we want to return 
to is itself then an underworld.  The womb offers, albeit figuratively, exit and return. 
Freud argues that ‘(i)n anatomy the orifices of the body are in so many words termed 
                                                 
45 The psychoanalyst Selma Fraiberg argued, ‘In every nursery there are ghosts. The 
intruders from [a family’s] past have taken up residence in their nursery claiming 
rights of ownership.  … while none has issued an invitation…the ghosts take up 
residence and conduct the rehearsal of the family tragedy from a tattered script’ 
(Blaffer-Hrdy 1999: 405). 
46 In Dreams (SE 15) Freud repeats the patients dream but here makes the ‘dead’ 
daughter seventeen rather than fifteen (Strachey thinks this is a misprint in the 
German work): ‘A woman, whose dream meant that she would like to see her 
daughter, now seventeen years old, dead before her eyes, found under our guidance 
that she had indeed at one time harboured this death-wish.  The child was the fruit of 
an unhappy marriage which was soon dissolved.  Once, while she still bore her 
daughter in her womb, in a fit of rage after a violent scene with her husband she had 
beaten with her fists on her body in order to kill the child inside it.  How many 
mothers, who love their children tenderly, perhaps over-tenderly, to-day, conceived 
them unwillingly and wished at that time that the living thing within them might not 
develop further!  They may even have expressed that wish in various, fortunately 
harmless, actions.  Thus their death-wish against someone they love, which is later so 
mysterious, originates from the earliest days of their relationship to that person’ (SE 





‘Leibespforten’ [literally, ‘portals of the body] (SE 15: 159).  As a ‘gateway’ or a 
‘doorway’ then Freud’s depiction of the womb is as something that is always already 
open, or at least slightly ajar.  The revenants that haunt Freud, that he drags 
throughout his life, that remain unlaid would seem to have some relation to this 
picture of the womb as paradoxically open and closed, as exit and return, and 
importantly as life and death. That Freud cannot make this explicit, that he gets 
‘caught’ in a navel as it were, is partly because he cannot picture the woman’s body as 
‘whole’.  She remains in parts, and at a distance, nudam we might say.  
 
Klein will argue that this depiction of the mother as a ‘hole’ but not ‘whole’ has an 
equivalent relationship in Eros’ alignment to the whole and Thantos’ to the part(s). 
For Freud the womb is not only Leibespforten but it stands in for the mother.  For 
Plato, this room/womb, as I argued in Chapter Two is not only Leibespforten, but also 
before God, and thus we could argue before time itself. If as Freud argued through 
Kant, that ‘time and space are ‘necessary forms of thought’’ (SE 18: 28), then how, as 
Rose argues through Bollas, can/do we think about mothers: ‘What does thinking 
about mothers do to thinking?’ (Rose, 2004: 151). The death instinct remains one of 
Freud’s most controversial ideas and its integral relationship to the body of the 
mother/womb remains relatively understudied. Is this because to think about the 
mother we need to think outside time and space, something that is metaphysically 
impossible for the human brain to do? Coupled with this is our overall rejection of not 
only the physical act of death, but its psychical meaning. Death is an end but we have 
God to mediate this end even if before God was the chora/the womb/room, the 
mother. We will return to these arguments later in this chapter, for now I want to look 
at how Freud understood his Jewishness and in turn, how this informed his writing on, 
or lack thereof, the mother. 
 
The Jew, the Gentile and the Woman 
To return to Freud’s recollection of his father being accosted by a Gentile and having 
his hat knocked off.  The hat argues Freud is a symbol of a man – of his genitals (SE 
5: 360).  The Jewish father who has his hat knocked off by a Christian lout expresses 
the difference that the Jewish male body held in 19th Century anti-Semitic Vienna – it 
is a ‘castrated’ body, the hat (the foreskin) was always already gone.  Now this may 
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be significant for Freud’s neglect of the mother, of his inability to understand the 
riddle of female sexuality.  Because if Freud made a dogma of his Oedipal complex 
he may have done so to assert his own masculinity in light of his father’s remembered 
weakness and the general anti-Semitism that Jews throughout the world faced (and 
continue to face).  Jay Geller in On Freud’s Jewish Body: Mitigating Circumstances 
arguing through Danial Boyarin states ‘The Oedipus Complex is Freud’s family 
romance of escape from Jewish queerdom into gentile, phallic heterosexuality’ (in 
Geller, 2007: 27).  Geller continues, ‘As a consequence of the syllogistic 
identification of the circumcised male Jew with women (via the mediations of 
circumcision as castration, as emasculation, as being effeminates), gender difference, 
so necessary to both Freud’s theory and to his society, was jeopardised’ (Geller, 2007: 
35).  Simply put, Geller argues ‘Jew equals woman’ which less simply would ‘entail 
the repudiation of psychoanalysis’ (Geller, 2007: 35).  Geller’s thesis continues, 
illustrating that this ‘Jew equals woman’ is itself too simplistic and lacks the 
‘necessary’ contradictions inherent to Freudian psychoanalysis.  Geller explains this 
by illustrating Freud’s statement that Judentum – a German word that conveys Jewry 
(the people), Jewishness (character and custom) and Judaism (religion) that the word 
‘Jew’ cannot adequately describe especially in its translation to English – has become 
‘to some extent a fossil’ (SE 23: 88 and Geller, 2007: 19).  In contemporary academic 
discourse then Geller argues, ‘Jews have been written out of critical feminist studies, 
which place the onus for misogyny on “traditional Jewish culture” and for patriarchy 
on the “Old Testament”’ (Geller, 2007: 19).  Feminism, Geller seems to be saying, 
through using the ‘Master’s’ tools to highlight ‘his’ misogynist leanings, in fact 
underscores ‘their’ own complicity in the Master’s game. This can be seen in the 
feminist psychoanalytic engagement in Chapter Two.  Either Freud is dismissed 
because of his apparent misogynistic ‘science’ or he is inappropriately appropriated 
we could say.  Freud’s unconscious either/or is consciously rendered as unproblematic 
by replacing the Oedipal with the pre-Oedipal.  Ipso facto, one for the other, but this 
of course neglects the intent of the unconscious and as Geller makes explicit it lets the 
other(s) off the hook.  
Feminism was from the start a ‘sisterhood’ where all differences were supposedly 
subsumed under the banner of a universal womanhood.  This neglected the obvious 
power structure already in place where ‘white was right’ and ‘black’ marginalized. 
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But Geller argues that even respected Freudian academics like Sander Gilman will 
explain, ‘Freud’s often stereotypical discourse on women as his defensive 
displacement of the discourses of racial antisemitism’ (Geller, 2007: 19).  Again, 
Peter Gay perhaps recognized as the expert on Freud par excellence will refute 
Freud’s Jewishness as having any share ‘in the making of psychoanalysis’ (Geller, 
2007: 24) as explicated in Gay’s book A Godless Jew (Gay, 1987).  In fact, as Gay 
illustrates in a letter to Ernest Jones Freud writes that his Jewishness, like his ‘passion 
for smoking’ and his lifelong interest in telepathy are his ‘private affair’ ‘inessential 
for psychoanalysis’ (in Gay, 1987: 148).  Gay concludes, ‘Inessential: wesensfremd—
his Judaism was inessential, not to Freud, but to his creation, psychoanalysis’ (Gay, 
1987: 148).  By utilising Freud’s own arguments in letters and in his psychoanalysis 
Gay will argue that ‘Freud would not be typecast’ (Gay, 1987: 33).  But Gay is a 
faithful biographer of Freud, taking him at his word.  This is not a criticism of Gay 
but by quoting from Freud’s correspondence to support his, and therefore Freud’s 
argument that psychoanalysis is not a Jewish science Gay neglects other references, 
however tenuous they sometimes might be.  For example, Gay quotes Freud as 
replying to a ‘correspondent from Palestine who sought to assimilate Freud’s theory 
of dreams to Talmudic discussions: “My attention has repeatedly been called to the 
observations in the Talmud about the problems of dreams.  But I must say that the 
approximation to the understanding of the dream among the ancient Greeks is far 
more striking”’ (in Gay, 1987: 32-33). Gay does not question this allusion – because 
an allusion it may well be, instead he will argue that ‘Parallels, then, may hint at 
much, but they guarantee nothing’.  And further, ‘They cannot ignore and must not 
minimize Freud’s repeated assertions that he was an atheist, an infidel Jew, all his 
life…’ (Gay, 1987: 33-34).  The allusion of course is to Freud’s frequent references to 
The Interpretation of Dreams as ‘the Egyptian dream book’ in letters to Fliess.  And 
yet he will say of W. Erb’s text book ‘the greatest name in German neuropathology’ 
(SE 20: 9) that he came to the realisation that ‘what I had taken for an epitome of 
exact observations was merely the construction of phantasy’ (SE 20: 9). In fact, Erb’s 
book had ‘no more relation to reality than some ‘Egyptian’ dream-book, such as is 
sold in cheap book-shop’ (SE 20: 9). This illustrates the inherent contradiction of 
taking Freud at his word.  On the one hand, his Interpretation of Dreams will be 
upheld as ‘the Egyptian dream book’, as a positive representation of the ancient 
Egyptian’s knowledge about dreams.  On the other hand, Erb’s book is compared to 
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some ‘Egyptian-dream book, such as is sold in a cheap book-shop’ (SE 20: 9). Freud 
may assert that he was a ‘Godless Jew’, but his attachment (Anlehnung – his ‘leaning-
on’) to Greek and Egyptian archaeology and mythology somewhat belies this 
statement.  His ‘dream’ book is the ‘Egyptian dream book’, and it is the Egyptian’s 
that Freud refers to as the people who did so much in denying the reality of death and 
who took ‘such pains to make existence in the next world possible’ (SE 23: 19-20).  
Of course the Egyptian Gods and Goddesses were different, perhaps only by apace, to 
a singular conception of a monolithic God as Christianity and Judaism portray it. The 
Egyptian Gods and Goddesses had the patina of ‘age’, of the archaic, perhaps even of 
timelessness.  But this is not a thesis on Freud’s relationship to God, or even for that 
matter on his understandings of Jewry, of being a Jew.  If he refers to himself as an 
‘out-and-out unbeliever’ (E. Freud, 1960: 453) then who are we to say this is wrong – 
he is wrong?  But his consistent denial that neither his atheism nor his Jewishness 
have anything to do with his science psychoanalysis sounds much like Hamlet’s 
mother when Hamlet presents her with a play depicting the Queen as she is, ‘The lady 
doth protest too much, methinks’ (Hamlet Act 3, scene 2).  An apt analogy if one 
considers the connotation for Freud not to make of the Jewish male a ‘woman’. We 
could say in fact, that this is what Rank stands accused of.  By making the mother the 
‘primal’ object, by making her the centre of the child’s life and as follows, the life of 
the adult he effectively dismisses the importance of the Oedipus Complex – he 
castrates Freud’s work.  That Rank is aware of this is expressed in his own belief that 
Freud could not ‘see’ that behind the Oedipus situation was a more powerful and 
primal object relationship – that of the mother (Rank in Kramer ed., 1993: 37).  Freud 
represses the role of the castrating mother argues Rank and in doing so splits off his 
fear and hatred onto women (Rank in Kramer ed., 1993: 37).  
To return to Geller’s argument concerning Freud’s Jewishness, as Geller, Gay and 
Gilman make explicit, Freud never denied his Jewishness.  But what Gay and Gilman 
forget argues Geller, is that Freud defined Jewishness himself in the mark of the male 
Jew and the ‘bedrock’ of his science psychoanalysis, castration.  In both the Little 
Hans case-study and ‘the beautiful example of his work,’ the novella on Leonardo da 
Vinci, Freud writes, ‘the castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of anti-
semitism; for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his 
penis—a piece of his penis, they think—and this gives them the right to despise Jews.  
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And there is no stronger unconscious root for the sense of superiority over women’ 
(SE 10: 36 n 1 and Geller, 2007: 25).  Geller will argue that Freud’s entanglement 
with the mother could be seen then, as both a reaction to, and displacement of, his 
own anxiety in the face of anti-Semitism. It was important for Freud to view himself 
as masculinized argues Geller and the Jewish male with a ‘piece missing’ in contrast, 
equated to a masculinized Jewish woman (Geller, 2007: 8). Gilman states something 
similar in the linking of ‘the Jew’ with the ‘image of the woman’, ‘Freud provided a 
place where the Jew could be made to disappear and still find a safe haven’ (in 
Brunner, 1995: 24).  In fact Gilman ends his informative and rigorous treaty on Freud 
with the words, ‘His weapon against anti-Semitism was the discourse of science’. And 
the author of The MAN Moses and the Monotheistic Religion was “Freud the man,” 
“not Freud the Jew” (Gilman, 1993: 199). 
God, (un)reason, illusion 
Freud refers to himself as both someone who had disturbed the sleep of mankind and 
as a ‘destroyer of illusions’, of his own, and those of mankind (in Gay, 1987: 56).  
Perhaps then, in Freud’s desire to keep the mother/son relationship intact, to leave it 
perfect and un-besmirched he left it in the realm of illusions.  In the Future of an 
Illusion (SE 21) he will argue that it is difficult to avoid illusions but that he holds fast 
against them and ‘If experience should show—not to me, but to others after me, who 
think as I do—that we have been mistaken, we will give up our expectations’ (SE 21: 
53). This is an argument against religious illusions, something Freud argues is 
infantile at bottom and which limits the potentiality of mankind and threatens ‘reason, 
our “God Logos” (SE 21: 54).  It may seem strange for Freud to make a ‘God’ of 
reason with its theological metaphor, but stranger still to bring reason to ‘God’s’ 
house.  Reason as Freud would show, is not ‘master in its own house’ (Gay, 1987: 
64).  An odd couple then, god and reason, more so when one considers that 
psychoanalysis is ostensibly concerned with ‘un-reason’.  Gay will call ‘Logos, the 
divinity of psychoanalysis…’ (Gay, 1987: 65) and will argue, through Freud, that 
religion and science are ‘irreparably split’.  Freud will state that religion as illusion is 
the fulfilment ‘“of the oldest, strongest, most urgent wishes of mankind; the secret of 
their strength is the strength of these wishes”… Religion, in short, is the mother, the 
champion, and the beneficiary of illusions’ (in Gay, 1987: 66).  As the argument goes 
then, both the mother and religion are illusions of a type that credits no scholarship, is 
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infantile at bottom.  But psychoanalysis, if it is nothing else is the study of the child in 
the man: a blithe and perhaps disingenuous statement, but true for all that.  Thus the 
child Freud is also implicated in the adult Freud, the creator of the science of 
psychoanalysis.  Freud turns from the mother, his mother, as he turns from the 
importance of the mother outside the desexualised metaphors of her as first love-
object, as integral to the mental life of the child, as the ‘essence’ of the sensual with 
the depiction of the baby sated at the mother’s breast.  And yet this sensual image 
which Freud calls ‘sexual’, ‘No one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from 
the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the 
reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual 
satisfaction in later life’ (SE 7: 182) while not necessarily devoid of sexuality is 
caught between the self-preservation instincts and the sexual instincts.  I think that it 
is the envelopment – and this seems an entirely appropriate word – of the self-
preservation instincts by the sexual instincts that Freud’s ‘gaps’ open up and 
thereafter through his science psychoanalysis, is the attempt to full them.  It is 
important to note, that Freud argued that these earlier ‘sensual’ tendencies remain 
intensely preserved in the unconscious, continuing to exist in their original form (SE 
18: 111).  
 
Freud avers that it is the self-preservation instincts not the sexual instincts that are 
responsible for ‘God’.  Religion he argues is founded on ‘infantile helplessness’ 
conceived of a world where parents are benevolent and all powerful (to Jung in 
McGuire, 1974: 283-284).  But this is a strange God, bound as it is to the self-
preservation instincts.  This God fashioned in infancy is initially exempt from the 
sexual instinct says Freud, this only ‘adds its spice later’.  There is a slip here, after all 
the self-preservation instincts are in the realm of the mother.  God, Freud will argue is 
a substitute for the father.  While the self-preservation and sexual instincts will 
coalesce under Freud’s later conception of Eros this does not address Freud’s earlier 
rendering of a ‘God’ emerging from, what can only be understood as, the pre-Oedipal. 
This can be explained argues Jonte-Pace if we acknowledge Freud’s turning away 
from the body of the mother, who in any event, lays encased in a tangle of dream 
thoughts, hidden behind an ‘unplumbable navel’.  
 
‘There is no God’ 
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In the short essay, A Religious Experience (SE 21) Freud is responding to a young 
American physician’s crisis of faith.  The young man writes to Freud telling him how 
he heard the voice of God with a recommendation that if Freud listened hard enough 
and searched his soul long enough he might also find God.  The ‘catalyst in the 
doctor’s crisis of faith had been the dead body of a woman’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 34). 
On seeing the ‘sweet-faced dear old woman’ being carried to the dissecting table, the 
American doctor thought ‘There is no God’ (SE 21: 169).  Freud interprets the 
doctor’s dream on his Oedipal paradigm; the sweet-faced old woman is his mother; 
the sight of her dead body on the point of being stripped or naked aroused in him a 
longing for his mother; condemnation against his father (God) was produced as a 
reaction against the ill-treatment of ‘his’ mother and his own Oedipal desires (SE 21: 
171). This is all straightforward enough argues Freud but Jonte-Pace sees 
discrepancies (displacements) in Freud’s argument. Freud fails to address the obvious 
Oedipal elements in the doctor’s account in particular the all important castration 
complex states Jonte-Pace.  For what is a dead body but a symbol of the erect penis 
i.e., stiff?  In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6) Freud states: 
 
From a dream of P’s it appears that ice is in fact a symbol by antithesis for an 
erection: i.e. something that becomes hard in the cold instead of—like a 
penis—in heat (in excitation).  The two antithetical concepts of sexuality and 
death are frequently linked through the idea that death makes things stiff. One 
of the Henris’ informants instanced a piece of ice as a screen memory for his 
grandmother’s death (SE 6: 49 n 2).   
 
Freud erases the castrative/death element from the American doctor’s account as he 
does in his own account of the dream of his dead mother. In Freud’s ‘anxiety’ dream 
in his seventh or eighth year he sees his ‘beloved mother’ with a peculiarly peaceful 
expression on her face being carried into the room by two or three people with bird’s 
beaks.  Freud says he woke in an anxious state and that this did not dissipate until he 
had seen his mother’s face and reassured himself that she was not dead (SE 5: 583-
584).  Freud argues that he was not anxious because his mother was dead in his 
dream, but ‘when repression is taken into account’ one can see the hidden sexual 
‘craving’ behind which, the dead mother was represented (SE 5: 584).  Freud had 
argued that the dreaming of the death of ‘persons of whom the dreamer is fond’ 
especially when accompanied by feelings of inconsolable grief suggests death wishes 
towards that person (SE 4: 248- 249, SE 15: 202 and Jonte-Pace, 2001: 40-41).  And 
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yet as Jonte-Pace argues that Freud is quick to deny the possibility of ‘matricidal 
fantasies’ in his dream instead insisting that the ‘obscure sexual craving for the 
mother…is deeper, more primal’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 41). Jonte-Pace quotes the 
psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu who in response to Freud’s interpretation of his dream 
calls it unsatisfactory, ‘and the insistence with which he plays down the specific 
anxiety most prominent in the dream [about death of his mother] by tracing it back to 
something else strikes me as suspect’ (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 41).  Pontalis goes further 
argues Jonte-Pace by suggesting that the theme of sex is a kind of cover-up for death 
in psychoanalytic theory: ‘“The theme of death is as basic to Freudian psychoanalysis 
as is the theme of sexuality.  I even believe the latter has been widely put forward so 
as to cover up the former’ (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 41).  Jonte-Pace suggests we follow 
the same hermeneutic that Freud followed in his analysis of the Bible where he 
comments on the ‘destinies’ of a text:  
 
Thus almost everywhere noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions and obvious 
contradictions have come about—indications which reveal things to us which 
it was not intended to communicate. In its implications the distortion of a text 
resembles a murder: the difficulty is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting 
rid of its traces.  We might well lend the word ‘Entstellung [distortion]’ the 
double-meaning to which it has claim but of which to-day it makes no use. It 
should mean not only ‘to change the appearance of something’ but also ‘to put 
something in another place, to displace.’  Accordingly, in many instances of 
textual distortion, we may nevertheless count upon finding what has been 
supressed and disavowed hidden away somewhere else, though changed and 
torn from its context. Only it will not always be easy to recognize it (SE 23: 
43). 
 
Freud in an effort to get rid of the traces of the dead mother in his dream (in the 
doctor’s dream): ‘I was not anxious because I had dreamt my mother was dying’, 
seems to be saying, ‘I was anxious because the dream made of my mother a sexual 
object and in knowing that this is the forbidden thing, I ‘erased’ her’.47 He puts 
                                                 
47 This harks back to the Irma dream and its connection to Emma Eckstein.  Seeing 
her lying there and looking dead, Freud says, suddenly it all became clear to me and 
he felt sick.  ‘We had done her an injustice’ Freud writes to Fliess, ‘she was not at all 
abnormal’ (Masson, 1985: 117).  Freud’s position in regard to Eckstein changes over 
the weeks, until finally, her near death, not once but several times has him confess to 
Fliess, that she ‘bled out of longing. She has always been a bleeder…’ (in Masson, 
1985: 186). Masson signals the ‘it became clear to me’ as Freud’s abandonment of the 
seduction theory and it might be said of Emma Eckstein.  Masson suggests that Freud 
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‘something else’ in her place as he once did with the primal scene in the Wolf Man 
case-study (SE 17).  Sarah Kofman argues that psychoanalysis will make all women 
dead women and it does so because ‘she’ ‘blocks all exits, all paths, all contact’ (in 
Jonte-Pace, 2001: 42).  A strange juxtaposition then, at once deadly but also deadly 
alive, one that signals the doubling (‘the double-meaning’) that occurs when Freud 
addresses his mother: ‘I was not anxious because I had dreamt my mother was dying’ 
(SE 5: 584): ‘I had missed my mother, and had come to suspect that she was shut up 
in this wardrobe or cupboard’ (SE 6: 49-51).  ‘We might well lend the word 
Entstellung’ to the mother then, with its suppression, hiding, disavowal, 
misrecognition and displacement. 
 
Freud’s dream with its bird beaked figures arose from his perusal of the illustrations 
in the Phillippson’s Bible.  They were ‘gods’ argues Freud, with falcon heads ‘from 
an ancient Egyptian funerary relief’ (SE 5: 584), which were ‘intended to ensure safe 
passage of the dead to the afterlife’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 43). Freud with his attendance 
to the linguistic meaning of words would have known, argues Anzieu that ‘the bird-
headed Egyptian god, Thoth, is pronounced in German the same way as Tot (the 
German word for a ‘dead person’)’ (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 43).  Further this is Freud’s 
last personal dream in his Interpretation of Dreams, and Anzieu suggests:  
 
By placing the interpretation of [this] dream at the end of his book, he was 
confirming that he had taken back his beloved mother from his father and 
regained possession of her; but, more than that, he was indicating that he now 
had the last word on death, the last word on anxiety, the last word on 
separation from the primally loved object.  For death, anxiety and separation 
are inevitable facts of life which we can counter (indeed, only counter) with 
words (Anzieu cited by Jonte-Pace, 2001: 44).  
 
Freud will say in Femininity that anxiety is the reproduction of an old-event and is 
linked to the self-preservation instincts (SE 22: 84-85).  How then might God and 
anxiety be linked to a dead but erotic mother? In particular if one considers as we did 
above, that Freud is never really clear how the self-preservation instincts, which are in 
the domain of the mother, are resolved outside of the mother in the first place. If as 
Bollas suggests that the mother might be our first clown and thereafter our 
                                                                                                                                            
was ‘enamoured’ of Fliess, in fact one could say ‘bewitched’ as he initially at least, 
regarded Fliess as a ‘prophet’ of types argues Masson (in Masson, 2004). 
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understanding of God (and I will engage with Bollas’s assertion in Chapter Five), how 
might we connect these disparate threads, of mother, self-preservation instincts, 
anxiety and an erotic but dead mother? In particular when Freud covers them over 
with his Oedipus complex, or an aspect of it at least. If Thoth and Tot have a linguistic 
connection and in Freud’s dream this is a connection to the mother’s dead body then 
why does Freud deny the matricidal phantasy and instead highlight the “hidden sexual 
craving” for the mother? Once again Freud highlights the Oedipal element of the 
dream while dismissing, what he will call, “the deeper primal element”. Of course, 
Freud’s mother appears as “blissfully dead” (sexually satiated like the baby at the 
breast), and the young Freud awakens anxious and insecure.  But Freud takes back his 
mother by “mummifying” her (and we will discuss the meaning of “mummer” as 
clown in Chapter Five).  Silenced then, the mothers role in “death, anxiety and 
separation” where she seems to be most present, “succumbs to an especially 
inexorable repression” it seems, of Freud’s own making. 
 
The déjà vu of the mother’s genitals, her womb 
Returning once more to the metaphors of paths and journeys Freud will tell us in The 
Interpretation of Dreams that our feelings of déjà vu are of a place that we have been 
to before, that is the mother’s genitals, her womb (SE 5: 399). He reiterates this in The 
Uncanny (SE 17) where he says that when a man dreams of a place or a country that 
is familiar to him he is right, because this is a memory of a place where we ‘lived 
once upon a time and in the beginning’ (SE 17: 245).  Invoking the introduction of 
this heim, with that of a traditional fairy-tale here Freud’s ‘tail’ is of another kind.  
The joke he says, ‘Love is home-sickness’ refers to the mother’s genitals or her body 
(SE 17: 245). But what is it that Freud means in his use of the concept déjà vu?  In a 
letter to Romain Rolland to celebrate his 70th birthday Freud writes that he is ‘an 
impoverished man who “has seen better days”’ (Freud, 2006: 68).  Offering Rolland a 
‘gift’ of a memory, which he titles, A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis 
(Freud, 2006: 68, SE 22), Freud writes, coincidentally I have just realised that my 
younger brother and you are the same age.  Freud’s younger brother Alexander 
mourns their mother’s death, something Freud is unable to do.  Romain Rolland 
understands the oceanic, which Freud describes as something unknown to him.  The 
experience on the Acropolis had troubled Freud for a ‘generation’ and he did not 




What was it that had disturbed Freud concerning this experience? Freud writes that 
the experience on the Acropolis ‘contained an element of doubt about reality’ (Freud, 
2006: 73).  In this, he compares it to ‘a piece of good news’ such as winning a lottery 
ticket or a girl finding out that the man she loves, loves her back (Freud, 2006: 71).  
Why then, asks Freud, do people fall ill when offered, either, everything that they 
deserve or when success seems to be theirs.  Because, Freud suggests, they cannot 
‘expect fate to supply anything so good’, they do not believe they are worth it.  Freud 
terms this expression ‘too good to be true’ and argues that it is an ‘expression of 
pessimism’ which we all have to some degree or another.  But Freud’s own 
experience of the Acropolis is one that he will call a feeling of estrangement 
(derealisation in SE 22).  Here it is as if he is split into two people, argues Freud.  One 
doubting the existence of the Acropolis but being moved to believe in it, because 
‘here I am, standing on the Acropolis’ taking in the view.  The other person simply 
enjoyed the experience because he never knew that the existence of the Acropolis was 
in doubt.  
 
The ‘momentarily feeling’ of disbelief that Freud encapsulates in the statement, ‘What 
I am seeing there is not real’ and which he terms estrangement (derealisation) is made 
to accommodate the ‘false pronouncement’: The Acropolis does not exist because I do 
not think I will ever get to see it due to circumstance, happenstance or what you will.  
Therefore I will put a false statement – it does not exist – in place of the true one – I 
know it exists (Freud, 2006: 73). But these estrangements (derealisations) are little 
understood argues Freud, ‘they are described as ‘sensations’, but they are clearly 
complicated processes bound up with particular contents and linked with decisions 
made concerning those contents’ (Freud, 2006: 73). They are failed actions, 
comparable to dreams and occur in normal people as often as in people with mental 
illness. Freud offers two clauses to this ‘sensation’ of strangeness.  Either the subject 
feels a part of him/herself has become strange, or a piece of reality has. The latter 
Freud terms depersonalisation, and then adds that other phenomena, such as déjà vu 
and déjà raconté are the positive counterparts to estrangement and depersonalisation.  
In estrangement we attempt to exclude something, a piece of reality from ourselves.  
In déjà vu a piece of reality that is excluded from us we assume is our own. Freud 




In the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6) Freud offers a more detailed account 
of déjà vu.  Linking it to the ‘uncanny’ and the ‘miraculous’ Freud argues that déjà vu 
is the ‘peculiar feeling’ we have, ‘in certain moments and situations, of having had 
exactly the same experience once before or of having once before been in the same 
place, though our efforts never succeed in clearly remembering the previous occasion 
that announces itself in this way’ (SE 6: 265). The object(s) of déjà vu is never fully 
remembered argues Freud, but they are not illusions, instead the ‘feelings’ associated 
with déjà vu are those of unconscious phantasies (SE 6: 266). Freud offers the 
memory of a ‘lady’ whose experience of déjà vu is finally understood by Freud as one 
of substitution.  Unable to deal with the near loss of her brother and her earlier 
wishful phantasy that considered his loss, Freud argues that she created ‘an analogous 
situation in the home of her friends, whose only brother was in danger of dying soon, 
as in fact he did die shortly’ (SE 6: 267).  Thus the repression of a wishful phantasy, 
an occurrence of real illness, later seen in a friend’s brother, who in fact did die, 
fashioned a feeling of déjà vu. Freud will admit that a ‘piece is missing’ here, but 
argues that until further study is undertaken concerning the phenomena of déjà vu and 
its counterparts, estrangement and depersonalisations this is all he can offer.  He does 
concede that the feeling of déjà vu is similar to Ferenczi’s contention that we have 
lost something, some object but we convince ourselves that this important object that 
we have lost is in fact not lost at all and everything will be alright (or will be righted) 
in our world.  This is the ‘cheaper’ equivalent to the ‘real’ processes of parapraxis 
(slips of the tongue) argues Freud (SE 6: 265-269). 
 
Thus ‘once upon a time and in the beginning’ in a loving and wishful phantasy (albeit 
of death) we journeyed to the place that without a doubt we can say we have ‘been 
there once before’ (SE 5: 399, SE 17: 245).  But this is perplexing because what Freud 
tells us of these phenomena is that they cause us to doubt a piece of reality either 
externally or internally, something has become strange to us.  No doubt a return to the 
womb might seem strange and Freud reiterates that the female (mothers) genitals are 
not only strange to us but also horrifying, there is definitely a ‘piece missing’ but how 
does this equate to his analysis of déjà vu. The female genital organs are unheimliche 
(unhomely) but the womb is our unheimliche heim (uncanny or unhomely home). And 
Freud frames the uncanny experience of the female genitals in the language of the 
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fairy-tale, ‘once upon a time’ and in the beginning.  In this ‘framing’ he is describing 
something that is so common as to be universal ‘of all human beings’, the mother’s 
womb, of which we have feelings of déjà vu states Freud. There is something I cannot 
quite put my finger on here, a useful analogy if one follows Freud in his discussion of 
the obsessional patient who tells Freud he has returned to a ‘house’ he has been in 
twice before.  As a child, sleeping next to his mother he inserted his finger into her 
vagina while she slept (SE 5: 399). Thus Freud follows his own feelings of 
estrangement on the Acropolis, of a situation that included ‘myself, the Acropolis and 
my perception of it’ and the doubt that persisted in the experience of the Acropolis 
(Freud, 2006: 73) with the obsessional patient who has been there, who has returned 
there (or at least his finger has) and who dreams of there. This of course calls the ‘da’ 
in Freud’s famous fort/da (gone/there) into question (which I will discuss in Chapter 
Four), but I remain troubled with Freud’s linking of déjà vu to the womb.   
 
Freud comments himself that the feeling of déjà vu has been linked to the mystical, to 
an other-worldliness if you like (Freud, 2006: 74).  But by enclosing our return to the 
mother, our feelings of déjà vu in the language of the fable, what is it that Freud is 
telling us? If the déjà vu of the womb is one associated with a fairy-tale, it might be 
pertinent to ask which fairy-tale and why?  That the womb is symbolised by a house 
(our uncanny home) brings forth a witch and a candy-covered house that children eat 
from and are in turn eaten by the witch.48That the witch both feeds them and cooks 
them in an oven again shows the doubling that Freud argues for in his Acropolis 
reminiscence: déjà vu is a defence mechanism through which the ego to protect itself 
from ‘disintegration’ displaces in whatever manner and in whichever way it can onto 
“something else besides”.  
 
While Freud will make our feelings of déjà vu in relation to the return to our uncanny 
home, comforting, albeit strange, it is not frightening in the way that the father is 
represented as a wolf, or as Rumpelstiltskin (SE 12: 281-287). Of course, these are 
not feelings of déjà vu or any of the related phenomena but Freud’s persistence in 
                                                 
48 This reference to the fairy-tale of Hans 





marking out the boundary of the uncanny in relation to the mother, or the mother’s 
body, in particular her womb seems to suggest that déjà vu and our uncanny home 
(the womb) are stranger than he will allow for.  More so, if one considers that Freud 
referred to himself as Rumpelstiltskin in a letter to Fliess, with the words ‘Oh, how 
glad I am that no one, no one knows…’ in relation to dreams being understood as 
wish-fulfilments, something no-one else had ‘guessed’ (Masson, 1985: 243).  
Rumpelstiltskin, states Freud, ‘gave access to the deeper, infantile stratum of the 
dream thoughts’ (CP 4: 238). This ‘droll little fellow…whose secret is so eagerly 
canvassed, who can perform such extraordinary tricks’ is the recipient of penis envy 
argues Freud (SE 12: 283, CP 4: 238-239). That is why there is so much ‘fury against 
him’ (SE 12: 283).  Freud then, as Rumpelstiltskin the possessor of an envious 
knowledge concerning dreams makes himself the possessor of an envious penis (male 
authority/gentile) with a whole piece more, and not with ‘a piece missing’ as Geller 
and Gilman argue.  Freud suggests this himself, through a fausse reconnaissance 
offered by his famous patient the Wolf Man. ‘Fausse reconnaissance’ or ‘déjà 
racontē’ understood as false recollection/memory, was in this case covering over/up 
the Wolf Man’s castration anxiety (the story concerns a memory of cutting off his 
little finger, albeit a memory associated with the loss of his mother, through, it could 
be argued, the acquisition of language: ‘Now I feel as though I had known it all the 
time’ (in CP 2: 341)).  Freud states that ‘particularly in relation to the castration 
complex, similar hallucinatory falsifications are of not infrequent occurrence, and that 
they can just as easily serve the purpose of correcting unwelcome perceptions’ (SE 
13: 205). While the return to the womb is a ‘special case’ of déjà vu argues Freud, in 
that it has a universal application the similarity to singular cases of déjà vu are also 
prominent.  The repressed and ‘common element’ of the ‘recollection/memory/dream’ 
returns against ‘the teeth of all resistance’ argues Freud.  In the very Oedipality of the 
statement ‘the teeth of all resistance’ Freud highlights the displacement that the 
feeling of déjà vu evokes.  Here then on/at the threshold of oral and anal our feelings 
of déjà vu towards the mother’s genitals, her womb are foregrounded only to be 
displaced in the Freudian dance of Rumpelstiltskin, the funny little man who grimaces 
and is representative of the penis (SE 12: 282-283). The feelings of déjà vu, which are 
at once ‘uncanny’ and ‘miraculous’ with their association to the mother’s womb are 
obscured through the allocation of fairy-tales, here Hansel and Gretel and Freud’s 




There is what Rank has called a ‘squaring of the circle’ happening here, which Freud 
argued Leonardo da Vinci did in an effort to ‘win’ back, perhaps keep, his mother.  
The ‘squaring of the circle’ suggests that through knowledge we might solve the 
problems of knowledge, in this case that of being and returning to the mother’s womb. 
Rank extends his analysis, in the myth of the hero, who he argues is set on regaining 
the mother by overcoming a particularly ‘severe birth trauma’ (Rank, 1952: 106).  In 
Rank’s reckoning the exodus of the womb is so traumatic that the hero is constantly 
striving, in his heroic conquests to return.  Leaving aside whether or not we reject 
Rank’s analysis as Freud finally did (although not all of it) it might be remembered 
that Freud referred to himself as nothing more than a ‘conquistador, an adventurer’ 
with all that this means, ‘curiosity, daring and tenacity characteristic of a man of this 
sort’ (Masson, 1985: 398).  A hero then, one who born in a caul (like the Wolf Man 
was also), is assured of being a ‘great man in the world’ (SE 4: 192).  Rank will have 
it that the caul (a membrane covering the babies head and/or body and which in being 
relatively rare has had legends develop around it) offers ‘a kind of permanent uterus’ 
and therefore a ‘heroic invulnerability’, a ‘magic’ we might say (Rank, 1952: 107). 
Birth trauma argues Rank is more commonly shown in fairy-tales than the myth of the 
hero.  Could it be that our caul covered Freud, who remembers in the Interpretation of 
Dreams that his mother was told by an old-peasant woman that they could expect 
great things from him, in rejecting anti-Semitism and displacing the sense of being an 
Other onto his mother, re-enacts this in his distancing of the womb, as canny and 




Freud tells Fliess that the dream journey is structured ‘on an imaginary walk’ 
(Masson, 1985: 365).  But the ‘dark forest’ with its ‘concealed pass’ through which 
Freud will lead his readers, is also where they are most likely to get lost: ‘Most 
readers will get lost in this thorny thicket and never get to see the Sleeping Beauty 
behind it’ writes Freud to Fliess (in Masson, 1985: 362).  In the Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (SE 6) Freud suggests that the fairy-tale uses screen memories like the 
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Hermit Crab49 uses empty shells as a new but familiar and canny home (SE 6: 49 n 2).  
This is an instance of what Freud calls a ‘verbal bridge.’ The shell hides the crab as 
the fairy-tale hides, becomes the screen for the real memory (SE 6: 49). The chosen 
fairy-tale will have a particular resonance for the child argues Freud and thereafter 
becomes a favourite without them knowing why.  Freud extends this point, ‘If we 
carefully observe from clear instances the way in which dreamers use fairy tales and 
the point at which they bring them in, we may perhaps also succeed in picking up 
some hints which will help in interpreting remaining obscurities in the fairy tales 
themselves’ (SE 12: 283). 
 
In Kristeva’s analysis of a patient she also addresses the fairy-tale of Sleeping 
Beauty,50 because the fairy-tale argues Kristeva helps to integrate ‘temporal shifters’ 
in language. Thus in Sleeping Beauty the sixteen year old princess is put to sleep by 
the ‘prick’ of a spinning wheel, enchanted by a Wicked Witch.  One hundred years 
later a prince, hearing of the ‘myth’ of the beautiful sleeping princess, manages to 
push his way through the thorny thicket that has grown up around the castle, and in a 
kiss, he awakens her.  This seems to be an example of Freud’s deferred 
action/Nachträglichkeit.  Time is rendered obsolete in this fairy-tale with its one 
hundred and sixteen year old princess awakening from a ‘deathly’ slumber with a 
kiss.  But what is more curious is the thicket that Freud refers to that his readers and 
the prince must get through to find Sleeping Beauty. This could surely be identified as 
the type of bush or thicket that he argues surrounds the mother’s/Medusa’s genitals 
and which we turn from in horror?  Thus to get to the Sleeping Beauty, which holds 
the suggestion of a prize, one first needs to push their way through the ‘mother’s’ 
thorny thicket.  Since this does not sound palatable, well at least according to Freud, it 
is unlikely that anyone will make the journey.  And why would we, if through the 
thicket, the mother’s pubic hair, death lies waiting?  But there is more to this ‘fable’ 
because if the fairy-tale is a screen memory, having some resonance to the child, 
                                                 
49 As an aside, the Hermit Crab, the screen for Freud’s fairy-tale was mythologically 
believed to grow spontaneously out of mud and slime. 
50 Cixous argues that the fairy tale of Sleeping Beauty is ‘particularly expressive of 
woman’s place...’ which is always to be found in or on a bed, and only a man can 
wake her up and transfer her from one bed to another.   She points out that in another 
fairy tale, Little Red Riding Hood, she does what women should never do, ‘travels 
through her own forest!’ (Cixous, 2000: 233). 
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albeit unconsciously, how might we understand Freud’s use of Sleeping Beauty?  
Comparatively we could say that ‘sleeping’ invokes dreaming, and here is a dreamer 
of some one hundred years.  But Sleeping Beauty is dreaming behind a thorny thicket.  
If we compare the thicket and the dreamer to Freud’s other, most quoted and 
celebrated passage, ‘the navel of the dream’ then perhaps we come closer to the 
mother that Freud turns away from.  It is worth quoting the excerpt in full: 
 
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream, which 
has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of 
interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which 
cannot be unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of 
the dream.  This is the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches down into the 
unknown.  The dream thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, 
from the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch 
out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought.  It is 
at some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish 
grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium (SE 5: 525). 
 
Even in the best interpreted dreams, there is often a place [eine Stelle] that 
must be left in the dark, because in the process of interpreting one notices a 
tangle of dream-thoughts arising [anhebt] which resists unravelling but has 
also made no further contributions [keine weiteren Beiträge] to the dream-
content.  This, then, is the navel of the dream, the place where it straddles the 
unknown [dem Unerkannten aufsitzt].  The dream-thoughts, to which 
interpretation leads one, are necessarily interminable [ohne Abschluss] and 
branch out on all sides into the netlike entanglement [in die netzartie 
Verstrickung] of our world of thought.  Out of one of the denser places in this 
meshwork, the dream-wish rises [erhebt sich] like a mushroom out of its 
mycelium (in Weber, 1982: 73 (SE 5: 530)). 
 
Earlier in the Interpretation of Dreams (SE 4) Freud had called this ‘unknown spot’, 
an ‘unplumbable navel’.  Samuel Weber in The Legend of Freud (1982) argues that 
here, on the border of metapsychology Freud exhibits no anxiety, ‘no cause for 
concern’ ‘for the ‘place that must be left in the dark’, ‘even in the best interpreted 
dreams’, can still be put squarely in its place, despite – or rather because of its 
obscurity’ (Weber, 1982: 73-74).  I offered Weber’s interpretation of this extract 
above because he will argue that the English translation of Freud’s German text loses 
something in its interpretation.  But it is not only English readers that are 
misinformed. Weber will argue that Lacan51 also misunderstands Freud’s emphasis 
                                                 
51 Laplanche who trained under Lacan argues that Lacan only ever read a few 
sentences in German and suggests that Lacan did not know German very well and 
105 
 
concerning the navel. Weber argues that Lacan positioned himself as a guide, 
someone to ‘orient us in this confusing space and place’ attached as it to this 
‘unplumbable navel’ (Weber, 1982: 78).  At the beginning of Lacan’s The Four Basic 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis Weber states, Lacan tells his listeners and future readers, 
‘“When you read the texts of Freud, you can rely upon the terms I have introduced to 
guide you”’ (in Weber, 1982: 78).  And yet here, where these terms should be our 
guide we are presented with a navel, ‘the centre of the unknown – which, like the 
anatomical navel itself, its representative, is nothing but the abyss (bèance) of which 
we speak’ (Lacan cited by Weber, 1982: 78). Lacan’s ‘navel’ his béance is centred 
and empty, something that Freud’s never was argues Weber.  Freud’s ‘unplumbable 
navel’ while ending in darkness does so in the knowledge that this darkness is 
‘saturated’, is ‘full’, to use Weber’s words, ‘because it contains too much’ (Weber, 
1982: 79).  Weber asks why it is that we notice, that Freud noticed this ‘tangle of 
dream-thoughts?’ Is it because ‘we see or notice’ ‘that place in a certain way?’ 
(Weber, 1982: 77).  This spot argues Freud ‘straddles the unknown’ illustrating 
interpretation’s ‘enabling limit’ but also its potential chaotic properties. Weber pauses 
for a moment on the meaning of the word straddle.  Freud straddles this dream-navel 
argues Weber, whereas Lacan makes of it a centre comprising of nothing.  Straddle, 
‘To spread the legs wide apart… to set the legs wide apart…to take up a position that 
favours both sides… and at the end of the article a synonym says Weber, to 
‘divaricate’ (Weber, 1982: 80).  ‘Divaricate’, a botanical term meaning ‘to stretch or 
open wide apart or asunder… to branch off or diverge’ (from O.E.D.52, in Weber, 
1982: 80). Freud straddles argues Weber ‘in all the meanings suggested so 
provocatively by the O.E.D., and of which the so-called primal scene is perhaps only 
the most graphic figuration’ (Weber, 1982: 81). Weber has Freud in a rather 
                                                                                                                                            
therefore was unable to read a complete text of Freud’s. Lacan’s famous ‘Return to 
Freud’ is premised on a reading of Freud.  We would suppose that this reading was in 
German but Laplanche argues that ‘I don’t think he knew German so well, and I don’t 
think he ever read much more than a few lines at any one time. I don’t think he read 
an entire paper of Freud’s in German. It was more an impulse, to go back to Freud, 
which was very important. His interpretations are completely speculative, or 
imaginative. Such as when he said that Freud nowhere speaks of ‘instinct’. That just 
goes against what Freud said. Instead of saying Freud never speaks of instinct, it’s 
much more interesting to admit that he did and explore the contradiction between 
‘instinct’ and ‘drive’ (Laplanche in an interview with John Fletcher and Peter 
Osborne, 1999). 
52 Oxford English Dictonary. 
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compromising position – although admittedly Freud put himself there. And it seems 
somewhat reminiscent of Irigaray’s phallic erection, which would arise in the spot 
where we were once connected to the mother.  
 
When Freud tells us that the dream is unknown he also concludes that it ‘rises … like 
a mushroom53 out of its mycelium’ (SE 5: 525. Weber, 1982: 75).  Thus Weber will 
tell us, ‘If the dream-wish erects itself, phallic-like, out of the mycelium, the latter 
serves to remind us of what the Lacanian reading would like to forget: that the dream-
navel cannot be reduced to a question of the phallus, of the béance, split or absent 
center of a subject, for one simple reason: the thallus’ (Weber, 1982: 81).  Once again, 
turning to the O.E.D., Weber finds a ‘“curious definition: one which consists almost 
entirely of negations: Thallus, (Gr. thallos, green shoot, f. thallein to bloom.) Bot. A 
vegetable structure without vascular tissue, in which there is no differentiation into 
stem and leaves, and from which true roots are absent’ (in Weber, 1982: 81).  The 
thallus, without true roots issuing as it does from the mycelium of the mushroom 
suggests that whereas Lacan’s ‘“signification du phallus”’ appears to be child’s play: 
manqué d’un manqué, béance, signifier of the effects of the signified – all such 
formulae move easily within the stable, homogenous spatial continuum that the 
thallus distorts and distends, dislocates and disfigures’ (Weber, 1982: 82).  At the 
limits of interpretation then argues Weber we find a navel and a thallus that suggest a 
negation of meaning because there is too much meaning.  Here then negations are 
employed to render the unconscious conscious, to avoid repression (Weber, 1982: 82). 
What does this have to do with our Sleeping Beauty?  Weber states that when Freud 
arrives at his ‘tangle of dream-thoughts’ he reassures himself and his readers that this 
is the ‘navel of the dream’ and in doing so takes us back to the body of our mothers. 
‘What could be more reassuring and familiar, more primordial and powerful than this 
reference to the place where the body was last joined to its maternal origins’ (Weber, 
1982: 76).  And further, ‘this place is also the site of a trace and of a separation, but 
also of a knot, is a reflection that carries little force next to the reassuring sense of 
continuity, generation, and originality connoted by the figure’ (Weber, 1982: 76). 
                                                 
53 Harvie Ferguson suggests that an ‘oft repeated’ metaphor or simile in Freud’s 
letters and his theory is that of the mushroom. Further Ferguson argues that Freud was 
an avid mushroom hunter and that on more than one occasion he refers to dreams ‘as 
primitive plant-like or fungus- like forms’ (Ferguson, 1996: 67). 
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Readers of the Standard Edition of Freud are reassured, argues Weber by the 
translation which renders the dream-thoughts as an ‘intricate network’ that branch out 
into our world of thought.  But Freud’s ‘net’ is also a ‘trap’ argues Weber, a net/trap 
that is not as consoling as Strachey has deciphered it.  And ‘traps’ as Weber states, 
‘particularly those of the unconscious, are rarely less effective for being ignored’ 
(Weber, 1982: 77).  
The words of Freud’s German emphasised the ‘tangle of dream-thoughts’ that do ‘not 
stay in its place’, but invade our conscious thoughts in the light of day (Weber, 1982: 
77).  That which seems so familiar, the navel, is represented then as not ‘quite as 
familiar as it seemed’ (Weber, 1982: 77).  The philology of das unheimliche is echoed 
in the familiar but unsettling navel: in the anatomical navel to the dream-navel. 
Freud’s injunction that ‘We can, must, and indeed should stop right here, 
contemplating the navel’ appears to echo the other imperative, to turn away from the 
mother’s genitals, for fear of going blind, therefore castrated. When Freud straddles 
the ‘tangle of dream-thoughts’ that reaches down into the unknown, he in effect 
straddles the mother. The navel with its proximity to the maternal genitals, which 
Freud evokes in his description, is figuratively the pubic hair, which covers the 
‘dangerous’ genitals of the mother.  To get to Sleeping Beauty, we have to, well the 
prince has too, push through the thorny thicket.  Thus both actions involve a getting 
too that resembles the sexual act.  A sexual act that is infantile and Oedipal at bottom 
because it evokes the boys desire for the mother.  Why then, does Freud, at the limit 
of interpretation, of knowledge of the unknown, turn away, or rather make the object 
of representation a horrifying Medusa’s head, or of a navel, comforting yet presented 
to us as a tangle, a net/trap? Like Perseus then, argues Jonte-Pace Freud ‘averted his 
eyes from the psychoanalyst’s task of interpretation when the task involved 
unraveling the threads that led to the mother’s body’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 31).  He turns 
away ‘at the tangle of maternal hair and at the navel, the site of the scar memorialising 
the loss of the mother through the cutting of the cord which once linked infant to 
mother, for he knew that the Oedipal road, the royal road, although it theorizes an 
erotic reunion with the mother, could not take him to this uncanny destination’ (Jonte-
Pace, 2001: 31). In fact, by comparing the figure of the navel with the ‘unknown’ 
which Freud tells us to turn away from he may be evoking the ‘Great Unknown’ – 
Death, suggests Jonte-Pace, as Freud in a dream interpretation a few pages earlier 
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identifies with Death (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 31-32).54But the ‘Great Unknown’ has 
implications of the unconscious, God and Fate, as Freud writes in a letter to ‘Frau 
Lou’ acknowledging that the First World War ‘is exactly the way we should have 
expected people to behave from our knowledge of psycho-analysis’ (Pfeiffer ed. 
1972: 21). Freud is saddened by this and states ‘We have to abdicate, and the Great 
Unknown, He or It, lurking behind Fate will someday repeat this experiment with 
another race’ (Pfeiffer ed. 1972: 21). Here Freud compares the Great Unknown to ‘He 
or It’, the id/unconscious/God but importantly ‘It/Id/He’ lurks behind Fate who we 
have seen before in the guise of the three Goddesses, all mothers, the most beautiful 
being, according to Freud the Goddess of Love who is later to be thought of as the 
Goddess of Death, ‘Death itself’ states Freud (SE 12: 298). While this may seem 
strange to have Eros and Thanatos merge, become One we might say, Freud tells us 
that the choice is unconscious, prepared by an archaic ‘ambivalence’ that ‘harks back 
to a primeval identity’. Choice argues Freud, ‘stands in the place of necessity, of 
destiny’ (SE 12: 299), but the idea of freely choosing is itself perhaps nothing more 
than a wishful phantasy, that, as wishful phantasies do, transforms into its opposite. 
Freud will say that this “borders on the uncanny” and that we can only ‘guess at what 
lies beneath’ (SE 12: 300). Here in a footnote he brings our attention to Psyche of 
Apuleius’s story who has many traits that remind us of death: ‘Her wedding is 
celebrated like a funeral, she has to descend into the underworld, and afterwards she 
sinks into a death-like sleep’ (SE 12: 300 n 1).  Psyche’s story has some resemblance 
to Freud’s childhood dream of his mother’s death that I engaged with above but here 
Eros conquers Thanatos as Freud cannot let Death take his mother and reversing the 
roles, he takes his mother in his arms, but unlike Shakespeare’s character King Lear, 
he holds his mother with “hidden sexual cravings”, Death cannot have her.  This is the 
paradox according to Freud, because Death already has her, if indeed ‘The Mothers’ 
are to be thought of as Death. Freud stops the pursuit of the unknown at the physical 
scar of our attachment to our mothers and thus in both stopping and turning away, he 
gets to keep her as the silent Goddess of Love.   
                                                 
54 As an aside, Freud tells Theodore Reik a fairy-tale, the same fairy-tale we have 
been discussing, although in this case it is a ‘Sleeping Beauty’ of the Orient.  Freud 
tells Reik the tale to explain that we are all of us dispensable, and further that 
‘psychoanalysis would continue on without him and that change within the 




Freud will ask his readers to accompany him on a journey into the unconscious arena 
of dreams and stops only to acknowledge that no one will make it through the ‘thorny 
thicket’ of the mother/Medusa’s pubic hair.  Or indeed be able to descend into the 
realms of the unknown stopped as we are by the naval of the dream. And if somehow 
we did get through to the other side of the mother/Medusa, what would we find but 
that death is waiting for us disguised as Sleeping Beauty.  How else are we to 
understand this myth, this fairy-tale?    
 
‘Witch metapsychology’ 
‘The Devil knows the recipe/But only a witch/Can stir and shake and make it.’55 
Jay Geller will say that ‘Freudian discourse was at least as much shaped by the 
corporealization of identity as it helped shape this phenomenon’ (Geller, 2007: 11).  
And that Freud sought to subvert some of these discourses – of gender, race, sexuality 
and class and in doing so was caught in a classic double bind.  Thus, uncannily argues 
Geller this ‘double bind’ will weave – travel maybe – its way through Freud’s corpus 
projecting and introjecting at turns, turning on its own travail.  What Sprengnether 
identifies as a haunting mother in Freud’s work, and Jonte-Pace a counterthesis is 
perhaps an ‘echo’ of a late19th, early 20th Century man attempting to both find his 
place in an increasingly anti-Semitic world through claiming a universality that 
effects/affects us ‘All’.  In a similar argument, although with a quite different aim in 
mind, Sabine Prokhoris introduces The Witch’s Kitchen citing Goethe’s exposition 
concerning the red thread that runs through the rope of the English navy; a red thread 
that denotes its allegiance to the Crown.  Goethe argues that in his work ‘Elective 
Affinities’ ‘there runs through Ottilie’s journal a thread of affection and inclination 
that binds everything together and characterises the whole’ (in Prokhoris, 1995: 1).  
Thus Prokhoris will argue that in reading Freud such a red thread also exists.  Binding 
together his love letters to Martha, his letters to Jung, Ferenzci, Jones and others, his 
scientific work – his psychoanalysis, and importantly to Goethe.  In fact, one could 
argue that Freud borrows Goethe’s red thread and weaves it throughout his work.  
Prokhoris contends that Freud does this when contemplating a ‘weak spot’ in his 
argument, calling on the ‘Witch’ of Goethe’s most “queerest brainchild” – Faust - to 
                                                 
55 Scene Eight, the ‘Witches Kitchen’, Mephistopheles speaks.  In Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Faust. Howard Brenton ed. 1995. All quoted material unless otherwise 
indicated from this edition. 
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use Prokhoris’s words, to proceed (Prokhoris, 1995: 2). Just as Oedipus calls on the 
blind prophet Tiresias to make clear the prophecy which, he does not believe Freud 
calls on the ‘Witch’ to explain his Metapsychology.  
 
In his Analysis Terminable and Interminable (SE 23) Freud tells us that the road of a 
successful psychoanalysis is long – there are no shortcuts (SE 23: 224).  Of one 
concern – he names three – in the analytic experience is the ‘taming’ of the instinct so 
that the demand of the instinct ‘falls’ into place alongside the ego (SE 23: 224-225).  
But how is this achieved asks Freud?  To which, he answers we do not know, ‘we can 
only say: ‘So muss den doch die Hexe dran!’ – the Witch Metapsychology.  Without 
metapsychological speculation and theorizing—I had almost said ‘phantasying’—we 
shall not get another step forward.  Unfortunately, here as elsewhere, what our Witch 
reveals is neither very clear nor very detailed’ (SE 23: 225).  ‘We must call the Witch 
to our help after all’ but unfortunately she offers us only one clue from which to work 
from, ‘although it’s a clue of the highest value’, the antithesis between the primary 
processes and the secondary processes’ (SE 23: 225).  Not only does Freud call on the 
‘Witch’, he will, several pages later, tells us that ancient myth and superstition 
continue to cling tenaciously onto life, so that one could almost believe that dragons 
still exist (SE 23: 229). In contrast, Peter Gay will state that Freud had no use for 
mythical creatures like dragons or the centaur, here used in reference to a 
‘philosophical theologian’ as a ‘strange centaur’ (Gay, 1987: 67).  Gay insists that for 
Freud the exposure of these mythical beings was a task that psychoanalysis was well 
suited for (Gay, 1987: 67).  Here mythical beings not only include centaurs – half 
man, half beast, but also God and Christ (Gay, 1987: 67).  But Gay himself refers to 
Logos as the divinity of psychoanalysis. An interesting parable then given that Logos 
in Greek is also Christ, the son who Gay places with other mythical beings of who 
Freud had little use for. And yet the Oedipus myth with its patricide, its incest and 
inducement to matricide and its mythical creature, the Sphinx is recognised as one of 
the major tenets, if not thee major tenet of psychoanalysis. The Sphinx with her 
woman’s head and breast, the body of a lion and wings of an eagle is not a monster in 
the traditional sense but an ancient religious figure. God and his son Jesus then appear 





Prokhoris argues that Goethe who was haunted for years by the ‘avatars’ of the Faust 
legend, was a father figure for Freud, and she adds, immortal besides (Prokhoris, 
1995: 78).  Prokhoris will argue that Freudian psychoanalysis and Goethe’s Faust are 
nocturnal creations – creatures of the night.  But also, and more importantly it is 
Goethe’s Faust that Prokhoris suggests, ‘helped maintain’ the blind spots – the navels 
– of Freud’s own self-analysis and correspondingly, of his theory.  The ‘massive blind 
spot’ that every patient encounters, including Freud, is also ‘the mysterious, obscure 
night hollowed out behind her, the night of a dark wood or deep spring, or else of a 
womb…’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 78).  ‘This nocturnal power’ argues Prokhoris, ‘finds 
expression, in Faust, in the figure of the Witch, veritable sublation but also naked 
reality of what Goethe calls “nature”—an undefinable, archaic maternal figure taken 
to wife in the nuptials that preside over artistic creation’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 78).  As I 
argued in Chapter One Freud states that it was hearing Goethe’s beautiful essay on 
‘Nature’ that attracted him to medicine rather than his original field of law. Goethe’s 
Nature though is quite a different one to the one that Freud will portray.  Initially, a 
‘nourishing, never exhausted, and never denying mother—a sensual and maternal 
deity’ ‘She’ is wholly different from the cruel, heedless, destructive Nature Freud 
would delineate in his late writings’ (Gay, 1987: 59).  
 
Goethe, Prokhoris argues, is a Mephistophelean mediator in Freud’s engagement with 
the Witch metapsychology and thus helps to maintain what Prokhoris will call Freud’s 
‘umbilical link’ with his ‘ongoing experience of the unconscious’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 
80).  The ‘umbilical’ as Freud has shown is the spot that reaches down into the 
unknown, where a ‘tangle of thoughts’ converge, cover over and also catch (trap?) the 
‘uninterpreted’, the ‘misinterpreted’ the not to be interpreted dream-thoughts.  
Prokhoris analyses that the intellectual labour needed to produce metapsychological 
theory must be the same as that that engenders dreams (Prokhoris, 1995: 80).  The 
source of both states Prokhoris is ‘nourished’ by infantile wishes, by the return of the 
repressed.  Goethe then, or more particularly Goethe’s Faust, can ‘serve as a support 
for the subtle alchemical operation that enables Freud to make the transition from 
dreams to scientific discourse’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 80).  Prokhoris contends that 
‘Goethe’s Witch is interminably delivering him [Freud] of this work of art he keeps 
returning to, which he nourishes even as he sucks sustenance from it, which he cannot 
quite manage to tear himself free of...’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 80).  A provocative analysis; 
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the Witch holds Freud to her breast from which he cannot free himself.  Evocative of 
Freud’s statement ‘The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it’ (SE 7: 222) and 
perhaps ‘There are thus good reasons why a child sucking at his mother’s breast has 
become the prototype of every relation of love’ (SE 7: 222).  But what does this say 
for Freud? About Freud?  Is he like Faust, asks Prokhoris who desires to drink (and 
drink…) from the eternally refillable breasts of nature?  But who has to be satisfied by 
the ‘Witches ghastly, loathsome brew’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 50).  And isn’t this an 
infantile wish and also as Freud makes clear a reproach against the mother, who never 
gave us enough milk, enough love that is to say (SE 22: 122).  It might be that Freud 
is less Faust and more Mephistopheles, he who can only whisper the name ‘ The 
Mothers’. Who in handing Faust the tiny key to ‘The Mothers’ tells him ‘Don’t 
underestimate/ It’.  Although Faust also says, ‘A beautiful word, ‘Mothers’/That the 
mind knows/Is comforting: What, then, shudders/ My soul?’(Part Two, Act One, 
Scene 5: 168-171). 
 
The Witch’s Kitchen 
‘The logic of soup, with dumplings for arguments’ (SE 12: 167 and E. Freud, 
1960: 280) 
In Goethe’s Faust, Faust complains to Mephistopheles that his words always smell to 
him like the Witch’s kitchen, ‘Of a long forgotten time, to me’.  Prokhoris makes a 
connection between Freud’s id, which Freud said we approach with analogies, ‘we 
call it chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitements’ (in Prokhoris, 1995: 111 and SE 
22: 73) and the scene of the Witch’s Kitchen in Faust.  The Witch’s Kitchen is about 
the turning back of time, a return to youth.  In this then it is reminiscent of another 
kitchen and the boy Freud.  Here he learns the lesson of death at the hands – literally - 
of his mother.  In recounting this dream in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud goes 
to the kitchen in search of pudding, but one of the women, of which there were three 
tells him he must wait until she was ready.  Freud leaves with a sense of injustice and 
in the fairy-tale scene reminiscent of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, here Freud 
being our Goldilocks begins to try on overcoats.56  The first is too long, the second 
                                                 
56 In the short paper, Observations and Examples from Analytic Practice (SE 13) 
Freud argues that an overcoat is a symbol for a man.  While he does suggest that this 
is common to woman’s dreams (simply because overcoat in German is ‘Mantel’ 
which has linguistic assonance to ‘Man’) it is interesting that Freud denied ‘pudding’ 
by a woman goes looking for comfort in a man, well a symbol of a man at least.  I am 
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belongs to a stranger with a long face (SE 4: 204), which is strangely descriptive of 
Mephistopheles argues Prokhoris (1995: 154).  He seems to be looking for one that is 
‘just right’.  He remembers when he was about thirteen and the first novel he reads in 
which the hero at the end of his life kept calling out to three women ‘who had bought 
the greatest happiness and sorrow into his life’ (SE 4: 205).  Freud continues, ‘In 
connection with the three women I thought of the three Fates who spin the destiny of 
man, and I knew that one of the three women—the inn-hostess in the dream—was the 
mother who gives life, and furthermore (as in my own case) gives the living creature 
its first nourishment.  Love and hunger, I reflected, meet at a woman’s breast’.  One 
of the Fates was rubbing her hands together, ‘as if she were making dumplings’ and 
Freud suggests that this is the Goddess of Death and here he remembers the lessons of 
his mother: 
 
When I was six years old and was given my first lessons by my mother, I was 
expected to believe that we were all made of earth and must therefore return to 
earth.  This did not suit me and I expressed doubts of the doctrine.  My mother 
thereupon rubbed the palms of her hands together—just as she did in making 
dumplings, except that there was no dough between them—and showed me 
the blackish scales of epidermis produced by the friction as a proof that we 
were made of earth. My astonishment at this ocular demonstration knew no 
bounds and I acquiesced in the belief which I was later to hear expressed in 
the words: ‘Du bist der Natur einen Tod schuldig’ (‘Thou owest Nature a 
death’). So they really were Fates that I found in the kitchen when I went into 
it—as I had so often done in my childhood when I was hungry, while my 
mother, standing by the fire, had admonished me that I must wait till dinner 
was ready (SE 4: 205).  
 
The ‘weird spectacle’ in the Witch’s kitchen where Faust drinks the witch’s brew 
while the Witch recites a strange spell/magic, mumbo-jumbo Prokhoris calls it, is 
reminiscent of ‘the unknowable, or unconscious, where (the Witch) metapsychology 
ultimately proceeds’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 140).  Here then between Goethe’s Faust and 
Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams the kitchen or the Witch’s Kitchen, because after all 
what are the three Fates but Witches is the place ‘where metapsychology learns to 
                                                                                                                                            
not suggesting anything here other that, when the mother says ‘No’ Freud turns to a 
father, or at least a male figure for some kind of reassurance/comfort. To extend this 
point, in the American lectures Freud argues that ‘Men generally are not candid in 
sexual matters. They do not show their sexuality freely, but they wear a thick 
overcoat—a fabric of lies—to conceal it, as though it were bad weather in the world 




undo repression and open its ears to the language of the drives’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 
145).  Perhaps we should pause for a moment and make clear what metapsychology 
is, irrespective or perhaps inclusive of its categorisation as a ‘Witch’.  For Prokhoris, 
‘Metapsychology is neither a serenely (and naïvely) totalising vision of things, nor a 
set of experimentally verifiable hypotheses; it is rather a palimpsest of the 
unconscious, communicating, via the bridges formed by words, with dreams, the 
transference, and, ultimately, the drive’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 13).  And further for 
Prokhoris, the ‘relation between Freud’s text and that which, in Freud’s text, operates 
as “infratext”—namely, the “citations” from Faust—assures the transmission of these 
“palimpsest effects”’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 13-14).  José Brunner argues that Freud 
denoted the term metapsychology to describe his use of metaphors, which helped him 
to explain the processes of the mind (Brunner, 1995: 48).  Brunner further argues that 
Freud’s use of metaphors, his metapsychological theorising ‘moulds the invisible 
world of the psyche primarily in terms of the outer world of society’ (Brunner, 1995: 
49). Freud states in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (SE 18): 
 
The indefiniteness of all our discussions on what we describe as 
metapsychology is of course due to the fact that we know nothing of the nature 
of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of the psychical 
systems, and that we do not feel justified in framing any hypothesis on the 
subject.  We are constantly operating all the time with a large unknown factor, 
which we are obliged to carry over into every new formula (SE 18: 30-31). 
 
Brunner sums it up well, citing Samuel Weber, ‘Freud’s willingness to negotiate with 
the unknown and to acknowledge uncertainty not merely as an impediment or defect, 
but as an integral part of thinking and writing’ (Brunner, 1995: 50).  To return to our 
‘Witch’ metapsychology then, the Witch in the guise of metapsychology ‘appears’ at 
the tangle of dream thoughts of the unplumable navel.  The Witch both reveals then, 
and also in juxtaposition, or at least paradoxically, keeps ‘things’ hidden.  As an 
‘undoer’ of repression, mindful of the fact that Freud said ‘It is not easy in theory to 
deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression’ (SE 14: 146), the Witch translates 
(and let it be noted that Freud in a letter to Fliess wrote that repression is a failure of 
translation (Masson, 1995: 208)), myth, dream, fairy-tale into knowledge.  But this 
knowledge itself goes back to the first riddle, ‘Where do babies come from?’ which 
could in fact be interpreted as, ‘Where did this particular, intruding baby come from?’ 
(SE 9: 212-213).  Freud states that this first riddle/question is like all research ‘the 
115 
 
product of a vital exigency’ (SE 9: 213).  Prokhoris argues that in Freud’s wish to 
know the unconscious and therefore in the attempt to undo the repression that bars 
access to the unconscious, he would have to ‘work out a system of thought capable of 
re-establishing a connection with the infantile’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 146). As Freud 
argued in Dreams, ‘The fact is thus confirmed that what is unconscious in mental life 
is also what is infantile’ (SE 15: 210). We can see that this is what Klein sought to do 
with her effort to get to a ‘before’: before the unconscious was unconscious – before 
that is the unconscious itself (see Chapter Two, page 55).  If as Prokhoris argues, 
Faust was ‘made new’ in the Witch’s Kitchen, rejuvenated we could say, then what 
Freud sought was a rejuvenation of types.  By re-establishing the connections between 
the repressed infantile sexual researches and the return of the repressed in the myth, 
dreams and fairy-tales of the adult analysand Freud was making clear, or at least 
conscious, the theory of drives and the unconscious.  Freud then is playing a double-
game argues Prokhoris comparable to the duplicities of the Trojan horse (Prokhoris, 
1995: 146).  All matter/mater of things reside within the psyche, not only the 
Odyssean shades, but Odysseus himself, or at least his figurative counterpart, ‘he’ 
who undertook the journey to the underworld, and was able to see the ‘ghosts’ only 
when they ‘tasted blood’.  A fitting analogy then, when one considers that the Trojan 
horse is a form of metaphoric trickery, a storming of the ‘barricades of repression’ 
and it might be said, who knows what else (Prokhoris, 1995: 146).  
 
To take us back to the kitchen, Freud states the child in his/her cloacal stage not only 
believes that babies are born from the anus but that the eating of some particular 
thing, like in a fairy story, will create a baby (SE 9: 220).  Prokhoris will argue that 
Goethe’s Witch’s Kitchen and Freud’s kitchen which has an echo of the primal scene 
(and might surely be included in Freud’s primal phantasies) encapsulates 
metapsychology but also, and tellingly the theory of drives of hunger and love, which 
Prokhoris neglects to say, that even Freud said, meet at the Mother’s breast. Prokhoris 
offers another dream from The Interpretation of Dreams one that elaborates the play 
of the three Fates in the kitchen scene.  Freud argues that this dream belongs to 
‘Dreams of convenience’ (SE 4: 125), which was seen in his desire for a glass of 
water.  Here Prokhoris diverts our attention showing that this dream, far from being a 
convenience dream is ‘modified’ as she writes it.  In the ‘modified’ version of the 
‘convenience’ dream Freud’s wife is giving him a drink of water out of an ‘Etruscan 
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cinerary vase’, which in any event Freud no longer owned having gifted it to someone 
else.  The water ‘tasted so salty (evidently because of the ashes in the urn) that I woke 
up’ states Freud (SE 4: 124).  Freud offers a footnote with two citations to prove that 
thirst and hunger in dreams give rise to awakening (of the soul also) and of quelling 
these needs.  Prokhoris is surprised that Freud is contented to leave the convenience 
dream there.  In Freud’s kitchen dream of the three Fates, we hear echo’s of his 
childhood kitchen states Prokhoris and simultaneously the intersection of love/hunger 
and knowledge, precisely the ingredients of the Witch metapsychology.  Here the first 
question of the infantile sexual researches, ‘Where do babies come from?’ and his 
mother’s lesson, ‘What becomes of the dead?’ are inseparable (Prokhoris, 1995: 154).  
Thus the origin of babies, ‘like being in a fairy story; one eats some particular thing 
and gets a child from it’ (SE 9: 220) and The End, ‘Thou owest Nature a death’ (SE 4: 
205), are intertwined.    
 
What Freud drinks from the Etruscan57 cinerary urn is a ‘dead man’ argues Prokhoris, 
but more than that, in the French at least, the salty taste of the water can be compared 
to the sea and the mother (‘the homonyms mer and mère mean sea and mother’ 
(Prokhoris, 1995: 152 n.)).  Thus death, dumplings/babies and knowledge are knitted, 
one might say knotted together like the navel and therefore have an ‘originary’ 
relation to the mother and her body.  That the babies/dumplings are implicitly 
connected to knowledge, or of the having of knowledge that is not yours is explained 
by Freud in the German: Knödel/dumplings is also Knödl the plagiariser. This takes 
me back to the question my six-year old son asked of me and that I offered in Chapter 
One of this thesis, ‘If you eat my soul does that mean you have my voice?’ Not unlike 
the six-year old Freud seeking his mother’s knowledge regarding the ‘sexual’ theories 
                                                 
57 The connection with death is further extended if one considers Freud’s dream on ‘a 
strange book’, She and its companion by the same author, Heart of the World (SE 5: 
452-455). Without addressing the dream in full, I will take one element of it: Freud 
sees the ‘wooden house’ in the dream as a grave.  Freud argues that in actuality ‘I had 
already been in a grave once, but it was an excavated Etruscan grave’. … ‘The dream 
seems to have been saying: ‘If you must rest in a grave, let it be the Etruscan one. 
And, by making this replacement, it transformed the gloomiest of expectations into 
one that was highly desirable’ (SE 5: 454-455). That Freud saw the ‘skeletons of two 
grown-up men’ in the Etruscan grave is reflected in the dream of drinking ashes of 
dead men from the ‘Etruscan cinerary vase’. Although this is not Freud’s point, and 
he makes no association to the ‘salty taste of the ashes’ and ‘death’ which is why 
Prokhoris refers to a/her ‘modified’ version of Freud’s ‘convenience dream’.   
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of ‘the beginning and the end’.  ‘So wird’s Euch an der Weisheit Brüsten’ quotes 
Freud from Faust, ‘Thus at the breasts of Wisdom clinging…’ (SE 4: 206 n 3), Freud 
links Eros and Death to the mother through the Witch metapsychology without 
realising that he is doing so.  He reiterates this in his quotation of Faust once again at 
the closure of a ‘botanical (monograph) dream’ (SE 4: 282): 
 
A thousand threads one treadle throws, 
Where fly the shuttles hither and thither, 
Unseen the threads are knit together, 
And an infinite combination grows (SE 4: 283 n 2). 
 
 
Weaving as Freud argued in Femininity (SE 22) is an unconscious response to the 
‘mattedness’ of the pubic hair, which conceals the Medusa affect of the female 
genitals.  Further weaving and plaiting argues Freud in this paper were perhaps the 
only contribution that women have made ‘in the history of civilisation’ (SE 22: 132). 
Prokhoris argues, ‘Like the kitchen, weaving, whose back-and-forth movement is not 
without sexual connotations, belongs to woman’s sphere…Weaving, thanks to which 
the texture of dreams excels at concealing, not a “nothing,” but a “dark continent” – 
the mystery of whatever it is that dreams cook up in their kitchen’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 
157). Also, and as Freud argued in The Interpretation of Dreams, it is Kriemhild’s 
embroidered cross that shows Hagen where to stab Siegfried (SE 5: 515 n 2).  Thus, 
and as Freud perhaps unconsciously, certainly inadvertently writes, the embroidered 
mark, reminiscent of the pubic hair of women, of the mother, has the power to cause 





Freud will argue that when the little girl turns away from the mother she does so with 
feelings of hostility directed towards the mother.  In fact, her ‘powerful’ attachment to 
the mother ‘ends in hate’ (SE 22: 121).  Her reproaches against the mother are great, 
but not argues Freud dissimilar to the little boys; the mother didn’t love her/him 
enough, which is equivalent to giving ‘them’ too little milk.  She is a ‘faithless’ 
mother, she brings another child into ‘their space’; she forbids any masturbatory 
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pleasure. ‘All these factors’ says Freud, ‘the slights, the disappointments in love, the 
jealousy, the seduction followed by prohibition—are, after all, also in operation in the 
relation of a boy to his mother and are yet unable to alienate him from the maternal 
object’ (SE 22: 122-124).  It is the castration complex states Freud, where the little 
girl feels ‘seriously wronged’ by the mother for her ‘inferior organ’ that differentiates 
the girl from the boy.  Penis envy will leave ‘ineradicable traces on their development 
and the formation of their character’ (SE 22: 125).  Here Freud means that women 
will have more jealously and carry more envy than men. That the turning away from 
the mother ‘ends in hate’ is never fully resolved and later, finds a substitute in the 
birth of a baby boy.  Thus Freud will argue, that ‘A mother is only bought unlimited 
satisfaction by her relation to a son; this is altogether the most perfect, the most free 
from ambivalence of all human relationships’ (SE 22: 133).  Certainly, to concur with 
Freud’s own analysis of his essay on Femininity, it is ‘incomplete and fragmentary’ 
and different to his earlier essay on Female Sexuality (SE 21).  In this earlier paper, 
Freud argues that the little girls turning away from the mother creates ‘aggressive oral 
and sadistic wishes in a form forced on them by early repression, as a fear of being 
killed by her mother’ (SE 21: 237).  This is a result of an unconscious hostility that 
the child feels as emanating from the mother towards/against her.  Freud argued that 
one unconscious could act on another unconscious – this is after all a psycho-analysis. 
Freud argued ‘How many mothers, who love their children tenderly, perhaps over-
tenderly, to-day, conceived them unwillingly and wished at that time that the living 
thing within them might not develop further!  They may even have expressed that 
wish in various, fortunately harmless, actions.  Thus their death-wish against someone 
they love, which is later so mysterious, originates from the earliest days of their 
relationship to that person’ (SE 15: 202 see also SE 4: 154-5 and 259).   
 
Jim Swan (1974) argues that the hostility and sadism that the child feels is actually a 
‘two-way-street’, die or be killed. In his example of oral sadism Swan makes this 
symbolic fantasy explicit: ‘the “sucked and hungry lioness” in Shakespeare’s ‘As You 
Like It’, the lioness representing a fantasy of a mother devoured by her infant and 
now about to devour the infant in retaliation’ (Swan, 1974: 50 and Act IV, Sc. 3).  
The fear of the mother then, which is a fear of being consumed, was initially found in 
analysis argues Freud, only in relation to the father.  But he argues that it is probably 
‘the product of transformation of oral aggressivity directed to the mother. The child 
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wants to eat up its mother from whom it has had its nourishment; in the case of the 
father there is no such obvious determinant for the wish’ (SE 21: 237). This deflection 
of the ‘bad mother’ to the father is a product of the battle for the mother by the child.  
Rank will place this ‘battle’ prenatally and in Lacan’s Hommelette/lamella given in 
Chapter One, a similar scenario takes place where the mother covers the baby with a 
‘kind of hunger’, her libido and in turn the baby tries to ‘devour’ – one could say 
exhaust – the mother in return. Rank argues that this image of the ‘bad mother’ 
continues in ‘Freud’s estimation of woman, who is merely a passive and inferior 
object for him: in other words ‘castrated’’ (in Kramer ed., 1993: 38). 
 
The Father’s Daughter is not the Mother’s 
Freud ‘borrows’ the Oedipus myth from the Greek playwright Sophocles but his 
favourite Greek figure, of which he owned a small bronze, was the ‘Pallas Athena’.  
H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) who was analysed by Freud in 1933-1934 states that after a 
psychoanalytic session they would often wander into Freud’s study and continue their 
discussion.  On one occasion Freud told H.D. that his collection of ‘Mythological 
figures, ancient Assyrian deities, wooden toys from Egyptian tombs, saints and 
gargoyles, the eloquent symbolism of serpents and Gothic dragons…hundreds of 
strange and lovely little carved faces…“helped stabilise the evanescent idea, or keep it 
from escaping altogether”’ (Donn, 1988: 6).  He once handed her a small bronze 
statue, positioned with others in a semi-circle on his desk.  ‘“This is my favourite”, he 
said, and placed it in her hands’ (Donn, 1988: 6).  The statue was the Pallas Athena.  
H.D. knew it was ‘“to be venerated as a projection of abstract thought … born without 
human or even without divine mother, sprung full-armed from the head of her father . 
. . Zeus”’ (Donn, 1988: 6). ‘She is perfect ... only she has lost her spear’ (H.D., 1974: 
69-69). With the Nazi invasion of Vienna Freud made the decision to move his family 
to England.  Concerned that he would lose his collection of antiquities to the Nazi’s 
he chose two examples, two favourite pieces, one being the Pallas Athena and had 
Princess Bonaparte ‘spirit’ them away to France.  Freud was eventually reunited with 
all his collection but on receiving the Pallas Athena from the Princess he said that he 
felt ‘proud and rich under the protection of Athene’ (Freud in Molnar, 1992: 237). It 
is intriguing that a man who depicted women as the ‘dark continent’, as an unsolvable 
riddle, eons old, could venerate a statue of a Greek goddess, one who wore the image 
of Medusa on her ‘breast’.  A Medusa that Freud had written as representing the 
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‘horrifying’ effects of the mother’s genitals (SE 18).  Tracing the mythic linkage of 
the ‘horrifying Medusa with the goddess Athene’ Freud notes the ‘appropriateness of 
the symbolism: “This symbol of horror (Grauen) is worn upon her dress by the virgin 
goddess Athene.  And rightly so, for thus she becomes a woman who is 
unapproachable and repels all sexual desires – since she displays the terrifying 
genitals of the Mother”’ (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 52 and SE 18: 273-274).  Freud’s 
conclusion that the Medusa’s head, like the sight of the mother’s genitals arouse 
castration anxiety, involves a ‘turning away’.  In doing so, he emphasises the 
apotropaic effect of the penis which ‘stiffens’ at the sight of the Medusa’s 
head/mothers genitals, reassuring the ‘male’ viewer that everything will be alright – 
after all ‘To display the penis or any of its surrogates is to say: ‘I am not afraid of you. 
I defy you. I have a penis’ (SE 18: 274).  Freud then seems to be saying that while 
‘his’ Athena is esteemed, ‘he’ is terrified of the mother. What might the Pallas Athena 
represent to Freud?  H.D. saw the statue as representing to Freud ‘his belief in reason 
against all odds’ (Donn, 1988: 6).  But is it reasonable to believe that the daughter 
sprang from the father’s head?  Perhaps this is how Freud ‘reasoned’ his relationship 
to Anna. It was as if she had bypassed the mother and was the father’s progeny alone.  
Freud said Anna was the ‘most gifted of his children’ and told Jones that she ‘does not 
claim to be treated as a woman’ (Donn, 1988: 176). In a letter to Arnold Zweig, Freud 
refers to Anna, as ‘my faithful Anna-Antigone’ (E. Freud, 1960: 424).58 To Lou 
Andreas-Salomé Freud said of Anna’s care, quoting Goethe’s Mephistopheles, ‘In the 
end we depend/On the creatures we made’ (in E.Freud, 1960: 425).  Prokhoris argues 
that the devil/demon Mephistopheles had a particular resonance for Freud (Prokhoris, 
1995).  Freud in his letters to Fliess calls him ‘my demon,’(daimonie) ‘my other half’ 
(Masson, 1985: 134).  Strachey will call Fliess Freud’s ‘auxiliary super-ego’ (in 
Grossworth, 1991: 32). To Ferensczi he says ‘“…you will long ago have guessed the 
subjective condition for the ‘Choice of the Three Caskets”’ (in E. Freud, 1960: 301).  
 
I want to question further how Freud’s attachment to the Pallas Athena and her 
association with Medusa might say something about the neglect of the mother in his 
work.  Athena is the virgin patron of Athens and the Parthenon on the Acropolis was 
                                                 
58 In fact the full sentence is as follows, ‘Even supported by my faithful Anna-
Antigone I could not embark on a journey’ (E. Freud, 1960: 424).  Antigone guides 
her blind father Oedipus through the ‘wilderness’. 
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built in Athena’s honour. J.J. Bachofen in Myth, Religion and Mother Right (1973), in 
his argument for the matriarchal society that preceded the existing patriarchal one 
argued that Athena was originally a maternal figure that was – like other goddesses – 
reinterpreted as a god and therefore given more power.  Freud in contrast saw Athena 
as an ‘original mother goddess divested of her power’, as all mother-goddesses were.  
But in Athena’s case, ‘she was reduced to being a daughter…robbed of her own 
mother and, by having virginity imposed on her, was permanently excluded from 
motherhood’ (SE 23: 45-46, n 2).59  In this interpretation, Athena was demoted to 
being only Zeus's daughter – his brain-child - never allowed the expression of 
motherhood (Freud would have known though, that when Zeus swallows Athena’s 
mother Metis, he takes over her progenitive capacity). Anna, the ‘child analyst’ as 
Freud referred to her, whether this meant the analyst of children or his child, the 
analyst is less clear, but in the language of old, she is a spinster, unmarried, childless. 
A ‘brain-child’ no less. It might also be said, that when Freud stood on the Acropolis 
with a feeling of ‘estrangement/déjà vu’, he was standing on the daughter’s house, 
importantly then, the mother’s womb. 
 
Rose cites an example given in H. D.’s Tribute to Freud of his recognition that one of 
her symptoms – writing on the wall – was ‘dangerous’.  Dangerous because as Freud 
analyses it this symptom of hallucinated writing was an expression of a desire for 
union with the mother (Rose, 2004: 154).  Later he tells her that what he found most 
disturbing in regard to this symptom was not only that it expressed a regression to the 
mother but that he was put in the position of the mother: ‘ I do not like to be the 
mother in the transference – it always surprises and shocks me a little’ (Freud cited by 
Rose, 2004: 154).  The moment of danger for Freud suggests Rose is where Freud’s 
own ‘rigid’ lines of demarcation between inside and outside, between object and 
subject break down. Freud himself links writing as originally a representation for the 
lost mother in Civilisation and its Discontents (SE 21: 91). But there is a doubling 
                                                 
59  In one version of the legend Athena becomes a mother, although she doesn’t 
physically give birth, rather Hephaestus who falls in love with her, follows her 
(although lame) and while she resists him, he ejaculates on her leg.  Disgusted Athena 
wipes the semen off with a bit of wool, which mingles with ‘Mother Earth’ and 
Erichthonius is born.  Athena recognises him as her son and rears him without the 




here, of both the mother in the form of writing, and Freud as a representation of this 
mother. The double is analysed by Freud as our reassurance against death but we have 
seen that the dead mother is covered over by Freud as something he does not want to 
see. But why is the mother such a troubling figure for Freud?  Is it really as simple as 
a form of displacement from the circumcised male Jew to the uncanny body of the 
mother, who represents both life and death?   
 
The Wandering Jew 
On the eve of Freud’s departure to England he writes a letter to his son with the 
words, ‘it is high time that Ahasuerus came to rest somewhere’ (E.Freud, 1938: 442-
443).  This is a letter of an ‘old man’ writing to his son for no particular reason he 
says.  But as Jonte-Pace suggests it is not a ‘Virgilian, Oedipal or Dantean hero, who 
maps the royal road and reads the hidden signs’ but ‘the eternal wandering Jew’ 
(Jonte-Pace, 2001: 28).  ‘Ahasuerus’, the ‘wandering Jew’, whose name is thought to 
have originated with the Persian King in the book of Esther who, is not a Jew and 
whose very name among medieval Jews was said to be an exemplum of a fool.60  
Thus the name Freud took for himself at the end of his life, like his Moses, is a Jew 
and not a Jew, is both wanderer and clown.  Strangely then, Freud the absolver of 
Moses Jewish identity takes a historical/mythical identity and makes it his own.  
Stranger still, when one considers Jung’s analysis of the wanderer as representative of 
a longing ‘of the ever-restless desire, which nowhere finds its object, for, unknown to 
itself, it seeks the lost mother’ (Jung, 1919: 127).  Jonte-Pace cites Susan Shapiro as 
arguing that Ahasuerus, the ‘eternal wandering Jew’ is the ‘troupe’ that underwrites 
The Uncanny.  As I have argued above in Freud’s attempt to masculinize the Jewish 
male, he displaces, or ‘grafts’ as Shapiro suggests, what is uncanny about the Jewish 
male – circumcision – onto the female body, especially the body of the mother (Jonte-
Pace, 2001: 81-82).  Freud himself recognises this wandering male Jew as himself in 
The Uncanny when in a ‘provincial town in Italy’ he finds himself retracing his 
footsteps not once but three times, to a street of small houses full with painted women 
at their windows (PE, 2003:144).  Jonte-Pace argues that Freud ‘portrays himself as a 
wanderer far from home who experiences a sense of the uncanny when he loses his 
way in a labyrinth of female sexuality’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 82).   
                                                 




Geller continues the ‘wandering Jew’ analogy although for Geller it is about the 
political position of the Jews in anti-Semitic Vienna.  Geller argues that from the 
definition of the uncanny as that which turns into its opposite comes an argument that 
incorporates the situation of ‘Viennese Jews during Freud’s professional career’ 
(Geller, 2007: 43). Gentiles viewed the Jews as a ‘Gastvolk’ that is a guest people, not 
as a welcome guest but as a parasite upon the Gastvolk, the host people. The double-
bind of the uncanny is evident here states Geller in the use of the word Gastvolk 
which places the Jew as both an uncanny guest and is also its host. Consequently 
argues Geller, ‘as with any encounter with the uncanny, Gentile encounters with Jews 
were mediated by dread, anxiety and the fascination, by the projection of all that 
would be strange on the all-too-familiar’ (Geller, 2007: 44).  Further Geller quotes 
from a pamphlet circulated in Vienna in the 1880’s where the Russian Jewish 
physician, Leon Pinsker concludes that Jews could not trust in the Emancipation but 
must emancipate themselves.  Of interest here, is that Pinsker highlights the ‘crimes’ 
of the Jews, as Freud does later in his Moses and Monotheism (SE 23) in particular 
aligning the hatred of Jews to their ‘hand’ in the death of Jesus.  As for the rest, 
Pinsker’s pamphlet lists the Jews crimes against humanity as perceived by the ‘rest of 
civilisation’ (Geller, 2007: 45).  Pinsker makes the point argues Geller that Israel had 
not really died but its spirit lived on in the displaced Jews.  The nation is dead but the 
Jew lives: lives though, as an ‘apparition,’ as ‘one of the dead walking among the 
living’ (Geller, 2007: 45). Here then, we have the image of Ahasuerus ‘the wandering 
Jew’ cursed to walk the earth for eternity for taunting Jesus on his way to the 
Crucifixion.  Freud’s use of Ahasuerus as a moniker, with its associations to Cain, 
nearing the end of his own life and being displaced to England raises other questions.  
In the biblical story Cain kills Abel because he believes that God favours Abel over 
him.  Here then is Freud’s displaced, dethroned and prejudiced infant who looks on 
the new arrival with jealously and death-wishes.  In a letter to Fliess Freud writes, ‘I 
greeted my brother (who was a year my junior and who died after a few months) with 
ill-wishes and genuine childhood jealously’ (SE 1: 262).  Freud wishes for Julius’ 
death, and indeed the death was a fulfilment of the wish, although as he says, ‘his 
death left the germ of self-reproaches in me’ (SE 1: 262).   
 
The Cain Phantasy 
124 
 
Freud comments on a patient’s ‘Cain phantasy’ because “all men are brothers”’ (SE 5: 
458, see also SE 4: 260). This young man who is diagnosed with an obsessional 
neurosis desired to murder his father and when his parents really died he began to 
reproach himself violently for having these murderous inclinations.  He believed that 
as Cain he could get rid of/murder complete strangers by keeping his ‘eye’ on them.  
Freud’s attention to the Cain phantasy is aligned with his sleepwalking on a train 
journey.  Here Freud’s wandering is an escape from his elderly travelling companions 
who he imagined wanted to ‘exchange affectionate embraces during the night’ and his 
arrival, met with such hostility had prevented this.  The young man with the ‘Cain 
phantasy’ had been Freud’s travelling companion a few weeks earlier and it had been 
an enjoyable journey.  Freud says at the root of the young man’s neurosis lay ‘hostile 
impulses against his father, dating from his childhood’ and involving a sexual 
situation (SE 5: 458).  In  ‘identifying myself’ with him suggests Freud, I was 
‘seeking to confess something analogous’ in myself (SE 5: 458).  Freud argues that 
the ‘something analogous’ was a scene from his early childhood where the sexually 
curious child ‘forced his way into his parents bedroom and had been turned out of it 
on his father’s orders’ (SE 5: 458-459).  This has connections with the other scene 
where the young Freud urinating in front of his parents is reprimanded with ‘the boy 
will come to nothing’ remaining and re-evoked in his journey to Rome and his visit to 
the Acropolis. The echo of the reprimand raising the possibility of finding out the 
‘forbidden thing’ is resolved as Freud surveys Rome. ‘I have come to something’ he 
seems to say.  
 
Jonte-Pace argues that Shapiro is ‘exactly on the mark’ when she aligns Freud’s 
uncanny wanderings with the next passage in The Uncanny.  Freud cherished a 
‘superstitious belief’ as he called it, that he was destined to die at the age of 62. Under 
the influence of Fliess’s ‘biological doctrine’ he placed an emphasis on the 
significance of numbers and in a letter to Jung in 1909 explains the uncanny 
experience he had with the frequency of the number 62 in his life (McGuire, 1974: 
219).  He felt the number 62, in its various forms, hotel rooms, theatre tickets, 
telephone numbers, pursued him.  After he had celebrated his 62nd birthday he 
apparently remarked to Ferenczi, ‘That shows what little trust one can place in the 
supernatural’ (in Jones, 1957: 418). In fact, Freud at the time of writing The Uncanny 
was 63.  And he writes in The Uncanny although without reference to himself, a man 
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would be very hard indeed if he did not respond to the ‘obstinate reoccurrence of a 
number; he will take it, perhaps as an indication of the span of life allotted to him’ 
(SE 17: 238). A year past his expected death one could say Freud may have felt as if 
he had cheated death: ‘The wandering Jew, fated to die at age sixty-two, had 
survived’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 84).  And quoting Cixous, ‘Isn’t the one who has lived a 
year beyond the age foreseen for his own disappearance in some way, a ghost?’ (in 
Jonte-Pace, 2001: 84). There is more to this autobiographical account because Freud 
offers another personal example of an uncanny effect.  On a train, Freud catches sight 
of his image in the mirror and experiences something like a shock he says because the 
meeting of one’s own image is sometimes ‘unbidden and unexpected’ like meeting a 
stranger whose appearance you ‘thoroughly disliked’ (SE 17: 248 n 1).  Rank quotes 
Heine as saying, ‘There is nothing more uncanny than seeing one’s face accidentally 
in a mirror by moonlight’ (Rank, 1971: 43 n 19).  Freud asks, ‘Is it possible, though, 
that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels the 
‘double’ to be something uncanny?’ (SE 17: 248 n 1).  Freud had argued that the 
double was initially seen as our insurance against annihilation with ‘our’ duplication 
recognised in ‘mirror-images, shadows, guardian spirits, the doctrine of the soul and 
the fear of death’ (PE, 2003: 142).  But that following the philology of das 
unheimliche into its opposite heimlich, and the cultural advance of mankind 
understood in the mental development of the child through the surmounting of 
primordial narcissism, the double which was once ‘an assurance of immortality’ now 
becomes ‘the uncanny harbinger of death’ (PE, 2003: 142).  Freud with his placement 
of the Cain phantasy and his ‘ill-wishes’ against his brother invokes the double of 
Cain, in his twin Abel.  In the talion of old, an ‘eye for an eye’. With my brother’s 
death ‘I hath’ castrated him seems to be the wish.  I have made him lesser.  I have 
made him woman.  I have made him dead.   
 
Ernest Jones in his trilogy on Freud’s life will also argue that the uncanny impression 
of seeing his double in the mirror was interpreted by Freud as an omen of his death 
(Jones, 1957: 409 (Freud will faint two times in front of Jung who he believed  
harboured death wishes against him after he analysed Jung’s dream)). Jones suggests 
that the importance of The Uncanny as a work is that it lays bare part of Freud’s 
personality: ‘That is the deep psychological origin of his own superstitious 
tendencies’ (Jones, 1957: 429). This is seen in his belief of his ‘magical omnipotence’ 
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carried through from the child to the man.  In the repetition of the number 62, which 
seemed to Freud an ‘uncanny harbinger’ of his own death. Freud will say that 
‘animism, magic and sorcery, the omnipotence of thoughts, man’s attitude to death, 
involuntary repetition and the castration complex comprise practically all the factors 
which turn something frightening into something uncanny’ (SE 17: 243). And yet 
Freud’s penultimate example of the uncanny – ‘the crown’ he says (PE, 2003: 150) – 
is the fear of being buried alive by mistake.  But this is not to be thought of as 
terrifying states Freud after all the representation of this burial phantasy is nothing 
other than ‘the phantasy, I mean, of intra-uterine existence’ itself having a ‘certain 
lasciviousness’ (SE 17: 244).  Finally for Freud, what is most uncanny of all, is not 
the dead brother caught up in the doubling of the self, or even the castration complex 
but the home of the uncanny, the mother’s womb (and I note that in fact Freud called 
the womb our ‘uncanny home’ and heaven the ‘home of the uncanny’. Certainly in 
this context with the womb representing both life and death, the home of the uncanny, 
or our uncanny home are in effect the same thing). 
 
Little Hans 
‘Oh, do let me alone’ 
Freud will say that the ‘male organ can be represented in dreams by a hand or a foot 
and that the female genitals can be represented by the mouth, the ear, or even the eye’ 
(SE 5: 359 [italics my own]). If the vulva can be represented as an eye and yet the boy 
child seeing his mother’s genitals disbelieves what he sees, what does that say to us 
about the concept of seeing?  If the castration complex is about seeing what is not 
there – the lack of a penis – how do we recognise this lack with an eye that does not 
see? For Freud castration anxiety takes the place of this lack but does this really 
explain how the eye – of sight itself – seems to be in two places at once: symbolically 
as the mother’s genitals, blindly in the act of seeing.  Little Hans will not give up the 
idea that his mother or his sister have ‘widdlers’ to use his word for the penis.  In fact, 
he will say his mother’s penis is as big as a horse and his sister’s is ‘lovely’.  Here 
Freud will say that it is laughter that meets castration for the little boy not the horror 
that the boy feels when confronted with the sight of the mother’s genitals. That Little 
Hans laughs when confronted with his sister’s ‘tiny’ yet lovely ‘little widdler’ is 
understood by Freud as a recognition of female castration as opposed to the denial of 
his own potential castration.  And yet Little Hans laughs when his mother refuses to 
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be ‘seduced’ by him and touch his penis.  It is ‘piggish’ she says because is not 
‘proper’ (SE 10: 19).  Hans in contrast, laughingly, tells his mother ‘But its great fun’ 
(SE 10: 19).  In Freud’s paper, Contributions to the Psychology of Love (CP 4) Freud 
will say that ‘a child is an erotic plaything’ that it is seduced by its mother (nurse) and 
that these seductions leave their mark on the child later to be expressed in other object 
attachments (CP 4: 205).  Lacan will concur, arguing that it is precisely at the time of 
the masturbatory interdiction by the mother, that anxiety will occur.  But that the 
anxiety is attached to the object of temptation, the mothers desire for Little Hans and 
therefore his penis – Little Hans as the penis (Lacan, 1962-1963: 10-11). Evoking the 
castration threat when Hans is caught playing with his penis his mother tells him she 
will get Dr. A. to cut it off (SE 10: 7-8).  She continues by saying, ‘And then what’ll 
you widdle with?’ to which Hans replies, ‘With my bottom’61 (SE 10: 8).  Freud 
suggests that it was on this occasion with the issuing of the castration threat that the 
castration complex first made its appearance (SE 10: 8). Later, when Freud is offering 
a summary of the Little Hans case-study he does not directly relate the threat of 
castration, and the subsequent ‘widdling bottom’ to either the bath incident or the 
switch between the hole and behind-hole.  It is after all the ‘behind-hole’ that Little 
Hans understands as the place that babies come from, like lumfs (Freud’s cloacal 
theory and lumf is Hans word for faeces). The box and bath are both symbols of the 
mother’s womb, something Little Hans alludes to often and to which Freud 
                                                 
61 My twin sons confirm Hans idea of a ‘widdling bottom.’ After listening to them 
talk about their day with their penises I ask them what would you do if you woke up 
in the morning and your penis was gone.  They looked shocked for a second and then 
one answered that he would scream to death, yes but what would you do I asked 
again. Now he really had to think about it, his twin just sat and looked.  Finally he 
said I still have my bottom!  Freud does point out that the bottom irregardless of the 
cloacal theory is ‘habitually regarded by children as part of the genitals’ (SE 5: 365).  
But he does not seem to consider that when Hans says he will ‘wee from his bottom’ 
this might indicate that Hans already knew at some unconscious level that his mother 
weed from hers, that is without a penis. His lack of care concerning the loss of his 
penis in that instant as opposed to the anxiety associated with the idea of its loss at a 
later date could be that he always already knew but did not want to know 
(Chasseguet-Smirgel argues that the little boy ‘knows’ but is ‘repressing an image of 
the mother as all-powerful and overwhelming’ (Benjamin, 1995: 83). See Chapter 
Two of this thesis, page 36). Freud says of his case study of Miss Lucy R., that her 
description of knowing and not knowing something is a form of repression although 
not a proper repression: ‘I didn’t know—or rather I didn’t want to know. I wanted to 





summarizes as, being the ‘‘phantasy of procreation’ distorted by anxiety’ (SE 10: 
128).  In fact the big bath of water that Hans imagines himself in ‘was his mother’s 
womb’.  The plumber who ‘bores’ into little Hans stomach while he takes his bath is 
both Freud (in Max Graf’s analysis) and Max Graf, in Freud’s analysis.  One could 
say, that somehow owing to the child’s own sexual researches, coupled with the birth 
of his little sister and a understanding of some form of the primal scene that Little 
Hans understood this phantasy of procreation as, ‘With your big penis you “bored” 
me’ (i.e. ‘gave birth to me’) ‘and put me in my mother’s womb’ (SE 10: 128).  Again 
this sleight of hand, Freud circumvents the mother to bring the father to the fore of 
Little Hans anxiety, and yet this does not sit quite right. Like Freud’s amoebic model 
with its protractible pseudopodia, the object-libido, and less significantly (because of 
Hans immature ego), his ego-libido converges on the body of the mother.  Freud 
makes Little Hans phobic object – the horse – representative of the father and yet it is 
his mother that Little Hans compares the horse’s penis to. Initially Max Graf thinks 
Hans phobia of biting horses is linked to Hans mother, asking Freud, ‘is the whole 
thing simply connected to his mother?’ (SE 10: 22).  
 
When horses lie down with their legs in a row, Little Hans thinks of death but also of 
lumfs, which he understands as ‘babies’.  Max Graf suggests to Little Hans that he’d 
like to beat his mother. Little Hans replies that he whipped a horse and it fell down 
and made a row with its feet.  He says this is just a joke but that he doesn’t like how 
big the horses are, how big and fat and that he thinks they might fall down and make 
rows with their feet.  This is an allusion to Hans making a row with his feet (that is 
kicking his feet around in a temper) when he doesn’t want to do something, including 
defecating. Max Graf and Freud both try and persuade Hans that the white horse that 
bites is in fact his father.  And the falling down and biting horse is Hans own fear that 
his father would bite him and then fall down dead.  Hans tells his father that the white 
horse bites fingers and Max Graf is struck by the fact that Hans says finger – i.e., 
penis – instead of hand.  But as Freud says in the Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (SE 7) the hand is seen as an ‘important contribution’ in the ‘instinct for 
mastery and it is predominantly male’ (SE 7: 188). And yet the biting is in Freud’s 
own analysis an oral cannibalistic stage concerned with the mother and Hans himself 
compares his mother’s long white neck to a giraffe.  This is from Hans giraffe dream 
where he takes the ‘crumpled giraffe’ away from the big giraffe.  The crumpled 
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giraffe is his mother, or more particularly his mother’s ‘vulva’ because Hans says he 
‘sat down on top of the crumpled one’ to stop it going back to the big giraffe, his 
father.62  Pointedly, he can say to his father, ‘“But Mummy takes me into bed all the 
same, and Mummy belongs to me!”’ (SE 10: 39-40). 
 
And yet Hans will not give up the childhood sexual theory as Freud explains it of 
believing his mother has a widdler – as big as a horse.  Now the horse is the phobic 
object but the anxiety attached to it is seen by Freud as a longing for the mother.  
Freud says that parts of Little Hans analysis are perplexing but he cannot understand 
why, although he connects the fear of the horses and the affection of the mother.  
Looking at Hans and his father together Freud recognises that Max Graf has both a 
moustache and glasses and Hans fear is the black thing around the horses’ mouths and 
also the blinkers around their eyes.  But this neglects Hans own analysis that he finds 
his mother’s black underwear disgusting and dirty – it makes him want to spit (SE 10: 
55-63).  And that his fear of ‘fat’ horses falling down and making a row with their feet 
developed after his mother gave birth to his little sister Hanna.  Significantly Hans is 
not frightened of horses that pull empty carts, only full carts.  Freud has said that the 
womb is symbolised by boxes and houses and cars etcetera.  It could be argued then 
that Hans is not frightened when his horse-mother is empty, i.e., not pregnant.  This 
would fit with Freud’s theory that children are jealous of their new rivals – the birth of 
a sibling, and that the sexual theory – infantile sexual researches, begins with such a 
birth.  
                                                 
62 In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud is analysing the ‘Count Thun’ dream (Count 
Nichtshun – ‘Count Do-nothing’) and in the ‘working through’ of the derivation of the 
elements of the dream argues that ‘Gir-affe’ leads to the association, ‘Affe’, which ‘is 
the German for ‘ape’’ (SE 4: 213). I was struck by the unconscious word-association 
here with little Hans dream.  Because the ‘ape’ is a predecessor of ‘Man’, we could 
say we are ‘ape’. But also to ‘ape’ somebody is to ‘mimic’ them, to ‘go ape’ is to go 
crazy, whether with excitement or anger is beside the point.  Hans dream is of Gir-
affes.  He takes the smaller Gir-affe from the big one and effectively makes it his 
own.  Thus in ‘aping’ his father he is mimicking him, i.e., taking his father’s place 
with the element of anger because he wants his mother to himself, and 
correspondingly, excitement at having his mother to himself.  How far back do 
‘archaic heritages’ go? Freud once said they could go back as far as the Ice Age, 
although this is his phylogenetic inheritance, although one is not necessary 
differentiated from the other.  It might be a bit ambitious to say that we go ‘ape’ 
because we were ‘ape’ (the great Hominidae family) but then again Freud had 
considered that the unconscious might be the long sought for ‘missing link’ (E. Freud, 




Freud will refer to Hans mother as ‘excellent and devoted’ and argues that she ‘has a 
predestined part to play’ and further that her ‘position’ is a ‘hard one’ (SE 10: 27-28).  
Sprengnether citing Coppelia Kahn and Iza Erlich argues that Little Hans mother ‘is 
not an agent but part of a stage set. . . .Her role is preordained, there is nothing in it 
she can alter’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 56 n 18).  Perhaps if we understand Freud’s 
neglect of Little Hans mother we could agree with this statement but the fact that 
Hans and his mother ignore Max Graf’s imperatives, you must not cuddle/sleep with 
your mother: you must realise that your mother and Hanna do not have widdlers: you 
must see that only mummies have babies and so on is significant.  Hans wilfully 
ignores his father’s advice and his mother just ignores him.  When pushed to 
enlighten Hans by Freud, Max Graf tries to tell him that women and little girls do not 
have penises, that he cannot have a baby, that he, or his penis is the horse and the big 
giraffe but Hans will have none of it. Hans in his sexual researches is trying to find 
out where babies come from.  His father tells him that God decides whether Mummy 
will have a baby or not.  ‘If God did not wish it none would grow inside her’ (SE 10: 
91).  Contradicting his father Hans says, ‘But Mummy told me if she didn’t want it no 
more’d grow…’ (SE 10: 91).  The mother trumps God then, or even the mother and 
God have an understanding that Max Graf – significantly, the father – is excluded 
from.  Freud comments that Max Graf is ‘pushing’ Hans with his endless inquiries.  
Hans fed up says to his father, ‘Oh, do let me alone’ (SE 10: 57).   
 
While Freud neglects the role of the mother in the Little Hans case-study he does not 
in contrast dismiss Little Hans so easily.  In fact, Freud argues that children do not lie 
without reason, are in fact often more trustworthy than adults. And further, he states, 
he did not hold to the ‘present fashionable’ view that ‘assertions made by children are 
invariably arbitrary and untrustworthy.  The arbitrary has no existence in mental life’ 
(SE 10: 102-103).  And Freud makes clear that Hans is a normal cheerful little boy 
who may be better – i.e., psychically healthier for overcoming his phobia rather than 
repressing it for a later date. Comparatively we could say that the little American girl 
whose mother writes Freud a letter exhibits the same forms of precocious knowledge 




In the brief paper Freud will title Associations of a Four-year old Child (SE 18) the 
mother begins her letter with the words, ‘I must tell you what my little girl said 
yesterday.  I have not recovered from my astonishment’ (SE 18: 266).  The letter 
continues with the almost four year old telling her mother that she knows that if her 
cousin Emily gets married she’ll have a baby.  Surprised the mother questions her and 
the little girl replies, ‘Oh, I know a lot besides.  I know that trees grow in the 
ground… And I know that God made the world’ (SE 18: 266).  The mother 
understood argues Freud that the little girl was making a symbolic equation – babies 
grow in the mother as trees grow in the Mother Earth: ‘we have already learnt from 
numerous incontestable observations the early age at which children know how to 
make use of symbols’ (SE 18: 266).  But says Freud, the little girl expresses she 
knows more about the origin of babies. She knows that, ‘its all the work of the father’. 
‘But this time’, says Freud ‘she was replacing the direct thought by the appropriate 
sublimation – that God makes the world’ (SE 18: 266).  In Hans ‘enlightenment’ he 
will not believe his father when he tries to convince him that it is he, not Hans mother 
that is closer to God.  Unlike the American girl Hans believes it is his mother who 
decides whether she will have a baby or not.  His mother may be in conjunction with 
God but he refuses to suppose his father has anything to do with it. Freud makes of 
God and the father a composite that ignores his own case-study.  Thus rather than 
addressing the constitutive links, Freud separates them out ignoring the reiteration of 
God and Mother/Nature, which as we saw above is viewed as an anathema to Western 
thought.  Freud needs to deny this to keep his Oedipal theory intact.   
 
Working from, or at least offering a ‘nod’ towards, Freud’s papers addressing the 
meaning (philology) of words, Swan extends Freud’s linguistic analysis employing 
‘contemporary’ examples. Discussing the word ‘fuck’ formerly one might say a taboo 
word for sexual intercourse, Swan states that it has a strong and ‘unconscious rhyming 
connection with the work “suck”’(Swan, 1974: 4).  Swan appears to argue that the 
move from ‘suck’ to ‘fuck’ has something of a ‘deferred action’ to it.  The infantile 
sexual researches may end in a latent period but they carry over symbolic associations 
between words and things.  Thus, ‘fucking’ and ‘sucking’ signify ‘frustration’ of the 
hands and mouth at the breast and towards the ‘hole’(vagina). Whether the symbolism 
here can extend to the hole being a void created by a lack of knowledge or because of 
a lack of knowledge the child cannot make sense of a body with a ‘piece missing’ 
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remains unclarified by Swan.  In any event, this is not quite Swan’s argument but the 
comparison between the words, ‘suck’ and ‘fuck’ continue in the language used for 
men ‘taking’ a woman.  Accordingly argues Swan, the man ‘gets himself a “piece of 
ass;” more aggressively, he may even “tear (or rip) off a piece”’ (Swan, 1974: 4).  
Thus the ‘sexuality of most male human beings’ which carries with it a ‘desire to 
subjugate’ is first recognised in the little boy’s desire, or propensity to, ‘tear open a 
hole somewhere’.  What needs to be considered here is that just when the child (the 
boy child) is trying to make sense of his desire for his mother, repression ‘sets in’.  
We can see this with Little Hans.  His desire to do something forbidden to his mother 
that he imagined his father doing, comes up against the incest prohibition says Freud 
(SE 10: 41).  He may ‘send away’ the ‘big giraffe’ (his father) and sit on the 
‘crumpled giraffe’ (his mother) but knows, says Freud that what he desires is 
‘forbidden in itself’ (SE 10: 41 (emphasis Freud’s own)).  Frustration because of this 
‘unconscious’ prohibition is ‘replaced by an act of violence such as smashing a 
window-pane or forcing a way into an enclosed space’ (SE 10: 41).  Freud makes it 
clear in his paper A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis (SE 22) that to 
overcome a forbidden action you have to surpass the father. What he does not make 
clear, or what seems uncanny to him, is that in overcoming the forbidden action, 
acquiring sexual knowledge we could say, we do not appear to let go of the feelings 
of déjà vu in relation to the mother, or more particularly our first heim, the womb. 
Thus, we may well overcome the father, but it seems that we are less able to let go of 
the mother. The relation to the mother/womb seems to be one of déjà vu, a 
reminiscence, a constant turning back. 
 
The woman/mother in ‘bits and pieces’ 
Freud states that the theory of instincts had the longest and hardest labour but was 
‘indispensable to the whole structure’ (SE 21: 117). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(SE 18) Freud argued that the instincts were ‘at once the most important and the most 
obscure element of psychological research’ (SE 18: 34), without which the ‘part’ 
would not become ‘whole’.   Freud’s use of metaphorical impregnations usually 
followed by difficult labours and birth is not unusual in male writers.  But Freud 
continues, creating a ‘whole’ line of metaphorical associations where woman/mother 
becomes a ‘part’ or more particularly, a ‘hole’.  Freudian ‘screen memories’ made up 
of the actual story, the remembered story and the phantasied story are very rarely 
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complete argues Freud but in one ‘good example’ Freud offers the recollection of a 
young man, now 24 who in his fifth year sought to understand the differences 
between male and female.  He had trouble differentiating between m and n.  His aunt 
suggests that ‘the m has a whole piece more than the n—the third stroke’ (SE 6: 48-
49). Thus Freud states later the boy was able to discern the difference between male 
and female through the realisation ‘that a boy, too, has a whole piece more than a girl’ 
(SE 6: 48-49). The ‘something missing’ as Freud says in relation to another male 
dreamer is the ‘principle feature of the female genitalia’ (SE 4: 333). The castration 
complex for the little boy is the recognition that the girl/mother has a wound in place 
of the penis – which is in fact a mis-recognition because anyhow the child will not 
believe the evidence of his own eyes.  And for the little girl it is a recognition that the 
mother never gave her a penis and therefore she ‘lacks’.  The boy has a ‘whole piece 
more than a girl’ but the girl is the ‘hole’.  She is and here I return to Horney’s 
recollection that She is becomes a series of negative personifications that the 
woman/mother will attract, the ‘hole’ that the little boy wants to do something violent 
to ‘which the child cannot account for—obscure urges to do something violent, to 
press in, to knock to pieces, to tear open a hole somewhere’ (SE 9: 218). In Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (SE 7) Freud will extend the little boy’s aggression 
arguing that sadism is easily detected in normal males: ‘The sexuality of most male 
human beings contains an element of aggressiveness – a desire to subjugate’ (SE 7: 
157).  He continues that this has biological significance and further that it oscillates 
between two positions, one given over to active or intimated violence of/on the sexual 
object, the other based entirely on the satisfaction gained from a continual humiliation 
and maltreatment of the object (SE 7: 158). It is only the latter that deserves the name 
of perversion argues Freud, the former, active violence towards the sexual object is 
normal ‘male’ behaviour.  
 
The Mother metaphors: Necrotic bones 
Freud will say of his ‘Project’ that to publish it before it was ready (mindful of the 
fact that it remained unpublished in his lifetime) would be like ‘sending a six-months’ 
foetus of a girl to a ball’ and anyhow ‘skittles and mushroom-hunting are far 
healthier’ (SE 1: 284). I engaged with Freud’s allegorical use of the mushroom earlier 
in this chapter but the pregnancy related imagery continues.  Freud will argue that in a 
psychoanalysis the ‘cure’ is comparable to an incompletely expelled placenta (Jung 
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uses a similar analogy when he says that psychoanalysis is an ‘abortion’ (in McGuire, 
1974)). If the placenta is delivered whole without any noxious fragments remaining 
this then is an accurate analogy for the process of psychoanalysis.  An analysis is 
completed when the patient can reach an endpoint from which future relapses and 
fresh onsets of illness will not reoccur (CP 2: 288).  In his papers on the psychology 
of love Freud will use an even stranger analogy for libido that remains attached to the 
mother.  Here he compares the shape of the newborn’s skull to the shape of the 
mother’s pelvis (SE 11: 169). And again, Freud will say that the genitals have retained 
their ‘animal cast’ and that love is still in its essence animal like (CP 4: 215). The 
shape of the mother’s cervix, imprinted on the infant’s skull is comparable to libido 
that remains attached to the mother.  Similarly, the genitals – and here he seems to 
imply the mother’s genitals, have retained their ‘animal cast’ and love too is 
animalistic. But love is also the cure and the cure here at least according to Freud ‘is 
comparable to an incompletely expelled placenta’ – ‘noxious fragments’ ruin the cure. 
Freud will say that the little girl realises her clitoris is ‘inferior’ – does not measure up 
to the penis and that this is an accurate analogy for the term ‘inferiority complex’ 
something little used in psychoanalysis. After all says Freud the child feels inferior if 
s/he notices s/he is not loved; and the ego feels unloved, and therefore criticised by 
the super-ego. Freud analyses a biography of Wilhelm II to extend this metaphor.  
Wilhelm II, last German Emperor and King of Prussia suffered from a birth defect, 
Erb’s Palsy, an injury that occurred at the time of his birth.  This made his left arm 
smaller than his right arm and with limited use (SE 22: 66). The author of the 
biography suggests that the ‘hero’s’ character, which from historical accounts was 
emotionally wrought, is built on the inferiority associated with this physical defect.  In 
fact as Freud suggests, it is not the physical defect at all, and therefore the inferiority 
complex does not stand up under scrutiny.  But rather the mother of this man, instead 
of compensating him for his physical deformity with an overabundance of love, 
withdrew love altogether.  His actions as a man showed that he had never forgiven his 
mother this lack of love. He professed an open hatred for this ‘English’ mother, one 
comparable perhaps only to his abhorrence for the Jews. The withdrawal of the 
animalistic cast of mother love, ‘the hungry lioness’, Freud explains will result in 
serious psychical defects in the developing ego/person. Thus the ‘lack’ that the little 
girl feels may not be because her mother did not give her a penis, it might rather be, 
that the mother did not love her enough. If as Freud argues the mother/son 
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relationship is without parallel how might the little girl understand herself in 
comparison to this? 
 
A rotten contention: The Wolf Man’s rotten bone 
The case study of the Wolf Man presented in Freud’s paper The History of an 
Infantile Neurosis (SE 17) was an attempt to bring together the ‘cardinal tenets’ of 
psychoanalysis – the unconscious, infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex.  
Torok and Rand argue that Freud was attempting to distance himself from his 
erstwhile colleagues, Adler and Jung ‘both who disputed the primacy of infantile 
sexuality and the Oedipus complex’ (Torok and Rand, 1986: lii).  But the Wolf Man 
never seemed to regain the psychic health Freud sought for him.  In Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable (SE 23) Freud writes that Wolf Man continued to have 
‘attacks’ in which, ‘the pathogenic material consisted of pieces of the patient’s 
childhood history, which . . . now came away – the comparison is unavoidable – like 
sutures after an operation, or small fragments of necrotic bone’ (SE 23: 217-218 and 
Torok and Rand, 1986: liv).  Thus the Wolf Man’s childhood history comes away like 
fragments of necrotic bone – rotten, one might say.  Between the noxious fragments 
of the baby’s placenta and the later necrotic bones of childhood lays the cure of 
psychoanalysis.  Freud un-mistakenly writes these maternal metaphors into his 
psychoanalysis and yet cannot see the forest for the trees as he once wrote to Fliess (in 
reference to the ‘original’ authors of dreams) (in Masson, 1985: 365).  Because, as 
Freud said in a letter to Jung, the cure after all, is love.  And if the mother is the first 
love object, if it is the mother to who we compare all other love-objects then why is 
she finally for Freud, like a piece of necrotic bone, stinking as Freud says in relation 
to the process of repression, itself a feminine concept. Thus libido with its adhesive 
womb like conformation, and the animal like cast of love and the mothers genitals; 
the inferiority complex whose confirmation is expressed in the little girl’s knowledge 
that her mother did not give her a penis, did not love her enough; all of these things 
have some profound and inherent relationship to the mother, bodily and mentally. 
And although Freud states that mother’s love is of upmost importance in the mental 
life of the child and his pregnancy/birth/mother analogies proliferate he will not, or he 




And yet Freud, as I have argued, will say ‘We call the mother the first love-object’ 
(SE 16: 329).  Love is the mental side of the sexual trend bought to the fore as the 
awareness of the aim of the sexual trend is repressed.  This is the latent stage or the 
so-called childhood amnesia.  The child – the boy child in particular, because Freud 
stresses that the original sexual trend is now attached – leaning on (Anlehnung) – to 
the Oedipus complex is free to love his mother uninhibited by the ‘erotic’ charge.  
This returns in puberty where a fresh ‘insult’ of the original object – that is to say, the 
mother, is cathected with libido. From the time of puberty onwards the child (again, 
the boy child) must give up his first and incestuous love-object, his mother and inturn 
reconcile with his father.  Freud will argue that this task is set for everyone but it is a 
remarkable fact that they are very rarely resolved.  Residues, ‘necrotic tissue’, remain 
attached to the mother predominantly in neurotics says Freud, and yet he will also 
argue that we are all a little bit neurotic (SE 6).  Thus the mother as first love-object 
remains cathected with libido but perhaps in a way similar to Freud’s description of 
libido that remains attached (leaning on – Anlehnung) to the mother: as ‘impress’.   
 
This is an argument reminiscent of The Mystic Writing Pad (SE 19).  Here a thick slab 
of wax takes the place of the mother’s cervix but it might well be a similar argument 
because of the impression left by the original medium.  Here a pen (a stylus) writes 
on the top layer of the pad, a celluloid layer that is then lifted to reveal a waxed layer 
underneath with a clear description of what has been written.  Lifting both the 
celluloid layer and the waxed paper beneath clears both of writing.  But says Freud, if 
we were to look at the wax slab – in a certain light, in a particular way (‘squinting at 
the point’ we might say (to Fliess, in A. Freud, Bonaparte, Kris, 1954: 298)), we can 
make out the impression of what was written beforehand. A permanent trace remains.  
This argument is premonitorily given in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (SE 18) and 
resurrected in On Narcissism: An Introduction (SE 14).  In fact it revolves throughout 
Freud’s writing with an almost fatal intensity, to understand the origin of time itself.  
Again, Freud uses the example of the amoeba – in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and 
On Narcissism, the amoeba is linked to the unconscious, in The Mystic Writing Pad to 
the ego – which sends out feelers to sample the excitations of the outside world only 
to hastily retreat once it has experienced them.  That it does this through a medium, 
here the system Freud calls the perceptual conscious, a kind of doorway between the 
inner and outer worlds, is an apt description of the impressions of the mothers cervix 
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on the baby’s head.  If as Freud argued above that the mother’s cervix leaves an 
impression on the child’s head, we could say that the mother through the process of 
birth leaves an impression of herself on her child.  Perhaps we could be so bold to say 
that the mother is the ‘medium’ albeit a bodily medium and thus a doorway of types, 
something Freud alludes to with his ‘condensing’ of mother to womb, and her 
attributions as ‘narrow spaces’, as ‘portal’, and of ‘water/amniotic fluid’. The ego 
after all as Freud said ‘is first and foremost a bodily ego’ comparable to the ‘cortical 
homunculus’ the little man inside our heads – our soul as ancient philosophy extolled 
it (SE 19: 26). The child then bears the mark of the mother in more ways than one. 
Freud alludes to the process of this ‘discontinuous method of functioning’ as lying at 
‘the bottom of the origin of the concept of time’ (SE 19: 231). This seems closer to a 
description – as I gave it – of Kristeva’s chora in Chapter Two of this thesis (51-53). 
Father time and Mother Species says Kristeva quoting James Joyce (1995: 204) but is 
it rather mother time and mother species with nary a father in sight?  The baby takes 
the mother in as s/he takes in her milk – s/he is the mother and the mother is ‘I’.  But 
with his analogy of the cervical shaping of the infants head by libido that remains 
attached to the mother we have a doubling up, something Freud maintains we employ 
as a measure of saving our soul against extinction (SE 17). If we save our soul/psyche 
then we save ourselves.  We are immortal, or at least we think we are.  Freud argues 
in The Ego and the Id, ‘To the ego therefore, living means the same as being loved—
being loved by the super-ego, which here again appears as the representative of the id’ 
(SE 19: 58). If the id with its correlation to the timelessness of the unconscious, which 
Freud designates as female—the ‘dark continent’ enables its representative the super-
ego to love the ego so that life might go on, then the super-ego here is not paternal, or 
even heir to the Oedipus Complex as Freud would have it, but maternal.  
 
The ‘hole’ 
Perhaps it is not so ‘cut and dried’ as this after all Freud will say that ‘in the id, which 
is capable of being inherited are harboured residues of the existences of countless 
egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be 
reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection’ (SE 19: 38). 
Freud switches between making his super-ego, his Über-Ich (Over-I) parental and 
thereafter paternal.  If Fate and conscience are only two aspects of the Über-Ich then 
Fate as Freud has shown it at least has a direct correlation to the mother, in the form 
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of the three Fates that decide the destiny of man as I have argued above.  But Freud 
will also say ‘Even Fate is in the last resort, only a later projection of the father’ (SE 
21: 185). Once again, that less than careful ‘sleight of hand’.  
 
In response to a letter that Rank writes, a condolence letter for both Freud’s cancer 
and his book, The Trauma of Birth that is viewed as cancerous to Freud’s ‘life’s 
work’, Freud says ‘The Über-Ich merely says to the Tr [dream of Trauma]: All right, 
you old jester and boaster.  This is not true at all! [Da ist ja alles nicht wahr!] …’ (in 
Kramer ed., 1996: 15). Here Freud exchanges ‘you old jester’ for the ego, something 
he has done before, and his super-ego, the Über-Ich, is putting the ego in its place.  
Freud is telling Rank that his book, The Trauma of Birth which places the mother at 
the centre of psychoanalysis not the father, is all ego, effectively, if we address the 
‘punning’ in the letters, ‘nothing’.  One of Freud’s most famous sayings, ‘The shadow 
of the object fell over the I’ is here expressed as ‘das Über-Ich, the “above-I” or 
super-ego, the shadow of the object that falls, after internalization of the castration 
threat, on das Ich, the “I” (in Kramer, ed., 1996: 14).  The super-ego, ‘internalized 
residue of the castrating father’ and source of Angst and guilt- feeling is viewed by 
Rank in contrast to Freud as a ‘turning away’ and also contradictory and 
simultaneously a ‘looking back’ to the mother.  With Freud’s train neurosis, his 
overlay of his dead baby brother with a desexualised naked mother, anxiety, guilt, 
grief and loss come together.  Freud saw this but did not see. In his defence of Rank 
against the ‘Committee’63 Freud argues, ‘Basically the attitude toward the [mother] 
would be ambivalent from the start.  Here is the contradiction. … I find it very hard to 
decide here, nor do I see…’(in Kramer ed., 1996: 22 (my emphasis)).  Freud 
continues with his analysis arguing that it is the father we always see.  Freud’s 
constant vacillations, his ultimate need to save his Oedipal theory will mean that when 
offered the chance to see he turns away.  How this could be configured as a form of 
protectionism is argued throughout this Chapter.  Whenever he is offered the key to 
‘The Mothers’ he turns away, from the horrifying sight of the mother’s genitals, her 
‘gaping wound’, from her countless positions as something essential that he wants to 
                                                 
63 The ‘Committee’, the ‘Old Guard’ was a group of seven until Rank left. Like the 
Wednesday group that met at Freud’s house to give talks, smoke cigars, eat cake. 
They each had a gold ring with a Greek intaglio that came from Freud’s collection. 
Their primary task was to protect psychoanalysis from within, i.e., ‘against 
personalities and accidents’ (in Jones, 1955: 173). 
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get behind but which inhibition and prohibition may stop him from doing so.  Freud 
argued that he had ‘restored what is missing’ in the case-study of Dora and as he 
never tired of repeating, the psychoanalysts task was about filling in gaps, covering 
over wounds, shoring up the void.  But what Freud forgets is that ‘a hole is a hole’, 
his words, and that the hole is always already female, a vagina, the womb.  As Kramer 
points out in his A Psychology of Difference (1996 – Rank’s American lectures) this 
‘gaping hole’ that Freud determined the little boy turned from in horror could also, in 
later life at least, be the prosthetic he was forced to wear when his lower jaw was cut 
away with cancer.  Freud referred to the prosthetic as ‘the monster’ and at one point 
called cancer his ‘old friend’ possibly because it had been a ‘companion’ to him for 
sixteen years.  Kramer suggests that Freud’s ‘poignant’ observation in Civilizations 
and its Discontents (SE 21) of ‘Man’ as a ‘kind of prosthetic God’ who puts on his 
‘auxiliary organs’ where briefly he is resplendent in all his glory, but these are not 
‘grown on him’ and still ‘give him much trouble at times’ is a reflection of his own 
prosthetic (Kramer ed., 1996: 23). Rank made a metaphor of it, ‘psychoanalytic truth 
is constructed artificially like an “intellectual prosthesis”’ (in Kramer ed., 1996: 27).  
In a footnote Freud says that a prosthetic ‘is to make up for some missing or 
inadequate part’ (SE 21: 92 n 1). It ‘restores what is missing’ then as Freud sought, in 
the arguments of Geller, Gay and Gilman to replace ‘the piece missing’ of the 
circumcised male Jew onto the castrated body of the woman/mother.  Kramer’s 
analysis that the ‘whole’ was more important than the ‘parts’ is echoed here.  But the 
whole, at least as Gallop will argue is the ‘pre-Oedipal mother, apparently omnipotent 
and omniscient, until the ‘discovery that she is not a ‘whole’ but a ‘hole’’ (Gallop, 
1982: 22).  
 
With Freud’s keys, and locks and riddling he hoped to find a way to bring together the 
major tenets of his psychoanalysis, to make it whole as it were.  It could be argued 
that his continued neglect of the figure of the mother, that is always there, on the 
periphery of his theories, pushed to the corners of the ‘dark continent’, is the reason 
that the puzzle would not – could not – fit together.  The mother who Freud described 
from a patients dream as a ‘gaping wound’ (SE 4) seems to straddle the navel of 
Freud’s own making.  On one side, the perfect mother of the son-mother relationship, 
on the other side the mother who did not give us enough milk, love us enough, did not 
give the little girl a penis, wants to devour us and in between the hole.  This then is 
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the hole that Freud attempts to fill but how can he when this hole seems to follow the 
example of the melancholic as he gave in Draft G. of his ‘Project’ ‘in melancholia the 
hole is the psychical sphere’ (SE 1: 205).  And it might be remembered that this 
description of the melancholic is particular to the ‘anaesthetic woman’ who Freud 
argues is still attached to her parents and therefore is incapable of sexual love – itself 
a substitute for the general category of love. Thus if we are all a bit melancholic or at 
least melancholic mourners of the lost object, the mother as Donald Capps argues (in 
Jonte-Pace, 201: 138) and also a little bit neurotic,64 and neurotics as Freud depicts 
‘are anchored somewhere in the past; we know now that it is at a period of their past 
in which their libido did not lack satisfaction, in which they were happy’ (SE 16: 365) 
then we are ‘squarely’ in the ‘space’ of the mother.  It might be as Freud once wrote 
of himself, ‘a void formed about me’ (SE 14: 21) in response to the silences that met 
his lecture on Hysteria – ‘a “scientific fairy tale” said Kraft-Ebing’ (Freud, 1989: 97).  
Here we have the fairy-tale and the hole both and it might be said that in Freud’s 
overwhelming desire to escape he created a scenario full of displacements and 
‘repressions’ against the very object he/we most desired.  But escape is impossible we 
are tied to the mother like no-one else, a fact Freud emphasises, ‘There are thus good 
reasons why a child sucking at his mother’s breast has become the prototype of every 
relation of love’ (SE 7: 222).  A ‘hole is a hole’, says Freud cynically in The 
Unconscious (SE 14) and this thereafter is a reference to all the competing metaphors 
he attributes to the ‘hole’, as woman/womb/mother/Mater.  
 
‘My son the Myops’ says Freud, which is the title of a dream where Freud’s eldest son 
does not recognise him as his father.  Regardless of subsequent interpretations and 
Freud’s own engagement with this dream we could say that this could just as easily be 
attributed to Freud, who myopic like closes his eye(s) when he does not want to see 
anything.  This relates to Freud’s dreams of his dying/dead father. Freud remembers 
how like ‘Garibaldi’ his father had ‘looked on his death-bed’ (SE 5: 447) and this 
made him think of his second son Oliver, named after the ‘great historical figure, 
Cromwell’.  The association in the dream is an association between the child and the 
dying man; they had both soiled their beds.  But Freud also remarks on the feeling of 
                                                 
64 ‘… psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental, but only quantitative, 




‘high satisfaction’ that Oliver’s birth gave him.  Only a year before he comments I 
had thought that if my new-born baby was a son I would name him after Cromwell a 
man who had ‘powerfully attracted me in my boyhood’ (SE 5: 448). Freud argues:  
 
It is not a matter of chance that our first examples of absurdity in dreams 
related to a dead father.  In such cases, the conditions for creating absurd 
dreams are found together in characteristic fashion.  The authority wielded by 
a father provokes criticism from his children at an early age, and the severity 
of the demands he makes upon them, for their own relief, to keep their eyes 
open to any weakness of their father’s; but the filial piety called up in our 
minds by the figure of a father, particularly after his death, tightens the 
censorship which prohibits any such criticism from being consciously 
expressed (SE 5: 435). 
 
You must ‘keep your eyes open to any weakness of the father’s’ but you are 
‘requested to close the eyes’ (SE 4: 317), as Freud says in The Interpretation of 
Dreams and in a letter to Fliess (SE 1: 233). In the letter to Fliess the ‘nice dream’ 
occurs after his father’s65 funeral and takes place at the barber’s, which Freud goes to 
every day.  ‘You are asked to close the eyes’, means also, ‘one should do one’s duty 
to the dead’ (SE 1: 233).  On the day of the funeral Freud is late to ‘the house of 
mourning’ as he is delayed at the barber’s.  The barber’s by definition since it is 
involved in ‘cutting’ is a symbol of castration (Freud makes this link clear in Totem 
and Taboo (SE 13) where he comments in a footnote that children equate castration 
anxiety with circumcision, hair cutting and loss of teeth (153 n 1). The question being 
is it Freud or Jakob his father that is castrated? In The Interpretation of Dreams 
Freud’s account of the dream is somewhat different.  He reads the quotation on a 
noticeboard like the ones forbidding one to smoke in railway waiting-rooms, the night 
before the funeral (SE 4: 317).  Apart from the change of address, ‘asked’ to 
‘requested’, the move from the barber’s to the railway seems to indicate some form of 
anxiety on Freud’s part.  I addressed Freud’s travelling phobia above and its 
associations to a naked mother’s body that covers over/up Freud’s dead baby brother, 
to Hell and to nanny. Here then we have a dead father brought to our attention 
through signage expressly about closing the eyes and located in the barber’s, where 
the castration is in the cutting (reminiscent of Samson).  And the railway where the 
no-smoking sign is substituted for one concerned with ‘closing the eyes’ and ‘doing 
                                                 
65 Freud’s father actually died on October 23, 1896. 
142 
 
ones duty to the dead’.  Freud argues that the most commonly disguised Oedipus 
dream is the one concerned with eye-symbolism (SE 5: 398 n 1).  But the anxiety 
concerning eyes here seems to suggest that it is Freud as Oedipus who is 
blinded/castrated with his father’s death, although it is his father whose eyes are 
closed.  Freud in fact says it himself: to close the eyes after the death of the father is to 
‘tighten the censorship’ around criticism of the father. Rilke says in the poem Gong, 
‘We must close our eyes and renounce our mouths…’ (in Derrida, 1993: 40). Quoting 
Matthew 13 Derrida says, ‘…you will indeed look, but never perceive …they have 
shut their eyes; so that they might not look with their eyes…’ (in Derrida, 1993: 18 
(In one version of The Holy Bible (1977) it is quoted as, ‘For this people’s heart is 
waxed gross…and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with 
their eyes’ (Matthew 13: 15)).  Derrida continues asking, why is it that in drawings so 
many women weep and so many men are blind?  Freud argued that eyes that weep are 
interchanged with other organs that ‘secrete’ in dreams: the penis, the urethra, the 
nose with their ‘secretions’ of semen, urine and mucus respectively.  When we are 
‘requested to close the eyes’ as ‘our duty to the dead’, the associations of the dead 
body with the erect penis, as argued above, are evoked, albeit, unconsciously.  Derrida 
argues that one can see with a single eye and one can wink, but this single winking 
eye seems to suggest the eye of the penis or the vulva, since Freud argued ‘the female 
genital orifice’ was represented in dreams by the bodily organs of mouth, ears and 
eyes (SE 5: 358).  He also, and perhaps more commonly substituted the eye for the 
penis given that this substitutive relation exists in ‘dreams and myths and phantasies’ 
(SE 17: 231). What does it mean then when one has a ‘thousand eyes like Argus 
…whose eye is multiplied on the surface of his body… like the manifestation of the 
soul’ (Derrida, 1993: 127).66 The multiplication of eyes is regarded as a manifestation 
of the symbol of the eye to ward off castration. Somewhat like the idea behind the 
‘evil eye’, which is a combination of a stare and a wink, a myopic squint we could say 
and is depicted duplicated – eyes everywhere.   
 
                                                 
66 Interestingly Argus was ordered to watch over Io (or Isis) who Zeus loved and was 
therefore Hera’s rival.  Hermes killed Argus and out of respect for her faithful servant 
Hera moved his eyes to the tail of a Peacock.  Io/Isis was then set free but Hera 
ordered a horsefly to attack her, which drove her mad. After the birth of her son, who 
Hera stole and hid from her, she resumed her human form and ruled Egypt as Isis, the 
goddess of the feminine principle, of the earth, the dead and magic. 
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In Freud’s account of the Sand-Man in Das Unheimliche (PE 2003) it is the father 
who begs the Sand-Man (as Coppelius the lawyer) to save his son’s eyes (PE, 2003: 
137).  The Sand-Man ‘who tears out children’s eyes …to feed his children’ (SE 17: 
227-228) is involved in some kind of experimentation (a ‘brazier with glowing 
flames’) with Nathaniel’s (the son) father.  One night eavesdropping and hearing the 
Sand-man call out ‘Eyes here! Eyes here!’ the little boy is seized by the Sand-Man 
who is about to throw hot coals into his eyes but the father intervenes.  The outcome 
of this for Nathaniel is a long illness. Another visit by the Sand-Man/Coppelius is 
responsible for ‘closing the father’s eyes’ in an explosion in his study. The theme of 
the double here is depicted in the duplication of the father, as the good dead father and 
the bad deathly father the Sandman/Coppelius/Coppola. The good father has his eyes 
closed.  The bad father wants to close the eyes.  Along a similar theme to the death of 
the good father, Nathaniel’s eyes are closed when the threat of castration, this time 
accompanied with a laugh, becomes too much and on seeing the Sand-
Man/Coppelius/Coppola in the crowd below he jumps to his death.  There is more to 
the Sand-Man story of course, of love, albeit to an inanimate doll with empty 
‘bleeding’ eyes.  And as Jonte-Pace argues the Sand-Man ‘has deadly maternal 
qualities: he tears out children’s eyes as food’ for his own owl beaked children.  
Jonte-Pace suggests that this can be read ‘as a fantasy concealing the fear of death at 
the hands of a dangerous mother’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 65).  We have heard this laugh 
before in the little Han’s case-study, where the eye that looks sees a ‘piece missing’, 
and laughs at the castration as a means to distance himself from it. In this instance 
laughter protects his ‘feeble ego’ and makes him feel secure.  I will look at how the 
‘clowning mother’ helps to establish ego boundaries in Chapter Five. The following 
chapter looks at how castration anxiety becomes indistinguishable from anxiety 
proper in Freud’s terms and how through the process of repression anxiety is finally 








Freud, Rank’s Anxiety 
 
‘When I happen to be without anxiety, I am still ready to take on all the devils; and 
you have never known anxiety’ (Freud to Fliess in Masson, 1985: 219). 
 
Freud was troubled by the problem of anxiety, returning to an analysis of it 
throughout his life.  Freud’s ‘troubling’ of anxiety troubles me.  Freud will make 
anxiety prototypical in the act of birth (SE 5: 400-401). But this prototypical affect of 
anxiety contains a dread of the womb and of death that Freud will link to God and a 
hereafter. Freud does not pursue this line of reasoning, instead attaching one 
‘unconceptualised’ object after another to the ever d/evolving concept of anxiety. In 
his New Introductory Lectures he will argue that anxiety is the reproduction of an old 
event but that something is missing in our understanding of anxiety ‘which would 
bring all these pieces together into a whole’ (SE 22: 84-85). The following chapter 
will address Freud’s changing, often contradictory relationship with the concept of 
anxiety.  Freud’s repositioning of his ‘economic model’, repression is a ‘product’ of 
anxiety to anxiety as an affect of repression seems to create a kind of unease, in 
anxieties ‘companion’ concepts of repression and libido. Rather than a ‘one for the 
other’ there is instead a sliding between the original meaning, anxiety before 
repression and thereafter repression before anxiety.  While anxiety may have no 
‘proper place’ Freud is quite certain, indeed has to be certain that repression and 
libido do.  
Rank unsettles this.  Perhaps we could say he turns Freud’s Oedipal theory and 
castration anxiety on its head.  By placing birth trauma and separation from the 
mother as more important Rank illustrates that not only is the Oedipal theory wrong it 
could in fact be called a secondary typography to Rank’s first. Rank argued in his 
lecture The Anxiety Problem (1996 (1926)) ‘I began with the Freudian supposition 
‘that, under certain conditions, anxiety takes the place of libido; indeed in place of 
every repressed affect, anxiety may appear’ (Rank in Kramer ed.1996: 116). Freud 
made the castration complex the nucleus of anxiety whereas for Rank the nucleus 
(kern) was separation anxiety. Freud argued that he had no need to introduce the topic 
of anxiety as ‘everyone’ would have experienced its affective state at one time or 
another (SE 16: 392-393).  And yet in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (SE 20) 
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Freud will say, anxiety is something felt but we are ‘ignorant of what an affect is’ (SE 
20: 132). What follows is an engagement with ‘anxiety’ looking at how and even 
why, Freud’s thinking around anxiety appeared to change so significantly. This raises 
several questions not least did the repositioning of anxiety and repression led to a 
different understanding of anxiety? Or was anxiety like the Emperor who needed new 
clothes but who was tricked into parading naked? Freud maintained that in neurotic 
anxiety repression came first and then anxiety made an appearance.  But neurotic 
anxiety comes under the banner of his ‘new’ model, as a part of the ‘greater’ realistic 
anxiety although anxiety neurosis still followed Freud’s original/economic model. 
And while Freud maintained a form of separation anxiety at birth he will not give it 
the centrality that Rank does. As I said a troubling conundrum. It is as if anxiety is the 
issue at hand but anxiety is also the problem. Or as Weber puts it, ‘anxiety turns upon 
a question that it never really resolves’ (Weber, 1991: 154).  Anxiety then is a worrier, 
but of itself as much as to the person it ‘affects’. But there is a question that remains 
both at the centre and the limit of anxiety, where is the mother in the act of birth (and 
the following ‘traumas’ of early childhood) and how is anxiety attached to her?  
Anxiety, Repression and Libido 
Freud argued in the Interpretation of Dreams:  
 
If ‘the unconscious’, as an element in the subject’s waking thoughts, had to be 
represented in a dream, it may be replaced very appropriately by subterranean 
regions.—These, where they occur without any reference to analytic treatment 
stand for the female body or the womb.—‘Down below’ in dreams often relates 
to the genitals, ‘up above’, on the contrary, to the face, mouth or breast. – Wild 
beasts are as a rule employed by the dream work to represent the passionate 
impulses of which the dreamer is afraid, whether they are his own or those of 
other people. … It might be said that the wild beasts are used to represent the 
libido, a force dreaded by the ego and combated by means of repression (SE 5: 
410).   
 
An interesting turn of phrase given that Freud never really lets go of his association of 
the feminine to repression and the libido as masculine.  Thus in Freud’s line of 
reasoning, the male libido is repressed by the feminine but only through the mediation 
of the ego, itself frightened of the libido. The ego is both the seat of anxiety (SE 20: 
93) but it is also the ‘true and original reservoir of libido’ (SE 18: 51). But in The Ego 
and the Id (SE 19) Freud states that the id is ‘the great reservoir of libido’ (SE 19: 30 
n 1).  Strachey in his editor notes attempts to remedy this by reiterating Freud’s 
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statement in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (SE 20) that the ‘apparent 
contradictions is due to our having taken abstractions too rigidly’ (SE 20: 97). The 
ego states Freud is ‘bound to the id’, is ‘identical’ to it, but is also different.  It is the 
‘organised part of the id’. The ego, in the process of repression is both powerful, in 
protecting itself, and powerless against the instinctual impulse that caused the 
repression in the first place argues Freud. 
 
What does it mean then, that the libido is only realized in the beginning to make 
clearer the theory of anxiety neurosis?  If anxiety is initially that which causes 
repression and only later is it the product of repression; if it is there in the beginning – 
whether we take Rank’s (and Freud’s) argument for birth anxiety as the prototype of 
all future anxieties then is libido some kind of third thing for Freud, situated between 
a feminine repression and an answering anxiety?  Put another way, if libido is only 
understood – in the beginning – because of neurotic anxiety, what is it – or more 
appropriately, who is it – that mediates this relationship?  If libido acts like some kind 
of wild beast(s), if the ego feels angst when confronted with it and then quickly 
represses it, how might we best understand the confrontation of these phenomena that 
Freud has defined as male and female? If the conflation of anxiety as repression and 
thereafter repression as anxiety, mindful of the fact that what is repressed as anxiety is 
libido that fails to find an object, is considered – and I don’t think that Freud was very 
rigorous in his attempt to separate the differing equations – then how are we to 
understand this?   
 
Freud suggests that if we were to represent the unconscious as a conscious thought in 
a dream then we would do so through the representation of the breasts and genitals of 
a woman. The wild beasts that so frighten the ego, and force their way into the 
‘dream’ are as a rule libido.  Thus, what escapes attaching to the object, here 
represented as the ‘female body’ or more explicitly the ‘womb’ are basically rejected 
‘wild beasts’.  I may be taking liberties with Freud’s ‘equations’ here but anxiety 
always seems to lay unresolved in psychoanalysis.  Just as I used the example of 
Hawking’s black hole in Chapter Two as something female and therefore unknown I 
now want to apply the same kind of principle to anxiety.  That is not to say that I am 
arguing for anxiety to be recognised as female – not at all.  But anxiety keeps 
reconfiguring itself as somehow embryonic – as if there is no end to it.  If anxiety is a 
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nodal point to which everything else converges then it is reasonable and certainly 
uncontroversial to suggest that it is also a black hole.  But following this line of 
reasoning anxiety as a nodal point would also be a navel. After all a node is a 
‘protruding knob’, a lump, a knot, a place on a plant stem where the leaf is attached or 
fallen to use a favourite botanical analogy of Freud’s. Thus anxiety lays unresolved 
because Freud separated it from the mother’s body at birth and instead rather ungainly 
(or even ungallantly) attached it to his sexual theory.  But it does not ever sit right. In 
Freud’s own terminology, it is a part of a puzzle that ‘blurs’ the edges of the parts of 
the puzzle because we cannot quite find its place in the puzzle.  Or as Lacan has said 
in relation to the mirror stage, the child attaches a prosthetic ego to itself, which never 
quite fits.  Thus anxiety then remains in the field of the prosthetic, it never really 
belongs and yet we all of us, and some more than others are left with the 
uncomfortable feel of it, rubbing up against the edge of something in the guise of 
something else. The child experiences castration anxiety because it realizes that its 
mother does not have a penis and it is frightened that it to will lose its penis (or never 
grow one as is the case for little girls) – and yet Freud will make the breast – the 
nipple – analogous to the penis (and the cows udder) and thereafter the baby. In line 
with other theorists that argue for the castration complex to be widened considerably 
Freud replies, very reasonably one might add, that where would castration end?  
 
Freud is confused, anxiety first causes repression and then Freud changes this to 
repression causes anxiety.  Since repression is basically an unconscious act and 
anxiety as an affect issues from the unconscious, behind repression if you will, what 
does that say about the association between these three terms? Freud tells Fliess that 
‘I’ want to get behind – coitus a tegro – repression; I want to get to the essential that 
lays behind it’ (Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris, 1954: 231).  In this same letter Freud 
refers to the internal libido as a kind of secretion reminiscent of Lacan’s 
Hommolette/lamella that I introduced in Chapter One.  Something that escapes with 
the baby at birth, that covers it.  Clement argues that Lacan’s Hommolette/lamella is 
the libido but is also perhaps the soul.  Freud tells Fliess that he will give up the idea 
that repression is feminine and libido is masculine (Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris, 
1954: 234) and yet it persists both directly and as a metaphor throughout his writing. 
Repression argues Freud is a ‘failure of translation’ – something gets lost. For Lacan 
what gets lost with the act of repression, tied up that is with the unconscious affect of 
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anxiety is his untranslated term, objet petit a (the little thing, or little other). It is the 
object petite a that we perceive at the moment of anxiety before or perhaps in 
conjunction with the repression itself.  Billig will say ‘particular ways of concealing 
desires from the self, such as projection, sublimation, denial, etc are all forms of 
repression’ (Billig, 1999: 25 n 49).  And yet Anna Freud denies this general category 
of repression, in a similar way that Freud defended the castration complex from 
commonality.  Anna Freud will argue that the correct general term is defence 
mechanism, repression in its true sense is always unconscious (A. Freud, 1966).  In 
this sense Freud’s maneuver (a kind of turn-around as opposed to a turn-away) with 
‘anxiety producing repression rather than repression producing anxiety’ has the 
meaning of discord – it jars a bit; we are left ‘squinting at a point’ that seems, in fact, 
nowhere to be seen.  To return to our ‘naked Emperor’ which Freud used to explain 
exhibitory wish-fulfillment, Freud will argue that the people knew the Emperor was 
naked but that the invisible cloak the Emperor wears becomes a touchstone of sorts – 
who is brave enough to ‘shame’ an Emperor by pointing out his nakedness, seems to 
be the question (SE 4: 244 and Masson, 1985: 255). In actual fact, says Freud, a child 
‘suddenly exclaims’, ‘But he has nothing on!’ (SE 4: 244 n 1).  Children, argues 
Freud although unashamed about displaying their nakedness are stopped by the 
‘mothers prohibition’ (the prohibition before the ‘fall of paradise’), “Ugh! Shocking! 
You musn’t ever do that!” is the command that inhibits them. Represses them 
suggests Freud, a strange thing to have in a dream but the distress felt at being found 
naked, even in a dream is one of shame and dread he argues. In the case of the 
exhibitionist scene that Freud gives, it has escaped censorship says Freud. In the 
language of Freud’s first typography then, the watchman turned away.  
 
Going back to anxiety 
Weber argues that anxiety, because it was not realised as a ‘true’ psychoanalytic 
concept, in that it was not ‘discovered’ by psychoanalysis has not received the signal 
importance that it perhaps deserves (Weber, 1991: 49).  After all Freud will link 
anxiety to repression the ‘cornerstone’ of psychoanalysis and state, ‘the problem of 
anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various and important questions converge, a 
riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole mental 
existence’ (SE 16: 393). But he also as I argued above connects it to libido, 
suggesting that libido was only discovered in the beginning to make clearer the theory 
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of anxiety neurosis.  Rank in contrast will say that his work on birth trauma made it 
clear that Angst (anxiety) held a position more central than libido, which in Rank’s 
terminology could be read as the mother outranks the father. Rank will argue that 
Freud’s positioning of the mother as ‘merely the coveted sex-object’ meant that he 
could turn away from the ‘spectre’ of the castrated mother, whose ‘open wound’ was 
seen as an abyss equivalent in some aspects to a Pandora’s box where all manner of 
nasty things might fly out. Freud argued that hate was the oldest known relation to 
objects ‘older than love’ (SE 14: 139) but that the mother-son relationship was 
exempt from this.  This belies the knowledge from his own case-studies, that the 
relationship to the mother is one of ambivalence, there from the start for all of us.  
After all, even if we do not consider birth as the proto-type for anxiety all future 
reference to situations where anxiety is present, in the presence/absence of the mother, 
whether she will feed us or not, whether she smiles or frowns and so on illustrate this 
position. A position Freud alludes to in his ‘reworking’ of anxiety as the form of 
‘helplessness’.   
 
What might be problematic to psychoanalysis (after Freud) is that anxiety lies up 
against physiology. Weber will argue that anxiety is located on ‘the periphery of both 
the psyche and of psychoanalysis itself’ (Weber, 1982: 49).  But at the same time it 
gnaws at the heart of both the subject and of psychoanalysis. Anxiety is central, 
argues Freud but its ability to attach, albeit as ‘free-floating energy’ (Weber, 1982: 
49) also designates it as marginal.  The ‘double-character’ of anxiety, not in a 
doppelgänger sense but as the two sides of the proverbial coin (Janus-faced maybe) is 
partly why it poses such a problem for psychoanalysis.  Anxiety like the displaced, 
dethroned, prejudiced infant – and this is an apt comparison – has ‘no proper place’.  
According to Weber anxiety ‘marks the impossible attempt of the ego to construct or 
delimit such a place, but this place is inevitably displaced, dislocated’ (Weber cited by 
Stonebridge, 1998: 192). How then are we to understand anxiety?   
 
Freud suggests that in trying to answer this we will find that ‘anxiety is not so simple 
a matter’ (SE 20: 132).  We are like the ‘benighted traveller’ says Freud, singing in 
the dark to allay his fears. This evokes Freud’s lovely little vignette given in The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6) on the side-effects of migraines.  One effect 
of migraines says Freud is the forgetting of names and in fact at the height of the 
150 
 
migraine attack all proper names are forgotten (SE 6: 21). To illustrate his point Freud 
offers a story of a robbery on a deserted street undercover of the night.  Suppose, 
Freud says, I report the robbery to the police with the words ‘loneliness and darkness 
took away my watch and my purse’ (SE 6: 21-22). Although the statement is true 
argues Freud, the wording of it would ‘put me in danger of being thought not quite 
right in the head’ (SE 6: 21-22). This state of affairs could only be described correctly 
by saying that favoured by the loneliness of the place and under the shield of darkness 
unknown malefactors robbed me of my valuables. Freud will say in The 
Interpretation of Dreams that ‘Robbers, burglars and ghosts, of whom people feel 
frightened before going to bed, and who sometimes pursue their victims after they are 
asleep, all originate from the same class of infantile reminiscence’ (SE 5: 403-404). 
Ghosts in the dream are invariably the mother.  Likewise, robbers represent the father. 
Thus, undercover of the night, robbers reminiscent of my father, and ghosts in the 
shape of my mother frighten me suggests Freud.  Freud continues, stating we repress 
these repetitious and seemingly banal moments until they return in the darkness at 
another time. Freud calls this type of repression ‘familial’ and as I have shown in 
Chapter Two it is indicated by a ‘continuous current of archaic personal reference’ 
(SE 6: 24).  
 
But this nocturnal spectre of our mother as a ghost and which Freud will argue creates 
our belief in ghosts is initially the mother responding to her infants ‘helplessness’.  In 
the shadow of a ‘half-light’ suggests Freud the mother checking that her infant is okay 
leaves it with the impression of her ‘ghostly shape’. Taking this image into their 
unconscious, any nightly terrors thereafter will be interweaved with the spectre of the 
mother.  But the anxiety that accompanies these ‘nightly terrors’, the nightmare, is 
more severe, according to Ernest Jones in his aptly named book On The Nightmare 
(1931) than anxiety proper. For Jones the nightmare can cause ‘morbidly acute 
feelings of angst’ and exercises a ‘greater influence on the waking phantasies than 
any other dream’ (Jones, 1931: 40-73). Lacan will say that the nightmare is ‘the most 
massive, unreconstituted, ancestral experience rejected into the obscurity of ancient 
times from which we are supposed to have escaped, a necessity which unites us with 
these ages which is still current and which curiously we speak about only very rarely: 
it is that of the nightmare’ (Lacan, 1962-63: 7). The nightmare deserves further 
exploration then, as in children according to Freud the first phobias are darkness and 
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solitude (SE 16: 407).  These first phobias of darkness and solitude persist throughout 
life but are felt initially and perhaps keenly in the absence of the mother: ‘both are 
involved when a child feels the absence of some loved person who looks after it—its 
mother, that is to say’ (SE 16: 407).  Again, there is something hidden here, 
something Freud does not, or cannot say.  If darkness and solitude are phobias then 
they are conceptualised as objects, uncanny objects even.  And if a phobia is the 
‘object’ that anxiety ‘creates’ then how are we to understand the relationship of the 
ghostly mother to solitude and darkness, if in fact what seems to be in question – is 
always the question – is what type of object is the mother herself?  
 
Freud will argue that children are anxious about a situation in the beginning because 
of unfamiliar people: ‘A child is frightened of a strange face because he is adjusted to 
the sight of a familiar and beloved figure—ultimately of his mother’ (SE 16: 407).  
Freud offers a family story of his son, who afraid of the dark calls to his Auntie in the 
next room: “‘Do speak to me, Auntie! I’m frightened!”  “Why, what good would that 
do? You can’t see me.”  To this the child replied: “If someone speaks, it gets lighter.” 
Thus a longing felt in the dark is transformed into a fear of the dark’ (SE 16: 407). 
Freud then will link longing with anxiety, with the nightmare and the ghost, with the 
womb and with death, with birth itself and yet he does not attribute any of these 
directly to the mother.  The mother figures prominently in Freud’s exploration of 
finding anxieties proper place and yet he cannot conceive of this proper place as 
belonging to the mother.  His exposition of The Uncanny illustrates a similar sleight 
of hand.  Das unheimliche and heimlich argues Freud make the unfamiliar familiar but 
do so without any attribution to the mother. Lacan argues that The Uncanny is ‘the 
absolutely indispensable hinge for approaching the question of anxiety’ (Lacan, 1962-
63:12).  And further that anxiety like das unheimliche has the linguistic equivalent of 
making the familiar unfamiliar.  Here though argues Lacan, anxiety frames the known 
(Heim) but with the added sense that the unexpected guest who is both arriving and 
arrived is already known.  This sounds remarkably like Geller’s argument concerning 
the Jew’s position as ‘Gastvolk’ who is both guest and host in an impossibly 
parasitical relationship.  Geller points out that this makes of the Jew someone who in 
arousing anxiety appears to ‘straddle’ the opposing barriers of dread and fascination at 




Freud felt that ‘little Rank’, as he referred to him, with his ‘birth trauma’ overstated 
the experience of birth as ‘separation anxiety’ because the mother in her role as object 
is completely unknown to the ‘narcissistic foetus’ (SE 20).  In a letter to Jones 
regarding Rank’s ‘birth trauma’ Freud states that ‘Anyone else would have used such 
a discovery to make himself independent’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 135-136. Jones, 1953: 
61).  And in a letter to Ferenczi Freud writes that Rank’s ‘birth trauma’ was ‘the most 
important progress since the discovery of psychoanalysis’ (Sprengnether,1990: 136). 
And yet Freud cannot accept Rank’s contribution to his psychoanalysis.  To do so 
would undermine both his castration anxiety and his Oedipal theory. Sprengnether 
notes that the concluding remarks of The Ego and the Id (SE 19) written at the same 
time Freud was reading Rank’s draft of The Trauma of Birth (1924) links the ‘subject 
of birth anxiety with that of the death instinct, although Freud fails to develop this 
train of association’ (Sprengnether, 1990:136).  Here Freud states that ‘once again the 
same situation as that which underlay the first great anxiety-state of birth and the 
infantile anxiety of longing—the anxiety due to separation from the protecting 
mother’ (SE 19: 58). Freud seems to be saying that the ego ‘gives up the ghost’ quite 
literally when it no longer feels under the protection of the loving mother. Freud 
argues that ‘We have long been familiar with womb phantasies and recognised their 
importance, but in the prominence Rank has give them they achieve a far higher 
significance and reveal in a flash the biological background of the Oedipus complex.  
To repeat it in my own language: some instinct must be associated with the birth 
trauma which aims at restoring the previous existence’ (Freud cited by Sprengnether, 
1990: 13 and Jones, 1957: 64). Here suggests Sprengnether Freud makes the 
connection between the impulse to return to ones origin – ‘the aim of all life is death’ 
(SE 18: 38) – and ‘the figure of the preoedipal mother’ but makes no attempt to 
unravel it (Sprengnether, 1990: 137).  The death instinct may well be there, but Freud 
suggests that it might be called ‘the urge for happiness’, with the acknowledgement 
that the concept of happiness here is used in its wider, erotic meaning (Jones, 1957: 
64).  Rank in collusion with Sprengnether argues that Freud built a ‘shallow’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ edifice over the original experience of birth anxiety (Rank in Kramer 
ed. 1996: 118).  
 
Rank insisted on the primacy of the mother-child bond and in turn undermined 
Freud’s Oedipus and castration complexes (Sprengnether, 1990: 139).  In fact Rank 
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illustrated in his discussions on animal phobias that the big fat horse that Little Hans 
was so frightened of was in fact the mother and not the father as Freud maintained 
(although unsuccessfully as I have shown in Chapter Three). Rank calls the separation 
from the mother at birth the ‘primal castration’, the ‘primal repression’, but also the 
‘primal catastrophe’. Quoting from Bachofen, who Freud referred to but did not 
follow, Rank states: ‘“Everywhere Woman appears as bearer of the laws of death, 
and, in this identification, at the same time appears as affectionate and as a dark 
threatening power, capable of the deepest sympathy but also of the greatest severity, 
like the maternal formed Harpies and the Egyptian-Phoenician Sphinx who bore in 
herself the law of all material life”’ (Bachofen quoted by Rank in Sprengnether, 1990: 
141).  Sprengnether argues that Rank repositions the pre-Oedipal mother as one of 
‘maternal power’ and ‘maternal love’ which undermines Freud’s theories but also 
illustrates Freud’s own regressive tendencies where the mother is concerned 
(Sprengnether, 1990: 141).  ‘Leaning on’ (Anlehnung) Bachofen’s ‘Mother Right’ 
Rank illustrates that Freud’s investment in a ‘father-God’ who ‘threatens castration’ is 
a ‘sham’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 142).  Oedipus, in Rank’s study is subordinate to ‘the 
Sphinx’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 142).   
 
It is no wonder then that Freud experienced a feeling of shock when he read Rank’s 
‘Trauma’ because his life’s work was on the line (once again). Here was his most 
talented ‘disciple’ and he was about to lose him. Freud in contrast to Rank will say 
that anxiety is a ‘special state of unpleasure’ different to mourning and loss because 
the latter are only affects, anxiety contains ‘motor manifestations’ (SE 20: 132-133).  
And further that the unpleasure affect and experience attached to birth (and here he 
means to the infant) still ‘provides a prototypic experience’ and that psychoanalysis is 
therefore inclined to regard ‘anxiety-states as a reproduction of the trauma of birth’ 
(SE 20: 133).  This is does not mean that Rank’s ‘extensive concatenation’ is without 
merit but that it neglects too many variables during the process of birth to make it 
valid argues Freud. Freud asks, how can we know what the baby experiences or even 
how it experiences the act of birth?  The important thing states Freud, is to know 
‘what recalls the event and what is being recalled’ (SE 20: 135).  Again Freud will 
stress that the danger of birth can only be seen physically, there is no danger in the 
psychological sense. It is important to realise that Freud’s reasoning only considers 
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the baby, the affect of anxiety on the mother and how this might be transferred to her 
infant is not considered. 
 
Both Freud and Rank attribute a happy intra-uterine existence to the foetus but Freud 
questions (even though his own analogies, throughout his work constantly make 
reference to a return to the womb as ‘canny’ and welcoming) Rank on the child’s 
‘happy recollection’ of this time.  If the womb experience is so happy asks Freud then 
why would the child be frightened of the dark and of being alone?  Freud answers, as 
he did with his migraine analogy that the child feels a ‘longing’ in the dark for its 
mother, it is loss that the infant is frightened of. Rank will argue that women in 
general feel less anxiety than men but corrects this to women feel a ‘different kind of 
anxiety’ (Rank in Kramer ed. 1996: 136). In fact Rank will argue that the anxiety 
women feel in parturition ‘at least partially re-experiences the anxiety affect originally 
experienced at her own birth and thus abreacts it, whereas man reproduces it only at 
birth’ (Rank in Kramer ed. 1996: 137).  Just as anxiety itself for Freud is caught in a 
double-bind so to is women’s experience of anxiety according to Rank. Rank’s 
argument is not dissimilar to Kristeva’s who argues, ‘What does a mother want, 
especially in childbirth? She wants her mother’ (in Oliver ed., 1993: 6). Caught in a 
two-way mirror then, the mother loves herself as Other which in this case is herself as 
a mother.  If anxiety accompanies this then it is an anxiety peculiar to what can only 
be called, a mother on mother encounter: the mother meets herself as mother. The 
‘uncanny’ experience of meeting ones doppelgänger takes us back to the infantile, to 
a feeble and under-developed ego.  But this meeting of our double, here evoked by 
Kristeva and Rank as being especially prevalent in childbirth, shows a prescience of 
the mother as immortal but also as ‘the uncanny harbinger of death’ (SE 17: 235). I 
shall engage with this argument in more depth in chapter five. 
 
What follows is an engagement with ‘anxiety’ in particular looking at a story of a boy 
of the holocaust. Here we have a picture, a literal picture even – a photograph that the 
little boy attributes an omnipotence and care, as a celluloid stand-in for the mother. 
His reunification with his mother at the end of the war causes severe anxiety and 
subsequent nightmares.  Significantly the father is of little consequence to this story. 
The story of Dori Laub’s little boy is interspersed with other stories of children whom 
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do not play the fort/da (gone/there) for fun but who play it for ‘real’. There is no da 
here the mother never came back.  
 
Little Sylvia 
Dorothy Burlingham in her studies of sighted and blind children offers the story of 
Sylvia, four years old on admittance to the Tavistock Clinic (formerly the Hampstead 
Child-Therapy Clinic) and blind from a gonorrhoeal infection contracted at birth.  If 
the experience of birth is both toxic and the prototype of the affects of anxiety then 
this was little Sylvia’s relationship to her mother.  Sylvia’s acute feelings of loss of 
her mother were illustrated in her acting out of this loss. To alleviate anxiety when her 
mother left her alone (once more) Sylvia sat on a chair with her arms around her neck. 
This enactment could be seen several ways. Her arms become herself holding onto her 
mother while sitting on her mother’s knee.  Or alternatively the arms were her 
mothers holding onto Sylvia.  A doll given to her she calls ‘Mummie’ and ‘Mummie’ 
becomes some kind of intermediary  - a transitional object perhaps – between the 
actual loss of the mother and Sylvia’s internalisation of this loss.  She tells 
Burlingham that she only likes being at the Institute because ‘Mummie’ is there.  One 
day says Burlingham: 
 
she invented a game with a ball, which she called her child.  She would throw 
the ball away and become very upset and unhappy if she could not 
immediately find it.  When she finally retrieved it again, she kissed and 
hugged it, but could not resume the game: she was too afraid of losing her dear 
child.  Instead, she took the ball and lay down on the sofa, tightly clutching the 
ball in her arms.  It is clear that this game depicts separation and reunion 
between Sylvia and her mother. She throws the ball away as she felt she was 
thrown away by her mother (Burlingham, 1972: 265).   
 
She told Burlingham, ‘My mother sent me away because she did not love me, because 
she wanted to get rid of me…so that I can die here’ (Burlingham, 1972: 226). Freud 
argued in Femininity (SE 22) that playing with dolls, which for little girls is on the 
same chain of symbolic substitution, i.e., the doll stands-in for the penis, is not an 
‘expression of her femininity’ but rather, ‘an identification with her mother with the 
intention of substituting activity for passivity.  She was playing the part of her mother 
and the doll was herself: now she could do with the baby everything that her mother 
used to do with her’ (SE 22: 128). Deutsche states that the playing with dolls could be 
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viewed as a ‘parthenogenetic fantasy’ and is a continuation of the child’s self-created 
fantasy child – him/herself, which excludes the father and resorts to a pre-Oedipal 
valuation of the mother (Deutsche, 1965: 194).  
 
If we agree with Rank that the literal separation of birth is also the very first an act of 
castration, then little Sylvia is castrated/blinded by her mother.  This is no imaginary 
threat, the threat is real, little Sylvia is literally blind. If the cutting of the umbilicus is 
for Irigaray the first act of castration then little Sylvia is castrated by her mother, 
twice. This is not the self-blinding of Oedipus because of the mother, but a blinding 
by the mother. In fact, what seems evident in both these encounters with the mother, is 
that she is ‘dead’; literally through suicide with Oedipus, metaphorically for Sylvia 
because she is ‘unavailable’.  Sylvia illustrates in her game with ‘Mummie’ and the 
ball, her dear child, that even though her mother has ‘thrown her away’ she is unable 
to throw her mother away. Burlingham argues that children are naturally responsive to 
the mother’s unconscious and their perception of this can be seen in the empathetic 
relationship that mother and infant develop – or fail to. If the mother’s unconscious is 
itself severely traumatised then the infant will, in all probability develop an 
unconscious along similar, if not harsher lines, given that the combination of the 




An interesting comparison arises here with little Ernst, and a Winnicottian boy.  Both 
boys are involved in string play.  For our ‘good boy’ the game involved ‘the child’s 
great cultural achievement – the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of 
instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without 
protesting’ (SE 18: 15).  The now famous reel game which imitated the mother’s 
leaving and returning orchestrated it might be said from the magical omnipotent 
                                                 
67 Freud states in ‘On Narcissism’ (Freud, 2006) that ‘there is no entity present in the 
individual from the very beginning that is equatable with the ego; the ego has to be 
developed’ (Freud, 2006: 361). The id in contrast is chaotic argues Freud, but it has a 
‘blind inflexibility’ (SE 20: 205).  It wants its demands met by the ego.  The ego 
mediates the id’s demands with external reality, for we must live in the world after all.  
Or as Freud put it ‘One cannot run away from oneself’ (SE 20: 203).  It is abetted and 
hindered by this through the agency of the super-ego or the censor/watchman as Freud 
originally called it. 
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stage68of little Ernst to demonstrate his mastery over his mother, was an example of 
the compulsion to repeat.  It could also be understood as an act of revenge of which he 
took an active part (and I will address this later in this chapter). Ernst, Freud’s 
grandson, was ‘greatly attached to his mother’ states Freud, who ‘not only fed him 
herself but had also looked after him without any outside help’ (SE 18: 14). But he 
had a curious habit, says Freud of ‘taking any small objects he could get hold of and 
throwing them away from him’.  Freud argues that he, in agreement with his mother, 
his daughter Sophie, believed that the game focused on the word ‘fort’ [‘gone’]. A 
description of the extended game is as follows: 
One day I made an observation which confirmed my view.  The child had a 
wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it.  It never occurred to him to 
pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. 
What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully thro it over 
the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time 
uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o’.  He then pulled the reel out of the cot again 
by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful ‘da’ [‘there’].  This, 
then, was the complete game—disappearance and return. As a rule one only 
witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, 
though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was attached to the second 
act (SE 18: 14-15). 
 
The game was a means of controlling his anxiety and sense of loss at his mother’s 
departure (although as Freud illustrated he showed no grief at his mother’s death four 
years later (SE 18: 16 n 1)). Similarly Anna Freud offers an account of a six-year old 
boy who after being hurt by the dentist also felt a need to transfer his pain.  He does 
this by cutting up objects that belong to Anna, a rubber and some string, which he cuts 
into smaller pieces.  He is enacting, it might be said a form of castration upon objects 
that he substitutes as himself – a self that must be got rid of, hence the cutting up into 
tiny, ‘insignificant’ pieces.  This goes someway to alleviating the anxiety he 
experiences in the pain inflicted on him, which could be recognised as a form of 
castration anxiety. Anna Freud explains ‘A child introjects some characteristic of an 
anxiety-object and so assimilates an anxiety-experience which he has just undergone’ 
(A. Freud, 1966: 120-121).  In contrast, Freud’s ‘good little boy’ loved his mother, 
and wanted her to return so he pulled the reel back to him, as he might hug the mother 
when she actually returned.   
 
                                                 
68 Ferenczi’s magical omnipotent stages will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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Winnicott’s boy did not have a mother that was quite as good as Freud’s Sophie.  This 
little boy’s mother was depressed and like little Sylvia he experienced a series of 
separations from her, one in fact a hospitalisation for her depression.  Thus, 
Winnicott’s seven-year old boy had lost his mother at an early age through her 
depression which both figuratively and literally took her away from him, and through 
the birth of another child.  His string play involved tying things together.  This 
Winnicott said was a denial of separation, by joining things together (a re-established 
umbilicus?) he could express the loss of his mother, bring her back to him.  When the 
boy was eleven the string play developed a new phase, one that imitated his mother’s 
morbid anxiety (Winnicott, 1971: 18).  In this the boy now using rope would imitate 
hanging, acting dead.  The father ignored the ‘play’ but the mother responded with 
hysterical anxiety. This boy also had a ‘family’ of teddy bears that no-one dared to 
call toys as for him they took the role of children.  He was the mother and cared for 
them deeply although no-one outside the immediate family was allowed to know of 
his attachment to them.  Like Sylvia with ‘Mummie’ and her ‘dear child’, the ball, 
these inanimate objects are animated in roles that involve caring in response to not 
being cared for. Freud explicates this readily in Das Unheimliche (SE 17) in 
Nathanial’s love for the doll Olympia, which is finally to be seen as a kind of 
dissociated narcissism.  And it can be noted that Rainer Rilke’s lifelong fascination 
with dolls occurs as a motif in much of his work.  But whereas Freud has the little girl 
play with dolls as imitative of the mother’s ‘play’ with babies, Rilke saw dolls as 
‘horrible foreign bodies’ who pervert love and make one unlovable.  Although Rilke 
admits that dolls ‘provoke assertiveness, inventiveness and fantasy’ (in Mandel, 
1965:107), it is in the relationship to the ‘disillusioning silence’ of the doll that God, 
Angels and destiny make an appearance in Rilke’s work.  
 
For Rilke, who had Lou Andreas-Salomé as a friend and confidant but who refused a 
psychoanalysis – it might rid him of his demons, but it might take his angels too – 
dolls were at the intersection of life and death.  We saw this in The Uncanny with 
Olympia but Rilke’s story is more tragic.  When his baby sister died his mother not 
able to deal with the loss, made Rilke take her place.  Thus his playing with dolls was 
to appease his mother, who also ‘played with me as a big doll’ (in Mandel, 1965: 4).  
Freud says little about the loss of his brother Julius apart from the fact that his death 
created remorse in him because he had wished (from the perspective of the dethroned, 
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despoiled and prejudiced child) his demise. But what is often neglected in the story of 
Julius’s death is the story of a mother’s mourning.  And in turn how the mother’s 
mourning would have impacted on her ‘Golden Sigi’. Freud says little about his 
mother, in either his letters or his work but he does argue that the myth of Oedipus 
reveals a true psychological insight, ‘I have found that people who know that they are 
preferred or favoured by their mother give evidence in their lives of a peculiar self-
reliance and an unshakable optimism which often seem like heroic attributes and 
bring actual success to their possessors’ (SE 5: 398 n 1).   
 
The significant difference for Ernst as opposed to Sylvia and Winnicott’s boy is that 
he had a ‘good-enough mother’69 so that even with her death when he is five his 
initial childhood experiences of her were stable, loving and secure.  Winnicott 
suggests that ‘success in infant care depends on the fact of devotion’ (Winnicott, 
1971: 10), that is to say mother-love.  For Winnicott the string becomes ‘a thing in 
itself’, an act of symbolic play to master the loss in the separation but also to engender 
hope.  For this boy hope eventually ran out, the mother’s pattern of depressive illness 
remained which conditioned the boy into finding an object for his loss.  In his case a 
drug addiction prevailed.  What little Ernst and Sophie experience is anxiety over the 
mother’s loss, a loss though that they reorchestrate in the objects around them to 
alleviate the helplessness they feel because of the loss. Winnicott will say that guilt, 
anxiety and physical pain are integral for the development of us as healthy human 
beings. But that these ‘emotions’ can only be developed in a ‘healthy’ way in the 
secure environment of what he calls a ‘good-enough mother’ (cited in Bowlby, 1979: 
3).  In turn they teach us, argues Winnicott to negotiate our feelings of ambivalence; 
in particular towards the person we love and hate the most, our mother.  
 
Testimony 
                                                 
69 Winnicott argued that the ‘good-enough’ mother was the ‘the ‘ordinary devoted 
mother...an example of the way in which the foundations of health are laid down by 
the ordinary mother in her ordinary loving care of her own baby’ (Winnicott, 1973: 
17, 44). Winnicott’s own experiences of being mothered, of having a depressed 
mother, are essential to how he understood this concept.  He spoke of his own early 
childhood experiences of trying to make ‘my living’ by keeping ‘my mother alive’ 
(Minsky, 1996: 134). 
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Dori Laub in ‘Truth and testimony’ (1995) offers a story of a young boy, aged about 
four who is saved from extermination by being smuggled out of the Krakow ghetto by 
his parents.  His mother wraps him in her shawl and gives him a photograph of herself 
as a student.  She gifts ‘magic’ to the photo by telling him to look at it in times of 
need. Also, and importantly here as Bowlby points out in his work on mourning, 
children who have had a parent die - and separation can be viewed as metaphoric 
death - need something of the parent to hold onto.  Into this they put the hope and the 
yearning of a return.  This little boy has a shawl (which I would have assumed would 
become a transitional object but we hear no more about it other than he was wrapped 
in it when he left his mother) and the photograph. He is sent out into the street with an 
address for a ‘safe’ house and an assurance that his parents will find him and 
importantly bring him ‘home’ after the war.  
 
The little boy, even though he is only four (and not fully Oedipalised, which is 
significant in the reunification) finds the safe house which is actually a whorehouse 
and after being received with ‘open’ arms is given a glass of milk.  The little boys 
trauma is soothed as this strange place becomes familiar with its milk and ‘helping’ 
hands.  The colour white, which has long associations with the soul and is represented 
in the glass of milk, a replacement for his mother’s milk, her breast, his security, 
becomes paradigmatic for him throughout his life.  After a period of time the 
whorehouse becomes a dangerous place for him to live (which is interesting in itself!) 
so the little boy is sent out into the streets once more.  Here he meets up with other 
boys roaming the streets and is taken in by Gentile families for short periods of time.  
Mere survival meant that he has rare moments of solitude, but when he does he takes 
out the picture of his mother and talks to her.  Interestingly when he is in houses 
where prayer is practiced nightly, rather than pray to God, he prays to the photograph 
of his mother saying as a kind of mantra, ‘“Mother, let this war be over and come 
back as you promised”’ (Laub, 1995: 71).  He never doubted that his mother would 
not keep her promise. In this the photograph of his mother becomes a talisman and the 
mantra that he recites identifies her with the magical omnipotence of God. 
Miraculously the young boy and his parents are reunited after the war, but the god-
like attribution he has given to the mothers photograph was never going to fit the 
image of the living mother, much less so since she returned as a death camp survivor.  
Unable to figure the loss the little boy resorts to calling his parents, Mr and Mrs. Now 
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that the trauma of the earlier loss has come back to haunt him in the loss of his safe-
guard, the internalised good/God ‘image’ of his mother the little boy ‘falls apart’.  ‘He 
begins to have a nightmare that will recur all his life’ (Laub, 1995: 72).  Because the 
‘god-like’ mother failed to save him, the longing he had suppressed, a longing 
internalised and expressed only in prayer in front of a photographic image comes 
hurtling to the surface and is felt through the nightmare as total disorientation and 
terror.  The little boy no longer has a home/heim. What was familiar has now 
morphed into its opposite unheimlich/unhomely. Importantly the photograph, which 
the little boy had invested with hope, failed him. This might be because the 
photograph of the mother, which carried with it the overvaluation attributed to her as 
both the ‘source of authority’ (a magical omnipotence - God) and thus his Oedipal 
object becomes fetishised.  Freud suggests that libido becomes fixated because of the 
masochistic components of the sexual instinct onto the authorative figure.  This is a 
male trait as the sexual over evaluation men exhibit towards women, women transfer 
to their children.  Of course, Laub’s little boy is still a child at the time of his 
reunification with his parents but his living mother has become a fetish caught in a 
celluloid image, ‘a remnant and precipitate’ of a forgotten sexual phase of early 
childhood.  Freud likens then, the ‘returned’ fetish to the screen memory (SE 7: 154).  
 
For Laub’s little boy the mother is not only felt as a loss, she is lost, so his nightmares 
continue until as a man he faces the nightly terror by transforming the loss and 
therefore the lie, ‘mummy’ didn’t keep her promise, into a truth; a truth irrevocably 
wound up with the actual experience of the Holocaust. Laub argues, and it is 
important to note that this is in relation to an exploration of the testimony of the 
witness, that it is only perhaps through reconciliation of the two worlds – ‘the one that 
was brutally destroyed and the one that is’ (Laub, 1995: 74) that a redemption ‘of an 
abruptly interrupted innocent childhood’ can be addressed (Laub, 1995: 74). This is a 
process through which the ‘repetition’ of separation and loss allow a repossession of it 
(Laub, 1995: 74). The little boy from the Krakow ghetto only truly felt the loss of his 
mother when she returned.  She was absent then because her presence, which was 
founded in a photograph had been internalised.  The little boy it could be said carried 
around with him the ghost of his mother.  ‘If someone speaks, it gets lighter’ says 
Freud’s son. To which Freud adds, a ‘longing felt in the dark is transformed into a 
fear of the dark’ (SE 16: 407).  The little boy who longed for his mother, kept the fear 
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of the dark and all its associations away by praying to her photograph.  There could be 
no darkness when he could look at the photograph of his mother’s face and the 
anxiety he felt with her loss was kept at bay.  The darkness and thus the anxiety 
arrived when the mother came back with the changed face.  His longing was 
transformed into fear and his nightmares began. Or, put another way, the loss 
associated with the longing was only felt when the object was conceptualised, that is, 
when the living mother returned.  To a degree then, the return of the mother, in this 
context at least, is the return of the repressed. 
 
Laub’s little boy is brutally separated in what is still a pre-Oedipal stage, he is only 
four.  That his response to this is to cling to the magical omnipotence given an object, 
importantly a photograph of his mother, bespeaks of a developmental stage he does 
not achieve.  Freud argues in Moses and Monotheism (SE 23) that ‘what children have 
experienced at the age of two [three or four] and have not understood, need never be 
remembered by them except in dreams… at some time later it will break into their life 
with obsessional impulses, it will govern their actions, it will decide their sympathies 
and antipathies and will quite often determine their choice of a love-object, for which 
it is so frequently impossible to find a rational basis’ (SE 23: 126). For Laub’s little 
boy the dream is a nightmare one that ‘breaks into his life’ with recurring frequency.  
One could say it breaks his life up. Importantly it confirms Freud’s analysis that 
darkness and loneliness are finally to be seen in the figure of the mother. Of course it 
also raises the inherent contradiction that the body of the mother offers.  On one hand 
the womb is depicted as ‘warm and comforting’ in its darkness and togetherness with 
the mother. On the other hand, the womb as a place of darkness and aloneness is 
depicted as uncanny and frightening.  This then is the liminal figure of the mother.  As 
giver of live and as representation of death she is to be always a threshold, a portal, 
(hole, womb, ‘slightly ajar), which according to Freud involves a straddling of types: 
there at the spot of the ‘unplumbable navel’ – ‘this far and no further’.  
 
As a result of the experiences the little boy has in his time of being without his 
mother, instinctual demands arise, which ‘call for satisfaction’. The ego refuses the 
instinctual ‘satisfaction’, whether because it is ‘paralysed’ by the ‘magnitude of the 
demand or because it recognises the danger’ we cannot be sure states Freud (SE 23: 
127).  Freud will argue that the ego most often freezes in response to the demand of 
163 
 
the instinct and then represses it so it can move on.  Thereafter through a ‘substitutive 
satisfaction’ the instinctual demand will try to ‘push’ its way through the ego’s 
defences.  Where it pushes through is interesting, because Freud will call it the ‘scar 
of repression’.  Here at the site of the scar, which Freud will call a weak spot 
reminiscent of the other weak spots Freud depicts in his psychoanalysis ‘that lay bare 
his/her entire mental life’ (SE 10: 243) a ‘scar of repression’ remains. Freud will 
argue that ‘Affective states have become incorporated in the mind as precipitates of 
primeval traumatic experiences, and when a similar situation occurs they are revived 
like mnemic symbols’ (SE 20: 93). Thus Laub’s little boy suffering a severe 
psychological shock with the separation from his mother resorts to a kind of ‘pagan’ 
worship of her image.  That the image and the real mother do not coalesce results in a 
dramatic breakdown of his ‘ego’ and a flooding of the affect of anxiety felt in the 
repetition of the nightmare. 
 
Freud argues that danger is both a lose of objects and a loss of perception for the ego 
and as Weber makes explicit the danger is understood as a ‘trauma’ it shocks the ego 
from ‘retaining and maintaining fixed cathexes (that is energy more or less stably 
invested in representation) (Weber, 1991: 155).  Weber extends this description of 
trauma by taking us back to Freud’s definition of ‘perceptual identities’ in The 
Interpretation of Dreams: a concept that combines wishes (desires) ‘out of which the 
very relationship of trauma emerges’ (Weber, 1991: 155). Weber reminds us that the 
perceptual identity ‘arises when a memory trace or image is reproduced in a quasi-
hallucinatory manner, in order to repeat the experience of satisfaction with which it 
has remained associated’ (Weber, 1991: 155). This is the experience of Laub’s little 
boy.  The photograph and the praying fall into Freud’s conception of a perceptual 
identity as a means to avert anxiety.  When his mother returns the anxiety ‘ruptures’ 
into the most ‘dense’ form of anxiety according to Lacan and Jones, the nightmare.  
This is because, Weber states:  
The radical discrepancy between the representation, and that which it signifies, 
but cannot represent – for the simple reason that a shift in tension is not as 
such representable – is the structural essence both of the heterogeneity that 
separates all desire from its “object” and of the “trauma” discerned by Freud 





Weber tells us, that yes confusion tends to abound towards a description of anxiety 
but a return to Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, once again, might untangle it.  In the 
description Weber uses Freud is defending his dream analysis against the charge that 
‘all accounts of dreams only falsify the latter’.  ‘Yes’, says Freud, ‘the recounting of 
the dream disfigures it’. ‘No’, states Freud, ‘“such a disfiguration does not disqualify 
itself as an access to the dream”’ (Weber, 1991: 156).  The movement between the 
affirmation and the denial is what Weber calls ‘psychoanalytic thinking’:  
 
The “it” of the discourse of psychoanalytic theory, like the Id that theory seeks 
to describe, entails a region of indeterminacy in which object and subject, 
signifier and signified, far from being clearly distinct, tend to redouble one 
another in a play of mirrors and shadows that one should not to hastily 
disqualify as “imaginary” (Weber, 1991: 156). 
 
It is precisely this ‘it’ then that makes of Freud’s discourse in Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety (SE 20) so ‘seesawing’ to use Weber’s word.  Thus, as I argued above 
Weber will state that Freud’s theory on anxiety becomes what he is describing, 
anxiety in ‘affect’, trumps anxiety.  
 
With Freud’s new (final) theory of anxiety he shifted the parameters of not only 
anxieties relation to the ego, the ego as the ‘seat of anxiety’ but to repression and 
libido also: by reversing his equation anxiety now lays behind repression instead of 
before repression. Freud told Fliess that he wanted to get behind repression, to the 
essential something behind it.  In doing so he finds anxiety but the problem with 
anxiety is it seems to have a slippery countenance. It has no ‘proper place’.  But in 
fact Freud finishes his exposition on anxiety by saying, ‘I don’t really have much 
more to offer you, that’s all we know’.  Freud is right to critique Rank’s theory of 
birth trauma; all animals give birth says Freud and Rank’s proposition of this trauma 
‘floats in the air’ because it is not based on ‘observation’. There is no ‘evidence’ of a 
correlation between birth trauma and anxiety says Freud.  But Rank’s argument is that 
finally the repetition of birth trauma of the separation anxiety is unconscious.  By 
making the ego the seat of anxiety Freud effectively displaces the id.   
 
It is the psychoanalyst’s task argues Freud, to reconcile the ego to the id’s demands, 
therefore, to make the ego free from the restrictions of the super-ego and to ‘give it 
165 
 
back the command over the id which it has lost owing to its early repressions’ (SE 20: 
205).  But if what is lurking behind these early repressions is anxiety then how do we 
give the ego back the command when it seems that the act of repression effectively 
keeps anxiety at bay? Obviously we feel the affect of anxiety but there seems to be the 
suggestion that there is more happening here behind the scenes as it were that anxiety 
for all its ‘discontented’ mantra simply will not let us see. This could well be a 
protective mechanism against the loneliness, darkness and helplessness we experience 
because of the affects of anxiety. 
 
This ‘behind’ and ‘before’ is evocative of the position of the mother in Freud. If she is 
a before in the sense that as a before she is pre-Oedipal then she loses something in a 
theory that rests on the resolution of an Oedipus complex. She will as Sprengnether 
points out be forever haunting ‘the house of Oedipus’ (Sprengnether, 1990: 5).  If she 
is behind then like Jonte-Pace’s depiction of a counter-thesis she lays beneath 
Freudian theory proper we could say. Like Sprengnether’s ghost, Jonte-Pace’s 
counter-thesis is always in the process of coming to the surface, of being seen.  But 
the difficulty in both of these positions is that while they attempt to give a ‘presence’ 
to the mother, where she seems to be marked by an absence, she is never able to be 
‘whole’. The position of the mother then is always already returned to a ‘hole’ 
whether as an asylum for the penis or as something Freud needs to straddle, because 
he cannot get through it (the tangle of hair) and the unknown quality of it (death) is 
too frightening so he turns away.   
 
Weber states, ‘Anxiety’ as Nietzsche among others, and here we can include Freud 
and Rank, argue is ‘related etymologically to the idea of “confinement” (Angst, from 
Enge: narrow): to “lack”, if you will, but above all, to a lack of breath.  Anxiety is 
perhaps what one feels when the world reveals itself to be caught up in the space 
between two frames; a doubled frame, or one that is split, who can tell?’ (Weber, 
1991: 167). One final remark says Weber.  At the end of Kierkegaard’s thesis on 
anxiety (“the pivot upon which everything turns”) he states: 
 
Anxiety discovers destiny, but just when the individual wants to put his trust 
in destiny, anxiety turns around and takes destiny away, because destiny is like 
anxiety, and anxiety, like possibility, is a “magic” picture (Kierkegaard cited 




Weber continues,  
 
            The Danish word that is here rendered as “magic picture” is: 
Heksebrev, literally, witch’s letter.  A “witch’s letter” is a set of picture 
segments of people and animals that recombine when unfolded and turned.” If 
we ever get “beyond the limits of anxiety,” beyond transference, or to any of 
the other “beyond” one might conceive, we might find a witch’s letter waiting 
there to greet us (Weber, 1991: 167). 
 
A witch’s letter beyond anxiety, beyond transference…what kind of witch’s letter 
might be waiting for us?  Freud argued that it never failed to dismay him, and that he 
did not really like it very much, when he was identified as the mother in an analysis.  
To get beyond transference then, we are moving beyond the mother.  Or perhaps we 
are getting to the mother given that she remains for the most part unrecognised. As for 
the figure of the witch, well the mother is always already the witch according to Klein 
and Horney: ‘The witch…only introduces a figure…of the mother imago…split off 
from his beloved mother, in order to maintain her as she is, the woman with the penis’ 
(Klein cited by Torok, Sylwan and Covello, 1998: 71 (italics added to emphasise 
Horney’s concept of the mother as ‘she is’ – see Chapter Two, page 38). But we have 
met this Witch before, as the Witch Freud calls on to aid him in his metapsychology 
as I discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
Rethinking Freudian anxiety through Lacan 
Weber argues that Lacan’s theory of anxiety functions on the famous ‘fallen object’ 
the object a which cannot be contained in the mirror image but might be found in the 
frame of the window or the curtain of the theatre argues Weber (Weber, 1991: 161).  
The subject says Weber encounters the object a in and as anxiety.  Lacan states that 
the problem of anxiety is a ‘snag’, ‘one should not come to terms too quickly with 
anxiety’ (Lacan in Weber, 1991: 162).  Weber argues that Lacan addressed anxiety in 
his lectures for a year and then ‘nothing’ (or not much).  ‘Could it be’ says Weber, 
‘that by thus dropping out, anxiety assumes the role of the o [object a] in Lacanian 
discourse itself?’ (Weber, 1991: 164). A valuable question when one considers that 
for Lacan anxiety was the means through which the ‘disparate membra’ of Lacanian 




The next part of this chapter will look at Lacan’s mirror-stage and his object a, which 
seem to have an intimate relationship with both the mother and anxiety. Alongside of 
these will be a discussion of Winnicott’s transitional object which seems to be never 
quite what it is represented as – which might be precisely the point given that 
Winncott specifically asked ‘intellectuals’ to think of it as a paradox.  Interspersed 
with Winnicott and Lacan’s theories is Ferenczi’s magical omnipotent stages, which 
while they are explicitly about the infants belief in his/her own ‘supremacy’, the baby 
as the ‘bundle of id’ Ferenczi makes clear that these stages are only effective if 
‘constructed’ in the realm of a ‘good-enough mother’.  It might be pertinent to note 
that Ferenczi came before Winnicott so his idea of the ‘good-enough mother’ which I 
assume will be similar to Winnicott’s conception may not in fact have be the same 
‘thing’.  Also as Torak and Rand point out Winnicott relied on several of Ferenczi’s 
ideas without acknowledging that he did so (Torak and Rand, 1997: 133). The 
following then is a detour of types, taking another pathway as Freud might have it 
with the intent of arriving back where we left, that is, at the nodal point of anxiety. 
 
The mirror-stage 
According to Sheridan, the Imaginary70 was Lacan’s first ‘stage’ and was conceived 
at a time when Lacan regarded ‘identification as the fundamental psychical process’ 
(Sheridan, 1977, 1966: ix).  Possibly working through Lorenz and certainly favouring 
studies in animal ethology Lacan’s mirror stage grew out of, is synonymous, one 
might say, with the Imaginary (although Stuart Schneiderman in his introduction in 
‘Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan’ (1980) argues 
that he mirror-stage came first and then the three registers: Imaginary, Real, 
Symbolic.)71 Catherine Clement argues that what Lacan identified in his 
                                                 
70 Lowe argues that the Lacanian notion of the Imaginary is rewritten by Kristeva ‘as 
a female pre-Oedipal phase’ which ‘privileges the infant’s identification with the 
mother rather than the specular identification stressed by Lacan’: ‘The child is bound 
to the mother’s body without that body being, as yet, ‘other’; rather, her body 
‘pleasures’ with the child’s body itself, in a kind of natural/social continuum’ 
(Kristeva cited by Lowe, 1993: 154). 
71 According to Sheridan, the ‘Real’ ‘stands for what is neither symbolic nor 
imaginary…but the Real cannot exist without the Symbolic’ (Sheridan, 1977: x).  
Sheridan quotes Lacan as saying ‘the real is the impossible’ (1977: x), which Clement 
argues is because the Real is ‘always already there’ and in being so ‘it is impossible to 
see, to speak, or to hear’ (Clement, 1983: 168).  In Lacan’s words, ‘It is there, 
identical with its existence, noise from which one can hear everything, and ready to 
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‘investigation’ of feminine paranoia, specifically, Christine and Léa Papin and Aimée 
was the ‘mirror-stage’.  This was revealed in the act of the double: Christine and Léa 
as ‘twin-selves’ and Aimée with her series of masks, which she viewed as 
duplications of herself.  Clement suggests that Lacan ‘glimpsed the crucial importance 
of an essential phase in the constitution of her human personality: the moment when 
one becomes oneself because one is no longer the same as one’s mother.  What Lacan 
finally discovered in his studies of women and never repudiated thereafter was the 
danger of too much closeness, the misfortune of one person’s identification with 
another’ (Clement, 1983: 76).  The mirror stage shows us that there is a ‘correct 
distance’ and this ‘correct distance’ needs to be established in our early identifications 
with self and Other otherwise psychical or physical disintegration may occur.  This is 
obviously, as Clement argues the case with Oedipus and Jocasta; their reunification is 
                                                                                                                                            
demolish what the ‘reality principle’ constructs under the name external world’(in 
Clement, 1983: 169).  The Real describes what is lacking in the symbolic order ‘the 
ineliminable residue of all articulation’ but it is something that can never be grasped.  
It is ‘the umbilical cord of the symbolic’ according to Sheridan (1977: x).  It is 
important to note that Lacan’s notion of the Real has nothing to do with reality.  But 
the fact that he juxtaposed the Real to the impossible should illustrate something 
about the Real that is too difficult to express and which when it does ‘break through’ 
the Symbolic barrier is ‘terrifying’ (Clement, 1983: 168).  Clement sums up her 
notion of Lacan’s Real by stating, ‘the Real partakes of both the Id’s disconcerting 
and unpredictable powers—always ahead of its time—and the terrifying archaic 
images associated with the Mother’ (Clement, 1983: 169).  The link between the 
Imaginary, the Ego and the Mirror-stage suggests that the ‘ego’ is a kind of cover to 
keep the subject safe.  Clement suggests that it is ‘a kind of garment, the first layer of 
which is armor, a protective covering that puts the subject beyond harm’ (Clement, 
1983: 169).  The cognito has no place in Lacan’s ‘structure’ because the act of seeing 
and therefore of knowing what the mirror stage should afford does not occur.  Thus 
the mirror stage and the Imaginary are primarily narcissistic. Clement suggests that 
we think of the three registers, the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic as ‘every 
individual’s life game’ following Lacan’s predilection for games, thus the ‘Symbolic 
precedes the game: in contrast to the Real, which is ‘always-already-there’, the 
Symbolic endures forever’ (Clement, 1983: 168-169). The Symbolic then could be 
understood as the determining order of the subject and as Sheridan argues, ‘its effects 
are radical’ (Sheridan, 1977: ix).  Weber argues that part of Lacan’s issue with the 
schools of American ego-psychology is that they neglect the ‘symbolic processes that 
were at the heart of Freud’s discoveries’ (Weber, 1991: 107).  To understand the 
Symbolic is to understand that it is the ‘showing of itself’ not the ‘show’ that is the 
reality of the Symbolic (Weber, 1991: 108). Weber argues that without the Imaginary 
the Symbolic would ‘fall’ to pieces, an adequate metaphor given that the child’s 




too close. Correct distance can also be to far away as Bowlby made clear, albeit in 
different language to Lacan, with his Attachment theory.   
 
The ‘Mother’ argues Clement, ‘is first of all the image of the All’: 
 
The “good” All, the perfect All, nostalgic, integrating: the circle rejoined, 
the Magdeburg sphere, the ball, the complete organism, the mandala . . . 
the atom, the glass bubble, the earth as in Hieronymus Bosch’s triptych, 
The Garden of Earthly Delights.  A greenish-grey sphere speckled with 
tiny clouds and above it the trunk of God.  The triptych opens up; the 
sphere explodes.  This is the separation. … It is also the weaning. … The 
root of separation, then, lies in weaning. … But at this point…Lacan 
discovered a handy little device. …the mirror stage.  
 
Elizabeth Grosz argues that ‘Lacan’s account of the ego is chronologically his first, 
and most accessible, intervention into the ‘reading’ of Freud’ (Grosz, 1990: 31).  The 
mirror stage, understood as a developmental stage encompasses the ages of 6-18 
months and occurs when the child views him/herself in front of the mirror for the first 
time.  The child laughs, ‘the jubilant assumption’ says Lacan (1977: 2). The laugh is 
not sarcastic, ironic or a chortle argues Clement, is it, ‘pure enjoyment’. We can 
understand this ‘jubilant assumption’ argues Clement as both biblical and 
mythological, as in the ‘Assumption’, the Virgin being impregnated by the Holy 
Ghost, which as Clement writes involves an intermediary, the Angel Gabriel.  But 
also from the verb ‘to assume’, which is a derivative of assumption and can be 
interpreted as ‘assuming responsibility for oneself’ (Clement, 1983: 85).  Lacan 
extends the metaphor of the ‘jubilant assumption’, the laugh, with the ‘purifying’ 
measure of the ‘child at the mirror, turning around to the person carrying it, appeals 
to the witness who decants, by verifying it, the recognition of the image from the 
jubilant assumption, in which, to be sure, it [such a recognition] already was’ (Lacan 
quoted by Weber, 1991: 116). The use of Lacan’s word ‘decant’ will be seen in his 
use of the word ‘precipitate’ to describe the way that the signifier ‘falls out’ into the 
signified: a process of sedimentation according to Lacan (in Weber, 1993: 117).  Thus 
the child turning around to ‘decant’ its image, has the meaning to ‘purify it’ to 
separate and decontaminate (Weber, 1983: 117). That there is an-other involved in 
this ‘turning around’, as the ‘measure’ of this process of ‘decanting’ alleviates the 
child’s anxiety suggests Lacan.  But also, the turning around here signifies the 
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infants/child’s turning away from the Gestalt and toward the look of another (and here 
I am going to say its mother). Lacan refers to this as the theatre of the Symbolic. That 
the process of decanting, if we were to take it literally, is to ‘pour out’, to ‘transfer’ to 
‘empty’ suggests that ‘the witness who decants’ (the mother) who in the process of 
decanting, ‘creates’ sedimentation is involved in a ‘recognition’ (and I include all 
meanings of recognition here) and the ‘shaping’ of the infant/child. To be sure, and as 
Lacan verifies the mirror stage is the crucial first step in the development of the ego. 
Through the use of the terms ‘decant’, ‘sedimentation’ and the description of the 
signifier ‘falling’ into the signified, seems to lead us back to the etymological 
meanings associated with both mother and mud as I have argued throughout this 
thesis. Importantly, the mirror-stage occurs after weaning, which is indicated in the 
actions of the infant/child both a turning around and a turning away.  
 
The child’s reaction to its mirror-stage distinguishes it from a chimpanzee’s 
recognition of itself in the mirror because once the chimpanzee realises the image is 
itself it loses interest.  The infant/child in contrast perceives the unity of the image but 
cannot place this unity in its own body (Weber, 1991: 12).  This is because the human 
infant is ‘premature’.  Human babies are dependent on the care of their mothers for a 
longer period of time than any other animal. The child though has a sophistication that 
other animals do not have.  It perceives itself but does so by perceiving an-other, 
usually its mother in the mirror image with it. From the recognition of its self in the 
mirror derives the constitution of the ego ‘and above all: the destiny – of the ego’ 
(Weber, 1991: 12).  Before all of Lacan’s theoretical machinations argues Clement 
came this important biological first step, the image in the mirror (Clement, 1983: 86).  
 
The ego then according to Lacan is constituted through the child’s identification with 
an image, an image that is not wholly ‘I’.  But the child overlooks this difference, sees 
instead a similarity that does not, and will not ever really exist.  Lacan calls this mis-
recognition of the self, orthopaedic and adds, ‘the armour of an alienating identity … 
will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’ (Lacan, 
1977: 4). The ego thereafter offers and fluctuates between a series of different guises 
(as well of that which the subject understands as normal), which Lacan describes as 
‘phantasies of dismembered bodies, hallucinations of doubles, Hieronymus Bosch’s 
paintings, and Hans Bellmer’s puppets’ (Weber, 1991: 14).  The mirror stage is a 
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phase, a turning-point that will be repeated incessantly, ‘caught up in the 
“inexhaustible squaring of its own vicious circle of ego-confirmations”’ (Weber, 
1991: 14).  According to Lacan this vicious circle is not the result of social conditions 
or of subjective interaction its roots are intrasubjective, ‘deriving from a relationship 
of mis-recognition, through which the ego comes to be by taking the place of the 
imaginary other’ (in Weber, 1991: 14). Thus in order to be an ‘I’ the subject is 
subjected, if that is the word, to a alienation of itself.  Clement calls this ‘being a 
prisoner of his/her identity’. For the subject to say ‘I am’ it must deny the irrevocable 
alterity of the image, that which constitutes the ego and instead internalise what it 
understands this relationship to be.  As Weber argues the ego becomes auto-reflective 
rather than hetero-reflective which is acknowledged by the subject’s own self-
consciousness (Weber, 1991: 14).  Lacan suggests that the ego forgets that the ‘‘I’ is 
another’ (in Weber, 1991: 14).  But this forgetting seems also to forget that the image 
of ‘another’ is in the first place an image of the mother.  
 
The mirror-stage takes account of the fictive nature of the ego and in doing so, 
illuminates the myth from which the Freudian ego arises, that of Narcissus.  Lacan 
argues that the Greek myth of Narcissus from which Freud formulated the concept of 
‘primary narcissism’, has forgotten its own mythic root.  Narcissus fell in love with 
the image of himself and this image with its ‘siren call’ ultimately (untimely) caused 
his death: through death, the image and Narcissus were now one.  It might be 
remembered that the image is not a representation of the subject in Lacan’s schema.  
Rather the image as object affected in a Spaltung, the irremediable split reinscribes 
the split as a chain of doubles, which ultimately depend on the image and its 
ostensible original (Weber, 1991: 16).   
 
One could read the mirror-stage then as both a ‘representation’ of what Kristeva will 
call a ‘gaping hole’ at the centre of the psyche, albeit as a visible band-aid for the 
subject’s growing sense of ‘identity’ and as a phase or developmental stage as 
Clement argues.  This would suggest that Lacan is aware the mirror-stage is saying 
something about ‘the human psyche’ that is so integral to the development of the 
ego/‘I’ that he can only offer ‘supplements’ to help am-mend it.  For Kristeva it is 
Freudian narcissism (primary narcissism) in conjunction with the emptiness (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) that hold Lacan’s child of the mirror-image at bay and not 
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as Lacan would have it the visual representation that adds up to some form of 
‘orthopaedic totality.’ Lacan in fact questions both the structure and function of the 
representation of the image.  To elaborate this Lacan introduces us to a common 
enough example in Western culture, lavatory doors segregated by the denominations 
of male and female. Two children, a boy and a girl are looking at the signifiers of the 
difference of these two lavatory doors as a railway train pulls into a station and both 
declare that they see the ‘other’, and thus the relationship between the sexes is called 
into question. In fact Lacan says that henceforth, ‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’ will be 
‘two countries towards which each of their souls will strive on divergent wings, and 
between which a truce will be the more impossible since they are actually the same 
country and neither can compromise on its own superiority without detracting from 
the glory of the other’ (Lacan, 1977: 152).  Weber argues that Lacan’s use of the toilet 
doors is no accident because the toilet is ‘a place that is never entirely “proper”, and 
to which access is generally more or less regulated’ (Weber, 1991: 43).  In Lacan’s 
illustration the toilet doors are closed which suggests that we can never be sure what 
is behind the doors and argues Weber, for Lacan ‘this is probably the most important 
aspect of the story’ (Weber, 1991: 43) because only someone ‘who doesn’t have holes 
in front of his eyes’72 (Weber, 1991: 43) ‘could possibly confuse the place of the 
signifier and the signified in this story’ (Lacan, 1977: 152).  Only someone without 
holes in front of his eyes could not see the signifier sent forth from a radiating centre 
‘into the shadow of incomplete signification’ (Lacan, 1977: 153).  Weber argues that 
the ‘traditional pathos of a metaphorics of light and darkness’ (Weber, 1991: 44) is 
evoked here by Lacan and that further there is a suggestion that what ‘radiates behind 
the bar of the signifier is the light of a hole’ (Weber, 1991: 44).  This is not a light that 
emanates through holes but is that of the hole.  We see objects only because of the 
precipitation73 of the signifier but in fact we only see them because ‘we can see the 
                                                 
72 In the Sheridan translation of Lacan’s Ecrits, this reads, ‘…who didn’t have his 
eyes in front of the holes…’ (1977).  I have quoted Weber’s translation of this 
sentence although he refers to Sheridan’s edition of Ecrits as well as the original in 
French. There is a wealth of difference between having ‘holes in front of your eyes’ to 
having ‘eyes in front of the holes.’  I have used the translation that makes sense to the 
argument, presented by Weber. 
73 Here Lacan is playing on ‘condensation’, ‘fall’ and ‘ground’. ‘“One sees,” writes 
Lacan, “that metaphor occurs at the precise point where sense takes place in non-
sense.”’  This taking-place, Lacan argues, is described in Freud’s theory of jokes, as 
well as in his account of condensation [Verdichtung]’ (Weber, 1991: 57). 
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holes: that is, the interstices, through which they relate to one another and delineate 
themselves’ (Weber, 1991: 44).  Thus it is not just the holes between objects and 
words that we see but the holes within the words and objects.  What one is allowed to 
see or what one thinks they see is not invisible as such but acts as, or at least is 
perceptually concealed by a hole/holes.  Whether we open the door (the not proper 
place of the toilet) or leave it shut and imagine we already know what is behind the 
door touches on Freud’s conception of the ‘lost object’ and also the phallus and 
‘desire’ as Lacan conceived of them according to Weber (1991: 45).  There is word-
play here of course with Lacan, between the rails and the raillery of word-play, of 
joking which suggests the ambivalence of the object itself.  Lacan appears to be 
saying that the object is in a constant state of fall (which in physics would suggest it 
has stopped, or alternatively is a measure of entropy) and that only the signifier or 
signifiers can save if from ‘falling out of this world’ to paraphrase Freud.   
 
To make clear the ‘irreconcilable difference’ that ‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’ evoke 
Weber takes Lacan back to Freud.  In Freud’s dream theory he offers a fairy-tale to 
help explain the ego’s place in the wish-fulfilment of a dream.  Freud argues, ‘Thus, 
in his relation to his dream-wishes, a dreamer can only be compared to an 
amalgamation of two separate people linked by some important element’ (SE 5: 580-
581 n 1, SE 17: 246, Weber, 1991: 78).  The ‘familiar fairy tale’ Freud offers is that of 
a husband and wife who are offered three wishes by a good fairy.  The wife, in spite 
of the couple’s desire to use their wishes wisely, is tempted by the smell of cooking 
sausages and wishes for a couple of them.  The husband angry with his wife and her 
ridiculous wish, wishes that the sausages were hung from his wife’s nose.  Finally, 
and because they must, the husband and wife wish together, as it were, that the 
sausages were never there.  And thus, they are back where they began, the knowledge 
of the wishes offered but never really fulfilled because they finally amounted to 
nothing.  The story of the husband and wife is made clear and the objects of their 
desire (her desire), the sausages (as a displacement for something else) are because of 
a perceptual invisibility rendered as holes in the final analysis of the fable.  Freud’s 
story argues Weber, ‘confronts us with nothing less than the constitutive relationship 
between desire and the phallus – or more exactly, between desire and castration’ 





(Weber, 1991: 79).  Husband and Wife are not two separate people but one, in that the 
one is the dreamer him/herself displaced as it were on to an-other.  Freud argues that 
‘I may safely assume that my own ego lies concealed, by identification, behind this 
other person; I may fill in my ego [Ich darf mein Ich ergänzen]’ (SE 4, 322-323, 
Weber, 1991: 80).  Alternatively when the dreamer’s own ego is represented in the 
dream, it may be that some other person lies behind my ego.  Weber argues that the 
German is ambiguous, ‘I may fill in my ego’ means to both complete my ego and to 
complete the scene by adding my ego to it – precisely at the place where the non-ego 
appears (Weber, 1991: 81).  The dream like the mirror-stage creates an imaginary 
illusion of the ego as whole and more as omnipotent in spite of its obvious 
fragmentation. Both the mirror-stage and the dream have the factor of repression, 
albeit in different ways, aiding this egoistic game of hide and seek, that is a game 
wholly about the presence and absence of the dreamers own ego.  Lacan takes this 
multiplication of the ‘I’ and suggests that what Freud was trying to say can be 
configured in the question, ‘Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier 
concentric or eccentric with respect to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? – 
that is the question’ (in Weber, 1991: 85).  The anomaly in the function of the ‘I’, the 
‘I’ as ‘scribe’ in a dream, who ‘receives’ the dream but is not author of it, is 
‘recognised by Freud as that which constitutes the norm’74a norm that encapsulates an 
other, variously described by Lacan as ‘the signifier, of enunciation, or of the 
unconscious’. One is quite literally, ‘subject to the other’ (in Weber, 1991: 86).  
Lacan enacts his own return to the first train journey depicting sexual difference on 
toilet doors, and here adds, that the ‘I’ of the shifter75 and here we might say ‘drifter’ 
‘whose only “home” is the rails of the signifying train (or the metonymic chain).  
What deranges in this re-inscription of the subject is that its destiny is no longer 
simply to follow the rails of the signifier, but rather to be derailed’ (Weber, 1991: 89-
90).  The subject then is located in a place where it can never arrive.  The subject is 
determined by its own ‘impossibility’ and translated into an image of itself, is called a 
‘fader’; ‘The subject only appears, insofar as it fades’ (Weber, 1991: 90).  
 
                                                 
74 And as Weber makes clear ‘norm’ does not really figure in Freudian terminology. 
75 Structural linguists such as Roman Jakobson and Emile Benveniste (working from 
Jakobson) describe the ‘I’ as a shifter.  The ‘I’ is both product of the enunciation and 





There are very few authors concerned with Lacan’s work who do not posit the object 
a as unconditionally a Lacanian concept.  Schneiderman states that Lacan considered 
the object a as one of his major contributions to psychoanalysis (Schneiderman, 1980: 
7).  Schneiderman defines Lacan’s concept as ‘an object that causes someone to 
desire’ (Schneiderman, 1980: 7). Clement argues, ‘In the Lacanian lexicon the ‘objet-
petit-a’ represents the little machine that unleashes desire’ (Clement, 1983: 99). In 
contrast Sheridan does not explain the concept in his glossary of Lacanian terms 
suggesting that Lacan himself refused to comment on it, advocating that the reader 
come to terms with it through the ‘working through’ of his work.  The ‘objet-petit-a’ 
is to be left untranslated at Lacan’s instruction (Clement,1983, Schneiderman, 1980, 
Vanier, 2000). Jacques-Alain Miller says that ‘The object a is a singular Lacanian 
substance, made of a lack, but a lack that is constant gives to a subject an illusion of 
synthesis’ (Miller, 1980: 51).    
 
The ‘objet-petit-a’ is almost as indescribable as it is untranslatable. Clement sees it as 
being intricately connected to the Hommelette as I discussed in Chapter One, the 
Hommelette offering a fable irresistible to this project.  But the object a – the 
remainder, leftover, trace – says something important about the process of what Freud 
called ‘Ichspaltung’ the first separation.  Clement calls the object a a ‘fallen object’ 
and I like this description because as she writes it, it falls from the body at birth – and 
importantly this is the mothers body – alongside the baby, the afterbirth and the 
Hommelette.  Thus what defines Freud’s fundamental cleavage are the ‘things’ that 
‘fall/out’ at birth, which leave something behind.  Narcissism and anxiety seem to 
have a direct relation to these ‘things’; direct in that they are an integral part of the 
process, but indirect in that narcissism as Kristeva would have it covers an emptiness 
and anxiety as Lacan argues ‘Is not the fear of nothing, the flight or fright before a 
void, but rather the encounter with the object a that marks the spot where there is a 
lack’ (in Schneiderman, 1980: 8).  
 
The object a has its roots (its ‘umbilicus’ even) in Freud’s description of his 
grandson’s play.  The fort-da, a psychoanalytic classic according to Clement, and 
which I described above. Little Ernst made no protest when his mother left, he 
compensated as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects 
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within his reach’ (Freud, 1989: 600). The object of this drive according to Freud is 
indifferent.  It serves only to attain a goal, a goal as Freud rightly points out, appears 
at least in this game, as unpleasurable/Unlust. This drive, variously described as the 
death drive, the death instinct, ‘perhaps even as the only primordial force’ (in 
Laplanche, 1976: 5), urges as it were, the child to play at his mother’s disappearance 
in the hope that she might reappear.  He substitutes the mother for a reel, and now this 
object, the reel, invested with libido stands in for the mother who has become the 
‘radically lost object’ (in Vanier, 2000: 56).  Vanier illustrates Lacan’s argument by 
stating,  
 
As the fort-da game shows, the cut made in the real by symbolisation 
makes the mother into a lost object of which objet a is just a remainder, a 
fragment.  This object is lost not because it has gone away but because of 
the process of symbolisation that, substituted for a symbol for her, has 
“absented” her. … this object orients the life of the subject into a quest for 
the refinding of what was lost.  For as soon as he is in language, the 
subject has only language available to try to refind the object that was lost 
by virtue of language.  This, then, is the paradox: it is at the moment of its 
loss that the object appears as such. … Before this, it was not separate 
from what was not yet the subject. And so it is all the more lost for being 
something that falls away in the operation that constitutes the subject.  
And each attempt to refind it will define it as a bit more missing (Vanier, 
2000: 56). 
 
It might be remembered that this ‘good little boy’ played a similar game of fort-da in 
front of the mirror, although this time the object and the subject are himself.  Again 
the mother was absent and to make up for her absence little Ernst finds a full- length 
mirror that does not quite touch the ground and in which he plays his own game of 
peek-a-boo.  The baby then takes himself as his own object but importantly an object 
constituted in the mirror as the specular image of himself. The object as a composite 
object/subject is caught in what Winnicott called an intermediate area, a third thing. 
Although for Winnicott the mother’s face is the child’s first mirror and her 
expression, whether it is accepting and the child sees itself reflected there, or 
rejecting, whose very rigidity makes the child unsure of this reflection are very real 
stakes in the development of the ego. The mother, it would seem is present, even 
when she is absent, the mirror and the reel emphasise this for the child. Whether we 
see this as ‘origin’ or ‘primordial’ which is how the object-relations school see it 
presumably, misses the point according to Lacan.  The alternation between the two 
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sounds ‘o-o-o-o’ and ‘a-a-a-a’ signify for Lacan the beginning of a linguistic form (in 
Weber, 1991:133).  It is the bridge between the thing- language, symbolised by the 
reel and enunciated through the sounds that oscillate between loss and gain, absence 
and presence.  The game taken in conjunction with the mirror-stage, illustrates how 
the ego is formed as ‘the figure of irremediable alienation’ (Weber, 1991:133).  But 
importantly it is the figure of the mother, her leaving and coming back, that ‘forms the 
matrix of narcissistic identifications’ for the child, even for Lacan (Weber, 1991: 
133). 
 
I have spoken of Kleinian object-relations theory in Chapter Two but I sense that 
there is something in the child’s relation to the object or objects that gets 
misappropriated.  This may be as Rose argues, that the best known version of object-
relations concentrates on the child’s relatedness to the object as a whole as opposed to 
the auto-erotic propensity of the child that ‘introjects’ parts of objects, ‘objects that 
are not quite objects’ in absentia of the mother (Rose, 1998: 135).  Joan Rivière 
elaborates the Kleinian stance by suggesting that the: 
 
Painful experience does much to bring about the recognition of an external 
object.  The infant oscillates between ‘seeking, finding, obtaining, possessing 
with satisfaction’ and ‘losing, lacking, missing, with fear and distress.’ In this 
scenario, and despite references to satisfaction obtained, the emphasis is far 
more frequently on the negative pole.  For the loss of the object forces a 
breach in the primitive narcissism of the subject, a breach which, in a twist, 
then produces the object as its effect: ‘the ego’s need to dissociate itself from 
the unpleasure is so great that it requires an object upon which it can expel it . 
. . For such an experience of unpleasure is too intense to be merely “killed,” 
hallucinated as non-existent.  Narcissistic phantasy would thus in itself lead to 
object-relations and these object-relations will at first be of a negative order’ 
(in Rose, 1998: 135-136).   
 
The unlust/unpleasure of this lost object is so intense that it cannot be hallucinated.  
Further this lost object is unable to be negatively hallucinated which causes it to 
attach to the ego so that the ego – as Lacan says of the ego of the mirror-stage, albeit, 
once again with different ‘tools’ – begins to see itself as alienated, ‘nothing good 
within lasts’.  Kleinian analysts can then invoke Freud by arguing ‘hate is older than 
love’.  Object-relations, argues Rivière are ‘“improvements on” and “protections 
against” primordial narcissistic anxiety; distrust of the object is better than despair’ (in 
Rose, 1998: 136-137).  Rather than ‘primordial’, or ‘origin’, Kleinian negativity can 
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be understood as a ‘psychic activation’ of the fort-da.  Klein believed that she 
answered (more than anybody else) Freud’s question, ‘When does separation from an 
object produce anxiety, when does it produce mourning and when does it produce 
pain? Let me say at once that there is not prospect in sight of answering these 
questions’ (in Rose, 1998: 137).  Freud saw the fort-da as ‘the renunciation of 
instinctual satisfaction’ – the mother as not All, but he did not see the mother’s 
absence as a loss of love for the child.  
 
Ragland-Sullivan argues that the object for Freud was not the whole object any more 
than it was for Lacan, (or for that matter, Klein) but the hallucinatory pleasure 
associated with the object attempted to make it whole.  For Lacan, the ‘lost object has 
become loss itself, while the leftover residue of unconscious effects is the objet a’ 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 44).  Objet a does not imply an object relation or even a 
relation to a unified whole but rather an expression of the loss of reference occurring 
in the gesture of reference itself.  ‘What is lost is any chance for a totalising 
experience of Oneness with the maternal body or gaze’ (Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 44).  
This then is the limit of human freedom initiated in the refusal for mother and infant 
to be ‘all’ for one another (Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 44).  Objet a represents an 
impossible yearning, a leftover from the mirror-stage which recognizes repression as 
an incomplete mode.  ‘Desire is not only an erotic (or positive) function, then, but also 
a signifying (negative) function when representations are linked to repression.  Desire, 
therefore, always exceeds the lack it denotes, marking a place of incompletion or 
aphanisis in language and unconscious representations, thus pointing to a hole in 
being that must continually fill itself up, oscillating between being and nothingness’ 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 45).  The push for Oneness is so strong that unlust and lust 
work together/against each other—create a paradox—a denial that they control their 
own destinies, make their own choices (Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 45).  Lacan not only 
argued that the unconscious was structured like a language but that language and 
desire are there from the start of life (Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 48).  But this seems to 
belie Freud’s contention that repression is not there from the beginning but arises 
through a Spaltung, a cleavage between the conscious and the unconscious (SE 14: 
147). To Freud’s primordial objects, the breast and faeces, Lacan adds the voice, the 
gaze, the phoneme, the ‘nothing’, and the imaginary phallus argues Raglad-Sullivan 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1989: 48).  As we have seen, for Freud each developmental stage 
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is ‘marked by a dominant object: oral, anal, phallic, and, later, genital’ (Vanier, 2000: 
57).  The whole object poses a particular problem for Lacan because as he puts it, 
‘How can we conceptualise the refinding of a whole fully gratifying object?’ (Vanier, 
2000: 57). As I have noted with the mirror-stage, the object-relations school has 
existed in collaborative juxtaposition with Lacan at particular developmental stages – 
however they use different tools to explain these periods.  Although Lacan would 
argue that the tools are almost profound opposites because a part-object presupposes a 
whole object and a ‘whole object is not conceivable because both whole object and 
part object are on opposite sides of a line of demarcation that cannot be crossed or 
undone….’(Vanier, 2000: 57).   
 
It is interesting that Vanier like Clement (although Clement’s focus is ‘play’) compare 
Winnicott, who following Klein is placed in the British school of object-relations 
theory, with Lacan.  Vanier suggests that Winnicott’s notion of the transitional object 
comes closest to Lacan’s objet a (Vanier, 2000: 57).  I pointed out in Chapter Two 
that Winnicott’s theories in particular the transitional object and transitional 
phenomena seem to me, to be, more often than not, misinterpreted. Vanier argues that 
Winnicott’s transitional object and Lacan’s objet a are similar because as he states, 
‘Winnicott emphasizes that, though it [the transitional object] represents the mother or 
a part of her, it is not the mother’ (Vanier, 2000: 57). This is not what Winnicott states 
at all, ‘I should mention that sometimes there is no transitional object except the 
mother herself’ (Winnicott, 1971: 5). Certainly there is linkage between Lacan’s objet 
a and Winnicott’s transitional object and transitional phenomena. A connection that 
Lacan himself allows for.  In his papers on anxiety (1962-1963) he suggests that the 
object a in the appearance of what he calls cedable objects – that is the object a 
through the very processes that constitutes it as a ‘lost object’ ‘cedes’ its position – its 
function to that loss.  This is what Lacan refers to as ‘lack’ (in Weber, 1991: 159).  
Winnicott’s transitional object(s) take up the function of this lack according to Lacan 
(Lacan, 1962-1963: 4). He understands Winnicott’s transitional object, in the position 
of his cedable object a as ‘a little piece of cloth, torn from something’, usually a 
bigger piece of cloth.  He argues for this cedable object as a support for the 
‘subject/child’ and positions Winnicott’s transitional object as the ‘substitute for the 
subject’. The subject is not ‘dissolved in it, he is comforted by it’ says Lacan (1962-




Winnicott argues that his terms ‘transitional objects’ and ‘transitional phenomena’ 
occupy an intermediate area of experiencing, a third part of human life.  This is a ‘not 
challenged’ area, which he refers to as a ‘resting-place’ (Winnicott, 1971: 2).  He 
argues that it is the substance of the illusion that he is studying, ‘that which is allowed 
to the infant, and which in adult life is inherent in art and religion, and yet becomes 
the hallmark of madness when an adult puts too powerful a claim on the credulity of 
others, forcing them to acknowledge a sharing of illusion that is not their own’ 
(Winnicott, 1971: 3). He specifies that he is not referring to the actual object but an 
area between the possession, the not-I, the subjective and ‘that which is objectively 
perceived’ (Winnicott, 1971: 3).  Of transitional phenomena, in which thinking and 
fantasying are included, sound – an infants babbling, a toddlers repertory of songs, 
and bits of things, such as the edge of a blanket, cotton wool to caress a cheek; the 
child’s own body before it distinguishes that it is its own body, the external, as in 
actual, breast, objects that are other-than-me stand in for a ‘internal/illusory’ breast, 
but indirectly.  This sounds like Klein but as Winnicott points out the transitional 
object is not an internal object, which is a mental concept, ‘it is a possession.  Yet it is 
not (for the infant) an external object either’ (Winnicott, 1971: 9). The transitional 
object is never under magical control like Klein’s internal object, although it has a 
magical omnipotent quality, ‘nor is it outside control as the real mother is’ (Winnicott, 
1971: 10).  What Winnicott stresses which is quite different to Klein’s mother who is 
constantly being ‘pulled apart’ then pasted back together only to be pulled apart again, 
is that for the transitional object to be successful, that is, for a healthy psyche to 
develop then the baby must have a whole mother.  The intermediate area needs a 
‘good-enough mother’ to start it off or it will never be successfully completed.  Thus, 
the mother initially at least, adapts to the infants demands, affording it almost a 
hundred percent of herself.  This is gradually lessened and the infant through the 
mother’s ‘failure’ to meet its demands learns to adapt in turn and thus make of its 
objects living things that are hated as well as loved.  Winnicott warns, like Lacan, that 
if the dyad of mother and baby is not subject to this failure, if the mother is not seen 
as separate to the infant then disillusion, which would be ascension to the reality 
principle and beyond primary identification, will not occur.  There is slippage 
between transitional phenomena and the transitional object although the transitional 
object as I understand it, is transitional phenomena that is privileged by the infant 
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above all else.  Thus the mother for some, a ‘gugee’ for others.76  Initially the infant is 
given a mother – and a mother is given an infant – who creates an illusory experience 
for the infant (and Winnicott distinguishes this from Freud’s hallucinatory object) of 
which the infant imagines that it controls.  A shape is given to this (these) illusion(s) 
and to that Winnicott applies the function of the transitional object and of transitional 
phenomena (Winnicott, 1971: 12).  This intermediate area, where illusion and 
disillusion are played out finds continuity in child play.  The paradox that Winnicott 
called our attention to at the beginning of his description of the transitional object and 
transitional phenomena leads to a resolution of sorts and the development of true or 
false personality types according to the Winnicottian schema. 
 
Just as the fort-da, the mirror-stage and the transitional object say something about the 
lost object or the missing object (the primordial object?), play or the game says 
something about ‘mastery’, over this loss.  Perhaps that’s not quite correct, perhaps it 
is more of an acceptance, coupled with play designed to ‘magically’ bring the object 
back. For Winnicott, ‘To play is to do’ (Clement, 1983: 164).  Further Winnicott 
states, ‘Play is natural, and psychoanalysis is a very sophisticated twentieth-century 
phenomenon.  It is useful to remind the analyst constantly not only what he owes to 
Freud but also what all of us owe to that natural and universal thing, the game’ 
(Clement, 1983: 164).  
 
For Winnicott, the game is an extension of the child’s omnipotent phase.  It is the 
‘space’ in which s/he first exerts control over his/her environment, or at least s/he 
believes s/he has: ‘The precariousness of magic itself is in question, of magic born of 
an intimate relationship of whose reliability the child wishes to assure itself’ 
(Clement, 1983: 164-165). The magic born of this intimate relationship and 
transferred to one special object, of which the child will never mourn because s/he 
never believes it is lost, is for Vanier, Lacan’s object a.  Certainly the fantasy 
attributed to this object, a fantasy constructed out of a belief for the child that the 
object is ‘real’ in the sense that it exists seems to lend some corroboration that the 
transitional object and the ‘object a’ are sourced from the same ‘loss’.  But I am not 
so sure that given an explanation of them both I agree.  Winnicott’s intermediate area 
                                                 
76 For one of my twins I am the transitional object, for the other a ‘shawl’ gifted the 
name of ‘gugee’ is the transitional object.   
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where the transitional phenomena reside is not quite the same as the fallen object, 
Lacan’s objet a.  That being said, the transitional phenomena and the objet a do have 
some relation to the mother, although Winnicott’s expression of this maybe more 
accessible than Lacan’s. Sprengnether argues this well, ‘“(m)other” represents that 
which cannot be appropriated by the child’s or infant’s desire and hence signals a 
condition of division or loss.  That which cannot be appropriated, in my view, is also 
what precipitates the organization of a self, which in turn enfolds and awareness of 
absence, or, in Lacan’s terms, “lack”’ (Sprengnether, 1989: 300).  And further in a 
footnote she writes citing Juliet Mitchell, ‘“A primordially split subject necessitates 
an originally lost object.” That the originally lost object is the mother seems clear in 
Freud’s accounts, less so in Lacan’s’ (in Sprengnether, 1989: 300, n. 6).   
 
Sandor Ferenczi’s ‘magical omnipotent’ stages and the development of the ‘I’ 
Ferenczi suggested that the ego goes through four preliminary stages before becoming 
differentiated as an entity in itself.  He argues that the first stage is an idealised state 
in actuality and also imaginatively.  This is of course the foetus in the womb, which 
lives as a parasite on the mother’s body according to Ferenczi (Ferenczi, 1916: 218).  
In this state, the ‘nascent being’ exists in complete gratification of its ‘needs’ and 
Ferenczi would say ‘desires’, for the idea of an unconscious mind must surely begin 
to function before birth he argues.  In this then he moves away from Freud who would 
have it that the unconscious begins after birth although he admitted that there 
appeared to be archaic vestiges to the unconscious, an unknown, perhaps innate part.77  
For the foetus in the womb the impression of omnipotence must occur suggests 
Ferenczi because all his/her wants are met and s/he has nothing left to wish for.  Thus 
the foetus ‘falls into the world’ with a feeling of ‘majesty’ and Ferenczi identifies this 
as the Period of unconditional omnipotence.  Ferenczi presents a rather idealised 
                                                 
77 The ‘It’ according to Georg Groddeck, which is not the same as Freud’s ‘id’ 
although they have the same meaning in the German translation as ‘Es’.  The ‘It’ has 
some relation to the hommelette, even maybe the object a as it falls from the body at 
birth, but importantly it falls with the baby as part of the baby.  It is perhaps 
analogous to the unconscious part of the id, something innate, which Freud had 
suggested but never fully elaborated.  Freud saw similarities in his unconscious with 
Groddeck’s ‘It’ which Groddeck did not. Groddeck felt that Freud took his ‘id’ from 
Groddeck’s ‘It’. Freud did not disagree saying to Groddeck in a letter that my id 
‘derived from yours’ even though ‘I’ do not recognise ‘my civilised, bourgeois, 
demystified Id in your It’ (in Groddeck, 1977: 93). 
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version of the womb, although in a footnote he does comment that disturbances 
through illness or injury to the mother or indeed to the infant can result in an infant 
born without this feeling of omnipotence.  Thus unless this omnipotence is gratified 
by an extremely ‘giving’ mother (the illusory mother according to Winnicott) the 
child could grow up with a sense of dread as outlined by Harold N. Boris (1994) or 
Wilfred Bion (1967).  In Boris’s book Envy in the chapter titled ‘Tolerating nothing’ 
he gives an account of the dread attached to nothing as that, which has something 
there.  Where absence should be ‘there is instead a presence of an absence’ (Boris, 
1994: 21).   A patient tells Boris that where the nothing should be inside the zero is 
instead a ‘breast sticking its tongue out’ (Boris, 1994: 21).  The nothing is ‘evacuated’ 
into an object of which a few people discover or see.  Just as Lacan can say in his 
seminar on anxiety that Pascal’s interest in the ‘vacuum’ – which is why he wasn’t 
altogether liked in his era or ours - is concerned with the horror associated with the 
thought that there could be a vacuum, a void (Lacan, 1962-1963: 13-14), so to Boris’s 
argument that ‘there is something in some human natures that abhors a vacuum’ 
(Boris, 1994: 22).  The breast, says Boris, should be full and giving, not defiant and 
with-holding; ‘The presence of the absence, the malign force, is the conjunction of the 
breast and the imperative’ (Boris, 1994: 24-25).  The infant, born with a premonition 
of its impending death is met with an empty breast; empty in the sense that the mother 
gives nothing back.  Just as most of us are met with loss in the continual repetition of 
the fort-da argues Boris, for others this loss is filled with a menace that overlays the 
loss.  The sense here is not that presence and absence oscillate between each other, 
but that a malignant presence fills the place where a void should be.  That this is 
frightening is self-evident, and some babies maybe able to surmount this, for others 
argues Boris, their sense of doom is due to the fact that they are not ‘fully into 
possession of their lives’ (Boris, 1994: 25).  He uses a case-study of Bion’s to 
illustrate this point.  This patient, Samuel Beckett no less had an inchoate sense of his 
return to his mother who made him feel ‘dead’.  Bion took Beckett to a lecture by 
Jung where Jung is explaining the case of a young girl who had dreams, which 
foretold her early death.  Jung argued that in fact the girl had been born too soon.  
Although she had had her prerequisite nine months in the womb she was not fully in 
herself.  Bion and Beckett saw that this might also be the case with Beckett who 
apparently thereafter saw himself as cured and who made a theme of this in several of 
his novels.  Boris asks, if the spool for Freud is represented as the absent mother and 
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the child’s ‘magical control of the absent object’ why can’t the spool also be thought 
of as the child who plays at a game of ‘himself’ being thrown away with the 
knowledge that the da might also restore him (Boris, 1994: 26).  This seems to be an 
apt description of Burlingham’s little Sophie that we saw above. I might also note, 
that the notion of ‘unconditional omnipotence’ was first seen in Freud’s 
obsessional/delusional patients, who like the Wolf Man remarked that ‘Life makes me 
so unhappy! I must get back into the womb’ (SE 17: 100).  
 
The infant’s megalomania begins to give way to the power of natural forces according 
to Ferenczi – and he defines this as the essential component in the development of the 
ego – but before he understands the ‘concatenation of cause and effect’ the infant 
believes that his or her wishes – which s/he imagines in a hallucinatory way are what 
brings things to him/her.  This phase Ferenczi calls the Period of magical-
hallucinatory omnipotence (Ferenczi, 1916: 222). The infant – if it has Winnicott’s a 
hundred percent mother – believes that s/he only has to wish for something and it will 
appear.  There is of course slippage between the wish – for the breast – and the 
hallucination of the breast.  Caught up in this magical-hallucinatory stage are the 
beginnings of education – or failure as Winnicott put it (Freud’s economic model). 
Ferenczi suggests that education in sleep patterns where the baby imagines he has the 
breast even though the breast is denied him/her continue throughout life.  Sleep he 
argues is nothing less than the remnant of the earlier magical-hallucinatory phase.  
Sleep which Freud also argued could be viewed as a phantasised return to the womb 
is understood by Ferenczi as illustrative of the ‘absolute omnipotence of the womb 
situation’ (Ferenczi, 1916: 223).  The magical-hallucinatory stage, which is already 
characterised ‘by the occurrence of uncoordinated motor discharges (crying, 
struggling)’ (Ferenczi, 1916: 223) are now utilised by the infant as ‘magic signals’.  
The infant realises that it need only to perform a gesture, reaching out, smiling, 
smacking its lips together, and it will receive the attention it craves.  To this stage 
Ferenczi titles Period of omnipotence by the help of magic gestures. There is a 
language to these gestures, a language that is universally understood according to 
Ferenczi.  At this stage the infant begins to have a sense of the outside world.  This is 
the period where inanimate and animate things are equated, symbolically.  Also the 
infant understands that there are higher ‘divine’ powers, such as those possessed by 
his mother, ‘whose favour he must possess if the satisfaction is to follow closely on 
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the magic gestures’ (Ferenczi, 1916: 229).  Following this, the infant begins to make 
noises that imitate those made to him.  This ensures him attention from the higher 
‘divine’ powers.  The child Ferenczi argues thinks it is in possession of magic 
capacities as through its expressions the mother or another adult respond to its very 
needs.  This is the Period of magic thoughts and magic words.  This is the stage of 
reality development – the spool/reel play of little Ernst – where the renunciation of 
instinctual satisfaction is obtained and the reality principle overtakes the pleasure 
principle.  The ‘cause and effect’ of the natural world is understood but as Ferenczi 
notes, the return of the repressed, of the magical-omnipotent phases is evidenced in 
the adults own role as parent and the telling of the fairy-tale.  For Ferenczi then, the 
question is whether ‘we’ ever really associated with it. 
 
Turning back to Anxiety 
Lacan links anxiety to Freud’s understanding of das unheimliche, which I have 
discussed in Chapter Three. In Lacan’s discussion of the mirror-stage he states ‘there 
is a moment at which this look which appears in the mirror begins to look no longer at 
ourselves, initium, aura, the dawning of a feeling of strangeness which opens the door 
to anxiety’ (Lacan, 1962-1963: 4). The object a has some relation to the double, 
anxiety, and the mother.  But it also, through the intimate association of ‘falling’ has a 
relationship to the Hommelette /lamella, and the soul.  Given that all of these things 
have a first, one could say originary or primordial relationship to the mother – 
admittedly at the beginning as body – and an integral relation to the baby, being that 
they are in effect his/her things, then we can see why the object a seems to occupy 
such a privileged position in the Lacanian doctrine.  It is difficult not to imagine the 
mother, represented by the (w)hole from which dangles, drags, ‘falls’, the baby and 
all its things, the object a, the Hommelette/lamella and the soul.  And this 
composition then is reflected back to us as some form of specular image: but it 
appears as if the image is caught in a fun-house mirror, of the kind you experience at 
the circus, everything is distorted, lumped together, dissociated and returned as 
fragmented whole.  No wonder then we experience anxiety, and why Freud was at 
pains to separate realistic anxiety from neurotic anxiety is made clear in this ‘house of 




‘Three knocks’, ‘the rise of the curtain’ and ‘Suddenly’, ‘all of a sudden’, das 
unheimliche makes its presence felt within Lacan says, the field of anxiety. But 
fascinated by the contents of the mirror (this fun-house mirror) you forget that a 
mirror has edges, has limits, and forgetting you let anxiety in.  A mirror is just a 
metaphor, a window will do just as well, perhaps as Winnicott would have it the 
mother’s face can also be such a metaphor, even Narcissius drowning in his own 
image, each pertains to a kind of horror, an oscillation between heimlich and das 
unheimliche.  In Lacan’s mirror, or indeed within the frame of Lacan’s mirror where 
all these things exist simultaneously and not separately, phantasy and the Real make 
an appearance.  Or it could be said at that the limits of the mirror, in a lacuna, an 
opening, phantasy and the Real ‘seep’ through.  Heimlich with its association to heim 
to things known and comforting is what allows the phenomenon of anxiety a foothold 
says Lacan.  And arguing through Freud’s analysis of the uncanny, Lacan keeps the 
Freudian formula, heimlich necessitates das unheimliche.  Anxiety is the cut in the 
Real that lets the signifier in.  Lacan argues that this cut in the Real is understood in 
the term ‘presentiment’, ‘which is not simply to be understood as the presentiment of 
something, but also the “pre” of feeling, that which is before the birth of feeling’ 
(Lacan, 1962-1963: 7).  Before the affect: this is Freud’s first formula for anxiety, 
which Rank made explicit and Freud let go, that ‘the act of birth is the first experience 
of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety’ (SE 5: 400-
401). Freud concludes his exposition on The Uncanny by saying that infantile anxiety, 
aroused by solitude, silence and darkness remain with us throughout our lives, it is 
‘something that most of us never wholly overcome’ (PE, 2003:159). Lacan’s 
‘presentiment’, his ‘before’ almost slips into a ‘beyond’, beyond anxiety, before 
anxiety, at an archaic level.  As Weber would have it, they often amount to the same 
thing.   
 
Rose states that Freud attempted to deny experiencing the ‘oceanic feeling’ that most 
of us are familiar with.  She argues that Winnicott enters this space where Freud did 
not dare to tread: 
This particular form of danger – that there might be a world without 
boundaries where all founding distinctions are lost – seems, for the most part, 
to have been ignored (repressed one might say).  Indeed, you could argue that 
the emphasis on the adequacy and inadequacy of the mother – what she can 
and should do – has served to make safe or occlude this space: not the space of 
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a necessary lack-in-being in Lacanian terms, but the opposite, a space too full, 
a space that will become our dream of the mother, but which is in fact a space 
with no simple origin, and for which no one is accountable, where the 
divisions inside my own mind, and between me and the other, are unclear.  
One of Bollas’s strongest early points – and a great deal follows from here – is 
that if Freud refused the mother as referent, he more than embraced her into 
the setting of analysis’ (Rose, 2004: 154-155).   
 
Rose argues that to read Bollas is to (re)enter the previously inscribed domain of the 
maternal from several unknown entrances.  But if Bollas is not content to show the 
mother as she is or was, he could in Rose’s words, ‘be seen as bringing to the surface 
of a whole tradition in relation to the mother what she is being asked to carry. He 
could be showing us what psychoanalysis – writing of her and returning to her in what 
so often feels like a punishing scrutiny – no less than any other discourse, repeats’ 
(Rose, 2004: 161-162).  Kristeva argues that what passes through the mother, ‘gnaws 
away at the all-mightiness of the Symbolic’ (in Rose, 2004: 159).  Lacan states that ‘if 
desire were primordial, if it were the desire of the mother which determined the 
bringing into the play of the original crime, we would be in the field of vaudeville’ 
(Lacan, 1962-63:12).  According to Bollas, it is.  In what might be one of his most 
interesting essay’s ‘Cracking Up’ (1995) he has the mother play clown to the infant. 
In fact he argues that the clowning mother might be our very first other and he 
suggests ‘I believe we are entering a primary area and encountering a primordial 
object’ (Bollas, 1995: 236). At this early constitution of the ego then, the clown takes 
precedence.  Freud said something similar when he argued that ‘The ego here plays 
the ludicrous part of the clown in the circus, who, by his gestures, tries to convince 
the audience that every change in the circus ring is being executed in response to his 
command.  But only the most youthful in the audience are taken in’ (SE 14: 53).  Like 
Rose, I think I like this mother as clown best.  Although what is most funny in a 
clown is sometimes most unsettling: when the clown becomes too much, goes to far.  
In the following chapter then, a discussion of Christopher Bollas’s clowning mother 





The Clowning Mother 
 
‘Look up at the sky! There’s a balloon there!’ ‘If I just said “look up” you would look, 
but would you see?’ (SE 16: 437). 
 
‘Know yourself’78 that is the Oracles decree, in ignoring it Oedipus trespassed on the 
boundary of propriety, he ‘did’ the forbidden act.  And his crime, self-blinding, 
‘Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his home’ (SE 4: 262).  But as Tiresias had 
illustrated Oedipus was already intellectually blind. The Oedipus complex, Freud’s 
bulwark against the black tide of mud, is resolutely concerned with ‘sight’; as the 
myth itself is concerned with loss, a loss literally of sight, allegorically with seeing the 
mothers’ horrifying genitals, the Medusa’s head Freud will say. Freud looks, and he 
tells us to look, he tells us that we all look, and that we all turn away in horror. But the 
question might rather be, does he see? Freud tells us that the boy looks away in fright 
because he fears that he will lose his penis – be castrated. The eye is a symbol of this 
loss, but it is also a symbol of the soul and therefore of death and like Gloucester in 
King Lear, (who Freud compares himself to), ‘I have no way, therefore want no eyes; 
I stumbled when I saw’ (IV.1.18-19), Freud looks away. Perhaps this looking away 
involves a rejection of “seeing” through “women’s eyes”: ‘And let not women’s 
weapons, water drops, Stain my man’s cheeks. No, you unnatural hags…’ (II.4.272-
273). Rank argued that not only could Freud not “see” that behind the Oedipus 
situation was a more powerful and primal object – that of the mother, but that through 
Freud’s repression of the ‘castrating mother’ fear and hatred are in-corporeal-ated in 
women (Rank in Kramer ed., 1993:37). Is this a reference to Anna Freud’s 
suggestion, as I stated in Chapter Three, that without the Oedipus Complex there 
would have been no psychoanalysis? That Freud became ‘blind’ to the trauma theory 
for this very reason? But the trauma theory, as does ‘The Project’, haunt Freud’s 
oeuvre, and like the red thread of Goethe’s ‘effective affinities’ (an umbilicus) weave 
there way throughout his work. As this thesis has shown and as this Chapter will 
conclude, Freud never really escapes “seeing” and the Witch/Hag/Mother, far from 
only being called on when needed, has accompanied him all the way.  
                                                 
78 ‘Look into the depths of your own soul and learn first to know yourself, then you 
will understand why this illness was bound to come upon you and perhaps you will 




Mother Mary Mud 
Freud makes clear the link between mother and mud – dejecta as Ferenczi states, 
which incorporates faeces as well (Ferenczi, 1916: 322) without realising he is doing 
so.  In an example of the ‘contrariness’ – ‘condensation’ of words in dreams Freud 
offers the title of a book by Clerk-Maxwell, ‘Matter and Motion’ that he saw (in the 
dream) bound in ‘brown cloth’ (SE 5: 456, 520). This makes him think of Molière’s 
‘Le – ‘La matière est-elle laudable?’ ‘Is the matter laudable’ (it has a feminine 
application). Old medical terminology for ‘Is the excretion healthy?’ ‘A motion of the 
bowels’ states Freud (SE 5: 520). Freud uses Mater/Matrem to describe his mother in 
Latin when she is nudem. Here then is a connection to the example of ‘contrariness’: 
mater, matter, motion. Freud’s example of ‘matter and motion’ is to illustrate 
‘forgetting’ in dreams but also judgment, which he will say is deterred in dreams.  If 
there is judgment in a dream it comes from the manifest content of the dream not the 
latent component.  Forgetting, as Freud makes explicit is about resistance to 
something or someone. He connects the forgetting in the ‘matter and motion’ dream 
to the embarrassment he felt when he gendered a starfish at the seaside. He tells the 
little girl that ‘He is still alive’ and then embarrassed corrects himself. He argues that 
this is an innocent example of ‘bringing’ sex in at the wrong place (SE 5: 519-520). In 
‘The Dream and the Primal Scene’ in the Wolf Man (SE 17) Freud says, ‘(i)t is 
always a strict law of dream-interpretation that an explanation must be found for 
every detail’ (SE 17: 42 n 2).  Mat(t)er/Motion as Freud argues has a feminine 
application.  Given that Freud utilises Latin in his explanation of Matrem/Nudem and 
knowing that Mater means mother, one would think, knowing Freud’s insistence on 
the philology of words and the often antithetical meanings, in a ‘primal’ sense, that 
the ‘obvious’ detail in the dream would be the link between Mater and faeces/motion? 
More so, if one considers that the ‘Matter and Motion’ book is bound in brown cloth!   
It is an equation Freud has offered before, faeces/baby/penis/mother/hole.  Admittedly 
the correlation here is my own, but throughout Freud’s discourse he constantly links 
one with the other, one despite the other and this too is an example of the stages of 
infantile sexuality, oral, anal, phallic, genital.  
Before the ‘matter and motion’ dream Freud offered the recollection of getting ‘sex’ 
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in the ‘wrong place’ (SE 5: 519). Freud states, in the misappropriation of gender, here 
a starfish he refers to as ‘he’ in response to the ‘charming’ little girl’s inquiry, ‘Is that 
a starfish?’ ‘Is it alive?’ we have the ‘keys’ to the solution of the dream (SE 5: 519). 
And yet when offered the ‘key to The Mothers’ (once again) Freud turns away, 
offering a different interpretation, one that seems to ignore the most obvious details – 
‘Is the matter laudable? It has a feminine application’.  Freud writes in the preface to 
Captain Bourke’s ‘Scatalogic Rites of all Nations’ (SE 12) that to ‘begin with, 
excremental and sexual instincts are not distinct from each other for children’ (SE 12: 
337).  For the child, as we have seen, the idea that they could eat some type of food, 
like in a fairy-tale and birth a baby though the anus is believable.  But the separation 
between them remains incomplete argues Freud, and is ‘still felt in many ways in 
normal adults. … Some portion of the old preferences persist, some part of the 
coprophilic inclinations continue’ (SE 12: 337). But just as Freud turns away from 
going to the depths of the Mothers, he turns away in this instance from an example in 
a dream that suggests the link between mothers, sex and excreta.  And what after all is 
excreta but ‘dead’ mat(t)er. For Kristeva it is to the mother, that all ‘part-objects’ of 
‘digust’ and ‘anality’ are projected (Kristeva, 1995: 119). In Chapter Three of this 
thesis Freud’s own analysis of the dream of his ‘dead Mater’ with a ‘peculiarly 
peaceful expression on her face’ is given as, primal desire for sexual intercourse with 
the mother, not as recognition that one might harbour matricidal phantasies. Perhaps 
Freud’s repeated turning away then is because like Oedipus he did not see, or want to 
see, what was right in front of his eyes. 
 
Numbers, 3 and 8 
Freud will argue it is ‘remarkable what a small degree of attention the other part of the 
male genitals, the little sac with its contents, attracts in children.  From all one hears 
in analyses, one would not guess that the male genitals consisted of anything more 
than the penis’ (SE 19: 142 n 1). And further, ‘In any case the number three has been 
confirmed from many sides as a symbol of the male genitals’ (SE 5: 358). Replying to 
Jung’s accusation of positivism in relation to Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality, 
Freud states that Jung was like the peasant who chalked three crosses on his door to 
ward off danger (McGuire, 1974: 19 n 7). Freud translates this to mean that Jung fears 
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‘dangerous sexuality’ and writes, ‘+++sexuality. You thrust it aside in dealing with 
this question, I make use of it but arrive at no solution; so it is not surprising that 
neither of us knows anything about it. ‘Nemo me impune lacessit’ rings in my ears 
from my schooldays.  The ancients knew how inexorable a god Eros is’ (‘No one 
provides me with impunity’) (McGuire, 1974: 19).  Bollas argues the number three ‘is 
a number with a disseminative destiny of unusual power in our civilisation’ (Bollas, 
1995: 62).  One of the Wolf Man’s obsessive symptoms was his association with three 
heaps of excrement on the road with the holy trinity (in Abraham and Torok, 1986: 
94-95). And yet in Dreams in Folklore Freud overlooks the number eight which it is 
argued is the symbol for the female genitals: ‘But it was there plain and clear, only 
you didn’t work [it] out…And the number 8 belonging to the series—the cunt shows 
you that—its like a number 8’ (SE 12: 203).  Freud will say in conclusion to this short 
paper, that it was not their (written with Professor Ernst Oppenheim) intention to offer 
material that was ‘often repulsively dirty and indecent’ but that in its comparison to 
psychoanalysis one sees that ‘behind these ugly facades are concealed mental 
reactions to impressions of life which are to be taken seriously, which even strike a 
sad note…’ (SE 12: 203). Here then, amidst these sexual/excremental dreams and 
folklore, is the dream of the female genitals described as resembling the number ‘8’.  
Freud comments that ‘Excremental things are all too intimately and inseparably 
bound up with sexual things; the position of the genital organs – inter urinas et faeces 
– remains the decisive and unchangeable factor’ (CP 4: 215). Freud borrows this from 
Lou Andreas-Salomé and in line with most of his remarks concerning female 
genitalia, it suggests the animal (and horrifying) cast that the female genitals have on 
‘whoever’ views them.  But here we have a number, like the number three, which 
holds such inordinate power in ‘our civilisation’ and the number eight it might be 
noted in numerology at least is the number of Fate.  The three Fates may decide the 
destiny of ‘Man’ but the number eight (the “cunt”) is that destiny.  Freud returns, 
reasonably constantly it might be said, to an appraisal of the number three.  The 
number eight only features in this passage (in his theoretical work at least) and so 
briefly that we might read past it.  Here then, is Freud’s response to the mother, and 
the mother’s genitals with their Medusa like configuration (turning men to 
stone/stiff/dead), he turns away.   
It has been a purpose of this thesis to understand this turning away but just as Breuer 
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ran away when confronted with Anna O.’s simulated birth pangs,  ‘Now Dr. B.’s child 
is coming!’ (E. Freud, 1960: 413), Freud while suggesting he is more Faustian in 
nature by mere dint of the fact that Breuer was not, also took flight when offered this 
‘key to The Mothers’.  Breuer turned away from Freud’s sexual theory, as Freud sees 
it, as later Jung and Rank will do also.  Freud tells Karl Abraham that this made him 
even more confident that ‘his’ Oedipal theory was correct and that he was on the right 
path (in Donn, 1988: 174). Rank in contrast argues ‘and from this one fact Breuer 
fled.  Freud, on the other hand, succeeded in interpreting it, by justifying it as a 
repetition of an earlier situation—which he called Oedipus situation’ (Rank in Kramer 
ed., 1996: 230). What is it then that Freud is turning away from?  If forgetting in a 
dream is a kind of resistance, then what is Freud resisting? Freud does connect the 
birth of Breuer’s youngest daughter not long after the treatment of Anna O., to the 
‘hysterical pregnancy’ and Breuer’s flight, but he does not elaborate on the 
associations he makes (E. Freud, 1960: 413). Thus, Breuer’s turning away from 
Freud’s sexual theory began with a ‘pathogenic pregnancy’. Freud’s own turning 
away from the mother (or Mothers) seems less easy to define.  
The mother offers a strange position for Freud.  She is, as I have made clear 
throughout this thesis Mater to be uniformly overlooked. But she is also for the son at 
least a love-relation that has the essence of surpassing all others.  Freud offers us a 
tale, as he is accustomed to do.  This is the tale of Schopenhauer’s ‘famous simile of 
the freezing porcupines’ (SE 18: 101).  Freud offers this tale to illustrate that we all 
need distance from our neighbour.  The story goes that a group of porcupines crowded 
together to keep warm on a ‘cold winters day’ but their quills got in the way so they 
moved apart again.  But because it was so cold they moved back together but once 
again the quills got in the road.  Thus they were driven backwards and forwards until 
they found a comfortable distance in which they could ‘tolerably exist’ (SE 18: 101 n 
1).  Thus argues Freud all lengthy intimate relations between people ‘contain a 
sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility which only escapes perception as a 
result of repression’ (SE 18: 101). The only exception to this he states is the 
relationship between mother and son, a relationship without parallel. Kristeva will 
disagree with Freud, instead suggestion that ‘loving one’s neighbour as oneself’, 
which Freud felt was an illusion (too much closeness suffocates and here we have 
Proverbs to support Freud’s argument: ‘Let your foot be seldom in your neighbour’s 
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house, lest he become weary of you and hate you’ (Proverbs, 25-17)), ‘returns us to 
the enigma—darker even than the mystery of gestation—that is the “good enough 
mother”: she who allow the infans to create the transitional space permissive of 
thought’ (Kristeva, 2009: 42). The ‘good enough mother’ is the one that allows the 
child ‘the pleasure of thinking her’ suggests Kristeva (2009: 46).  But what does this 
mean when we consider Rose’s/Bollas’s question, ‘what does thinking about mothers 
do to thinking?’  If the ‘good enough mother’ is the one that allows the child to think, 
or more particularly the ‘pleasure of thinking her’ then when does the child become 
aware of the distance that such a thinking must entail? A distance that must be 
observed argues Freud or the accompanying feelings of ‘aversion and hostility’ will 
ultimately threaten to overwhelm the child. Just as too much love will suffocate the 
child, how do ‘we’ negotiate a distance from the mother when the repression that 
should take place, indeed must take place is rendered precarious in the ‘symbiotic 
oneness’ of mother and infant/child. If the ‘good enough mother’ allows this thinking 
of her, is this thinking reciprocal? Can the mother think the child as the child thinks of 
her?  Is this a kind of ‘love one’s neighbour as one’s self’, an ‘oceanic oneness’ 
peculiar to mothers and that cannot be undone?  Or is it a continuation of the 
parasitical relationship that first takes place in the womb? Irigaray will argue that we 
have a debt to the mother that we will never repay but is this debt so unconscious (if 
indeed we recognise an unconscious not previously realised – a definitely before 
language unconscious) that it cannot be thought – is beyond thought (and this has 
echo’s of Bollas’s ‘unthought unknown), and pleasure, desire even? Are we always 
aware then (without really being aware) of a prickling, suffocating sense of the 
mother?  And how do we turn away from this? And is the ‘good enough mother’ the 
one that both allows the ‘pleasure of thinking her’ but also allows a turning away 
from this thinking?  
 
God, the Devil, the Word, and the Dog 
In Freud’s discussion with the Impartial Person in The Question of Lay Analysis (SE 
20) he states, ‘And incidentally let us not despise the word. It is a “powerful 
instrument”’: 
It is the means by which we convey our feelings to one another, our method of 
influencing other people. Words can do unspeakable good and cause terrible 
wounds.  No doubt ‘in the beginning was the deed’ and the word came later; in 
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some circumstances it meant an advance in civilization when deeds were 
softened into words.  But originally the word was magic—a magical act; and it 
has retained much of its ancient power (SE 20: 187-188).  
Freud’s Ariadne like thread is at work here suggests Prokhoris, because the borrowed 
words, ‘In the beginning was the deed’ are weaved effortlessly into his own text.  
Taken from Faust’s mouth, ‘in the beginning was the deed’ itself an inaccurate 
translation of the Biblical expression, ‘In the beginning was the Word’.  Of course, 
this is Faust’s point, but just as he considers that God’s word is misinterpreted the 
Devil arrives in the form of a dog.  A fitting disguise because Freud makes clear in 
Civilizations and its Discontents (SE 21) that in the evolution of man and the 
adaptation to an upright gait, we diminished our olfactory stimuli and ‘fell victim to 
organic repression’ (SE 21: 105-106 n 3).  Fitting also, because Freud compares 
Ariadne’s thread to the umbilical cord and ‘the legend of the labyrinth…as a 
representation of anal birth, the twisting paths are the bowels’ and Ariadne herself, we 
know is a symbol of the phallic mother (SE 22: 24-25).  
 
‘Cleanliness next to godliness’ became the mantra, particularly in regard to excreta 
with the child who learns control of its bowel motions early deemed good. Less 
praiseworthy if it takes pleasure in the production and tactile quality of its faeces. We 
call those people who are not clean, who smell, ‘dogs’ states Freud and in doing so 
we do an injustice to mans ‘most faithful friend in the animal world’ (SE 21: 99-100 n 
1).  But the dog’s dominant sense is smell and it has ‘no horror of excrement’ or its 
‘sexual functions’.79  
                                                 
79 Kristeva will argue that it is not the lack of cleanliness that causes horror but what 
disturbs the borders of that cleanliness.  This introduces Kristeva’s theory of the 
abject, the ‘jettisoned object’ that occurs ‘at the place where meaning collapses’ 
(Kristeva, 1982: 10). Abjection is ‘a hatred that smiles’ argues Kristeva and in this 
she seems to signal the abjects ‘uncanny’ relation to the mother (Kristeva, 1982: 4-5). 
Kristeva will argue that the abject is different from ‘uncanniness’, it is more violent, 
and it is recognised through the lack of recognition. For Kristeva, the child that 
experiences the abject has ‘swallowed up his parents too soon’ (Kristeva, 1982: 5).  
Frightened the child rejects everything; his/her boundaries have been breached, fear 
keeps the abject – the horror – from seeping in: 
 
Yes, Horror smiled at him . . . Seldom/did you, Mother, smile so tenderly.  
How could he help/loving what smiled at him?’ (Rilke in Mandel, 1965: 101). 
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The ‘organic repression’ of our sense of smell shows the doubling that we have 
become familiar with in Freud in his expression ‘repression stinks’.  This says Freud 
works with the theory of ‘internal stinking’: libido and disgust are linked in such a 
way that makes a current memory stink just as an actual object stinks. We turn away 
in disgust as the conscious/ego and preconscious/super-ego turn away from the 
memory: this then is repression (SE 1: 269).  Freud will tell Fliess, ‘I can scarcely 
enumerate for you all the things that I (a modern Midas) turn into excrement’ (SE 1: 
273).  And through the word money with its associations of dirt and excrement he 
offers a chain of words that he tells us all go back to the toilet: birth, miscarriage, 
menstruation (SE 1: 273).  What stinks then, seems to be anything to do with a 
‘birthing body’ since all these things are concerned with a woman’s body that 
becomes a mother. Freud had already told Fliess that the upright stance was 
accompanied with a sense of ‘the earth becoming repulsive’ (SE 1: 268).  Thus 
Mother Nature and the mother, which are intertwined in their positioning as the three 
Fates, among other things, stink according to Freud: we turn our nose up at them as 
we turn away (SE 1: 269).  Freud extends this analogy in his example of the child that 
sucks eagerly at the breast of its mother, in a nutritional and sensual way says Freud, 
only to develop several years later an aversion to drinking milk emphasised in the 
disgust when warmed milk develops a skin.  Freud suggests that we cannot exclude, 
‘the possibility perhaps that the skin conjures up a memory of the mother’s breast, 
once so ardently desired’ (SE 16: 366). Thus the wrinkled skin on milk makes us 
think of the wrinkled skin of the breast. But this is where Freud neglects his own 
                                                                                                                                            
Kristeva argues that the child has ‘swallowed up’ emptiness instead of maternal love 
(and this seems different to the emptiness that Kristeva discusses in Chapter Two): the 
emptiness here signalled as maternal hatred.  For Kristeva the abject collapses the 
‘wall of repression and its judgements’ (Kristeva, 1982: 15).  It is triggered by ‘food 
loathing’ – the ‘most elementary and most archaic form of abjection’; ‘The corpse (or 
cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a cropper, is a cesspool, 
and death’…excrement and blood’ (Kristeva, 1982: 3). In contrast to Freud, none of 
the abject ‘objects’ stink.  The point is, we recoil from them because somehow they 
have fallen outside, have collapsed the boundaries between inside and outside, 
between proper and improper. For Kristeva, ‘Mother and death—both abominated, 
both abjected…’ (Kristeva, 1982: 112). Kristeva states that the ‘eroticisation’ of 
bodily wastes is in the ‘space’ of the mother, is even a function of the mother, which 




argument because as he states in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6) the 
mnemic image of the mother remains in our unconscious ‘looking beautiful and slim’ 
– forever Jocasta we might say (SE 6: 49-51):  ‘being in love with one’s own mother 
one is never concerned with her as she is in the present but with her youthful mnemic 
image carried over from one’s childhood’ (SE 6: 178). This form of ‘deferred action’ 
(and really what else are we to call it) on Freud’s part where the mother is at once 
young but also old, where the breast is firm and full of milk, but wrinkled and akin to 
disgust, also raises the spectre of the ‘Witch’.  I wonder at this ‘Witch’ who offers us 
an important clue to aid our ‘“taming” of the instinct’ (SE 23: 225).  Because Freud 
tells us, only two paragraphs later that the strength of certain instincts are ‘almost’ 
beyond “taming”, those during puberty ‘and, in women, at the menopause’ (SE 23: 
226).  Thus ‘we must call the Witch’ to our help’ but it seems to be that we must ask 
who is this Witch? Because in-between the menstruating and the menopausal 
‘untamed’ woman is the mother.  
We have met this Witch before in her different guises in the preceding Chapters. 
Freud writes to Fliess telling him that Emma Eckstein’s symptoms, her 
haemorrhaging, her near death, are reminiscent of a ‘scene’ that as a ‘hysteric’ she 
had offered before.  This ‘scene’ where the devil ‘sticks pins into her finger and puts a 
piece of candy on each drop of blood’ (in Masson, 1985: 103) says Freud marks her 
as the devils concubine, a ‘Witch’. Here then Freud amalgamates the bodies of 
mother-witch and father-devil, so we are left with the Platonian example of 
Aristophanes’s creature, forever wanting to become one/whole from two/parts (this 
after all was Zeus’s intention). A strange creature, Freud’s Witch, an incubus maybe, 
itself compared by Freud to his psychology, psychoanalysis: ‘This psychology is 
really an incubus’ (to Fliess in Bonaparte, A. Freud and Kris, 1954: 123). The incubus 
in this context, and in its linguistic usage, particularly in Freud’s native German, is a 
mare (night-witch), nightmare. The nightmare as we saw in Chapter Four, is itself, 
according to Lacan and Jones the epitome of anxiety, and anxiety is the witch’s letter.  
But in the perpetual roundabout that Freud’s ‘labyrinth’ takes, the witch as incubus, as 
night-mare not only suggests the archaic in Freud’s and Lacan’s arguments but 
suggests that this ‘archaic’, both a before and a beyond is irresolutely bound (by our 
Ariadne thread) to the witch’s letter and thus to the anxiety that precedes it.  
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Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé ‘we must have recourse to the witch Prehistory 
or Phylogenesis…’ (Pfeiffer, 1972: 80), which suggests as I argued in Chapter Four 
that the significance that Rank gave to ‘separation anxiety’ and womb phantasies and 
that Freud argued ‘reveal in a flash the biological background of the Oedipus 
complex’ (in Sprengenther, 1990: 13 and Jones, 1957: 64), point instead to an 
‘unknown’ here referred to by Freud as a restoration of the previous existence (ibid.), 
the ‘biological oneness’, symbiotic union of mother and child. Further, Prokhoris 
argues that ‘Freud turns, like Faust to the Witch, the “Witch metapsychology” to find 
a “love with which we operate”’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 73), and that Freud’s Ariadne 
thread travels down through his self-analysis with Fliess, his other half, his demon as 
he refers to him and finally is worked out as a pact with the Witch: ‘the instinct to 
investigate is in turn transformed: initially associated with the paternal function…it is 
gradually transmuted into unsettling, uncontrollable maternal terrain, subject as it is to 
the Witch’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 74) 
What is an instinct but a kind of passion that must be tamed according to Freud?  
Kristeva will ask, ‘what do we know, what do we have to say today about maternal 
passion? Does what was once a “beyond” not seem to take refuge in the maternal 
belly today? Omnipotence and madness of mothers: the desire for maternity at any 
cost goes hand in hand with the denial of pregnancy and the denial of maternity’ 
(Kristeva, 2009: 42).   The ‘maternal object’ cannot be represented argues André 
Green and this seems to be what Freud is also saying.  She can be fought over, after 
all this is what the basis of the Oedipal complex is about, the sons and the father 
fighting over the right to have the mother.  Yerushalmi offers a pertinent response to 
this, stating ‘Curiously, desire for the mother, so significant in your account of the 
Oedipal conflict of the individual, disappears along with the wives of the Primeval 
Father in your account of the history of religion’.  And asks, ‘Who, then, at the 
juncture we have reached, is the mother? (Yerushalmi in a monologue with Freud, 
1991: 92). In Yerushalmi’s reply the mother need not be a person, but ‘brazenly’ he 
states, she is the Torah, the teaching, the revelation’ because the Torah in Hebrew is 
‘grammatically feminine and which is midrashically compared to a bride’ 
(Yerushalmi, 1991: 92).  It seems then that we might have lost the mother to the bride, 
but the bride is eternally the Virgin Mary, the Mother of ‘God’. We arrive back at the 
mother then through an Eternal Return, which illustrates to us the ‘split’, the Spaltung 
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of maternal passion. Kristeva argues that ‘Religious myths wove their webs around 
this split’ and therefore, woman is to be thought of as “hole” ‘this is the meaning of 
the word woman in Hebrew: nekeva…and a queen in the Bible; the Virgin is a “hole” 
in the Christian trinity father/son/holy spirit and queen of the church’ (Kristeva, 2009: 
46-47). Freud seems to allude to this point without actually saying it.80  
The skin on the milk then, reminiscent of the skin of the breast makes us want to spit 
the mother out as Freud argues in his paper Negation (SE 19).  To negate something 
through a judgment argues Freud is to repress it.  As Rose reasons, Freud manages to, 
and not for the first time ‘set the mother up as blindness and insight’ (Rose, 2004: 
151). The ‘No’ of the negative judgment claims Freud is the ‘hall-mark’ of repression, 
a ‘certificate of origin—like, let us say, ‘Made in Germany’ (SE 19: 236). Thus the  
‘No’ is the hall-mark of repression but it is also the certificate of origin; the ‘un’ is the 
token of repression; and repression stinks avows Freud. But we have a scar left-over 
where a repression occurs states Freud.  Thus if we were to say, ‘Made in…’ wouldn’t 
the corresponding mark then be the navel, which might be thought of as the scar of 
repression, or at least the scar of a ‘first’ repression the spot that reaches down into 
the unknown. Which would suggest that, ‘Made in’ would correspondingly be, ‘Made 
in Mother’.  After all, what is a certificate of origin if not our mother?  
What Freud seems to be telling us here, is that the mother, of whom initially we were 
so fond ‘I’m so fond of you Mummy.  When you die I’ll have you stuffed and I’ll 
keep you in this room, so that I can see you all the time’ (SE 4: 254); and who we 
owe our lives to: ‘The mother gave the child his life and it is not easy to replace this 
unique gift with anything of equal value’ (CP 4: 201); becomes negated.  Again we 
turn away from the mother as Freud says we turn away from Mother Nature who 
becomes repulsive to us, or at least the dirt – ‘the distressing trace of the Earth’ – with 
its equivalence to dejecta does.81 
                                                 
80 Groddeck argues that ‘Thus the desire for happiness is the innermost impulse in a 
woman’s soul; that she does not succeed in taming it is the ultimate reason for 
woman’s suffering’ (Groddeck, 1977: 255).  
81 Freud in his preface to Bourke quotes Goethe’s Faust (once again) to illustrate with 
Bourke how ‘civilized man’ finds the ‘problem of their physical nature’ embarrassing 
and too close to the ‘animals’.  Mankind attempts to ‘emulate the ‘more perfected 
angels’ in the last scene of Faust, who complain’:  
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Repression leaves a scar as the navel leaves a scar.  Both of these scars, as I have 
argued are linked to the mother, or more particularly the mother’s body.  And anxiety 
seems to have a ‘primal’ or at least ‘original’ relationship with both of them.  How is 
it then that the mother seems to be left out of Freudian theory?  Or is only seen as 
‘something’ that everybody else gets to do something to? The baby gets to be born 
and to feed; the boy gets to dream and scheme; the daughter gets to hate and envy; the 
man gets to use and replace.  What does the mother get? Freud offers her recognition 
in her position as first love-object and as integral to the child’s mental health.  All 
things I have said before but this is a piecemeal mother, one who is also breast and 
genitals.  She is also the navel, in that the navel illustrates to us the place we have 
been before and are all striving to return states Freud.  A navel that Freud straddles in 
an attempt to get closer to the unknown component of the dream.  But still, he fails to 
designate this place as maternal.  
Groddeck, the ‘wild psychoanalyst’ 
Freud said that ‘the aim of all life is death’ (SE 18: 38).  And here Groddeck, Freud’s 
‘wild analyst’, although self-proclaimed and not in the sense that Freud understood in 
Wild Psychoanalysis (SE 11) wrote that man fears death, and thus longs for it 
(Groddeck, 1977: 200).  Because, suggests Groddeck, fear is finally to be understood 
as a wish, if we really fear something, at a deeper and apostate level we wish it.  To 
this then Eros and Thanatos coincide.  Symbolically argues Groddeck ‘we possess a 
religion which still seems to us the symbol of our human existence’ (Groddeck, 1977: 
200).  Thus Eros, the God of Love says Groddeck will, as an exemplar for 
humankind, die on the cross, be buried (entombed/en-wombed) and there after be 
resurrected.  The truth is, contends Groddeck, ‘man has a longing for death because 
he longs for love, and a longing for love because he craves death, the mother’s womb’ 
(Groddeck, 1977: 201).  This is not far from Freud’s argument that in all likelihood 
man still longs for the mother’s womb where he was safe and warm.  Where it is 
                                                                                                                                            
Uns bleibt ein Erdenrest 
zu tragen peinlich, 
und wär’ er von Asbest, 
er ist nicht reinlich. 
 
Literally states Freud, ‘We still have a trace of the Earth, which is distressing to bear; 
and though it were asbestos it is not cleanly’ (in SE 12: 335). 
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different in Groddeck’s argument is that the womb is not necessarily to be thought of 
as a lost paradise for Groddeck, rather the womb becomes a ‘prison’ for the child 
from which s/he, in cohesion with the mother’s desire, wants to escape (Groddeck, 
1977: 145).  Groddeck makes the act of birth, not wholly a ‘mechanical’ process but 
‘a mutual agreement between two unconscious individualities’ (Groddeck, 1977: 144-
145).  Children’s fear of the dark then is a fear relating to the wish to escape the 
prison/womb, which formerly had been a comforting home.  This is different to Freud 
who as we saw felt that children were frightened of the dark because of a longing for 
the mother. The correlation of womb and prison frequently occurs in dreams argues 
Groddeck and represents the ambivalence, carried over into childhood that is 
characteristic of the human condition. ‘The strongest negative and positive effects are 
always directed against the mother, and the fear of being buried alive, like the fear of 
darkness at night and of hell, go back to prenatal conditions.  Here, too, one can see 
that the fundamental direction of man’s and mankind’s life is already given in the 
womb’ (Groddeck, 1977: 145). Freud argues that his old nurse taught him the 
difference between heaven and hell but according to Groddeck this differentiation is 
already there, as it were, inutero.  For Groddeck the battle between the mother and the 
unborn baby begins in the womb and is orchestrated by the conflict between the 
mother’s consciousness (the Ego) and her unconscious (the It).  The It wants the Ego 
to get rid of something that it regards as ‘poisoning it/It. There is a war going on and 
it does not seem to really matter/Mater who wins argues Groddeck. 
Groddeck makes his It omnipotent and also a manifestation of the ambivalence that 
we all feel in relation to the mother.  ‘The mother, the love of the mother and the 
hatred of the mother, gives man everything, even his God’ (Groddeck, 1977: 152).  
The root of religion and every religious feeling stem from the mother complex argues 
Groddeck, where love of the mother predominates, this is the oceanic that Freud 
professed to have no feeling for, no knowledge of.  Groddeck would argue that this is 
because Freud turned away from the mother. An atheist in Groddeck’s view is 
someone who wants to deny their childhood and in doing so ‘get away from the 
authority of his mother complex’ (Groddeck, 1977: 152). He covers over the godhead 
with words, and in so doing, in his rejection of God he believes he has surmounted his 




Kriteva extends Groddeck’s argument, although her engagement with the maternal is 
quite different in interpretation to Groddeck’s.  In a discussion of The Bible (in 
reading The Bible (her capitals)), she will say:  
 
The Bible offers the best description of this transformation of sacrifice into 
language. … And further, ‘In my view, the fulcrum of this biblical process can 
be located in its particular conception of the maternal: the maternal is a 
promised land if you are willing to leave it, an object of desire if you are 
willing to renounce it and forbid it; the maternal is delight as well as murder, 
an inescapable “abject” whose awareness haunts you, or which may very well 
be the constitutive double of your own awareness (Kristeva, 1995: 120).  
 
Kofman suggests something similar to both Groddeck and Kristeva stating that it is 
the ‘Son’ who acts as the mother’s Saviour, ‘(a)ll religions have known this all along: 
the child takes the mother’s wounds to himself and restores to her an intact body. The 
mother thus becomes a Virgin Mother, whom nothing can penetrate. … Motherhood 
is a path to salvation’ (Kofman, 1985: 215). And further that Freud’s double gesture 
“turns up everywhere”. Freud both acknowledges the fantasmatic “maternal 
omnipotence”, transformed argues Kofman, into ‘a Fate or a great goddess’ and 
undermines it by ‘turning this power to the profit of man, who runs up against the real 
“resistance’ of the mother’ who in Kofman’s argument is “irreplaceable and 
“unsublatable” (Kofman, 1985: 80).  
 
While some of Groddeck’s work on women as mothers is contentious his positioning 
of the mother as our personal God resonates with this paper as a whole.  In particular, 
his argument that labour pains start from the backbone and that the backbone is 
comparable to the cross on which Christ is nailed is suggestive.  The cross (backbone) 
argues Groddeck is the mother herself.  ‘Suddenly’ says Groddeck, ‘I am confronted 
with the question: ‘isn’t it perhaps the unattainable longing to become one with the 
mother-unattainable because the son is nailed to the cross on the outside, turned away, 
his back to the mother – isn’t this longing perhaps the deepest meaning … and there 
are still others, even darker, unrecognisable meanings?’ (Groddeck, 1977: 201).  
Freud in a letter to Fliess states, ‘What oppresses me can hardly be helped. It is my 
cross and I must bear it, but God knows my back has become distinctly bent from the 
effort’ (in Choisy, 85). Perhaps Freud’s turning away from the mother was a 
resistance to what Kofman calls above, her omnipotence, her “unsublatabilty”, her 
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position as ‘God’ as Groddeck would have it. Freud makes the mother-son 
relationship ‘the most perfect’ and by doing so makes the mother impenetrable. 
Freud’s turning away from the mother, his pulling away from the mother – “my back 
has become distinctly bent from the effort” – whether as a means for mastery, or as 
something always already preordained, or as something else besides is echoed in 
Groddeck’s suggestion that a trip to Faust’s ‘realm of the Mothers’ might help us 
understand the ‘depth of meaning’ attributed to the longing for the mother.   
 
Perhaps Freud’s turning away has as much to do with the mother, his mother as with 
the guilt he felt at the death of his baby brother Julius. The ‘Cain phantasy’, as we saw 
in Chapter Three, that all men are brothers but only one brother is truly good, the 
other brother is cursed to walk the earth for all eternity: Ahasuerus/Cartaphilus/Cain, 
three names, perhaps the same personality, ‘all’ wanderers for forsaking God. Freud 
the ‘non-believer’ turns from God as he turns from the mother: ‘Eli, Eli, láma sabach-
tháni?’ ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ (Matthew 27: 45-46).  In 
what is called ‘The Seven Expressions’, Christ’s last words, this cry to God is ‘The 
Word of Abandonment’. The son cannot see the Mother, this is Groddeck’s 
contention, that in any event she is the cross on which he is nailed. But he can cry for 
her, as he cried for her as an infant.  Groddeck’s suggestion seems to imply that this 
longing for the mother, no matter the tears we shed, has an ‘Infallibility’ to it: the 
mother with the ‘crown’ of immortality. This is interesting because Rudnytsky will 
argue that Freud at his ‘best’ ‘could be as inspiring as Jesus, at his worst he arrogated 
to himself the infallibility of a Pope’ (Rudnytsky, 2011: 4). If we combine these 
arguments then we could say that Freud takes the ‘mantle’ of infallibility from the 
mother, albeit in aversion to leaving it with a Catholic Pope.  
 
Auf Geseres/Auf Ungeseres 
In the dream of ‘My Son, the Myops’ Freud states, ‘This dream was constructed on a 
tangle of dream thoughts provoked by a play which I had seen’ (SE 5: 442). The play, 
by the Zionist Theodore Herzl is titled, Das neue Ghetto (‘The New Ghetto’ in 
Masson, 1985: 293).  In the dream Freud is in Rome, sitting on the side of a fountain 
and ‘almost in tears’.  A nun brings two boys out and hands them over to their father 
who is not Freud, although in the ‘farewell’ the eldest boy who Freud recognises as 
his son showed a preference to Freud.  Freud in interpreting this dream concentrates 
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in particular on the words, ‘Auf Ungeseres’ and ‘Geseres’. Freud states he had to get 
help from philologists (even though Jones in his biography on Freud argues that Freud 
had a knowledge of Hebrew from his father),82 to translate ‘Geseres’ which is a 
‘genuine Hebrew word’, and is best translated as ‘imposed sufferings’ or ‘doom’ (SE 
5: 442) or more commonly (in slang) as ‘weeping and wailing’. Of Ungeseres Freud 
suggests it was ‘a private neologism of my own and was the first word to catch my 
attention, but to begin with I could make nothing of it’ (SE 5: 442).  Noting the 
preference both to himself in the dream by his son and to the word, Ungeseres Freud 
compares it to caviar; ‘unsalted [‘ungesalzen’] caviare (sic) is esteemed more highly 
than salted [‘gesalzen’]’ (SE 5: 442). Freud decides then that the association to 
Geseres (salted caviar) and Ungeseres (unsalted caviar) is to leavened (gesäuert) and 
unleavened (ungesäuert).  Freud argues that in ‘their flight out of Egypt the Children 
of Israel had not time to allow their dough to rise and, in memory of this, they eat 
unleavened bread to this day at Easter’ (SE 5: 443). This is of course a reference to 
the Exodus led by Moses, of the Israelites from Egypt: Moses led the Israelites to 
Mount Sinai where God offers Moses/the Israelites the Law (Torah). Freud continues 
with ‘a sudden association’.  I was walking with my Friend (Fliess) ‘through the 
streets of Breslau, a town in which we were strangers’ (SE 5: 443).  A little girl 
approaches and asks for directions, Freud tells her he does not know the way, and 
comments to Fliess that one hopes that when the little girl has grown, she will have 
better discrimination in who she gets to direct her. They pass a house with a door-
plate bearing the words ‘Dr. Herodes. Consulting hours…’ Freud remarks wryly to 
Fliess, ‘Let us hope that our colleague does not happen to be a children’s doctor’ (SE 
5: 443). In the space of a few sentences then Freud moves from a reference to Moses 
and the Exodus of the Israelites, to one of Jesus. After all the biblical King Herod is 
responsible for the ‘Massacre of the Innocents’: the systematic murder of all baby 
                                                 
82 Freud though, most often stresses his lack of knowledge when it comes to Hebrew.  
He tells a ‘Dr. Roback’ that ‘My education was so un-Jewish that today I cannot even 
read your dedication, which is evidently written in Hebrew’ (in E. Freud, 1960: 395).  
Yerushalmi offers a convincing reply to this, questioning Freud’s statement that ‘my 
education was “so un-Jewish” (1991: 68).  After all Freud was tutored by his father 
and he ‘studied Bible, Jewish history and religion, as well as Hebrew throughout his 
Gymnasium years with Samuel Hammerschlag, whom he hails as a wonderful teacher 
and to whom he remained almost filially devoted for the rest of his life’ (Yerushalmi, 
1991: 69). I think, as I remarked in Chapter Three of this thesis Freud is like Hamlet’s 
mother, ‘The lady doth protest too much, methinks’ (Hamlet Act 3, scene 2). And by 
this, I do not associate Freud with ‘womanliness’, only the content of the quote. 
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boys under the age of two in the town of Bethlehem in an attempt to kill the ‘new 
born-king of the Jews’ (Matthew 2: 13-16).  Freud may well be a ‘godless Jew’ but 
here he cites – although seemingly indirectly – two important biblical and Jewish 
people, one might say ‘Hero’s’. Of course, later Freud makes Moses an Egyptian and 
Jesus is excluded from Judaism but it would seem that Freud favours the Jew, in his 
rather complicated doubling which here operates as a division of opposites: 
Geseres/Ungeseres, salted caviar/unsalted caviar, leavened bread/unleavened bread, 
Jesus/Moses, Gentile/Jew.  Jesus might be displaced here, being a Jew, (as 
Yerushalmi states, there is no reason to suggest that Jesus did not think of himself as a 
Jew. Christianity as we might know it was only founded later (1991: 38)) but as the 
‘father’ of Christianity he is associated with, is perhaps seen as, ‘Gentile’ (‘a Galilean 
Aryan’ even (in Yerushalmi, 1991: 46)).  
 
Freud continues with his emphasis of the Jew in the comparison of his dream position 
‘sitting on the edge of a fountain and was greatly depressed, almost in tears’ to Psalms 
137 ‘By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept, when we remembered Zion’ 
(SE 5: 442). Freud collapses a longing for Jerusalem by the wandering Israelites into 
his longing for Rome (‘My longing for Rome, is by the way, deeply neurotic’ 
(Masson, 1985: 285)) as Freud in his dream is sitting by a fountain in the ‘Porta 
Romana’ at Siena. All this doubling though returns us to the ‘spectre’ of the uncanny, 
which is both homely and unhomely, familiar and unfamiliar. We have seen the 
uncanny invoked by Geller in his position of the Jew as Gastvolk, the parasitical body 
who in an uncanny ‘doppelgänger effect’ is part of the ‘host body’ that the ‘parasitical 
body’ resides.  The only equivalent metaphor to this is of the pregnant body, which 
‘acts’ as the ‘ground/matter/Mater/mud’ through which self and Other are uncannily, 
we might say, interacting. Freud alludes to two famous Jews and in doing so, through 
reference to the ‘Passover’, to a Christian celebration of it as Easter, and to the 
‘Massacre of Innocents’, itself having an implicit reference to Christmas, he refers to 
them as infants. Infants who are both subject to infanticide, one at the hands of a King 
(Herod) and one we could say at the hands of the King (God).  The celebrations of 
birth and death are intertwined, one invokes the other: Gentile and Jew, Christianity 
and Judaism, Easter/Passover, Christmas and the ‘Massacre of the Innocents’. The 
‘Passover’ saves the Jew, and in the ‘Massacre of the Innocents’ the Jew dies.   
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Herzl’s play is concerned with ‘The Jewish Problem’, that Jews have no home to give 
their children, and therefore they must ‘educate them in such a way that they can 
move freely across frontiers’ (SE 5: 442). Freud is ‘almost in tears’ as he considers 
this but he takes comfort from the preference given to him by his ‘son’. But what 
appears to be most prominent here and indeed most uncanny is ‘our’ knowledge that 
for Freud Moses is later to be re-typed as an Egyptian and Jesus the Jew becomes a 
Christian-Gentile. It is interesting then that Freud’s neologism that illustrates his son’s 
preference to him is finally a preference to be a Jew. Freud explains this with the final 
analysis of the dream, ‘My son, the Myops’ which brings to mind he states a comment 
by ‘my Berlin friend’ (Fliess) who ‘had begun a sentence with the words ‘(i)f we had 
an eye in the middle of our foreheads like a Cyclops’ (SE 5: 443).  This is to give 
substance to Fliess’s ‘biological doctrine’ of bilateral symmetry, which Freud then 
undercuts with a story about the disease of the eyes that correspondingly gave rise to 
anxiety. Freud’s doctor tells the anxious mother that as long as the disease stayed in 
one eye, it was of no consequence but if it ‘passed over to the other eye it would be a 
serious matter’ (SE 5: 443). The one eye clears up but then the other eye becomes 
affected and the ‘terrified mother’ calls the doctor, who yells, ‘‘Why are you making 
such a “Geseres”?’ he shouted at the mother, ‘if one side has got, well, so will the 
other.’ And he was right’’.  The doctor argues Freud now went over ‘to the other side’ 
as Freud will later do in relation to Fliess’s theories.  
What does this complicated and rather tumultuous engagement with Freud’s dream 
tell us? Boyarin will argue that if Freud is not the father to the son then he must be the 
mother given that the child cannot have two fathers (Boyarin, 1997: 227).  Boyarin’s 
argument is different to mine, since two fathers, at least in this dream is not 
impossible.  After all Jesus according to biblical scripture has two fathers, a heavenly 
one, God and an earthly one, Joseph. Boyarin’s argument though, suggests like 
Gilman, and this is echoed in Yerushlami’s argument above, that the mother is the 
“Torah, the teaching, the revelation” and that what Freud sought to reject was the 
femininity ascribed the Jewish male.  
 
Freud rejects biblical scholarship and belief but tells us that ‘It will be noticed that the 
name Josef plays a great part in my dreams … My own ego finds it very easy to hide 
itself behind people of that name, since Joseph was the name of a man famous in the 
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Bible as an interpreter of dreams’ (SE 5: 484 n 2). He will call Jung his Joshua to his 
own position as Moses (in McGuire, 1974: 196-197).  And will tell Jung that as 
Moses/Freud he can only glimpse ‘the promised land of psychiatry…from afar’ 
(McGuire, 1974: 197), but that Joshua/Jung can claim it (Yerushalmi, 1991: 76).  
Yerushalmi (1991) reveals that Goethe ‘had already speculated that Moses had been 
murdered’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: 5) but here the assassin was Joshua no less, a fitting 
parable for the later (perhaps not murderous) split between Freud and Jung, expressed 
no less as a division between a Jew and a Gentile.  Here though, in this dream is a 
conflation of himself as Moses/Jesus, a double-sided figure whose own stories mimic 
each other: babies saved by their parents from genocidal kings: saviours of their 
people the Jews: and wanderers, as Ahasuerus and Ephraim are.  In a move 
reminiscent of ‘The Uncanny’ Geseres and Ungeseres ‘merge’ together, as references 
to Moses and Jesus, to one eye/one side and the other eye/other side do, in seemingly 
complimentary albeit oppositional ways. Inadvertently Freud invokes two “stations” 
of Christ/cross here, of his birth (with the decree of Herod) and his death in the use of 
Easter instead of the Hebrew ‘Passover’/Pesah.83 In doing so Freud aligns himself to 
Groddeck’s contention that ‘Man’ weeps for the mother, who is ‘blind-side’ to the 
Son we could say, and is here evoked by Freud in his repetitive and biblical doubling 
of terms, that finally has us at the foot of the Mother-cross, ‘Geseres’.  But in biblical 
tradition it is Mary (the Mary’s) who lies at the foot of the cross weeping. Thus the 
figure of the mother for Groddeck, and for Freud we might say, is split, one laying at 
the ‘foot of the son’ the other the ‘backbone’ to which he is ‘grafted’. A strange 
creature this, somewhat reminiscent of the mythological centaur that Freud uses as an 
allegory to the ‘philosophical theologian’ that we saw in Chapter Three (Gay, 1987: 
67). Here the son is finally understood to be reason/Logos.  What then does this make 
God, a God who is immortal but has the power and fervour of Moses (perhaps 
gifted?), or even of a mother we might say. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, in 
Michelangelo’s depiction of God and his son Adam, there was a space, and I 
wondered if this space might be understood as ‘the mother’, as the revolutionary 
aspect of the chora as Kristeva (and Plato) depict it.  A ‘lost territory’ that might also 
be the ‘promised land’ that Kristeva suggests in her reading of The Bible (Kristeva, 
                                                 
83 Freud quotes Leonardo da Vinci as questioning the mourning of Christ: ‘In every 
part of Europe great peoples will weep for the death of a single man who died in the 
East’ (in SE 11: 124). 
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1995: 120). But to get to this ‘promised land’ to reclaim your ‘lost territory’ you must 
be willing argues Kristeva, to first leave it, and thereafter renounce it and forbid it but 
be aware that it will forever haunt you, and in so doing, ‘may very well be the 
constitutive double of your own awareness’ (Kristeva, 1995: 120), which sounds for 
all the world, like a description of the ‘soul’ as Freud gave it in ‘The Uncanny’.  
It is perhaps not surprising that Freud might turn from the figure of Jesus, but less 
understandable is his turning away from the mother.  If we look to Groddeck’s 
formula the mother cannot be seen anyway given that she is always facing in the 
opposite direction to her son.  But there is more here, as there always is with Freud.  
Perhaps it can be explained in part through a letter he wrote to Arnold Zweig where 
Freud states, ‘one asks oneself again how the Jew came to be what he is and why he 
has drawn upon himself this undying hatred.  I soon found the formula: Moses created 
the Jew’ (E.Freud 1960: 421).  Perhaps ‘we’ have become over familiar with Freud’s 
argument concerning Moses but it seems to me that it is as contentious now as it was 
in 1938-39 when he published it.  It is not the purpose of this thesis to question why 
Freud might have made Moses the Jew, Moses the Egyptian84 but rather to recognise 
this ‘turning away’ as having some similarity to that of Freud’s response to the 
mother. Freud will say in a letter to Barbara Low on the death of her brother-in-law, 
the psychoanalyst Dr. David Elder that ‘We were both Jews and knew of each other 
that we carried that miraculous thing in common, which – inaccessible to any analysis 
so far – makes the Jew’ (E. Freud, 1960: 428). ‘Miraculous’ and ‘inaccessible’ it may 
be, but it seems to me that what ‘makes the Jew’ for Freud is something that might 
also ‘make the mother’.  After all, as Yerushalmi illustrates, the terms that Freud 
describes as having some relation to his understanding of Jewishness, ‘“dark 
emotional powers”, “essence”, “inner identity”, “psychological structure”’ and which 
were not able to be expressed ‘by this most articulate of men’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: 15), 
are similar to the terms that Freud uses to describe the mother. And this seemingly 
‘inaccessible thing’ is made more obscure by dint of the fact that it is so simply 
rendered by Freud, albeit in a mother-son relationship, which in itself, as I have 
shown in this engagement at least, is never as uncomplicated as Freud might make it. 
                                                 
84 And as Yerushalmi makes clear, that in making Moses an Egyptian, Freud is no less 
a Jew (Yerushalmi, 1991: 7). 
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Love and prophecies 
As we saw in Chapter Four, anxiety troubled Freud, but the mother remains a 
troubling – and troubled – figure in Freud.  I am not entirely convinced that she exists 
on the periphery.  Rather like Freud’s secretious libido she seeps through everything 
and everywhere.  Of course, libido remains masculine for Freud, well its aim is and 
repression does not quite lose its feminine nomenclature.  Freud wants to get behind – 
coitus a tergo – repression he tells Fliess, to something essential behind it.  
Repression would not allow that, and given that She is unconscious, Freud’s ‘getting 
behind’ would be impossible and possibly ‘forbidden’.  But Freud says we can see the 
affects of repression in anxiety.  Here he undercuts the mother, pushes her 
unceremoniously out of his theory.  First, she, or the act of birth, which is the 
personification of anxiety, creates repression and later anxiety is an affect of 
repression. The common feature to both these ‘things’ is the mother. Rank saw this 
and Freud as he did with Jung – his two favourite disciples – declared Rank mad.  
‘Mad call I It’ says Shakespeare’s Hamlet but could we be as audacious to suggest 
that Freud’s ‘It/id’ was at play in these dissensions?  Freud argued that one persons 
unconscious could work on anothers, this is a psycho-analysis, and he analysed both 
Jung and Rank (Rank for several years, Jung only briefly.  Jung did not appreciate 
Freud’s lack of reciprocation. Freud felt he would lose his authority).  The 
relationship to the mother is a ‘mad desire’ and Freud will reiterate throughout his 
work that she is our first love object, and integral for the mental health of the child.  
Bowlby and Winnicott would change this to a ‘good-enough mother’ who was 
important to the child’s wellbeing.  A ‘good-enough mother’ that importantly loved.  
‘Love is the cure’, says Freud to Jung, and in J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter (a new 
Faust maybe? And why not?), Voldamort will say to Dumbledore, ‘…nothing I have 
seen in the world has supported your famous pronouncement that love is more 
important than my kind of magic’ (in Rowling, 2005: 415). Freud will write to Jung, 
‘To be slandered and scorched by the love with which we operate…such are the perils 
of our trade…’( in Prokhoris, 1995: 210).  Prokhoris argues, if psychoanalysis’s 
famous pronouncement, is, that ‘the cure is love’, one needs to consider just what type 
of love psychoanalysis is talking about: ‘Original love, whose hoped for form the cure 
reveals to be maternal; transference love, which operates upon Freud as a result 
precisely, of his contemplation of Leonardo’s work and inspires him to write this 
“psychoanalytic novel” (“like others I have succumbed to the attraction of this great 
209 
 
and mysterious man”). But such love is impossible for someone devoted exclusively 
to research. “He has investigated instead of loving…” (Prokhoris, 1995: 73). 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Freud will say to Hilda Doolittle (H.D.) that he is 
shocked and surprised when the patient identifies him as their mother.  And he does 
not like it because he feels so masculine.  Gilman and Geller will argue that Freud 
rejects what is feminine – the mother – to make of himself an uncircumcised male, a 
Gentile.  This then happens in the unconscious because Freud ‘was always a Jew and 
remained one’.  But Freud tells us again and again that people, who do good deeds at 
the expense of all else, are fighting the opposing conflict in themselves.  They do not 
really want to do good deeds they want to commit patricide states Freud they want to 
‘kill the father’.  First of all says Freud, quoting Faust ‘is the deed, and then the 
word’. This is echoed in the Hebrew maxim, ‘The deeds of the fathers are the signs of 
the sons’ (Yerushalmi, 1991: 7). But what did man do? (and here in the gendered not 
genetic sense).  He transferred the deed to the woman to the mother we could say as 
this is a reference by Freud to Hamlet who transfers his own desires onto his mother 
but also Ophelia (SE 1: 266). Irigaray argues that men transfer their own madness 
onto women (Irigaray, 1993). And this is in fact what Hamlet does to Ophelia who 
dies ‘mad’ one might say, but not because of her own madness, rather it is madness 
put upon her. Ophelia offers a prophecy one that not only undermines, (perhaps 
extends?), the Delphic oracle, ‘Know thyself’ but that could also be offered as a 
compliment to Freud’s famous pronouncement ‘Where id was, there ego shall be’ (SE 
22: 80). In fact I prefer Ophelia’s prophecy to the Delphic oracle/Oedipus myth, 
because it seems to resonate better with the ‘shibboleths’ of psychoanalysis: ‘Lord, 
we know what we are, but know not what we may be’ (Act IV, Sc. iv. 42). 
 
Freud’s dream interpretation is structured on a journey, over hill and over dale our 
repressed infantile self seeks the path of redemption (the ego will out). But the point 
to the path is surely this, pathē: to be free of the ‘troubling forms’ of emotions, and 
repressed desires/traumas?  Isn’t this what a psychoanalysis offers?  In agreement 
with Irigaray, it is not the fear of the repressed patricide we are fighting but the 
original matricide that exists behind the former, like the Minoan-Mycenean behind the 
great Greek empire.  Freud wanted to identify with the Greek.  He takes from them 
their mythology in “his” Oedipus complex and tells us that ‘we were once, in germ 
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and in phantasy, just such an Oedipus’ (SE 1: 265). In the Interpretation of Dreams 
Freud argues that the myth of Oedipus reveals a ‘true psychological insight’: 
Favoured sons succeed (SE 5: 398 n 1). In Freud’s lecture Dreams he amends this: 
 
I do not wish to assert that the Oedipus complex exhausts the relation of 
children to their parents: it can easily be far more complicated.  The Oedipus 
complex can, moreover, be developed to a greater or lesser strength, it can 
even be reversed; but it is a regular and very important factor in a child’s 
mental life, and there is more danger of our underestimating rather that over-
estimating its influence and that of the developments which proceed from it.  
Incidentally, children often react in their Oedipus attitude to a stimulus coming 
from their parents, who are frequently led in their preferences by difference of 
sex, so that the father will choose his daughter and the mother her son as a 
favourite, or, in case of a cooling-off in the marriage, as a substitute for a love-
object that has lost its value (SE 15: 207).   
 
Let us pause for a moment on Freud’s Oedipal drama.  It is after all Freud’s 
‘bulwark’.  A Greek myth that somehow illustrated to us how down to our archaic 
roots we want to kill our fathers and marry our mothers, well have sex with them at 
least.  It is an ‘ancient drama’ full of prophecies and ghosts and murder.  But this is a 
drama that Freud tried to convince us was not old but lived on in all of us, 
contemporaneously as it were.  I think J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series85 continues 
this myth and maybe part of our enjoyment of it is that we realize this, albeit it at 
some kind of primordial level. The themes are all there, although perhaps not as 
directly as the Sophocles Oedipus myth.  And Rowling is clever, she splits Harry the 
books hero into two making his nemesis Voldamort a part of Harry after a killing 
curse goes wrong and Harry absorbs a piece, one seventh of Voldamort’s soul – his 
psyche that is too say.  Harry, ‘the boy who lived’ is not killed by this curse, we are 
told, because he is protected by an ancient magic, love.  But this is not any old love, 
this is a mother’s love, and the protective spell is the love of a mothers sacrifice.  
Psychoanalysis, as we saw above is the cure through love: ‘Your mother died to save 
you’, Dumbledore tells Harry. ‘If there is one thing Voldemort cannot understand, it is 
love. He didn’t realize that love as powerful as your mother’s for you leaves its own 
mark. Not a scar, no visible sign… to have been loved so deeply, even though the 
person who loved us is gone, will give us some protection forever. It is in your very 
skin’ (Rowling, 1997: 216).  And isn’t this precisely the point?  The unknown spot, 
                                                 
85 See Appendix 2 for a synopsis of the Harry Potter books. 
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the navel that Freud turns away from because he is stopped by a ‘tangle’ is also the 
unknown quantity, love.  Freud puts a label on it – it is Eros with all ‘her’ 
attachments, libido in both its forms, object and ego, the pleasure principle, the sexual 
and self-preservation instincts. Freud argues: 
 
One can never tell where the road may lead one; one gives way first in words, 
and then little by little in substance too.  I cannot see any merit in being 
ashamed of sex; the Greek word ‘Eros’, which is to soften the affront, is in the 
end nothing more than a translation of our German word Liebe [love] …(SE 
18: 91).   
 
Freud will tell us that words were originally magic and that they hold an inordinate 
amount of power but he will also say that when it comes to love words are a tiny bit 
of reality: ‘Even in its caprices the usage of language remains true to some kind of 
reality. Thus it gives the name of ‘love’ to a great many kinds of emotional 
relationship which we group together theoretically as love…’ (SE 18: 111). Freud 
continues his exposition on love (Eros). The love that psychoanalysis talks of is no 
different to the love espoused by the apostle Paul ‘in his famous epistle on the 
Corinthians’ argues Freud (SE 18: 101).  But, he also states that jealousy of the other, 
whatever or whoever the other is, is always an undercurrent (or an out and out battle) 
in any group (SE 18: 101).  Lacan offers a scene from St. Augustine’s Confessions 
where a child watching his brother at his mother’s nipple experiences the ‘most 
terrible and the most beautiful manifestation of jealousy that there is’ (Clement, 1983: 
87 (‘Wrath is cruel, anger is overwhelming; but who can stand before jealousy?’ 
(Proverbs 27: 4)). Freud argued that jealousy, like grief can be described as normal 
because of the very commonality/universality of these emotions (CP 2: 232). The sole 
exception to this jealousy says Freud, is ‘the relation of a mother to her son, which is 
based on narcissism, is not disturbed by subsequent rivalry, and is reinforced by a 
rudimentary attempt at sexual object-choice’ (SE 18: 101 n 2). Further, Freud will say 
that between transference love and everyday love the difference is negligible, they 
both issue from ‘old components’, and repeat, ‘infantile reactions’: ‘But that is always 





But this is just part of the story. Freud also talks of sacrifice.  The son in his rescue 
phantasy must save the mother because he owes her his life.  Freud calls the ‘rescue-
complex’ an independent derivative of the mother-complex and adds that it changes to 
a ‘saving’ phantasy where the tender feelings for his mother remain but the feelings 
directed towards his father are transmuted into a saving phantasy.  It is as if to say, 
states Freud, ‘If I save my father I owe him nothing and I can replace the father and 
have my mother to myself’ (CP 4: 200-201). Thus, one can surpass the father, 
standing on the Acropolis and experiencing “estrangement” but one is always 
“homesick” for the mother’s genitals, that is to say her womb and it might be said for 
the mother herself. 
 
To return to J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series (as Freud returned to his Faust), 
Harry’s substitute fathers are all a bit rogue and his eventual wife the flame-haired 
Ginny is a mother substitute, even down to the colour of her hair.  Harry is marked, as 
the Jews are marked we could say, he carries a literal scar, the remainder, although 
indicative of the ambivalence caught up in the presence/absence game of fort/da, of 
his mother and the prophecy that sought his death.  Oedipus anyone, we could ask?  
But it is a second death that saves him.  Once more at the hand of Voldamort who 
seeks to fulfil a prophecy where only one can survive, Harry dies.  He is castrated 
twice then but after visiting a place that we might call heaven, and heaven if we 
remember is the home of the uncanny as the womb is our uncanny home, he returns to 
kill Voldamort in his place.  Thus Harry’s return to das unheimliche, a return that 
takes him beyond the navel, saves him (this even begs the question is heaven the 
realm of ‘The Mothers?’).  Harry survives because the ‘cut’ takes a part of him that 
wasn’t really him to begin with.  This is reflected in another cut, the first cut we might 
say and asks of us another question, just whose umbilicus/navel is it really? 
 
Freud would have loved Rowling’s Harry Potter I think, it has similar ‘elements’ to it 
as E. T. A. Holfmann’s writing, which Freud called ‘mad, fantastic stuff’ (in E. Freud, 
1960: 158).   Harry, the boy who lived because of his mother’s sacrifice: and this has 
an echo of Leonardo da Vinci, with the love of a mother cut short; and Harry’s quest 
for the Horcruxes and his lack of fear. But there is more here, because this Oedipal 
drama is full of dead fathers, whether Harry wished them dead or not.  And Freud’s 
emphasis on the magic of words is here magnified.  The prophecy that only one can 
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live, and like the Oedipus prophecy that foretells Lauis’s death at the hand of his son, 
Voldamort in an attempt to divert the truth of the prophecy, kills (well tries to) a child.  
But the mother steps in. Thus there are other types of mothers’ then than Jocasta, who 
willingly or not, hands her son over to be murdered. Harry’s mother Lily, in contrast, 
sacrifices herself.  She gives up, gifts we might say her own life for that of her baby 
son.  And finally Harry/Oedipus survives the second castration/death and becomes the 
hero.  In a fitting feminist psychoanalytic understanding it is the loss of the mother 
that both protects and castrates at the same time.  Her sacrifice, which protects him, is 
unable to stop the cut from happening.  A part of a father lives within him, a part of 
the soul of the father.  And we are told again and again, the point of recognition for 
other people to Harry is that he looks like his father, but he has his mother’s eyes. 
 
The Soul and Castration: Harry Potter and the Castration complex 
Most of us are familiar with the maxim of old, ‘that eyes are the windows to the soul’. 
If the threat of castration is a blinding of the eyes, then perhaps we need to consider 
where the threat of the act of castration actually lies.  Is the fear of castration deeper 
then than the loss of eyes or penis, is it in fact the loss of the soul we are frightened 
of?  If we lose the soul, then don’t we lose ourselves? In the Harry Potter series, in the 
penultimate book our sense that Voldamort has split his soul is confirmed when Harry 
and Dumbledore, in the aptly named Pensieve watch a memory of Voldamort’s 
unfold.  Voldamort as his younger identity Tom Riddle asks Professor Slughorn, by 
appealing to his vanity, what a Horcrux is.  Slughorn, although evidently reluctant to 
tell him states that, “A Horcrux is the word used for an object in which a person has 
concealed part of their soul” (Rowling, 2005: 464).  Tom acts bemused, saying he 
doesn’t quite understand, Slughorn continues, “Well, you split your soul, you see,’ 
said Slughorn, ‘and hide part of it in an object outside the body.  Then, even if one’s 
body is attacked or destroyed, one cannot die, for part of the soul remains earthbound 
and undamaged.  But, of course, existence in such a form… few would want it, Tom, 
very few. Death would be preferable’”(Rowling, 2005: 464-465). Not content with 
this explanation, Tom asks Slughorn, how does one do it? Slughorn, now extremely 
uncomfortable, after all, this is classified information, tells Tom, “‘By an act of 
extreme evil – the supreme act of evil.  By committing murder.  Killing rips the soul 
apart… you must understand that the soul is supposed to remain intact and whole.  
Splitting is an act of violation, it is against nature’” (Rowling, 2005: 465).  Tom 
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presses, “‘Can you only split your soul once? Wouldn’t it be better, make you 
stronger, to have your soul in more pieces?  I mean for instance, isn’t seven the most 
powerfully magical number, wouldn’t seven -?’” (465-466).  
 
We learn that Tom Riddle as Lord Voldamort has indeed split his soul into seven 
pieces, one piece residing in his pet snake and one in Harry himself.  In the synopsis 
of this series, I explained how Lord Voldamort tried to kill Harry when he was a baby, 
because of a prophecy, and that in fact the killing curse backfired and ‘killed’ Lord 
Voldamort himself, because of a mother’s sacrifice, her love.  In this mangled curse 
we discover, Lord Voldamort has transferred a part of his soul, to Harry.  Harry who 
is recognized in the wizarding world not only by his famous scar, the 
remainder/reminder of the killing curse, but by his eyes, he has his mother’s eyes we 
are told again and again.  Hegel says, ‘that the eyes are the outer manifestation of the 
soul.  Through the eyes, the inner soul presents itself to the outside’ (Hegel cited by 
Derrida, 2002).  Further Derrida states, ‘It is the eyes and hands that are the site of 
recognition, the signs through which one identifies the Other’ (Derrida, 2002). We 
know that the snake is a representation of the phallus and that the multiplication of the 
symbol of the penis such as Medusa’s hair is both a denial of castration and an 
expression of it (SE 18: 273). The ancient Egyptians thought that by duplicating or 
multiplying a symbol such as the penis, they created a ‘insurance against the 
extinction of the self’ (PE, 2003: 142). Rank argues that the ‘immortal soul’ was 
probably thought of as the first double of the body and as ‘double’ an “assurance of 
immortality” (PE, 2003: 143).  As I illustrated in Chapters One and Three, in the short 
essay, ‘The Medusa’s Head’ (SE 18), Freud suggests that ‘The terror of Medusa is 
thus a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of something’ (SE 18: 273).  This 
something we are told is the ‘terrifying genitals of the Mother’ (SE 18: 274), the hair 
surrounding them symbolically connected to the hair/snakes upon Medusa’s head.  ‘It 
is a remarkable fact,’ Freud says, ‘that, however frightening they may be in 
themselves, they nevertheless serve actually as a mitigation of the horror, for they 
replace the penis, the absence of which is the cause of horror’ (SE 18: 273). Even the 
Devil takes flight at the sight of a woman’s vulva (SE 18: 274), says Freud, but ‘To 
display the penis (or any of its surrogates) is to say: ‘I am not afraid of you.  I defy 
you.  I have a penis’ (SE 18: 274).  The apotropaic effect of the penis ‘is another way 
of intimidating the Evil Spirit’ (SE 18: 274). Jones offers an interesting comparison to 
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this.  Here Jones states that the one person the devil is frightened of is the ‘Mother’, 
and not just any mother, the Virgin Mary.  Like Freud, Jones will make the Devil a 
father/devil (Rank makes the mother the primal devil) but this is a father/Devil that 
cannot win against the all-powerful Holy Mother, argues Jones and in the proverbial 
‘stand-off’ it is the devil that runs away (Jones, 1931: 177). The devil runs away not 
because the Holy Mother shows him her vulva but because in the face of the mothers’ 






The Clowning Mother 
Of all the spirits which say yes / The clown is least burdensome to me.86  
Freud will argue that the dreamer shows several gaps in the dream…gaps ‘filled in’ 
with a mumble (SE 15: 138). In English, we say ‘mum’ for mother, which is akin to 
mumble and means to make a sound that is inarticulate with the lips slightly closed. 
‘Mummer’ which means clown has an etymological link to ‘mum’ and ‘mumble’. An 
interesting connection when one considers Christopher Bollas’s contention that the 
mother might be our very first clown. Bollas puts it like this ‘The clown may be our 
very first other. Look for yourself’ (Bollas, 1995: 236). Mothers transform themselves 
in comedic routines to make baby laugh, “Well! Who does he think he is? Who does 
he think he is? (Bollas, 1995: 237).  This brings chortles and laughter argues Bollas, 
but importantly it is implicitly to do with timing.  A mother, like any good comedian, 
knows when her audience is receptive and knows when ‘it’ is not.  The mother’s 
manic routines for baby, which in any other setting might be considered quite mad, 
teach the baby to laugh at itself and the world.  This is important argues Bollas 
because a ‘mother who is amused by baby and who can get baby to laugh at himself 
before he consciously knows what the joke is all about helps to develop a sense of 
amusement in the human predicament well before the self comprehends his condition’ 
(Bollas, 1995: 241).  Bollas will argue that the ‘sense of humour precedes the sense of 
self’ (Bollas, 1995: 241).  Perhaps it is the sense of humour that helps create the sense 
of self?  Freud states that the ‘humourist’, (which in Freud’s argument differs from 
the joking or comedic person, humour has a dignity that the joker or the comedic 
person lack argues Freud), plays the part of him/herself as a child, at the same time as 
they enact the role of the ‘superior adult towards the child’ (SE 21: 164). The parental 
super-ego, is in effect commanding the role of the comic.   
 
In this paper on Humour Freud will state that the humourist acquires ‘his superiority 
by assuming the role of the grown-up and identifying himself to some extent with his 
father…’ (SE 21: 163). For Freud the super-ego, while he will first call parental, is 
paternal in origin.  But as Bollas explains, it is the mother that is the child’s first 
                                                 





clown.  It is the mother that “cracks baby up”.  The mother is the superior person who 
dominates baby, but in such a way that they, mother and baby both take pleasure in 
this domination.  As Bollas puts it, that there is a war going on with the basic issue, 
‘Who is going to dominate who?’ (Bollas, 1995: 240).  But if the super-ego is in play 
(which in women according to Freud is never as developed as it is in men), it will be 
the super-ego that dominates and the baby as yet does not have a super-ego or for that 
matter a very strong ego.  The super-ego here though, ‘bows’ in effect to the ego.  
Lets the ego have some pleasure, outside the battle between the psychical agencies 
that the ego must mediate. What is provoking in Freud’s argument is that humour is 
the super-egos ‘handmaiden’ which would suggest, as Rank does that the super-ego is 
primarily maternal. 
 
This is not unlike Groddeck’s contention that there is a battle of ‘wills’ between the 
Ego and the It, and here mother and baby take their respective parts.  I have reiterated 
several times throughout this thesis Freud’s belief that the unconscious of one person 
can operate on another’s.  For Burlingham, as we saw in Chapter Four, the child is 
particularly attune to the mothers unconscious, s/he has an ‘empathetic’ relationship 
to it.  Lou Andreas-Salomé also remarked on this in a letter to Freud. Here she states, 
that the little girl she has in analysis has an excellent relationship with her mother to 
the point that “sometimes both of them dream the same dream” (Pfeiffer, 1972: 71-
72). If the baby as the ‘bundle of id’ is to develop an ego then it does so in relation to 
the mother’s ego.  The ego must be developed says Freud. To exist in the world we 
need to develop a coherent ego against a repressed and unconscious one.  But this is 
never as stable or as separate as we would wish.  Freud argues ‘In dreams and in 
neuroses what is thus excluded knocks for admission at the gates, guarded though 
they are by resistances’ (SE 18: 131).  In waking life, in contrast we circumvent these 
resistances and receive what is repressed temporarily into our ego by artifice – that is, 
‘Jokes and humour and to some extent the comic in general’ (SE 18: 131).  
 
Lets, look at this ego for a moment. The ego serves as a kind of façade argues Freud, 
for the id, much like a rider to a horse.  The ego maintains a clearly defined relation to 
the outside, disturbed only (or drawn incorrectly as Freud says) in certain pathological 
states and in love.  In love the boundary between ego and love object falls away (SE 
21: 68 n 1).  In love then we fall into the world because in a metaphysical sense at 
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least the world falls away.  A person in love acts much like the infant at the breast, the 
love object is ‘All’.  A primordial ego includes everything; everything belongs to a 
‘whole’, fashioned it might seem to meet the infants needs/desires/wants.  As a 
function of development and growth, whether we attribute this to the Oedipal theory, 
the Symbolic or something else, the child learns to differentiate between an inside and 
outside.  Freud argues that the adult ego-feeling is a ‘shrunken residue of a much 
more inclusive-indeed, and all embracing – feeling which corresponded to a more 
intimate bond between the ego and the world about it’ (SE 21: 68). This ‘shrunken 
residue’ exists side by side with the ego-feeling of later maturity and the ‘ideational 
contents’ of the former could be termed ‘oceanic’.  
 
Freud continues by arguing there is nothing strange in attributing an originary 
component to something that was later derived from it. Here he cites the origin of the 
species: the dinosaur is extinct but the crocodile still exists as a ‘true representative of 
it’ (SE 21: 68). An interesting analogy when you consider Lacan’s proposition of the 
mother as a crocodile, with her jaws wedged open by the phallus (Lacan, 2007: 112). 
For Lacan ‘we’ are in the ‘huge mother crocodiles’ mouth and it is only the phallus 
wedging her jaws open that keeps us from being swallowed! 
 
Thus the mother, whether clowning or not has a lot to do to ‘develop’ her infant: to 
create a strong ego, through knowing the right time to clown; the right time to be calm 
and obviously the right time to love, mindful of the fact as Freud has argued that 
mothers do not love their infants all the time (Anna Freud argued that no child is 
wholly loved).  Bollas states that through the act of humour the mother cracks both 
baby and herself up.  She in effect saves them both. Freud pointed out in ‘On 
Narcissism’ that comedy sweeps away egoism leaving in its stead a kind of ‘banal’ 
pleasure, an indifference (Freud, 2006: 368). The mother must ‘shore up’ the infant’s 
feeble ego boundaries, only to ‘sweep’ them away in an act of comedy.  This is what 
Bollas means when he argues that this act of comedy creates a ‘self’ that can face the 
world. Bollas asks what would be lost ‘if the great clown simply talked to her baby 
like an adult’ (Bollas, 1995: 241).  Winnicott, Lacan and Kohut all discuss the first 
other as a mirror states Bollas, but what would happen if we replaced the standard 
mirror with a ‘fun-house mirror?’ What if what was reflected back to the infant was 
so distorted it offered a tortured reflection to the infant? What sort of mirroring would 
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we have then?  As Bollas points out, the mother who is in tune with her infant, Bollas 
calls it ‘uncanny’ will know when to ‘metamorphoses from her ordinary facial self 
into a clown: she breaks herself up in order to break up baby’ (Bollas, 1995: 242). 
What does it mean for the baby if his/her mother cannot clown for whatever reason?  
The mother transforms herself out of ‘ordinary hate’ argues Bollas, and here he means 
the mundane day to day care of her infant with the same endlessly repeating itself, 
into a comedic routine to relieve herself.  That she brings baby along for the ride 
teaches baby about the world outside of him/herself.  In doing so, she breaks up, 
cracks up, Ferenczi’s magical omnipotent baby.  Humour ‘deflates the baby’s 
grandiosity’ but it also and quite tellingly ‘disarms the frustrated mum’ (Bollas, 1995: 
243). Baby and its clowning mother then, laugh together.  
 
Perhaps a sense of humour is vital to human survival argues Bollas.  The mother who 
makes her baby laugh will assist him/her in looking at the world, when it is at its 
worst from a comic angle.  Laughter crosses and breaks down boundaries, the id has 
momentarily been revived.  Like Bakhtin’s analysis of Rabelais then, it is the id that 
‘is uncrowned and transformed into a “funny monster” (Bakhtin, 1984: 49). Bakhtin’s 
engagement with the carnivalesque strangely evokes the Freudian uncanny, here 
comparing the familiar to the fairy-tale and the unfamiliar to the ‘grotesque’ or the 
alien, the one being the linguistic equivalent of the other. Unlike the later conception 
of laughter as individualised, and therefore given an importance which cannot be 
trivialised through the comical, Bakhtin prefers the ancients’ conception of laughter as 
a “truth” from where the world was continually “made anew”. In fact Bakhtin will 
state that the creation of the world, according to an ancient Egyptian alchemist’s 
papyrus of the third century, “is attributed to divine laughter”. God laughed and there 
was light, he laughed again and there was water and finally, with his seventh bout of 
laughter “the soul appeared” (Bakhtin, 1984: 71 n 19). Laughter defeats something 
more terrifying than the earth itself and all unearthly objects are transformed into 
earth, that is to say the mother: ‘There can be nothing terrifying on earth just as there 
can be nothing frightening in a mother’s body, with the nipples that are made to 
suckle, with the genital organ and the warm blood. The earthly element of terror is the 
womb, the bodily grave, but it flowers with delight and a new life’ (Bakhtin, 1984: 
91-92).  The “uncrowned funny man of the id” returns us to the “mothers womb” 
argues Bakhtin.  Bakhtin’s argument with its Rabelaisian register will make of the 
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part a whole, arguing that “this whole speaks in all carnival images” but that the idea 
of the whole is “eternally unfinished” and compares it to Goethe’s “Nature”… “Its 
crown is love” (Bakhtin, 1984: 256). To survive we need to momentarily revive the 
“uncrowned funny man of the id” which will return us to the mother’s womb where 
we will be whole again, made anew, through it might be said, laughter and love. 
 
If we accept Bollas’s argument that the mother is our first clown, and why not, this is 
my favourite image of the mother yet, then we acknowledge that this mother with her 
timed clowning helps develop the infant’s ego.  In fact, we could suggest that the 
mother not only creates the baby’s ego, she is the baby’s ego to a certain extent.  This 
is not about ‘oneness’ between baby and mother that is certainly not my point.  But if 
an ego is not there at the start, if it must be developed then it is the mother’s ego as a 
maddening rendition of crazy clowning that would seem to be instrumental in creating 
the baby’s ‘I’. In order to ‘evade the compulsion to suffer’ argues Freud, we laugh 
(SE 21: 163).  But this is where confusion might reign, at a metapsychological level at 
least, because Freud will write to Jung that the ‘ego is like the clown in the circus, 
who is always putting in his oar to make the audience think that whatever happens is 
his doing’ (McGuire, 1974: 400). And again, the ‘ego behaves as the ego always 
behaves, like the clown in the circus who keeps grimacing to assure the audience that 
he has planned everything that is going on (“The poor fool”)’ (in McGuire, 1974: 
404). Thus the carnivalesque might well be the “uncrowned id” playing the “funny 
monster/man” but it is the ego that performs.  And if the super-ego bows to the ego, 
then it raises once again the spectre of just what sort of super-ego do we have? 
Because if the super-ego is to be thought of as our moral conscience, as having some 
representation as the Fates, then the super-ego is surely to be thought as maternal as 
Rank would have it. After all, the ego itself, as I argued above through Freud, issues 
from the id, is a kind of façade for the id, negotiating the desires of three masters, the 
external world, the super-ego and the id. But when offered comic relief the ego, and 
for that matter the super-ego fall away.  
 
Is the mother then as first love object, retained as part of our id, undifferentiated, in 
laughter and in loving? And is it here then that Sprengnether’s haunting mother makes 
the most sense. The mother as a kind of mirror (as Winnicott and Lacan argue) as 
apart of ones self, is perhaps most evident when the boundaries between self and 
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other, between inside and outside, between the psyche and the body fall away. That 
these “falling aways” are never really unequivocal is echoed in the Freudian uncanny.  
Because here, at the point of recognition, the unknown (not necessarily the 
unrecognisable) takes its place. That Freud failed to recognise this, relies almost 
completely I would argue in his desire to make the Oedipus complex his “bulwark” 
(and biological to boot!). That he acknowledged, and I might say, unconsciously, that 
there was something greater, darker, stronger than the Oedipal structure finds its 
‘echo’s’ in the abyss he feared to tread, the navel/hole/gap he would not explore; his 
unresolved issue with anxiety and for that matter repression (the cornerstone of 
psychoanalysis) and the uncanny to which he offered his own “unintentional return” 
towards “painted women” and that in fear, a feeling of helplessness, he turned away. 
To find the familiar in the unfamiliar is echoed Freud argues in the regression of the 
ego to a time before it had differentiated itself from the ‘world outside and from 
others’ (PE, 2002:143), which is often transformed ‘by means of grotesque 
exaggeration, into something irresistibly comic’ (PE, 2003: 144). 
 
For a brief moment then the clown in her act of ‘humour’ moves us between life and 
death in what Bollas will call a ‘death-defying’ moment: ‘Is the journey to the far side 
and back a minor triumph of the self, a self that goes to the dark world where 
humanity is shredded by ruthless humiliations, to the forbidden which gives life but 
also takes it’ (Bollas, 1995: 253). Bollas suggests that this kind of ‘flipping the bird’, 
which has connotations with Freud’s ‘flipping the bird’ (vögeln – to fuck, from Vogel, 
bird (SE 5: 583 and SE 11: 125)) is directed at God we might say.87 This is partly due 
to God’s attitude to the ‘creatures’ he made argues Bollas: His frustrations, his 
making the world, his ending the world and all the momentous events, quite often 
whimsical, with a touch of ‘you are all really “pissing” me off, in between (Bollas, 
1995: 253-256).  But then, in a rather revolutionary turn of phrase, Bollas suggests 
that this brings God to the mother:  
 
A God who comes from otherwhere, who has harnessed a power that shakes 
us, who comes too close for comfort, who plays upon our own incapacity, who 
presents us a face that presumably exaggerates our own, a clown face, seems a 
jester who not only puts us into existence but puts us on.  If this figure is partly 
                                                 
87Freud in a footnote to the Schreber case-study states, ‘What a thing to have to say—
that God lets himself be f—d!’ (SE 12: 27 n 2).  
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based on the function of the mother—a figure who comes from otherwhere, 
barely visible, yet audible, who provokes us with her clowning around and 
shakes us into life...’ (Bollas, 1995: 256). 
 
 
As I said, this clowning God-mother is closer to my understanding of the mother as 
someone ‘so much’, that she is too much, so ‘we turn away’.  She shows us, as Bollas 
makes explicit our own fallibility and therefore the fallibility of the world (does this 
suggest that the mother might have an ‘infallibility’ as I argued above?).  When Freud 
said, ‘we don’t fall out of the world’ he was partly right, but only if we have a ‘good-
enough mother’ to manage the ‘fall’ in such a way that we can laugh even while we 
are falling, endlessly it might be said, into the void: 
 
At this point in the conversation, in which the artist, a sublime clown, was 
steadily enraged with Mr. Loyal, in the center of the audience cockatoos of 
whom Mr. Loyal was, so to speak, the designated representative, Mr Loyal 
tore his clothing: “He blasphemed!” And then, foaming at the mouth, he gave 
the Clown a kick in the behind. But this kick sent the Clown, like the one at 
Banville, “up into the stars.” The orchestra stopped playing.  The lights came 
down.  From the loges, from somewhere, there came a laugh, receding into the 
distance, and a deceptive voice saying, “Look for me.” (Lacan cited by 
Clement, 1983: 20). 
 
 
A bit more on ‘The fall’ 
There is something more in the concept of ‘the fall’, something quite intangible. 
Jung’s son Franz, suggests that when Carl Jung had his ‘breakdown’, after the split 
from Freud, he wrote that he ‘chose’ to drop/fall, to embrace the ‘madness’ within.  
Franz states, that ‘My father writes that he chose.  I do not believe that he chose.  I 
believe he had no choice.  Can you imagine what it must be to think that you might be 
going mad? That you might fall forever into the void?’ (in Donn, 1988: 172-173).88 
Here ‘the fall’ and ‘the void’ (echoing Freud’s “a hole is a hole”), suggest the ‘hole’ 
of the mother. ‘We do not Fall out of this world’ but our mother falls pregnant and we 
fall, are birthed from her.  In the fall from our uncanny home Lacan’s hommelette 
might well attach itself to us and with it our soul: itself a ‘fallen object’ the object a. 
                                                 
88 In Buddhism it is said, ‘If you search for the void, you can never reach it’. Or, 
alternatively, ‘If you run away from the void, you can never be free of it’ (Billington, 
2002: 76). Freud argued that he felt a void form around him; Jung felt that he was 
falling forever towards it. 
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Lacan will argue that all forms of the object a are representatives of the 
lamella/hommelette, which is itself an organ “whose characteristic is not to exist”.  
Where might this leave love/Eros, hunger/desire and the immortal soul then if this 
object, the hommelette, through its very existence/presence suggests an absence? And 
if the hommelette has an intimate relationship with the afterbirth, with the baby and 
the contents of the womb, how might we understand the mothers’ body from which it 
escapes?  If as Freud wrote in the uncanny, that one term can merge into the other, in 
the case, as we have seen, of das unheimliche and heimliche, as if to have the same 
meaning (the presence of one is marked by the absence of the other) then is the 
mothers body both the site of the uncanny with the linguistic pairing of 
familiar/unfamiliar, canny/uncanny but also if we are to take Lacan’s argument for the 
uncanny, the place/space of anxiety? We have been here before, in fact we constantly 
return here at this space/place where longing and belonging, perhaps even 
immeasurable loss are felt in this ‘chora’, between a man and his God.  I called this 
place/space/womb feminine and maternal after Plato, Freud and Kristeva but I also 
wondered if it is here where the infinite and finite almost touch/meet that the mother 
as we knew her, as we know her, as we want her to be, appears. Eerily then, the 
mother seems to occupy both a space that can never be, but is also, paradoxically, 
always in the process of becoming. Bollas’s question, ‘What does thinking about 
mothers do to thinking’ is echoed here but perhaps the question needs to be reframed, 
taking into account that thinking about mothers takes us both to a place beyond 
thinking (and what might this place look like?), and to a depth (Faust’s unhallowed 
place of ‘The Mothers’), that only those brave enough to speak this name ‘Mother’, 
and aided through the magic of a devil/father might attain.  There is an impossibility 
here as I argued in Chapter One, because to think of a before/beyond language is to 
realise an unknown, or in Bollas’s expression an ‘unthought unknown’. But perhaps 
the uncanniness of this is that we know the figure that occupies this unknown: we 
have known her all along. We know ‘her’ because we have been a part of her, retain a 
part of her, in the mark of the navel, the point through which the unknown is made 
manifest while remaining latent. It is here then that Irigaray will argue the debt to the 
mother is concealed and Schneider states ‘negation appears at the limit of the 
inconceivable in Freud’s dream’ (in Prokhoris, 199 :162). I have argued throughout 
this thesis that Freud’s turning away from the tangle of dream thoughts situated near 
the mark/scar of the naval is mirrored in his turning away from the mother. But I will 
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also argue that Freud cannot really be blamed for this, because if this 
space/relationship is as old as time, is perhaps before the concept of time itself, then 
how does one approach it? How does one dare approach it even?  
 
Weber argues that Freud’s word, Abfallsbewegung, ‘falling away’, also, ‘fall back’ is 
not only a deviation from the right path of psychoanalysis as Freud accuses Adler and 
Jung of doing but also a ‘falling away’ of waste products (Weber, 1991: 9).  Weber 
suggests that this ‘falling away’ with its processes of absorption and elimination leads 
Freud to conclude many years later that Adler’s psychology lived ‘a kind of parasitic 
existence’ on the host body of psychoanalysis (SE 22: 140).  Interesting terminology, 
one that Weber argues ignores the complicity the host has in the survival of ‘its’ 
parasite.  The feminisation of this terminology is lost on Freud.  We do not fall out of 
this world but we do fall out of our mother at birth.  I would not be so cruel to call a 
baby ‘waste product’ but in Freud’s own line of reasoning a baby is both lumf (faeces) 
and a ‘penis’. And a foetus does after all have a parasitical existence in the body of its 
host, its mother.  In fact, Freud’s analogy of the Alderian parasite on the host body 
psychoanalysis, invokes the pregnant body (the mother) and the foetus. It could be 
said then, as Freud had said, albeit in a different context but with the same intent, he 
makes of psychoanalysis a mother! 
 
 
A devil of my own 
Freud stands accused of turning away from the mother, and although I find myself 
somewhat playing the devils advocate here isn’t that a necessary part of growth?  The 
great cultural renunciation.  I turn from my mother as she turns from me – fort/gone. 
What Freud does not seem to do is turn back: and my mother is returned to me, 
da/there.  But perhaps rather than haunting as spectre or as counter-thesis existing on 
some kind of underside, she walks with him, like God is said to walk with the weary 
traveller.  And God as Bollas has argued has a direct lineage to the mother. 
 
But isn’t that partly the point?  Children turn away from the knowledge offered to 
them argues Freud; the childhood researches end in a kind of knowing.  Leonardo 
sublimated the knowledge of the sexual researches so he was always searching, for 
what one might ask? If the kite/vulture tail was offered as an example of the nipple 
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(penis) pressing against his mouth/lips, if his initial relationship was reflected in the 
paintings of the virgin and the mother, in the famous Mona Lisa smile, then he was 
searching for the original lost object, his mother.  All his searching goes back to this 
because his recollection is of the vulture as his mother argues Freud: ‘To denote a 
mother . . . they delineate a vulture’ (SE 11: 88 n 1).  The vulture who is impregnated 
as it were by the wind, because there was only the dyad of mother and son for 
Leonardo, no father to intervene and this led him to the study of the kite and of flight: 
‘It seems I was always destined to be so deeply concerned with vultures; for I recall as 
one of my very earliest memories that while I was in my cradle a vulture came down 
to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and struck me many times with its tail 
against my lips’ (Leonardo da Vinci cited by Freud, SE 11: 82).  Here then, Freud’s 
conception of the most perfect, conflict free relationship of mother and son is 
illustrated.  But also as Jones makes explicit, the three men that Freud took the most 
interest in and whom he in fact identified with, were Leonardo da Vinci, Moses and 
Shakespeare (in Jones, 1957: 459 (and I would add Goethe to this list)). Freud tells us 
that ‘The Egyptians’ worshipped a Mother Goddess, who was represented as having a 
vulture’s head… This goddess’s name was Mut. Can the similarity to the sound of our 
word Mutter [‘mother’] be merely a coincidence? There is, then, some real connection 
between vulture and mother—but what help is that to us?’ (SE 11: 88). Here then, 
Freud will find a phonetic similarity between the Egyptian Goddess Mut with the 
German expression for the term mother, Mutter, yet when offered a similar 
comparison between ‘matter, Mater and motion’ Freud failed to recognise it (“what 
help is that to us?”).  Freud will also, to aid the development of this vulture mother 
and thereafter the vulture child, Leonardo, state, ‘this story of the vulture was eagerly 
taken up by the Fathers of the Church, in order to refute, by means of a proof drawn 
from the natural order, those who denied the Virgin Birth’ (SE 11: 90 n 1).  Leonardo 
can then identify as Christ, as the blessed, the sufferer and the redeemer.  In fact 
Leonardo wrote in the Codex Alanticus of himself, ‘Why do you suffer so?’ And, ‘I 
thought I was learning to live; I was only learning to die’ (in Whiting, 1992: 40).  
 
But there is more to this because what does Freud tell us about anxiety – realistic 
anxiety which is later to be incorporated into danger anxiety, as a form of 
helplessness, the mechanism of fright/flight is the basic precursor of anxiety. We 
could say that Leonardo studied flight then because of his longing for his mother. But 
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he was not frightened of the longing that instigated the feelings of ‘helplessness’ he 
wanted to know, the first ‘riddle’ as all children do, where did ‘he’ come from?  And 
if Leonardo experienced anxiety it would most likely have been when he was taken 
from his mother and given a new mother.  Where had his mama (fort) gone?  To 
reclaim his mother, he turned back (da/there) and thereafter represented her in his 
painting, in his research, in a smile. Kofman will say of Leonardo’s fascination with 
‘La Gioconda’s smile, ‘it is explained by the same originary fantasy of the mother’s 
smile. …The smile is always already lost, known only later through the very existence 
of its lack and through the satisfaction brought by the hallucination, the dream, the 
fantasy or the work of art’ (Kofman, 1985: 80). Prokhoris extends Kofman’s 
discussion in what she calls, ‘A fragment of Freud’s self-analysis’ here reflected in 
Freud’s ‘A Childhood Memory of Leonardo da Vinci’ as ‘an expression of a 
resistance operating within Freud’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 75). Thus, the myth that Freud 
offers us of a “return to the lost paradise” reflected in the mother/son relationship, the 
most perfect and conflict free of all relationships is alas found in a gap, “a ceaseless 
struggle” between the idealisation of the Mona Lisa/Mother smile and our Witch 
argues Prokhoris.  Observing Freud’s resistance, Prokhoris states that 
characteristically when Freud comes face to face with the Medusa of his own making 
(the Mother) he turns away: ‘in the dream of the three Fates – these lines from Faust: 
“Day by day you’ll take greater pleasure at wisdom’s breast”.  Immediately preceding 
these verses are the following lines, also spoken by Mephistopheles. Freud forgets 
them: “Thus the infant takes its mother’s breast/At first only reluctantly. …”’ 
(Prokhoris, 1995: 75).  
 
Freud does his own turning back in the conclusion of his Leonardo essay.  Here he 
says, ‘We all still show too little respect for Nature which (in the obscure words of 
Leonardo which recall Hamlet’s lines) ‘is full of countless causes [‘ragioni’ ] that 
never enter experience’ (SE 11: 137).  “We show little respect for Mother Nature”, 
and yet her omnipresence, so rich, so full, the bountiful breast that Faust wanted to 
drink from, rarely enters our experience.  Freud offers a doubling image of the 
beneficent mother here, in her guise as Mother Nature and also as the mother of our 
infancy: ‘it is no longer possible to doubt the importance precisely of the first years of 
childhood’ (SE 11: 137). But this is a Mother Nature that Freud turns away from 
argues Gay. The Nature that Freud responds to, and that the essay (by Goethe/Tobler) 
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describes is one of beneficence, describing a ‘nourishing, never exhausted, and never 
denying mother—a sensual and maternal deity wholly different from the cruel, 
heedless, destructive Nature he would delineate in his late writings’ (Gay, 1987: 59). 
What can be seen throughout Freud’s work is this ‘struggle’ between depictions of a 
Mother Nature as beneficent and a Mother Nature as destructive. That this battle 
‘catches’ him is evident in his descriptions of navels with depths to the unknown 
covered up with tangles of dream-thoughts/hair.  It seems as if Freud in an effort to 
keep his Oedipal theory intact and therefore away from the troubling pre-Oedipal 
mother at its margins (which attacks its very core/kern/nucleus) divides her in such a 
way so that he can ‘deal’ with her.  In this way he will keep the mother as Madonna, 
looking down on her ‘male’ Christ child with love and away from the other mother 
(dare I say ‘real’) who the little girl (and the rest of us) turn away from in hate. 
 
Turning back to Harry 
What do we see in the poignant scene of the eleven-year old Harry Potter standing in 
front of a mirror, where little Ernst extends his game of fort/da, absence/presence of 
his mother?  We see the boy who lived because of his mothers love.  And there in the 
mirror are his parents reflected back to him, a superimposed super-ego – and really 
what other type is there.  And the inadvertent command, spoken through a ‘symbolic’ 
father, Dumbledore, the prophet, the oracle, ‘Know yourself’.  Which can only be 
achieved by turning away from the mirror, from the mother.  Perhaps the ‘key’ was 
always already separation, a form of the castration complex and maybe the reason 
Freud overlooked this ‘key’ was he turned away from the mother too soon (or he did 
not turn away at all). Freud says himself that the English word ‘lock’ can be compared 
phonetically with the German Lücke, Loch (hole) ‘in both there exists the exactly 
contrary sense without modification of sound’ (CP 4: 189).  If the mother haunts she 
may do so, perhaps must do so as a revenant in the present. Freud turned away from 
the ‘key to The Mothers’ as Breuer did because in Mephistopheles words, it is too 
much, to horrible a word – Mother – so we turn away.  Freud’s turning away involved 
a displacement from the mothers face as Winnicott would have it, and the breast as 
Klein understood it, in its good and bad divisions, to the genitals as Freud saw it or as 
the little boy saw it who turns away in horror says Freud at the sight of the 
mother’s/Medusa’s castrated genitals.  Perhaps the turning away involved Freud’s 
own castration anxiety of being a circumcised Jew.  Perhaps it was a reflection of a 
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number of things.  Maybe Jones (1953) is correct and Freud’s turning away has 
something to do with the realisation of a wish?  He wished that this intrusive 
annoying baby brother would be gone and he would have his mother to himself.  But 
here guilt and grief become his childhood companions instead of his brother because a 
mother does not lose her baby and not turn away in grief herself.  Yes she turns back, 
and she probably clung to her surviving child but Freud’s world would have 
shuddered – like a camera with a too slow shutter speed, the picture is still there, but it 
blurs for a moment before its clicks back into place.  An entirely appropriate 
metaphor if we consider that it was the photograph in the case study of Laub’s little 
boy that kept both the anxiety at bay and through which the terror of the nightmare 
began. Yet Freud depicts another scene, a happy scene, of a childhood nurse, a 
youthful mother, a half brother who could easily be the father, an aged father who 
could be the grandfather, and a nephew and niece who could be siblings. A happy 
scene says Freud and maybe it was but the infant who wished to get rid of his eleven 
month younger brother because he felt dethroned, despoiled, prejudiced had a tragic 
ending.  His brother really went away and his mother grieved and as in Chapter Four 
with the expression of Winnicott’s boy and his depressed mother how could Freud not 
have been affected? 
   
We have only had one Freud and he had only one mother.  The separation between 
nanny and Mater allowed him to sexualize one and make of the other a paragon that 
in turn would create of them and in his theory, a perfect conflict free relationship.  But 
this could also be the result of a mother’s guilt.  Her baby dies, but she still has 
another one and to him she holds tight, fearful that she might lose him too.  His 
mother’s ‘Golden Sigi’ (‘mein goldener Sigi’ (in Jones, 1957: 3)), and his old nurse 
who made him believe that he was a sexually clumsy boy (SE 1: 262).  At her request 
he gives her his coins, and wraps the infantile sexual researches and the anal stage 
(faeces is the first gift says Freud) and hands them over to her.  But she gets locked up 
– Kasten, as I explained in Chapter Two and Freud turns away, as he will continue to 
do for his lifetime when offered the ‘key’ to The Mothers.  At the spot that reaches 
down into the unknown Freud fears to tread.  He can go no further.   
 
Freud said that the story of Moses tormented him like an ‘unlaid ghost’ (SE 23: 103). 
Similarly, in his case-study of little Han’s Freud argues that in an analysis ‘a thing 
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which has not been understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost, it cannot 
rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell broken’ (SE 10: 122). 
Sprengnether may be right then.  The mother is a kind of unlaid ghost for Freud, 
haunting him, tracing his steps.  Perhaps it is unlaid precisely because Freud refused 
to acknowledge it, turning away whenever ‘it’ makes its presence felt. Groddeck 
argues that the turning away of the head, the eyes, the body from the object in order to 
avoid visual impressions is the work of the ‘It’ (Groddeck, 1977: 113).  Here is 
Freud’s unconscious then, at the site of the infantile sexual researches, called up, 
mediated no less by the Witch/Mother of the metapsychology. 
 
I said in the Prologue that Freud did not mourn his mother when she died.  But I 
amended this because Freud suggests both in his own response to his mother’s death 
and in his letter to Eitingon on the death of his mother, that the loss of a mother is 
something so strange, ‘unlike anything else’ as to be ungraspable (E. Freud, 1960: 392 
and 400).  In the conclusion to the engagement with the ‘My son, the Myops’ dream 
above, I suggested that ‘what makes the Jew’ for Freud, a difficult and miraculous 
thing although inexpressible, might also ‘make the Mother’.  In fact, there is a sense 
that ‘my/the mother’ and ‘Freud the Jew’ has become increasingly intertwined 
throughout this thesis that one begins and ends with the other.  Of course just when I 
thought I had made some sense of the mother in Freud, another path, and actually 
quite often the path was a pit/a hole, opened up in front of me and I was left with the 
feeling that Freud expressed on his own thesis in Moses and Monotheism, ‘To my 
critical sense this book … appears like a dancer balancing on the tip of one toe’ (in 
Yerushalmi, 1991: 25).   
Jonte-Pace argues that Freud’s inability to grieve or mourn his mother’s death is 
perhaps an inability that we all might share. Describing the process of mourning as ‘a 
great riddle’ Freud argues that mourning is one of those ‘phenomena which cannot 
themselves be explained but to which other obscurities can be traced back’ (SE 14: 
306). Here we are on familiar ground, mourning, the mother, the ‘essence’ of 
Jewishness, all obscure, having something unknowable, and unexplainable about 
them.  Freud questions why the ‘detachment of libido from its objects should be such 
a painful process’ and contends that it is a ‘mystery’ and ‘(w)e can only see that libido 
clings to its objects and will not renounce those that are lost even when a substitute 
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lies ready to hand.  Such then is mourning’ (SE 14: 306-307). Perhaps it is the 
question of the substitute that needs to be addressed.  With Freud’s ‘attachment’ to his 
Oedipal paradigm he ‘weaves’ (a feminine accomplishment no less) as Jonte-Pace 
suggests, the ‘act’ of mourning into the ‘first and most important identification, [the] 
identification with the father’ (in Jonte-Pace, 2001: 136 and SE 19: 31).  Freud 
suggests here, or at least attempts to explain the first loss and the first identification as 
paternal.  But as I have shown repeatedly throughout this thesis, and which takes on a 
mysterious element of its own, Freud replaces the mother with the father, building a 
rather shaky Oedipal edifice over a primarily maternal one.  Jonte-Pace will state, 
‘(i)n my view, however, none of us can fully mourn the mother. To mourn the mother 
would be to identify with or become the mother…’ (Jonte-Pace, 2001: 137). Freud’s 
inability to mourn the mother, as first love object, as the ‘most important 
identification’ seems to be aligned with his own ‘fears’ of what being and living as a 
Jew might really mean.  Geller and Gilman suggest that this might have something to 
do with the feminisation of the male Jew, seen in the covenant to God, circumcision 
and enacted in Freudian castration anxiety of which the mother’s genitals seem to 
arouse the greatest ‘angst’. That historically the male Jew was viewed as ‘womanly’ is 
espoused in Jung’s diatribe against Freud and Freudian psychoanalysis, given in his 
1934 paper ‘The State of Psychotherapy Today’ (in Yerushalmi, 1991: 48-49).  But 
Jung both misunderstood Freud and for that matter Goethe argues Prokhoris. 
Prokhoris states that Freud took the ‘impure, muddy-path that alone leads to the 
discovery of psychoanalysis’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 104), which Jung saw as a ‘perverse’ 
and ‘scandalous’ act.  After the break with Freud, Jung will write that ‘his’ 
psychotherapy is an ‘“Aryan science” proper to the “Germanic peoples”, whose 
“profound soul” does not wallow in the “insipid mudhole fit for children” he sees 
“Jewish” psychoanalysis as being’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 104).  Jung’s (mis)interpretation 
of Goethe’s “call for regeneration” is at complete odds with Goethe’s or for that 
matter Freud’s intent argues Prokhoris. Goethe’s Faust after all takes its inspiration 
from the “muck” that Jung is so scathing of. It emerges from ‘popular tradition, the 
tradition of the puppet theatre’: ‘It comes out of a “mudhole fit for children”, the 
mudhole of folklore, where one is not afraid to roll around in the dirt, the impurity, 
the filth, in which the pure gold of truth lies buried’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 105). Freud 
makes explicit that psychoanalysis is attentive to the dregs, to fairy-tales and folklore, 
to myth and even to religion. Jung’s “profound soul” and even his conception of the 
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mother are cleansed of any dirt. We saw in Chapter Three that when Jung declared 
Freud ‘neurotic’ he did so in reference to his own belief that the neurotic found it 
difficult to ‘climb up out of the mud of the commonplace’ (Jung, 1963: 161).  This 
mud, that the neurotic wallows in, is itself comparable to what Jung will call the 
“earlier repressed” an archaic, maternal “unconscious” (“treasure-house”). For Freud  
‘the soul of the people is a treasure-house, but in a completely different sense: that of 
Bakhtin’s “carnivalesque”, carnival understood as hodge-podge, vulgarity, truth in the 
raw. “The muddy fountain, in other words, which Goethe draws on for Faust, and 
Freud for analysis’ (Prokhoris, 1995: 106).  
 
Jung’s paper is of no interest here, apart from the date (and the acknowledgment that 
it caused an international uproar because of the anti-Semitic content), because in 1934 
Freud was quietly completing the first essay of his Moses and Monotheism (SE 23). 
The doubling here, once again between the Gentile and the Jew, repeats the 
duplication that with rigorous monotony occurs throughout Freud’s work.  Here 
though, in this important one, between the gentile and the Jew is also, as I argued 
above, that between Christianity and Judaism, the Son and the Father.  Although as I 
argued in my engagement with the ‘My son the Myops’ dream, the son and the father 
become one and the other and finally the only question that remains is where might 
the mother be in all of this? Again, to repeat, the juncture between that of Christianity 
and Judaism is the mother according to Yerushalmi (1991: 92).  The problem being 
that no one seems to know how to resolve the mothers place here, in the middle, 
caught between the father and the son: prostrate we might say (again that repetition) at 
the foot of the cross, geseres. Jonte-Pace’s response to this was to offer a 
‘counterthesis’, a compelling and convincing ‘uncovering’ that borrows from Freud’s 
paper The Theme of the Three Caskets to ‘guess at what lies beneath’ (Jonte-Pace, 
2001: 149 (regardless of my feelings regarding the term ‘counter-thesis)).  
 
Where Rank and to a lesser degree Freud, stumble, is their insistence on the womb as 
a ‘blissful paradise’ one that through a ‘return’ we enter a Nirvana, a ‘pleasurable 
Nothing’ (in Kramer ed., 1996: 9).  Nothing then, before the scientific explanation for 
the creation of the universal, the ‘Big Bang’ there was nothing. No concept of time or 
space.  A difficult theory to accept and yet Kristeva will tell us that we commonly 
accept the premise of Father Time and Mother Space (Kristeva, 2005: 204).  This 
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poses a problem if we consider that both time and space belong to the nothing and that 
this nothing belongs too a ‘pleasurable return’ the mother’s womb.  We desire this 
return argues Freud. This nothing in fact is something the Big Bang theory goes, it is a 
kern to use Rank’s word for the nucleus of something: a miniscule infinite and 
condensed particle that through the expansion of the universe matter/mater is 
produced. Perceptively Kristeva argues ‘The reality of castration is as real as the 
supposed “big bang” at the origin of the universe, yet we are less shocked when this 
sort of intellectual process concerns inanimate matter than when it is applied to our 
own subjectivity and to the fundamental mechanism of our epistemic thoughts’ 
(Kristeva, 1995: 211). This point, this singularity from which all life/matter is created 
is similar to the idea of the ‘foundation stone’ the original primal matter/mater that 
God built the world around.  This is a Jewish concept, perhaps a fitting comparison at 
the end of a thesis on a ‘Godless Jew’ and his neglect of the/his mother.  If Jerusalem 
is the centre of the universe, and in The Bible She is then She is also Umbilicus 
Mundi, the Navel of the World.  Freud said that behind Greece – and as I illustrated in 
Chapter Three, Freud emphasises his commitment to the ‘Greeks’ their myths – stood 
the ancient and shadow civilisation of the Minoan-Mycenean era.  It might be said 
that the foundation of Greece is built on her very ‘bones’.  Freud then invokes the 
Greek but silences the Jew.  What is caught in this statement is the inexorable 
repression of the mother behind the father because, it might be said, that to really 
acknowledge her then Freud must acknowledge the castration/circumcision that marks 
him as a Jew.  Something, according to Geller at least, he was unable to do.  
Kristeva will argue that ‘If “the Mother” is not someone, there is no one’. And, ‘The 
Mother’ is an abstraction—the “the” being a party to a “defensive system”’ (Kristeva, 
1995: 11). For Freud, both senses of ‘the mother’ are used throughout his work.  She 
is some one, but by being a ‘some one’ with Madonna like qualities, the Virgin Mary 
and her Christ-like child, she effectively becomes no one. Particularly when one 
considers that the person positioning the mother in this way is himself a Jew and a 
Godless one at that. But if, as Yerushalmi argues that for Freud the question of ‘how 
the Jews have come to be what they are’ is central to his personal and ‘general’ 
understandings, then I would ‘guess that what lies beneath’ this, or these, question(s), 
is one framed as ‘how the Jews (and others) have come to be what they are, and how 
the mother might play an important role in this?’ If the infantile sexual researches are 
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bought about in part by a belief in the mother’s penis before castration anxiety, then I 
wonder whether Freud’s mother of the ‘perfect’ ambivalent free relationship ever had 
a penis in the first place? Or alternatively, whether the penis/phallus of this ‘Mut’ like 
Goddess is in fact, never realised as castrated? Perhaps Leonardo da Vinci could hold 
on to this ‘whole’, that is ‘complete’, without a ‘piece missing’ mother because she 
was ‘lost’ to him before his sexual researches could be satisfied. And yes, we might 
suppose his step-mother was kind and loving but this somewhat belies the step-
mothers of fairy-tales/tails that Freud espouses throughout his work.  These are step-
mothers though that have as their adversary the step-daughter not usually the step-son, 
although Hansel and Gretel is one fairy-tale at least that illustrates a step-mother that 
does not like him: ‘loses him in the forest’ with his sister Gretel and leaves him to 
fend off the/our ‘Witch’.   
 
This thesis is echoed in its title, ‘Fragment of an Analysis of the Mother in Freud’ 
echoed because it is haunted by the paper for which it is named, Freud’s first 
incomplete analysis on Dora/Ida Bauer.  Here Freud’s Oedipal complex makes an 
appearance to be rejected by his female analysand.  Freud and Dora/Ida embark on a 
conversational engagement although as other theorists point out Dora/Ida loses her 
voice – literally in aphonia. A sense of loss perforates this case-study (as it does this 
thesis): Loss, and riddles and keys and locks and ambivalent relationships to mothers. 
Freud gives Ida the pseudonym Dora, after a servant who has to give up her name 
Rosa, because this is the name of Freud’s sister (‘Poor people…they cannot event 
keep their own names!’). It is not my attention to engage with the case-study of 
Dora/Ida here, at the end of this work, but rather to suggest that just as Freud 
understood that the psycho-analysis of Dora/Ida was fragmentary, incomplete so too 
is this engagement with the mother in Freud. How could it not be?  Unceremoniously 
pushed to the margins of any analysis, the mother yet features for all her ostracism. 
Even Dora/Ida in her explanation of the attraction she felt for Raphael’s Madonna can 
say finally to Freud, it is the Madonna that interests her. What she fails to say, and 
which Freud fails to analysis is that here in Raphael’s painting of the Virgin Mary 
holding her son, the Jew and the Gentile once more collide.   
 
Freud will say that we are often blind to the symbolism looking at us, squarely we 
might say, in the face. I have argued this throughout this thesis both in relation to the 
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mother but also to Freud’s own complicated relationship to his Jewishness. In fact, I 
have shown that these two seemingly different things are more often than not 
conflated. Freud will say in his Fragment of an Analysis of Hysteria (Dora): ‘Anyone 
with eyes to see and ears to hear will be convinced that mortals cannot hide a secret. If 
ones lips are silent, one will be voluble with one’s finger-tips; betrayal seeps through 
every pore. And for that reason the task of bringing the most hidden parts of the soul 
to consciousness is very easy to accomplish’ (in Phillips ed., 2006: 498). As a final 
remark, it is illuminating that Freud makes this comment after telling us that the 
jewelled purse/box is after all a symbol for the female genitals. Here then, the 
Medusa’s head makes way for a decorated ‘box’, illuminating because the either/or 
principle, which does not exist in dreams states Freud, is here evident in the 
conundrum that frames female sexuality, femininity and the mother. Perhaps Freud’s 
desire to bring the “hidden parts of the soul to consciousness” is not so easy as he 
wrote. Particularly if we consider that these hidden parts, so often rendered as female 
may be so heavily censored by the ‘watchman’ that they have no – are allowed no – 
threshold to cross. Trapped then, in a ‘box’ of whose making, I do not know. But that 
the mother remains a liminal figure, here at the end of this thesis as she did so 
throughout, may not be so surprising. If our relationship to the mother suffers an 
exorable repression, then the key to The Mothers, which Freud turns from, may yet 
not exist. But as Freud states, quoting Charcot, ‘That doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist’ (in 
Phillips ed., 2006: 533).  
 
But I am going to conclude this thesis with the words of Freud’s favourite poet, writer 
and scientist all.  The ‘great Goethe’ who in the final words of his ‘immortal’ work, 
Faust evokes both the mother with her ‘uncanny home’ and the place of the mother—
the home of the uncanny: 
 
‘The eternally feminine 






MOTHER, (muther), n. [Sax. moder; D. moeder, mother, and modder, mud; baar-
moeder, the womb; moer, mother, dam, womb, lees; moerspul, hysterics; (moer seems 
to be a contraction of moeder;) moeder-naakt, stark naked; G. mutter, mother, and the 
thick, slimy concretion in vinegar; bürmutter, the womb or matrix; mutter-fieber, a 
hysteric fit; mutter-lamm and mutter-schaf, a ewe or female sheep; mutter-flecken and 
mutter-mahl, a mole; mutter-pferd, a mare, the female of the horse…; mutter-schiede, 
the vagina; mutter-nackt, stark naked; moder, mud, mold. 
     Sw. moder, mother; vin-moder, mother of wine; moderfall, prolapsus uteri; 
moderlif, the womb or matrix. 
     Dan. moder, mother; moderskeede, the vagina; moderen i quinder, the matrix; 
modder or mudder, mud. 
     Ir. mathair, a mother, and matter, pus. 
     Gr. µατηρ, mother, and µητρα, matrix. 
     L. mater, mother; matrix, the womb; materia, matter, stuff, materials of which any 
thing is made.  
     It. madre, mother, cause, origin, root, spring, a mold or form for castings; matrix or 
materia, matter, subject, cause; matrice, the matrix. 
     Sp. madre, mother, matrix, womb, the bed of a river, a sink or sewer; madriz, 
matrix; materia, matter, purulent, running. 
     Port. madre, a mother, the matrix, the channel of a river; materia, matter, pus. 
… 
     Russ. mat, mater, mother; matka, a female, a matrix. 
     Fr. mere, mother, contracted from the latin. 
     W. madrez, matter, purulent discharge. 
 
     We observe that in some other languages, as well as in English, the same word 
signifies a female parent, and the thick slime formed in vinegar; and in all the 
languages of Europe here cited, the orthography is nearly the same as that of mud and 
matter. The question then occurs, whether the name of a female parent originated in a 
word expressing matter, mold; either the soil of the earth, as the producer, or the like 
substance, when shaped and fitted as a mold for castings; or whether the name is 
connected with the opinion that the earth is the mother  of all productions; whence the 
word mother-earth. We are informed by a fragment of Sanchoniathon, that the ancient 
Phenicians considered mud, µωr, to be the substance from which all things were 
formed. (See MUD).  The word matter is evidently from the Ar. … madda, to secrete, 
eject, or discharge a purulent substance; and I think can not have any direct 
connection with mud.  But in Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, the same word madre 
signifies mother, and a mold for castings; and the northern languages, particularly the 
German and Danish, seem to establish the fact that the proper sense of mother  is 
matrix.  Hence mother of pearl, the matrix of pearl.  If this word had its origin in the 
name of the earth used for the forms of castings, it would not be a singular fact; for 
our word mold, in this sense, I suppose to be so named from mold, fine earth.  The 
question remains  sub judice. 
1. A female parent; especially, one of the human race; a woman who has borne a 
child; correlative to SON or DAUGHTER. 
2. That which has produced any thing. 
 
               Alas! poor country! it can not 
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                 Be called our mother, but our grave.                     Shakespeare 
 
     So our native land is called mother country, and a plant from which a slip or coin is 
taken is called the mother plant.  In this use, mother may be considered as an 
adjective. 
3. That which has preceded in time; the oldest or chief of any thing; as, a mother-
church. 
4. Hysterical passion. [Not used] 
5. A familiar term of address or appellation of an old woman or matron. 
6. An application given to a woman who exercises care and tenderness toward 
another, or gives parental advice; as when one says, a “woman has been a 
mother to me.” 
7. A thick, slimy substance concreted in liquors, particularly in vinegar, very 
different from scum or common lees. 
MOTHER OF PEARL, (-perl,) n.  The hard, silvery, brilliant, internal layer of        
several kinds of shells, particularly oysters, which is often variegated with changing 
purple and azure colors.  … 
MOTHER, (muth’er,) a.  Native; natural; received by birth; as mother wit. 
1. Native; vernacular; received from parents or ancestors; as, mother tongue. 
MOTHER, (muth’er,) v. i.  To concrete, as the thick matter of liquors. 
MOTHER, v. t.  To adopt as a son or daughter. 
… 
MOTHER-HOOD, n.  The state of being a mother. 
… 
MOTHER-LAND, n.  The land of one’s mother or parents. 
MOTHER-LESS, a.  Destitute of a mother; having lost a mother; as motherless 
children. 
MOTHER-LY, (muth’er- le,) a.  Pertaining to a mother; as motherly power or 
authority. 
     2. Becoming a mother; tender; parental; as, motherly love or care. 
MOTHER-LY, adv. In the manner of a mother. 
 
 
MUD, n. … This Phenician word mod, µωr, …is precisely the English mud, the 
matter, material, or substance of which, according to the ancients, all things were 
formed.  …Plutarch, de Iside, says the Egyptians called Isis muth, that is, mother.  
This is a remarkable fact, and proves beyond controversy the common origin of the 
Phenician, Celtic, and Teutonic nations. Mud may perhaps be named from wetness, 
and be connected with L. madeo, … 
     Moist and soft earth of any kind, such as is found in marshes and swamps, at the 
bottom of rivers and ponds, or in highways after rain. 
… 
MUDDY, a. [from mud.] Foul with dirt or fine earthy particles; turbid, as water or 
other fluids; as a muddy stream. … 
2. Containing mud; as, a muddy ditch; a muddy road. 
3. Dirty, dashed, soiled, or besmeared with mud… 
4. Consisting of mud or earth; gross; impure; as, this muddy vesture of decay. 
5. Dark; of the color of mud; as, muddy cheeks. 
6. Cloudy in mind; dull; heavy; stupid. 




MATRICE,} n. [L. matrix, from mater, mother]. 
MATRIX,   } 
     The womb; the cavity in which the fetus of an animal is formed, and nourished till 
its birth. 
MATRICE, (matris) n. A mold; the cavity in which anything is formed and which 
gives its shape; as, the matrix of a type. 
2.The place or substance in which any thing is formed or produced; as, the matrix 
of metals;… 
3. In dyeing, the five simple colours, black, white, blue, red, and yellow, of which 
all the rest are composed.   
     … 
MATER, n. [L. mother.] … 
MATTER, n. [L. Sp. and It. materia; Fr. matière; Arm. Matery; W. mater, what is 
produced, occasion, affair, matter; madrez, pus, matter; madru, to putrefy or dissolve.  
Owen deduces mater from mâd, what proceeds or advances, a good; madu, to cause to 
proceed, to render productive; mâd, good, beneficial, that is, advancing, progressive.  
Here we have a clear idea of the radical sense of good, which is, proceeding, 
advancing.  A good is that which advances or promotes; and hence we see the 
connection between this word mâd and matter, pus, both from progressiveness.  The 
original verb is in the Ar. … madda, to extend, to reach or stretch, to be tall, to thrust 
out, to excrete, to produce pus, to yawn; derivatives, pus, sanies, matter.  This verb, in 
Heb. and Ch. signifies, to measure,             
     … 
1. Substance excreted from living animal bodies; that which is thrown out or 
discharged in a tumor, boil, or abscess; pus; purulent substance collected in an 
abscess, the effect of suppuration more or less perfect; as digested matter; 
sanious matter. 
2. Body; substance extended; that which is visible or tangible; as, earth, wood, 
stone, air, vapor, water. 
    … 
MATTER, mater,n. [O.Fr. matere, F. matière, from L. materia, matter, from root of 
mother.] That which occupies space and which becomes known to us by our senses; 
that of which the whole sensible universe is composed; body; substance; not mind; the 
substance of any speech or writing; the ideas or facts as distinct from the words; the 
meaning; logic and metaph. That which forms the subject of any mental operation, as 
distinguished from the form; 
… 
 
Freud argued that psychoanalysis was often concerned with what one might call, ‘the 
dregs… of the world of phenomena’ : ‘It is true that psycho-analysis cannot boast that 
it has never concerned itself with trivialities.  On the contrary, the material for its 
observations is usually provided by the inconsiderable events which have been put 
aside by the other sciences as being too unimportant—the dregs, one might say, of the 
world of phenomena’ (SE 15: 26-27). 
 
 
DREGS, n. pl. … That which is drained or thrown off, or that which subsides. … 
1. The sediment of liquors; lees; grounds; feculence; any foreign matter of liquors 
that subsides to the bottom of a vessel. 
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2. Waste or worthless matter; dross; sweepings; refuse.  Hence, the most vile and 
despicable part of men; as, the dregs of society. … 
 
Mother, as we note has connections with ‘mud’ and ‘dregs’, thus what I want to do is 
take this statement of Freud’s and use it to both define the mother and make sense of 
her.  As we have seen, Freud marginalises the mother, whether as ‘ghost’ or 
something more ‘concrete’, like ‘the dregs’, she is still, uniformly, mater to be 
overlooked.  
 
REMNANT, n.: 1.  Residue; that which is left after the separation, removal, or 
destruction of a part. … 
2. That which remains after a part is done, performed, told, or passed. 
 
REMNANT, a.  Remaining; yet left. 
 
REMAIN, … 2. To be left after others have withdrawn; to rest or abide in the same 
place when others remove, or are lost, destroyed, taken away.   
3. To be left after a part or others have passed. … 
 
REMAIN/REMAINS.  That which is left; a corpse; also abode … That which is left 
after a part is separated, taken away, or destroyed… 
 
But a remnant is also a small piece of fabric, a leftover from a w/hole – the 
mother/child analogy… by being a fabric it suggests several fabrications; it can be 
cut, torn, stitched together, pulled apart, draped, made into something, printed on, 
distressed and/or acid washed.  The material or the fabric is not inert then, merely 
waiting for its purpose/construction… 
 
Remnant also suggests relic(s) in that a relic is a remain, usually aged, but often a part 
of something older which has been destroyed or lost.  The relic in an archaic sense 
meant corpse. 
 
Again, remnant also suggests leftover, which is understood to mean that which 
remains after the rest of something has been used or eaten; something that remains or 
was not used. If it is pluralised then leftovers are something that can be made into 
something else. (So the ‘mother’ is what is leftover after she has been used, or her 
breast has been emptied ). 
 
Also, residue, that which remains after a process involving the removal of part of the 
original has been completed.  Again, the leftover…either the not wanted or the too 
much. Perhaps even the not liked. 
 
Again, trace, which suggests a something there – a remainder- that shows the former 
presence of a person or thing no longer there.  One can also trace this ‘remainder’ by 






A Brief Sypnosis of J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter. 
When the first novel of the series Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone 
(published in some countries as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone) opens, it is 
clear some remarkable event has taken place in the wizarding world, an event so very 
remarkable, even the Muggles notice signs of it. The full background to this event and 
to the person of Harry Potter is only revealed gradually, through the series. After the 
introductory chapter, the book leaps forward to a time shortly before Harry Potter's 
eleventh birthday, and it is at this point that his background begins to be revealed. 
Harry's first contact with the wizarding world is through a half-giant, Rubeus Hagrid, 
keeper of grounds and keys at Hogwarts. Hagrid reveals some of Harry's history. 
Harry learns that as a baby he witnessed his parents' murder by the power-obsessed 
dark wizard, Lord Voldemort, who then attempted to kill him also For reasons not 
immediately revealed, the spell with which Voldemort tried to kill Harry rebounded. 
Harry survived with only a lightning-shaped scar on his forehead as a memento of the 
attack, and Voldemort disappeared. As its inadvertent saviour from Voldemort's reign 
of terror, Harry has become a living legend in the wizarding world. However, at the 
orders of the venerable and well-known wizard Albus Dumbledore, the orphaned 
Harry had been placed in the home of his unpleasant Muggle (non-wizard) relatives, 
the Dursleys, who had him safe but hid his true heritage from him in hopes that he 
would grow up ‘normal’. 
With Hagrid's help, Harry prepares for and undertakes his first year of study at 
Hogwarts. As Harry begins to explore the magical world, the reader is introduced to 
many of the primary locations used throughout the series. Harry meets most of the 
main characters and gains his two closest friends: Ron Weasley, a fun-loving member 
of an ancient, large, happy, but hard-up wizarding family, and Hermione Granger, a 
gifted and hardworking witch of non-magical parentage. Harry also encounters the 
school's potions master, Severus Snape, who displays a deep and abiding dislike for 
him. The plot concludes with Harry's second confrontation with Lord Voldemort, who 
in his quest for immortality, yearns to gain the power of the Philosopher's Stone, a 
substance that gives everlasting life. 
The series continues with Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets describing Harry's 
second year at Hogwarts. He and his friends investigate a 50-year-old mystery that 
appears tied to recent sinister events at the school. Ron's younger sister, Ginny 
Weasley, enrols in her first year at Hogwarts, and finds a notebook which turns out to 
be Voldemort's diary from his school days. Ginny becomes possessed by Voldemort 
through the diary and opens the ‘Chamber of Secrets’, unleashing an ancient monster 
which begins attacking students at Hogwarts. The novel delves into the history of 
Hogwarts and a legend revolving around the Chamber. For the first time, Harry 
realises that racial prejudice exists in the wizarding world, and he learns that 
Voldemort's reign of terror was often directed at wizards who were descended from 
Muggles. Harry also learns that his ability to speak Parseltongue, the language of 
snakes, is rare and often associated with the Dark Arts. The novel ends after Harry 
saves Ginny's life by destroying a basilisk and the enchanted diary which has been the 
source of the problems. 
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The third novel, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, follows Harry in his third 
year of magical education. It is the only book in the series which does not feature 
Voldemort. Instead, Harry must deal with the knowledge that he has been targeted by 
Sirius Black, an escaped murderer believed to have assisted in the deaths of Harry's 
parents. As Harry struggles with his reaction to the dementors—dark creatures with 
the power to devour a human soul—which are ostensibly protecting the school, he 
reaches out to Remus Lupin, a Defence Against the Dark Arts teacher who is 
eventually revealed to be a werewolf. Lupin teaches Harry defensive measures which 
are well above the level of magic generally shown by people his age. Harry learns that 
both Lupin and Black were close friends of his father and that Black was framed by 
their fourth friend, Peter Pettigrew. In this book, another recurring theme throughout 
the series is emphasised—in every book there is a new Defence Against the Dark Arts 
teacher, none of whom lasts more than one school year. 
During Harry's fourth year of school (detailed in Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire) 
Harry is unwillingly entered as a participant in the Triwizard Tournament, a 
dangerous contest where Harry must compete against a witch and a wizard 
‘champion’ from visiting schools as well as another Hogwarts student. Harry is 
guided through the tournament by Professor Alastor "Mad-Eye" Moody, who turns 
out to be an impostor – one of Voldemort's supporters named Barty Crouch, Jr in 
disguise. The point at which the mystery is unravelled marks the series' shift from 
foreboding and uncertainty into open conflict. Voldemort's plan to have Crouch use 
the tournament to bring Harry to Voldemort succeeds. Although Harry manages to 
escape from him, Cedric Diggory, the other Hogwarts champion in the tournament, is 
killed and Voldemort resurges. 
In the fifth book, Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, Harry must confront the 
newly resurfaced Voldemort. In response to Voldemort's reappearance, Dumbledore 
re-activates the Order of the Phoenix, a secret society which works from Sirius 
Black's dark family home to defeat Voldemort's minions and protect Voldemort's 
targets, especially Harry. Despite Harry's description of Voldemort's recent activities, 
the Ministry of Magic and many others in the magical world refuse to believe that 
Voldemort has returned. 
In an attempt to counter and eventually discredit Dumbledore, who along with Harry 
is the most prominent voice in the wizarding world attempting to warn of Voldemort's 
return, the Ministry appoints Dolores Umbridge as the High Inquisitor of Hogwarts. 
She transforms the school into a dictatorial regime and refuses to allow the students to 
learn ways to defend themselves against dark magic.  
Harry forms ‘Dumbledore's Army’, a secret study group to teach his classmates the 
higher- level skills of Defence Against the Dark Arts that he has learned. An important 
prophecy concerning Harry and Voldemort is revealed, and Harry discovers that he 
and Voldemort have a painful connection, allowing Harry to view some of 
Voldemort's actions telepathically. In the novel's climax, Harry and his friends face 
off against Voldemort's Death Eaters. Although the timely arrival of members of the 
Order of the Phoenix saves the children's lives, Sirius Black is killed in the conflict.  
In the sixth book, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, Voldemort begins waging 
open warfare. Harry and friends are relatively protected from that danger at Hogwarts. 
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They are subject to all the difficulties of adolescence; Harry eventually begins dating 
Ginny Weasley. Near the beginning of the novel, Harry is given an old potions 
textbook filled with annotations and recommendations signed by a mysterious writer, 
"the Half-Blood Prince". This book is a source of scholastic success, but because of 
the potency of the spells that are written in it, becomes a source of concern. Harry 
takes private lessons with Dumbledore, who shows him various memories concerning 
the early life of Voldemort. These reveal that Voldemort, to preserve his life, has split 
his soul into pieces, creating a series of horcruxes, evil enchanted items hidden in 
various locations, one of which was the diary destroyed in the second book. 
Harry's snobbish adversary, Draco Malfoy, attempts to attack Dumbledore, and the 
book culminates in the killing of Dumbledore by Professor Snape, the titular Half-
Blood Prince. 
Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, the last book in the series, begins directly after 
the events of the sixth book. Voldemort has completed his ascension to power and 
gains control of the Ministry of Magic. Harry, Ron, and Hermione drop out of school 
so that they can find and destroy Voldemort's remaining horcruxes. To ensure their 
own safety as well as that of their family and friends, they are forced to isolate 
themselves. As they search for the horcruxes, the trio learns details about 
Dumbledore's past, as well as Snape's true motives—he had worked on Dumbledore's 
behalf since the murder of Harry's mother. 
The book culminates in the Battle of Hogwarts. Harry, Ron, and Hermione, in 
conjunction with members of the Order of the Phoenix and many of the teachers and 
students, defend Hogwarts from Voldemort, his Death Eaters, and various magical 
creatures. Several major characters are killed in the first wave of the battle. After 
learning that he himself is a horcrux, Harry surrenders himself to Voldemort, who 
casts a killing curse at him. However, the defenders of Hogwarts do not surrender 
after learning this, but continue to fight on. Having managed to return from the dead, 
Harry finally faces Voldemort, whose horcruxes have all been destroyed. In the 
subsequent battle, Voldemort's curse rebounds off of Harry's spell and kills 
Voldemort. An epilogue describes the lives of the surviving characters and the effects 
on the wizarding world. 
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